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THE

JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

GENERAL SIR HARRY CALVERT,

BART., G.C.B. & G.C.H.,

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE FORCES UNDER H.R.H. THE DUKE OF YORK.

COMPRISING

THE CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS AND HOLLAND

IN 1793-4.

1395

WITH AN APPENDIX,

CONTAINING HIS PLANS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY IN CASE OF INVASION.

4725

EDITED BY HIS SON,

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CAMPAIGNS

IN

FLANDERS AND HOLLAND.

INTRODUCTION.

In selecting for publication those parts of my father's MSS. which refer to the events in the Low Countries, in 1793-94, I have been encouraged by the conviction that those events are of importance both to the military and the general reader.

His letters convey an impression of the conduct of the Duke of York, and of the British Army under his command, more favourable than that which is generally received; and they afford warning and

instruction, which may prove valuable, if, unhappily, we should be again engaged in warfare in the same countries.

From the opening of the campaign until after the route of the Camp de César, about August 13, 1793, when the allied armies divided, and the Duke of York marched towards Dunkirk, our arms met with uninterrupted prosperity. From that period, until we were driven out of Holland, during the rigorous winter of 1794-5, our occasional successes were deeply chequered by reverse. In the letters and journals contained in these pages, we may learn with equal exactness the causes of success and defeat. In driving the French out of the Low Countries, we were in reality fighting in defence of England; but through the continuance of that mercy with which Providence has for centuries past exempted England from being the seat of foreign war, the scene of action lay on the banks of the Scheldt and Sambre, and not on those of the Thames.

So long as we were truly carrying on a defensive war, and driving the French within their own territories, our efforts were crowned with success. In these letters, a warning was given that we ought to content ourselves with this achievement; and that, having repelled the aggression of France, a "forward movement of the allied armies was to be deprecated, as likely to unite all parties in that

country;"* that we had accomplished our task by ensuring the safety of our own country; but that if we converted our position from one of defence to one of aggression—if we endeavoured to invade France, and ourselves indulge a love of conquest—we should, by our own conduct, put an end to the internal divisions of the French, combine the whole nation as one man against us, and entail on ourselves all the grievous disasters which can be inflicted by a great military nation, who believe that they are struggling for existence.

The warning was given in vain. No sooner was the war of defence converted into one of ambition, than our successes were changed into defeats. Our allies proved to be perfidious, and the great combination which had achieved such important results, crumbled to pieces. The unhappy inhabitants of the Low Countries became the victims of their attachment to Austria and of their friendship for us. Within the space of eight months we sustained a series of defeats, and lost all the advantages which we had obtained by the expenditure of so much blood and treasure.

Yet the conduct of our troops and of their General was blameless. The Duke of York never had the command of the army. The commanders

* Letters, April 17 and 26, 1793.

were, first the Prince of Cobourg, afterwards the Emperor of Austria. The Duke's numbers were never such as to enable him to cope single-handed with the enemy. At the battle of Turcoin (May, 1794), 60,000 French assailed the columns under the Duke of York and General Otto, which consisted of only 40,000, while such was the bad generalship of the allied Commander-in-chief, that 47,000 Austrian soldiers were within a day's march, but were not brought up to take part in the engagement; and after the end of May, when the Imperial Cabinet decided on relinquishing the Low Countries and their troops retired towards the Rhine, the Duke's army consisted of not more than half as many soldiers as the French, which inequality of force was increased by the diminution of his army and the augmentation of that of Pichegru, so that when forced across the Meuse and the Waal, he could not bring into the field more than a third, or even a fourth as many men as the enemy.

Our system was entirely dependent on the co-operation of our allies. That the Duke of York and the army under his command nobly did their duty, will be proved by the facts narrated in these pages, and is abundantly testified by Hardenberg, Jomini, and others, and by the public declarations of the Commander-in-chief. That our defeats arose from our system of subsidies to foreign powers, from the

baseness and treachery which pervaded their Cabinets, and from the incapacity of their generals, is the necessary inference from these MSS. And it will equally appear that our impolicy was unceasingly deprecated in the communications made from the British head-quarters, while our government received repeated warnings that, "under Providence, England must place confidence in herself alone."

I cannot believe that the lesson placed before us in these pages is without instruction in these days. We have here a brief history of a war in the Low Countries. The campaign of Waterloo was not a war of detail. It was the preparation for one successful battle, and the achievement of one mighty victory. Subject to that exception, the war in 1793-94 was the last waged by us in that country. I earnestly trust that we may not witness another European war. Should, however, such a calamity occur, it is more than probable that the same country may be the seat of a future contest.

Thus, in respect of the seat of war, the events of the past may be instructive for the future. Nor will this, in all probability, be the sole point of similarity. The same questions will, no doubt, arise as to subsidies and allies. Human nature will be the same. There will be the same avidity for the acquisition of English gold, the same desire of each nation to spare herself, and to compass her own individual objects.

I will not for one instant suggest that there will be the same perfidy in foreign Cabinets. I do not doubt that, were this sad contingency to arise, they would be animated by morality of a very different standard. Still, between ourselves and other European nations, there would always be great points of difference and probabilities of disagreement. Imagine, for instance, an alliance with Austria. Our ministers at home, our commanders abroad, our forces by sea and land, would manifest on all occasions their hostility to oppression, civil and ecclesiastical. The war would assuredly be tinged with deep religious feeling; and a foreign government devoted to Rome would anticipate in the triumphs of England no small danger to the very existence of the Papacy. Thus there would be room for the same distrust of foreign alliances, though it would be grounded on somewhat different principles. There would be a like necessity for the manly advice repeatedly urged in these MSS: "Let us trust to nothing but God and to ourselves; on nothing else can we rely with safety."

Trusting, then, entirely to our own exertions, we should find in this history how urgent is the necessity for ceaseless activity in every branch of the services connected with war. Recruits were sent to the army imperfectly clad, insufficiently fed, even without arms. Our navy did not co-operate with our army. One

commander did not bring to another the succour that was promised. Of these errors we here read the effects, and a careful consideration of the narrative may contribute to prevent the recurrence of similar evils. Indeed, when we remember that the Duke of York, who was Commander-in-chief during the war in the Peninsula and the battle of Waterloo, gained his first experience in these campaigns, and that in one of them our late illustrious General first encountered the French army, we may perhaps be justified in saying that the lessons painfully taught in them were not without effect in the Peninsular War.

Since the death of the Duke of Wellington, these subjects have acquired a new interest and importance. His existence was a source of safety—the very fact that he was there to advise with—the great man, whose invariably ruling motive was the good of his country. Now that it has been the will of the Almighty to take from us him who was spared to us so long, we must all feel the urgent necessity of being the more ready to meet any contingency that may arise, and to profit by any warnings which former wars may have afforded us.

But I must not attribute too much importance to the matter which I introduce to the public. I am very conscious of the deep feelings of partiality with which I regard all events connected

with my father's memory. In requesting the indulgence of my readers, I can most sincerely say that I have carefully studied brevity in the selection of the letters and passages of the journal, and that I have endeavoured to exclude from publication all matters of merely a personal interest.

My father embarked for Holland a Lieutenant and Captain in the Coldstream Guards. When the British force joined the allied army near Tournay, and arrived in front of the enemy, the Duke of York was created a general, and my father was appointed one of his aides-de-camp. In this position, he had the opportunity of making himself intimately acquainted with the character of the war, and of learning the circumstances under which the several events took place.

He enjoyed the advantage of having been engaged previously in very arduous service in the American War. In January, 1788, he had left England to join his regiment, the 23rd Welch Fusileers, when only fifteen years old. His corps formed part of the expedition to Carolina, under Lord Cornwallis. After taking Charlestown, the British army advanced into the interior, with the view of affording succour and countenance to the Loyalists; and, during the whole of the very harassing warfare in which my father was engaged, he kept his daily journal, describing every march and every action. His

observations, when Lord Cornwallis came to the Duke of York's head-quarters, in July, 1794, show the regard and reverence which he entertained towards his former commander. He always spoke warmly of the high military qualities displayed by Lord Cornwallis during the American campaigns, and of the extreme hardships cheerfully submitted to by him, as well as by his army, who were encouraged and animated by seeing their General endure every privation, and encounter every peril.

Lord Cornwallis's army surrendered prisoners of war at York Town, on October 17, 1781, and my father remained a prisoner until the peace, returning to England in February, 1784. Early in 1790 he exchanged into the Coldstream.

Before proceeding with the manuscripts I will remind the reader, in a few words, of the position of the belligerent parties at that period.

In April, 1792, Louis XVI. gave a reluctant consent to the declaration of war against Austria and Prussia. He still maintained, personally, an amicable understanding with those courts; and, in June, recommended a manifesto to be issued by them on entering the French territory. It breathed good-will and regard towards himself and the French nation, and abjured any thought of conquest or desire to interfere in the internal government of France. It declared that the only object of the

Allied Powers was to enable the nation to re-establish freedom on a sure foundation, and to set it free from the Jacobin faction, which tyrannized over both court and people, and was determined, for objects of personal interest, to plunge France into a war of aggression on other states.

Louis predicted, with a sagacity which cannot fail to obtain our admiration, the evils which a contrary conduct would bring on himself and on France. "He besought the emigrants to take no part in the war; to avoid everything that could give it the appearance of a contest between one nation and another, and urged the allies to appear as parties, not arbiters, in the contest between the Crown and the people; warning them, that any other conduct would infallibly endanger the lives of the King and royal family, overturn the throne, lead to the massacre of the royalists, rally to the Jacobins all the Revolutionists, who were daily becoming more alienated from them, revive an excitement which was fast declining, and render more obstinate a national resistance, which would yield at the first reverse, if the nation was only convinced that the fate of the Revolution was not wound up in the destruction of those who had hitherto been its victims."*

* Bertrand de Molleville.

Of this document Bertrand de Molleville says, that "there is not a more striking monument of political wisdom and foresight on record in modern times."

The Duke of Brunswick,* with an army of 70,000 Prussians, and 68,000 Austrians and Hessians, broke up from Coblentz on July 25, and issued a proclamation to the French nation, which, while it disavowed any intention of individual aggrandizement, assailed the Revolution, reproached those who had overturned legitimate government and had usurped power, and even threatened the "total destruction of the city of Paris, as a punishment to the inhabitants, if the palace were forced, or the slightest insult offered to the royal family."

This proclamation had a powerful effect in uniting the French nation against the allied powers. However, when their armies first entered France, an easy success attended their advance. Longwy, Sedan Verdun, fell before them; the only ostensible obstacles between their army and Paris consisted in Dumouriez'† 25,000 men, and the woody

* William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick, restored the finances of his Duchy, which had fallen into great confusion: was Commander-in-chief of the Prussian army at the battle of Jena (Oct., 1806) and wounded. Died 1807. His son and successor, Duke Frederick William, was killed at Quatre-Bras, June 15, 1815.

† General Dumouriez, born 1739. In 1772 he was sent out by Louis XV., without the consent of the Minister

defiles of the Argonne Forest. But the talents and firmness of the General derived the utmost advantage from these difficult passes, and from the unhealthy and unprovided condition of the Prussian army. He summoned to his aid General Bournonville from Flanders with his army of 16,000 men, and Kellerman from the neighbourhood of Metz with 22,000; and before their arrival, he so commanded his small army as effectually to arrest the advance of the enemy, and confine them in an unproductive and difficult district. He negotiated with the King of Prussia, the chief of the coalition, and

Aiguillon, to negotiate with Sweden. Arrested in consequence, he was imprisoned in the Bastille, whence he was liberated by Louis XVI. In 1790 he was Major-General. He first attached himself to the Girondists. For a short time, in 1792, he was Foreign Minister, and in that capacity he persuaded Louis to declare war against Austria. He joined Marshal Luckner's army, and took command of that which General Lafayette quitted when he left the French Republican ranks. By his defence of the defiles of the Argonne Forest, and his masterly retreat on St. Ménehould, he saved France, and caused the Prussians to retire. After he left the French, he was forbidden an asylum in England, and after many wanderings, found a refuge in the Danish territory, near Hamburgh. The allies often consulted him, and in 1804 the British Government permitted his residence in England, and gave him a pension of £1200 per annum. In 1821, he furnished to the Neapolitan Parliament a plan of defence against the Austrian invasion. He never returned to France, and died near London, March 14, 1823.

contrived to awaken in his mind jealousy of Austria and Russia, and to remind him of acquisitions on the banks of the Vistula, more important to Prussia than successes on the frontiers of the Netherlands, which would turn chiefly to the benefit of Austria. He found means of impressing on the mind of the King the belief that the secret object of his ambition was to enact the part of Monk, which, at the head of 100,000 men, he could do without difficulty. He suggested that the lives of the French royal family depended on him and his army, and that the further advance of the invader would render hopeless the restoration of the royal authority; and the Duke of Brunswick, the Generalissimo, was reminded that the triumph of the Liberal party in France might open to him the most brilliant prospects.* During the negotiation, information arrived that Holland and Great Britain would not join the coalition against France, and that the Committee of Public Safety had decreed not to negotiate as long as the enemy remained on the French territory. At the same time the Prussian generals represented the bad state of the army, and the King's mistress was induced by a bribe from the French government to urge a retreat.

We have the high authority of cotemporary statesmen for disbelieving the statement of Monsieur

* Alison, chap. viii.

Thiers, that the retirement of the allies was caused solely by military considerations. Dumouriez had consented not to molest them in their rear during their retrograde march; but he was at liberty to harass them on their flanks, and they suffered great privations and heavy losses from the want of supplies on their retreat, which commenced early in October. They evacuated the fortresses which they had conquered, and reached the neighbourhood of the Rhine. On October 21, Marshal Custine took Mayence, and on the 25th the Duke of Brunswick and his army crossed to the right bank of the river at Coblentz.

Dumouriez was now free to attack the Austrians in their Flemish territories. On November 6, he defeated Clairfayt at Jemappes, near Mons. In this battle, the young Duc de Chartres (Louis Philippe) behaved with distinguished gallantry, and the Archduke Charles fought at the head of the Austrian Grenadiers.

The great result of Jemappes, and of the Duke of Brunswick's retreat, was the evacuation of the Austrian Netherlands by the Imperial troops. The Scheldt was opened in November 16, by a flotilla from its mouth ascending to co-operate in the siege of the citadel of Antwerp; and on the 30th that fortress capitulated to the French arms.

On January 21, 1793, the unfortunate Louis XVI.

was executed; and on February 1, the National Convention declared war against Holland and Great Britain. This declaration found Dumouriez at Antwerp. His first care was to concert with the French ministers at Paris, plans for the defence of France. It was decided to raise the army to 502,000 men, to maintain the defensive in the south and east, and to act on the offensive only in the north, but in that direction to push the war with the utmost vigour and boldness. "In the North," said Dumouriez, "you can defend yourself only by gaining battles."

The immediate force of France amounted to 270,000 soldiers. Of these, 100,000 were in Belgium under the orders of Dumouriez. He had 30,000 with him on the Scheldt, 70,000 were on the Meuse under his lieutenants. Various plans for the conquest of Holland had been pressed on him by the French government, and by the military authorities. That on which he decided was the offspring of his own genius. It was to confide to his Generals, Miranda and Valence, aided by Colonel Thouvenot, in whom he placed the utmost confidence, the attack on Holland from the east. They were to descend the Meuse, take Maestricht and Venloo, and enter Holland by Graave and Nimeguen, while he should himself cross the Biesbosch from Moerdyk

and Gertruydenberg with 25,000 men, take Dort and Rotterdam, and thence penetrating to the Hague and Amsterdam, reduce the whole country, and fraternize with the numerous partizans whom he expected to rise, and aid him in expelling the Stadtholderate.

On February 17, Dumouriez entered the Dutch territory, and published a proclamation, breathing good-will to the Dutch people, and enmity only to the House of Orange and British influence. On the 25th, he took Klundert; on the 27th the important fortress of Breda opened its gates to him, and on March 4, he became master of Gertruydenberg. He intended to leave General Le Clerc to blockade Bergen-op-Zoom and Steenbergen, and to Berneron he confided the siege of Willemstadt. So far his efforts had been attended with success. In Breda and Gertruydenberg, fortresses which had been surrendered to him with a facility little honourable to the Dutch, he found a great supply of guns, ammunition, and military stores; and with Gertruydenberg he obtained possession of many vessels that that would aid him in traversing the Biesbosch. He had, besides, seized all the boats and small craft on the shores within his power, but was disappointed on reaching Moerdyk to find that his advanced guard had not effected the passage. He

expected them to have crossed to Stryen Island and Dort Island, and to have made themselves masters of a flotilla adequate to the transport of his army. To remedy this deficiency with the least possible delay, he collected shipwrights and carpenters, and set them to work to prepare boats for the passage.

Delay was indeed fatal to his plans, for the Dutch army was mustering at Gorcum, a British frigate and some gun-boats were watching him off Moerdyk, and even cannonading his camp, and more might arrive, which would effectually bar his access to the interior of Holland in this direction.

Such was the state of affairs when H.R.H. the Duke of York, and the advance of the British army, consisting of three battalions of Guards, arrived in Holland. The moment was one of the most pressing and urgent necessity. Was it possible to arrest the progress of the successful General, who, armed with all the power of republican France, breathing war to the palace and peace to the cottage, proclaiming hostility only to oppressive governments and feudal privileges, and promising liberty and happiness to the oppressed people—had driven behind the Rhine the best armies of Austria and Prussia, defeated and outwitted the most experienced generals and statesmen, expelled the Austrians out of their possessions in the Netherlands, and now stood on the frontier of the only power which appeared capable of resistance?

Such was the task to which the British army was called: our generals having had but small experience in active warfare; our military arrangements being all extremely imperfect; the system still prevailing of ordering from the Cabinet at St. James's the active operations of the army in the field; and the commander doubtful how far he could confide in the zealous and active co-operation of the allies he was to aid, and whose country he was to defend, and possessing, indeed, only one unalloyed and undoubted ground of confidence—an entire reliance on that which never failed him—the courage, and fortitude, and stern endurance of the troops under his orders, who, he well knew, in every circumstance, either of prosperity or reverse, would be true to their duty.

CHAPTER I.

THE GUARDS EMBARK FOR FLANDERS—OCCUPATION OF HELVOET—THE DUKE OF YORK ARRIVES IN HOLLAND—DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH AT MAESTRICHT—OPERATIONS OF THE DUTCH—THE FRENCH RETREAT FROM WILLEMSTADT—DEATH OF LIEUTENANT WESTERN—THE FRENCH DEFEATED AT LOUVAIN—WILLEMSTADT, DORT, AND THE HAGUE—SIEGE OF BREDA—MAESTRICHT RELIEVED—BATTLE OF NERWINDEN—PROPOSITION OF DUMOURIEZ TO THE ALLIES—BATTLE OF MAYENCE.

An old pensioner, named Lee, is still living (August, 1853) in one of the almshouses in Westminster, and till lately swept the crossing from St. James's Park to Queen's Square, who belonged to the Coldstream Guards at the time of their embarkation for Flanders. He accurately recollects and relates the muster of his battalion on the Parade at the Horse Guards, its inspection by the King, the march to Greenwich, and embarkation in transports. Sir Harry Calvert was Lieutenant and Captain in the same battalion, and thus describes his embarkation and arrival in Holland:—

February 20.—The 1st battalions of the three

regiments of Guards received orders to hold themselves in readiness to embark for foreign service.

February 25.—The battalions ordered for foreign service, assembled at daybreak, on the Parade, in St. James's Park, and marched to Greenwich, where they immediately embarked on board nine transports. Their Majesties and all the Royal Family were present at the embarkation.

The embarkation return was as follows:

1st Regiment, under the command of Colonel Hulse: 1 major, 8 captains, 12 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, 1 chaplain, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 2 mates, 1 drum-major, 40 serjeants, 12 drummers, 600 rank and file.

Coldstream, under the command of Colonel Pennington: 1 major, 8 captains, 9 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 2 mates, 1 drum-major, 36 serjeants, 10 drummers, 540 rank and file.

3rd Regiment, under the command of Colonel Grinfield: 1 major, 8 captains, 9 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 1 surgeon, 1 mate, 1 drum-major, 36 serjeants, 10 drummers, 540 rank and file.

Total: 3 majors, 24 captains, 30 lieutenants, 24 ensigns, 1 chaplain, 3 adjutants, 3 quarter-masters, 1 surgeon, 5 mates, 3 drum-majors, 112 serjeants, 82 drummers, 1680 rank and file.

The brigade was under the command of Major-General Lake. Captain Lake was appointed his aide-de-camp, and Captain Hill, of the 1st regiment of Guards, his Major of Brigade. The two grenadier companies of the 1st Regiment, with those of the 1st battalion of the Coldstream and 3rd were formed into a battalion under the command of Colonel Leigh. Immediately, on the troops coming on board, the transports fell down to Long Reach.

February 26.—The transports fell down below Gravesend, where they anchored, in consequence of one or two ships not being quite ready for sea.

February 27.—The whole anchored in the Nore.

February 28.—Sailed at twelve o'clock, under the convoy of the 'Iris' and 'Lizard' frigates. At eight in the evening came to an anchor in King's Road, off the mouth of the Nore.

March 1.—At two in the morning under weigh; at five in the evening came to anchor in the mouth of the Meuse off Helvoetsluys.

March 2.—General Lake and his suite landed at Helvoet.

March 4.—Seven companies of the 3rd Regiment landed, and marched to the Brill. Five companies of the Coldstream occupied Helvoet.

March 5.—At break of day the remainder of the brigade quitted their transports, and under the immediate command of General Lake, proceeded in Dutch small craft towards Dort, the place of their destination. It was necessary to proceed by the inland navigation, as the French batteries, in the neighbourhood of Willemstadt, rendered the usual passage dangerous. After being thirty hours on board their vessels, finding that they had proceeded no more than eighteen miles on their route, the brigade landed on the Island of Ysselmond, and marched that evening to Dort.

Lieutenant-General the Duke of York had embarked the same day as the Guards, on board the 'Syren' frigate, Captain Manley, and had proceeded to the Hague, to concert measures for the defence of the country, with Lord Auckland* (the English ambassador) and the Princes of Orange. The French, under General Dumouriez, had advanced to the southern shore of the Biesbosch, and were engaged in the sieges of Gertruydenberg, Breda, and Willemstadt.

It is much to be lamented that the first observation that must occur to every officer employed on this service, is the very unfit state the transports

* Elevated to the peerage of Ireland, Nov. 18, 1789; created Lord Auckland, of the peerage of Great Britain, May 23, 1793. Died, May 28, 1814.

were in for the reception of troops, and the very small provision that was made for their health and accommodation while on board. The tonnage of the ships was so inadequate to the numbers embarked, that every bad consequence was to be apprehended had it been necessary to put on the hatches, which must have been the case had we not made Helvoet before the gale of wind came on. There was no small species of provisions on board; no vinegar (that most essential preservative); and, lastly, neither medicines nor surgical instruments. On our arrival at Helvoet, we could not, without much surprise, observe the perfect tranquillity of that town, and the little preparation for defence, when we were within hearing of the enemy's guns before Willemstadt; and there were no embrasures cut through the parapet walls, and not above twenty men employed on that most essential service; and yet the contents of the dockyard, eleven line-of-battle ships and two frigates, and large arsenals and stores, seemed to demand every attention, and call for every exertion for their defence. The cause of this total want of energy was supposed by many to be the disaffection of the people to the Stadtholder; and the shameful surrender of Breda appeared to give grounds for this idea. When we reached Dort, there appeared to be some degree of satisfaction among the people; but we have since that time been informed that, a

very few days before our arrival, there were not in the town above twenty adherents to the Stadtholder; and the difficulty we met with in providing quarters for our troops, indicated that there was no great predilection for us on the part of the inhabitants. The town of Dort is rich and very populous, but has no fortifications.

On March 8, we received intelligence of the defeat of the French army, in the vicinity of Maestricht, by the Prince of Cobourg,* and that the enemy had retired beyond Liège. On this and the preceding evening, we sent ammunition to Willemstadt. His Royal Highness the Duke of York was at Dort when we arrived, and took up his quarters with the hereditary Prince of Orange. To the latter the defence of the frontiers of Holland was entrusted; and the command of the force afloat, consisting of

* Prince of Cobourg. Ernst Frederick became reigning Prince in 1764. Plunged his principality into so much debt, that in 1773 an Imperial Commission, for inquiring into and liquidating the debt, was sent to Cobourg. Died, September 8, 1800. His son and successor, Francis Frederick Anthony, paid off much debt, and died December, 1806. He was succeeded by his son Ernst III., who was in the service of Russia. In 1817, Prince Ernst married Louisa, daughter of Prince August of Saxe-Gotha. In 1821, he gave a representative constitution to his country. In 1834, he joined the Zollverein, and died in 1844. He was succeeded by his son Ernst, the reigning Duke, brother of Prince Albert.

five English and a number of Dutch gun-boats, was given to Admiral Kingsbergen, an officer of high character.

March 9.—The picquets took their post in the evening as usual; the whole garrison had orders not to take off their accoutrements at night, till the turning of the tide prevented the possibility of an attack. The tide turned at three in the morning. The Dutch troops on the island consisted of seven companies of fifty each.

TO HIS SISTER, MISS CALVERT.

Dort, March 11, 1793.

Our situation here, for the first three or four nights, was rather unpleasant; but at length our phlegmatic friends have brought their batteries so near completion, that, if what they assure us is true —that there is no other part of the island accessible —I think we have nothing to apprehend. The unconcern expressed in every Dutch face, and the absolute *sang-froid* with which they listen to the report of the French guns before Willemstadt, is enough to make an Englishman's blood boil; but the climate is of a nature to keep us all tolerably cool. My own opinion is, that, from the success of the Prince of Cobourg in the neighbourhood of

Maestricht and Liège, Dumouriez' situation will soon be very critical, and, instead of making any further progress in Holland, his own retreat to Antwerp will be by no means secure. I hear that he went there himself the day before yesterday, but the siege of Willemstadt still continues. The French are still in possession of Breda and Gertruydenberg, but have abandoned their designs on Gorcum, where Prince Frederick of Orange is with a large body of troops. We have had much difficulty in providing quarters and accommodations for our men and officers in this town; I am fortunate myself, having a spacious parlour fitted up for my reception, of which, while we remain here, I shall keep possession. The owner of the house, a maiden lady of a certain time of life, by name Madame Rapläer, is not in town; but her nephew, a very civil young man, does the honours of the house very handsomely, and desires me to consider myself quite at home. The only use I make of this liberty is to keep a large fire, a much larger one, I apprehend, than ever was kept in the bright stove before my time. You may tell Louisa that she can have no idea of sticking out till she sees a Dutch woman. Five yards at least in circumference, to be at all in the *ton;* a score would make a full Ranelagh; a hat like an umbrella. On my return I will bring her a *fille-de-chambre de ce pays ci;* who, in addition, to the above elegancies, will have

a pair of wooden shoes, the size of ordinary wherries. *Les culottes des messieurs répondent parfaitement aux jupons des dames*, and the *tout ensemble* is delightful. Notwithstanding all these, and many more *agrémens*, after the most mature deliberation and impartial investigation of effects and causes, I must acknowledge the air of St. James's is more salubrious, more congenial to my constitution, than that of the High Street of Dort; but that predilection is perhaps prejudice of education, and will wear off. We have none of us received any English letters since our departure. You will make me one of your best curtsies for this letter, when I tell you I am just returned off picquet, at one of the distant batteries, with about as much warmth in my body as is usually contained in the shell of a muscle.

March 12. P.S.—Since writing the above, a grenadier corporal, who went with some gun-carriages to Willemstadt, has returned. He left Willemstadt last evening, the garrison in high spirits, the loss very trifling. The fire of the French batteries considerably slackened. Prince Frederick of Brunswick will this night be, with upwards of 20,000 men, within ten leagues of Breda.

I hope that you have provided yourself with a map. Adieu.

March 12.—The command of the force afloat having been given to Admiral Kingsbergen, appears to have infused into that department more activity than we had previously witnessed, and we have reason to rely on every co-operation and assistance it may be in his power to afford us. The hereditary Prince of Orange lived entirely on board his yacht, very seldom came on shore, and never visited the batteries erected for the defence of the island. This conduct appeared very extraordinary, when his presence was particularly necessary to animate and encourage his friends and adherents. We could not remark, without astonishment, that at this time, when the enemy were within so short a distance, no association was formed for the defence of the town, or attempt made to raise men for that purpose. It appeared yet more unaccountable to me, that some sort of defences were not erected on the dykes leading from the town to the extremities of the island, which, in case the enemy should make good their landing, would enable the British troops to defend the town till they were sufficiently reinforced to drive the enemy from the island. The picquet on Stryen Island indicated a jealousy of our right flank, which had always appeared to me to be our vulnerable point; and the reinforcements, which at this time were sent to the island, pointed out that, in the opinion of our commander, it was the most probable point of attack.

TO HIS UNCLE, JOHN CALVERT, ESQ., M.P., OF ALBURY HALL, HERTS.

Dort, March 17, 1793.

For some days after I wrote last to you (which I think was on the 8th), nothing material occurred. On the 11th we sent a picquet on the island of Stryen, at. a ferry rather more than two miles from hence, the chief object of which was to keep up a communication with the Dutch troops stationed in that island; this piquet was ordered, in case of attack, to recross the ferry, and defend that pass. On the 13th, a small escort which had carried gun-carriages to Willemstadt, returned and reported that the enemy had found means of mounting three pieces of cannon on the glacis of the place, which enfiladed the works, and much incommoded the garrison—that the loss, however, was very inconsiderable, and that the works of Willemstadt had sustained no damage. On the 14th, a detachment of 320 Swiss Guards from Gorcum occupied the post of Stryen; they reported that Prince Frederick of Orange had driven the French from the neighbourhood of that important pass, and that his Serene Highness was at that time near Gertruydenberg. On the 15th, before daybreak, a detachment of the garrison of Willemstadt, consisting of 45 men under the command of two young

officers, embarked in a boat, and by that means gained the rear of the battery, which I mentioned that the enemy had erected on the glacis. They immediately disembarked, and attacked the battery, which they carried. They spiked the guns, and returned into the town without the loss of a man either killed or wounded, having killed thirty of the enemy, and taken nine prisoners: the officer who commanded the French refused to take quarter, which was offered him. Yesterday I went with three or four more officers across the Island of Stryen to the Dutch advanced post at Bluytsluys, which is immediately opposite Willemstadt, at the distance of about a mile. We were much surprised to hear no firing on our route; and on our arrival at Bluytsluys, were informed that the French had raised the siege that morning, and were retreating from all the posts on the coast. I have since heard they left their guns in the batteries before Willemstadt, and that they are evacuating Breda; but this last report wants confirmation. Their head-quarters are now at Steenbergen. I should imagine that Antwerp will be the first place at which they will make any stand; and I hope Prince Frederick of Brunswick, who is by this time very near Breda (though I fear not in the force we understood him to be) will have it in his power to attack them before they can reach that post. The garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom may annoy

them if they come within reach. The Governor of Willemstadt has gained much honour by his conduct; and I hope the gratitude of the Dutch will be liberally shown towards him, and his garrison, which did not consist of above 600 men. The Commandant of Breda, I hear, is in irons at the Hague. The retreat of the French, and the success of the allies in Brabant, give a new face to the war. I shall be much obliged to you, if you will write me word what is the general opinion in England in regard to our destination. Are we to guard the Dutch frontiers, or to join the allies, and drive the French out of Brabant; and in that case are we to push the war to French Flanders, or on the evacuation of the Dutch provinces, is the object of our expedition completed? Pray, write me on this subject, and tell my aunt a newspaper is not more welcome at Albury on Tuesday morning than at Dort.

March 18.—The face of the country on Stryen Island resembles that of Dort: the dykes form the communications between the towns and villages, and in some places these roads are nearly impassable, in all very bad. The orders of the Hereditary Prince in regard to the batteries disappointed us much; but the whole tenor of his Serene Highness's conduct since the

arrival of the British troops has greatly differed from that which they have been accustomed to experience on the part of their own royal family, and gave no very favourable impression to the officers of the representative of the house, whose interests they were sent to protect.

March 21.—At night, Lieutenant Western of the 'Syren,' who had particularly distinguished himself by the conduct and gallantry with which he attacked the French batteries before Willemstadt, was killed by a musket-shot off the Moerdyk.

When the enemy raised the siege of Willemstadt, they did not quit the neighbouring country: they had detachments along the shore by the Moerdyk, which they occupied occasionally; it was by the fire of one of these detachments off a place called the Nordschanz, near the entrance of the Klundert Canal, that Lieutenant Western lost his life. I shall not be accused of partiality to my relation, when I say he was most deservedly lamented by all who knew him, either personally or by character.

The Governor of Willemstadt did justice to the assistance he derived from poor Western's gallant exertions; and the tears which fell over his grave from the honest seamen, who bore his corpse, proved that he united to intrepidity and resolution, the happy faculty of conciliating the affections of those under his command. He was buried with military

honours; and on a column over his grave in the great church of Dort, is placed a marble monument with the following inscription:

"To the lamented memory of John Western, Esq., Lieutenant of his Britannic Majesty's frigate, 'Syren', and in testimony of the gallant services performed by him, this monument is erected by order of his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

"Lieutenant Western, after distinguishing himself by the conduct and intrepidity with which he assisted the garrison of Willemstadt, at that time besieged by the French, fell early in the career of glory, having been killed by the enemy off the Nordschanz, on the 21st of March, A.D. 1793, in the twenty-second year of his age, in the service of his own country and in the defence of Holland.

"His remains were deposited near this place, attended by his Royal Highness the Duke of York, by the officers and seamen of the Royal Navy, the companions of his meritorious exertions, and by the brigade of his Britannic Majesty's Foot Guards in garrison at Dort."

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Dort, March 23, 1793.

With the deepest concern, I inform you of a melancholy event that happened yesterday morning,

and request you to undertake the mournful task of forwarding the intelligence to Mrs. Western, as I conceive that the fatal news coming through you will not shock her so much as if she heard it from any other quarter.

John Western is no more. He was killed, poor boy, yesterday morning. It will be some alleviation to the distress of his friends to learn that he did not suffer. His death was instantaneous. As I was on picquet five miles from hence last night, the news of this misfortune has but just reached me, and the Duke of York being out, the particulars I send you I heard from his secretary, who promises to send this by a private messenger of the Duke's.

John had conducted his gun-boats close in to the opposite shore, near the Moerdyk, for the purpose of destroying some small craft lying there, when he received a discharge of musketry from a party concealed behind a dyke; a ball struck him on his forehead. The Duke of York is much pained by his loss; by the very last post, he had written to England, strongly recommending John for his good behaviour. By order of his Royal Highness, he is, I understand, to be interred at this place, with all the unavailing honours we can bestow on him. He dined with me last Tuesday, elated with all the honest exultation which the encomiums he received from every quarter for his gallantry and good con-

duct naturally occasioned. Most sincerely do I lament his fate.

One of the Duke's aides-de-camp returned the night before last from the Prince de Cobourg, with intelligence that, after several skirmishes on the two preceding days, a general engagement took place on Monday last, the result of which was a total defeat of the French. The Austrians, however, have lost 1200 men, and the French appear to have made a stout resistance; the particulars of the engagement you will have in England before you receive this. It was fought near Louvain; the Austrians, I hear, took twenty-nine pieces of cannon, and the victory being obtained over Dumouriez in person, is doubly valuable.

The French still occupy Gertruydenberg, where they have assembled some boats, and at times come down to the Moerdyk; they are in force at Breda, and I fancy still occupy Klundert, but the uncertainty we are in of their motions is incredible, considering their close vicinity; I conclude our commanders are better informed. Lord and Lady Auckland arrived here last night, and with the two daughters of the gallant Commander of Willemstadt, are this morning gone to visit that fortress; the Stadtholder, who arrived last night, is also of the party. On Monday I am to accompany Colonel St. Leger and other officers for the same purpose.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Dort, March 24, 1793.

The Duke's messenger having been delayed last night, gives me an opportunity of sending the news, this moment received, of the consequences of the victory gained by the Prince de Cobourg over Dumouriez, on Monday last. The pursuit, we heard, continued the following day, when numbers of the enemy were killed and some prisoners taken, and Dumouriez found his defeat so complete as to abandon the idea of taking post on *les Montaines de Fer* (where, it was apprehended, the strength of his situation would have prevented the possibility of the Austrians attacking with success), and has fallen back as far as Halle, abandoning Brussels and all the adjacent country. It is added, but I fear without absolute certainty, that immediately on the news of the defeat reaching Brussels, the *bourgeoisie* rose, and being joined by two regiments of Dumouriez's army in garrison there, shut the gates against the defeated army. This I look upon to be the salvation of Brabant; and I dare say the next news we hear will be that the French army have retired within their own frontiers. The enemy are still at Breda, and I hope the Princes Frederick of Bruns-

wick and Orange, uniting their forces, will render their retreat impracticable.

Poor John Western is to be buried this evening, when a proper detachment of the garrison, and all the officers, are desired to attend.

Lord Auckland is here, and this morning all the officers were presented by the Duke of York to the Stadtholder.

Sir James Murray is, in this day's orders, appointed Adjutant-General to the Army on the Continent.

* * * * *

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Dort, March 25, 1793.

Yesterday evening we deposited the remains of our lamented friend in the first church of this place. His funeral was attended by the Duke of York, by the officers and the crews of the gun-boats, and by all the officers of the brigade of guards; and if his friends can receive any comfort in the sympathy of that assemblage, we have it, I assure you, very completely.

A detachment of grenadiers fired three volleys at the church gate, as the corpse being deposited in a vault in the church prevented their firing actually over the grave, as is usual. The Duke of York ordered the funeral to be performed in the hand-

somest manner, and has sent me word that he means to defray all the expenses. By his Royal Highness's orders, I have this morning presented a twenty-pound note to the English clergyman who came from Rotterdam to perform the ceremony. The Duke signified his pleasure to have a monument erected to poor Western's memory, expressive of the circumstances of his services, death and funeral, and desired me to send him a copy of the terms in which I wished to have them represented. I much wish his Royal Highness had employed a more able pen; but of the inscription, such as it is, as it has been approved by the Duke, I send you a copy.

The Duke of York goes to-morrow to the Hague, and has given leave to as many officers as can be spared to come there in the course of Wednesday and Thursday, on which days he will present them at the Stadtholder's Court. I shall not be able to go till Friday, when his Royal Highness will return here. The Duke's leaving Dort indicates no further apprehension for this place; and the gun-boats return to-day or to-morrow to Rotterdam, where the embargo laid on merchant vessels is taken off. I am going to-morrow, with Sam Hulse* and a large party to visit Willemstadt.

* Field-Marshal Sir Samuel Hulse, Governor of Chelsea Hospital. Died in January, 1837.

TO HIS SISTER.

Dort, March 28, 1793.

The conduct of the Austrians deserves every encomium, and affords a striking contrast to that of the Prussians. Is it not wonderful that a monarch, who derives his power and consequence solely from the reputation of his arms (for without a superiority of military character the kingdom of Prussia instantly degenerates into the marquisate of Brandenburgh), can permit his great and natural rival so far to outstrip him in the career of military fame? As I am a great speculator, I foresee the probability of his having, one day or other, reason to repent of his inactivity, and the ascendancy in the affairs of the empire which the house of Austria will obtain by the character which their troops are now establishing. The enemy in our neighbourhood seem to be playing an extraordinary game. We hear they are rendering Breda and Gertruydenberg as strong as they possibly can, and appear determined to shut themselves up in these posts. Several corps belonging to the States are ordered to-day over to the Moerdyk, and the Princes Frederick of Brunswick and Orange, we hear, are very near Breda and Gertruydenberg. You will wonder I so frequently make use of the words, "*we hear*;" but the uncertainty of our intelligence

is incredible, and I do not like to state anything for fact which I do not *know* to be so. You will perceive by my last letters that I had an intention of going to Willemstadt, and will naturally expect some account of my expedition to a place so much the subject of conversation and anxiety. *Soit.*—On Tuesday, a large party of us, amongst whom was Colonel Hulse only of your acquaintance, having engaged a boat, assembled on the wharf at six, A.M., and in about an hour and a half got the skipper and his vessel under weigh (this, for a Dutchman, is reckoned very fair). The wind being as favourable as it could blow, whether we chose it or not, took us down in about two hours and a half; but so determined an enemy was our skipper to expedition, that, for causes which we could never discover, he slackened sail about half-way on our voyage. Whatever the causes might be, the effects we soon learnt to our cost, for on our arrival at the pier-head at Willemstadt, the tide was so far spent as to render navigation up the small canal that leads to the town a very troublesome operation. Now trouble being to a Dutchman the thing of all others the most disagreeable, he, with the greatest coolness imaginable, ran the vessel slap into the mud, and had recourse to his pipe, which he enjoyed with admirable *sang-froid* amidst the execrations of the whole party. Picture to yourself a *party of pleasure* lying on a

mud-bank for four hours, and pelted by every wave, dripping wet, and half of them sick with the working of the vessel. This, however, was our situation (the wind increasing every minute) till the rising of the tide floated us and took us into the town. Having paid our respects to the Governor, and shown our passports, he ordered a *sergent de l'ordonnance* to attend us round the works; and now I shall proceed to give you a most minute detail of the fortifications of the place, as well as of the works erected by the French. I see you look grave, as well you may from such a threat; but cheer up, I scorn to take the advantage chance has given me over you, and therefore will only say that, according to the opinion of Colonel Moncrieff, our engineer, who was of the party, had the plan of attack been different, the place is in itself by no means impregnable. By the time we had seen the works, and eaten the cold meat we had with us, it blew very hard: and when we thought of our return, no argument—not even gold—could tempt a single Dutchman to take us across the river; for finding the wind strong against us, we had resolved to return by land across the island of Spryen. After many fruitless attempts, we began to think of lodging for the night. Beds seemed to be quite out of the question, and a fireside was all we expected; but even here we were disappointed, for the master of the

inn gave us to understand that he always obliged everybody in his house to go to bed at twelve; and as there were no beds, he expected us to walk into the street at that hour. Our remonstrances were all in vain; and it was not until we obtained a positive order from the Governor that we had the landlord's permission to sleep on the floor of a room, which was at that time occupied by a couple of score of Dutchmen, supping, smoking, spitting, &c., &c.; but we were informed that at midnight they would retire. They did so, and we were shown into our apartment. A little straw? Nay. A pillow? Nay. A blanket? Nay, nay. However, down we lay, with a promise from the skipper that, at six in the morning, he would take us over the ferry. At six we paid our bill (and by the price we paid for sleeping on the floor, for my own part, I was glad it was not in a bed, which, if charged in proportion, would have amounted to a considerable sum), and assembled once more on the quay. In about an hour, the barque that was to carry us over, and the skipper, were ready. This hour's delay had considerably lowered the water, and at the mouth of the canal—smack once more into a bank of mud. We knew, from experience, there was no remedy but patience; but we had the good fortune this time to scramble ashore, where we remained till two in the afternoon, when we crossed the ferry, and hired a

waggon, which we used by turns, for it would only carry half of us, and arrived here at night; and thus ended our *party of pleasure.* You will think me incorrigible when I tell you that, to-morrow, I am going with Sir Hew Dalrymple* to the Hague; but I have a wonderful desire to see every place; and being absolutely determined never to come into this country again if I can possibly avoid it, I don't like to lose the present opportunity. But we mean to have recourse to a trakshout, which, being drawn by horses, is subject to little chance of disappointment. It is reported we are to leave Dort in about ten days. Our destination I by no means can guess. If we are not destined for the siege of Breda, I should not be surprised if we were to embark for Ostend. I hear the transports that brought us are engaged to attend our motions. "The Leyden Gazette" says that the States have memorialised the King not to withdraw his troops from their assistance while the enemy hold Breda and Gertruydenberg, and have requested him to allow them to join the Allies whenever the enemy retreats. We carry

* Sir Hew Dalrymple, Bart., Ensign 31st Regiment, 1763. Exchanged as Lieutenant-Colonel into the 1st Foot Guards, and served in Flanders. Was Governor of Guernsey in 1796, and of Gibraltar 1800. Took command of the army in Portugal in August, 1801. Concluded the Convention of Cintra. General and Colonel 57th Regiment. Died in April, 1830.

on the war tolerably well at Dort, though, in some particulars, we are badly off. Not being able to procure a room to mess in, we are at the mercy of a villainous innkeeper; and very little he shows us, I assure you, either in the length of his bills or the badness of our fare; but I hope we shall be on a better plan soon. My servant did not choose to come with me from England, and I had thoughts of doing without one; but as we have received orders to provide ourselves with horses to carry our baggage, these will more than occupy the soldier allowed me, and I have therefore sought for a servant, and found one who, I hope, will suit me. He is a Swiss, talks German, French, and a little English. I give him the same wages that I did in England, which come very high when you include half a guinea a-week for board, but I can get nothing under. He has not yet left his place, but will come to me soon, and immediately if we move. I have an undeniable character with him. I find my letter is of such a length, that I must put you to the expense of double postage; but it goes free to London, and you won't grudge the extraordinary fourpence. I should be happy to be put to the same expense, but I have not had the happiness of hearing from Lyme* since I left England, and have been eternally tantalized by the inundation of letters I have seen received by

* Where his father and mother were at this time.

other officers. The wind, for the last three or four days has prevented any arrivals.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

The Hague, Friday Night,
March 28, 1793.

I arrived here to-day in time to dine with Lord Auckland, and was immediately informed by the Duke of York that he meant to move the brigade on Monday morning; this intelligence will oblige me to return to Dort some time to-morrow night. My intention was to have remained here till Monday, the environs being well worth seeing. As matters are, I must content myself with viewing *l'intérieur de la ville*, which, from its appearance, repays the trouble of the journey. At dinner, the Duke received a letter, informing him that the French had evacuated Antwerp, and before we broke up Lord Auckland received a courier with intelligence that the French had retired from Ostend to Dunkirk: these manœuvres indicate Dumouriez' intention of evacuating Brabant, and retiring within the French frontiers, and are the result of the victories obtained by the Austrians.

The news I sent you on Sunday is entirely confirmed; Brussels is in possession of the Austrians, and the last accounts state the main body of the

French army to be at Halle, a strong post twelve miles from Brussels. It is imagined that Dumouriez cannot have had less than 20,000 men killed, wounded and missing within the last few weeks. The enemy are still in possession of Gertruydenberg and Breda, having, it is imagined, 2000 men in the former, and 5000 in the last place. These corps appear to be entirely cut off from their army in Brabant. All the Dutch troops in the neighbourhood of Dort passed over to Moerdyk yesterday and to-day, to invest Gertruydenberg and Breda, and I learn this evening that a heavy cannonade was heard before Gertruydenberg to-day at noon. I think these fortresses must fall. We hear (but I do not give it as a fact) that Breda has been summoned, and that the answer of the French Commandant assured Prince Frederick that he should find the garrison was not composed of *Dutchmen*, and that Breda should not be surrendered while a single man could stand to their guns. Our immediate destination is Bergen-op-Zoom, and from what I could learn from the Duke of York, it is his opinion that we shall join the Allies to push the war into French Flanders; but of that you will probably know more than we do.

I congratulate you on the turn the affairs of this country have taken this last month, which I think must effectually tend to put an end to the war. I shall thank you to inform me whether it is the

opinion in England that we are to pursue the enemy into their own country, or are we to act upon the frontiers only? I learnt from Lord Auckland that the siege of Mayence by the Prussians was to commence to-day or to-morrow.

I am writing in a great crowd and some hurry; I will therefore beg you to forward this letter to Lyme, where I have not time to write at present.

P.S.—The 1st Division of Hanoverians will reach some part of the territory of the States to-morrow or next day. Pray let my saddles be well provided with new girths, &c., and add to them a pair of small screw camp candlesticks.

The chief command of the Austrian army was now entrusted to the Prince of Cobourg, who had served with distinction against the Turks. The French, under General Miranda, were besieging Maestricht. On March 1st, the Prince of Coburg attacked them in their cantonments, and forced them to raise the siege. On the 2nd and 3rd they were flying in disorder beyond the Meuse. On the 4th they were driven from Liege, where many of the inhabitants, now lef to the vengeance of the incensed Prince-Bishop, had shown inclination to side with them.

Dumouriez was suddenly interrupted while concerting the passage of the Biesbosch and his plans against the Dutch Government, and recalled to his defeated and retiring army. He joined them at Louvain, and immediately adopted measures to rally and re-organize them. Having done this in some degree, he took advantage of the encouragement which a slight success against the Imperial advanced guard gave to his soldiers, to lead them against the enemy. The armies met at Nerwinden, on March 18th, and though his men fought well, they were worsted. In this battle a young Prince was greatly distinguished on each side—the Archduke Charles, at the head of the Austrian Grenadiers, and the Duc de Chartres (Louis-Philippe) in command of a French division.

The repeated defeats experienced by Dumouriez' forces had led to despondency and demoralization, which, had they been fully known to the Imperialists, might have proved fatal to him. The condition of his army, and his unsatisfactory relations with his government, induced him to commence negotiations with the Prince of Cobourg, who sent to him Colonel Mack, the Austrian Adjutant-general. It was settled in conference between them that the French should retire unmolested within their own frontiers.

April 1.—The brigade embarked, leaving four

companies of the 3rd Regiment at Dort, and anchored that evening in the mouth of the new cut that divides Stryen and Dort Islands.

April 2.—Got under weigh the next morning, and arrived that evening at Bergen-op-Zoom; the next day in the afternoon, the brigade disembarked, and went into quarters in the town; the same evening two Swiss regiments embarked for Helvoet and the Brille, Dort, &c. The strength of the works at Bergen-op-Zoom has been so much celebrated, that no observation is necessary on my part. To a person confessedly by no means a master of the subject, they appeared to be too numerous, and the three advanced works on the south-west flank, to be unsupported by the works of the town. There is a line of redoubts from the town to the inundation which leads to Steenbergen, the fortifications of which place are faulty; the curtains are too much extended, and the whole of the works are considerably weakened by numerous hornworks and ravelins. I have since understood they were intended for a fortified camp, but not being occupied, certainly very much diminish the strength of the place.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Bergen-op-Zoom, April 4, 1793.

Captain Crauford,* one of the Duke of York's aides-de-camp, returned this morning from the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg with intelligence of such an extraordinary nature, that I cannot omit the opportunity I have of sending it to you, though you will probably have heard it through other channels before you receive this. Dumouriez demanded a cessation of arms, and a conference with the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg, which were both granted. After lamenting that the conduct of the National Assembly afforded little probability of a permanent Government being established in France, he informed the Prince that if he might confide on his Serene Highness's co-operation, it was his determination to march his army to Paris and declare for the royal cause; that to prevent the smallest suspicion of his sincerity, he was willing to deliver Lille and Valenciennes to the Prince of Cobourg.

* Captain Crauford, Aide-de-Camp to the Duke of York, entered the army as Cornet in the 1st Dragoon Guards in December, 1778. After the Campaign of 1794, he was sent to the Austrian armies on the Rhine, and was present at several actions, and was severely wounded at the Battle of Amberg in 1796. Colonel of the Queen's Dragoon Guards and G.C.B. Died Lieutenant-General in April, 1821.

His terms were accepted. Pending the negotiation, four deputies from the Convention arrived from Paris with orders to seize Dumouriez, and give the command of the army to General Bournonville, who accompanied them. Dumouriez made them all five prisoners, and delivered them to the Prince of Cobourg, and has this morning set off with his army for Paris to put in force the plans which he has concerted with the Prince of Cobourg. Crauford saw the deputies in custody.

The King of Prussia has gained considerable advantages over Custine before Mayence, and taken two thousand prisoners. The number he has killed and wounded is not mentioned, but it is, probably, great in proportion. The Duke's packet is just going to be made up. I am writing in great haste; excuse inaccuracies, and be so good as to forward this to Lyme. We expect to leave this place about the 9th, our route probably Antwerp, and so to Ostend, Ghent and Bruges. I congratulate you most sincerely on this event, in which the hand of Providence appears revenging the death of their murdered sovereign on the heads of his execrable assassins.

CHAPTER II.

GUARDS ARRIVE AT ANTWERP—DUMOURIEZ QUITS THE FRENCH ARMY, AND ESCAPES TO BRUSSELS—THE DUKE OF YORK ARRIVES AT GHENT—VISIT TO THE ENGLISH CONVENT—BRUGES—PROCLAMATIONS OF THE ALLIES—PROTEST OF DUMOURIEZ—THE FRENCH REPULSED AT VICOGNE AND RUME—ATTACK THE ALLIES AT ST. AMAND, AND ARE DEFEATED.

April 9.—THE brigade of Guards embarked on board the 'Schouts,' and the next morning anchored off Antwerp. A brigade, consisting of the 14th, 37th, and 53rd Regiments, under Major-General Abercromby,* disembarked from their transports at the ferry opposite Antwerp. The Guards disembarked the same day, and marched to Bevern, about six miles. The brigade of the line were quartered in the neighbouring hamlets. On the junction of the brigade of the line, we remarked with concern that the recruits they had lately received were in general totally unfit for service, and inadequate to

* General Abercromby, Sir Ralph, mortally wounded at the Battle of Alexandria. Died, March 28, 1801.

the fatigues of a campaign, being mostly either old men, or quite boys, extremely weak and short.

There are many most beautiful pictures in the churches of Antwerp; amongst others that of Rubens (the Descent from the Cross) which is deservedly called his *chef-d'œuvre*. There is another very fine picture, by the same master (the Erection of the Cross), but it appeared to me much inferior to the first. The coats-of-arms in the different churches had been covered with plaister of Paris to save them from the destructive fury of the French. The citadel is in bad repair; there are few guns mounted, and the greatest part of the barracks was burnt by the French.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Bevern, April 12, 1793.

You will have heard that Dumouriez' plan has failed; he escaped himself, and is now, I hear, at Brussels, with about 1000 followers; the great object of the war is probably neither promoted nor impeded by his defection. On Tuesday we left Bergen-op-Zoom, and the next day we landed at a ferry opposite Antwerp, and marched to this place (about six miles), a brigade consisting of three regiments of the line, having previously landed, and taken up their quarters in the neighbouring villages.

To-morrow we begin our march towards Bruges, and Ostend, by the way of Ghent, and shall probably arrive at our destination in about six days. Ghent, I hear, is to be occupied by Hanoverians; Bruges and Ostend by the British troops. Should we take the field in Flanders, I shall much wish to have my grey nag sent to me, and shall beg the favour of you to request Edward at all events to cap him with a few oats immediately, and I will write again when I have arranged matters for bringing him over. The French are intrenched to the amount of 13,000, we hear, at Mount Cassel. I went yesterday to Antwerp, a column of the French Army arrived there from Breda; they marched in, colours flying, drums beating, bayonets fixed, and lighted matches. As a body of men, their appearance was very bad—few seemed vigorous and in the prime of life—but they were by no means so ragged, neither was their order of march so unmilitary as I have heard represented. I conversed with some of their officers, and many of them saluted us with their sword, as they passed. Is it not a most extraordinary circumstance that a body of 7000 men, totally cut off, without the most distant chance of relief, should obtain the terms of marching to their own country without being prisoners? The safety of the town of Breda appears to have been consulted more than the honour of those who granted such a capitulation. The corps I

saw consisted of 2300 men, being two regiments of the line, a few artillery and cavalry, the rest National Guards. Here are the French and ourselves, marching up the two sides of the Scheldt, the one army to attack, the other to defend the frontiers of France.

April 15.—Ghent is by far the best town we have seen in Flanders; there are many fine pictures, and much fine statuary worthy the observation of travellers. The French have not done much damage here, but the inhabitants appeared rejoiced at our arrival, and much disposed to show us every civility in their power. Here is a convent of English nuns, which his Royal Highness the Duke of York visited. Bruges is a large and opulent town, though much inferior to Ghent. The arrival of his Royal Highness was announced by the ringing of bells and an illumination of the town; the people are much enraged against the French. Courtray is a town without much trade, inferior to Ghent and Bruges. The face of the country had gradually improved ever since we entered the Austrian dominions; between Courtray and Tournay it is quite beautiful, diversified with woods and hills, and very thickly inhabited. The town of Tournay, as all the other towns in the Netherlands, is dismantled, and there is in them all an appearance of melancholy which is only to be

accounted for by trade not being in the prosperous state it formerly was. Closing the Scheldt was a measure injurious to every town in the Netherlands.

TO HIS SISTER.

Bruges, April 17, 1793.

I must be quite insensible to flattery (which, whatever we may say, we none of us are) if I did not hasten to answer your letter of the 3rd; and I do assure you, that the idea of my letters affording the smallest entertainment to my friends at Lyme makes me find much gratification in scribbling them. We have had very fine weather for this last week, and I hope that you have had the same, and that my mother has had frequent opportunities of preparing herself for her journey without experiencing any bad effects.

Since I wrote to you last from Bergen-op-Zoom, affairs have taken a different turn, and M. Dumouriez' apostacy is not likely to be attended with the advantages we expected. I hear he himself means to retire into Switzerland, there to enjoy the wealth he has amassed by every species of fraud and rapacity. Miranda is beheaded at Paris, and the war remains where it was: the Austrians threatening Condé and Valenciennes, the Prussians straitening the quarters of the French at Mayence, and the

English waiting the arrival of 21,000 Hanoverians and Hessians and their reinforcements from Britain, and, above all, the return of Sir James Murray, which will probably determine the important question whether France is to be invaded or not. Most sincerely do I wish I may prove a false prophet, but I cannot help thinking that a forward movement of the allied armies will unite all parties in France, and prevent those who are well-wishers to order and good government, from exerting themselves in favour of a counter-revolution.

I wrote to my mother on the 12th from Bevern, and the next morning we marched fifteen miles on our route to Ghent, where we arrived the next day; on the 15th we halted, and I was exceedingly gratified in viewing the town of Ghent. It is rather remarkable, that the further we get from Holland (the defence of which country is the principal object of our expedition) the more we are welcomed, and the more alacrity we discover in procuring us every accommodation; at Ghent almost the whole town were ready to receive us into their houses, and our men paid for nothing; there was a ball each night we remained there, at one of which the inhabitants were much gratified by the appearance of the Duke of York. By the bye, I must give you an instance of his condescension and good-humour. I was walking with another officer the day we passed at Ghent, and

was stopped by a man, who informed us that the nuns of the English convent had the greatest desire to see the Duke. On our conveying this intelligence to his Royal Highness, he immediately went to the convent, attended by nearly twenty officers; you can have no idea of the satisfaction his visit seemed to give to the nuns. In consideration of the blood-royal, the *grille* was thrown open, and we were received into the *sanctum sanctorum.* I shall think better of nuns as long as I live, from the cheerfulness and good-humour which appeared to reign amongst them. They were particularly gratified by finding amongst the officers some who were acquainted with their families in England. Besides the nuns, about five-and-thirty in number, there were about twenty *pensionnaires,* who were all presented to the Duke by the Lady Abbess; some of these were the children of distressed French families, others young ladies who were receiving their education as *demi-pensionnaires;* amongst the latter were some very fine, agreeable young women. After staying upwards of an hour, we took leave of our fair countrywomen, and I do assure you their adieus on our arrival at the outer *grille,* and the reflection that it was a barrier they were never more to pass, joined to the fervour with which they assured us of their prayers for our success and return to our own country, which they themselves were to see no more, were altogether

something so striking, that I could have shed tears over them every one, young and *old* too, I do assure you. However, I did what was better, for I went back, and told them their civility and kindness was such, that if I ever came again to Ghent, I should certainly knock at their door, which they promised should at any time be opened to me. The Abbess requested the Duke's interference with the Emperor for the restoration of some of the privileges of the convent, which he promised, with the proviso of her giving permission to the *pensionnaires* to attend the parade in the evening, where accordingly they all were, and I dare say will never forget the attention of the Duke to them. The nuns could not help expressing a wish that it was possible for them likewise to see the British troops, but that was quite out of the question.

Ghent is the town which gave rise to the threatening *bon mot* of Charles V.: "Je mettrai Paris dans mon Gand;" but his poor Ghent, or Ghand, is not much increased since that time, and Paris is perhaps five times the size. I should not have disliked remaining a few days longer at Ghent, where there are many good pictures, and much beautiful statuary; but yesterday morning we arrived at this place, by means of the canal, down which we were drawn by horses. We arrived in the evening. The town was immediately illuminated, and bells ringing, and

crackers, squibs, and huzzas from every quarter announced the joy the people experienced in receiving a garrison of English soldiers. I have not been long enough here to give you any account of the place; I am myself quartered in a house where I am treated with great civility, and I have the greatest difficulty in the world in excusing myself from breakfasting, dining, and supping with the family while we remain here. M. Gontbon est bourgmestre, actuellement à Bruxelles, où il fait sa cour et ses complimens. Madame son épouse sort du convent il y a six mois, et attend le retour de Monsieur ce soir; en attendant elle voudrait bien faire toute la politesse possible au capitaine. Madame est aristocrate, aime beaucoup les mœurs français, c'est-à-dire de la vieille cour, parle beaucoup; malheureusement elle n'est point belle.

I have told you a long story about my runs, &c., which has expended all my paper. I have been writing in much haste, in hopes of saving the Duke's courier, so adieu, my dearest friend.

In the above, and in other letters, the writer expressed his opinion of the evil consequences which would attend the invasion of France at this time. The second proclamation of the Prince of Cobourg, dated April 9th, manifested the change on this very

momentous subject, wrought in the counsels of the Allies by the Congress of Ministers which assembled at Antwerp.* The violation of the French soil, and the intimation that conquest was their object, contributed powerfully to unite the whole nation against the invaders, exciting in the breast of every Frenchman indignation against those who aimed at the dismemberment of his country, and engaging all his feelings of honour and patriotism in the service of the government, which was making the most energetic efforts in resistance.

The proclamations of the Prince of Cobourg are as follows:

"April 5, 1793.

"Desirous only of securing the prosperity and glory of a country torn by so many convulsions, I declare that I shall support, with all the forces at my disposal, the generous and beneficent intentions of General Dumouriez and his brave army. I declare that our only object is to restore to France its constitutional monarch, with the means of rectifying such experienced abuses as may exist, and to give to France as to Europe, peace, confidence, tranquillity, and happiness. In conformity with these principles,

* Count Metternich and Stahremberg on the part of Austria, Lord Auckland on that of England, and Count Keller on that of Prussia.

I declare on my word of honour, that I enter on the French territory without any intention of making conquests, but solely and entirely for the above-mentioned purposes. I declare, also on my word of honour, that if military operations should lead to any place of strength being placed in my hands, I shall regard it in no other light than as a *sacred deposit;* and I bind myself in the most solemn manner to restore it to the government which may be established in France, or as soon as the brave General, with whom I make common cause, shall demand it."

"April 9, 1793.

"The proclamation of the 5th instant was the expression only of my *personal* sentiments; and I there manifested my *individual* views for the safety and tranquillity of France. But now that the results of that declaration have proved so different from what I anticipated, the same candour obliges me to declare that the state of hostility between the Emperor and the French nation is unhappily re-established in its full extent. It remains for me, therefore, only *to revoke my said declaration,* and to announce that I shall prosecute the said war with the utmost vigour. Nothing remains binding of my first proclamation, but the declaration, which I renew with pleasure, that the strictest discipline shall be observed

by my troops in all parts of the French territory, which they may occupy."

On this second proclamation of the Prince of Cobourg, Dumouriez observes in his Memoirs, written in 1794:

"Le 10 au matin, on apporta au Général une proclamation du Prince de Cobourg, datée du 9, qui anéantissait entièrement celle du 5, et spécifiait expressément qu'il allait opérer pour le compte de son souverain, et qu'il s'emparerait, à titre d'indemnité et de conquêtes, de toutes les places qu'il pourrait prendre.

* * * *

"Il n'est que trop vrai que cette seconde proclamation, en privant le parti du Général Dumouriez de tout moyen de ralliement, et en faisant voir dans les puissances belligérantes, des conquérants avides, a réuni tous les Français armés à la Convention Nationale, que la plus grande partie abhorrait; a fait disparaître la cause de la royauté devant le danger de la patrie; leur a montré dans la défense de la République, le salut de la France; les a ralliés sur le point de vue de l'honneur national, et a certainement nui au succès de la première campagne, et rendu le sort de la guerre très incertain.

" Cette seconde proclamation avait été donnée au retour du congrès d'Anvers, en conséquence de ce qui y avait été arrêté entre les ministres des Puissances coalisées. Le Général vit alors que son traité était entièrement rompu, et sans chercher à réclamer inutilement sur ce changement subit, qu'il jugeait être irrévocable, il ne consulta que son caractère et ses principes, et il se sacrifia.

" Il se rendit sur le champ au quartier-général, et dit franchement au Prince de Cobourg, qu'il venait le remercier des bontés personnelles qu'il lui avait témoignées ; qu'il voulait continuer à mériter son estime ; que lorsqu'il s'était lié avec lui par un traité, ce n'avait été que pour opérer la regénération de la France, et non pas son démembrement ; qu'il n'entrait dans aucune discussion sur les motifs des Puissances coalisées qui ne le regardaient pas ; mais que lui personnellement ne croyant pas pouvoir coopérer à la diminution du territoire Français, et y employer, ou son influence, ou ses médiocres talens, il se croyait obligé de se retirer, et qu'il le priait de lui accorder un passe-port.

" Le Prince de Cobourg ne put que donner des éloges à cette délicatesse. L'Archiduc Charles lui témoigna la même estime, ainsi que le Colonel Mack ; et le Général partit pour Bruxelles. Il ne doute point qu'après une variation aussi forte dans les principes de la négociation qui avait eu lieu, après

un désaveu aussi formel de la première proclamation, les Impériaux ne dussent être embarrassés de sa présence, qui devenait au moins inutile, et ne vissent avec grand plaisir le parti qu'il prenait de s'éloigner; mais il ne leur laissa pas le temps de cette perplexité, et sa résolution fut prise sur le champ."*

* Alison's remarks on this momentous transaction are:

"A Congress was assembled at Antwerp of the ministers of the Allied Powers, which was attended by Count Metternich and Stahrenberg on the part of Austria, Lord Auckland on that of England, and Count Keller on that of Prussia. Such was the confidence inspired by recent events, that these ministers all imagined that the last days of the Convention were at hand; and in truth they were so, if they had communicated a little more vigour and unanimity into the military operations. Inspired by these ideas, and irritated at the total failure of Dumouriez's attempt to subvert the anarchical rule in that country, the plenipotentiaries came to the resolution of totally altering the object of the war, and the necessity was now openly announced of providing *indemnities and securities* for the Allied Powers; in other words, partitioning the frontier territories of France among the invading states. The effect of this resolution was immediately conspicuous in a proclamation, which Prince Cobourg issued to the French, in which he openly disavowed on the part of his government, those resolutions to abstain from all aggrandizement, which he had announced only a few days before, and declared that he was ordered to prosecute the contest by force of arms with all the forces at his disposal. The effects of this unhappy resolution were soon apparent."

To show the feeling excited in England by this proclamation of the Commander-in-chief of the Allies, we may cite the speech of Mr. Fox, on March 6, 1794, as follows:—"Within four, or at most five days, the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg, without waiting to see what effect his first proclamation would produce in France, with audacity and effrontery unparalleled in history, issued a second proclamation, retracting every word of it."

Mr. Pitt, who followed him in the debate, made no reply to his well-merited censures. Indeed, they were unanswerable. The whole country participated in Mr. Fox's sentiments on this transaction.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Bruges, April 18, 1793.

Courtray is the place of our destination; we shall be there to-morrow night. The Prussians, we hear, are at Tournay; the Austrians in the neighbourhood of Condé. The French have a strong corps advanced into the Austrian Netherlands, in front of Cassel, at a place called Roesburgh; their line is between Cassel and Dunkirk.

April 23.—The Guards, who had been joined by a brigade of the line (and shortly afterwards were reinforced by a brigade of Light Infantry), arrived at Tournay, and may, for the first time, be considered as forming part of the allied army.

The Duke of York having at this period been promoted to the rank of General, his Royal Highness did me the honour of appointing me one of his aides-de-camp.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Orcq, two miles in front of Tournay,
April 26, 1793.

We were rather surprised at a sudden order for our move from Bruges, where we expected to remain till our camp equipage, &c., joined us. The order came out a few hours after Sir James Murray's return from England, and I conclude, was the result of the determination of the Cabinet. I am sorry to say that our small force is much diminished, by two of the regiments in the second brigade being totally unfit for service, so much so, that the Duke of York has left the 37th and 53rd at Bruges and Ostend. The recruits that were sent to complete them, immediately before their embarkation, are worse than any I ever saw, even at the close of

the American War, and I sincerely hope the representation of the Duke of York may awaken the resentment of the King against whatever person or persons the fault lies with. In the meantime, it is a most cruel circumstance upon the officers who command these regiments, and upon General Abercromby, whose brigade is for the present placed quite *hors de combat*. We arrived at Tournay on the 23rd, but we have left the town in the possession of the 14th regiment, and are ourselves in cantonments in this miserable village. The Grenadiers and Light Infantry of the line occupy a village about half a mile in our front; and, on our left, is a small encampment of two regiments of Austrian cavalry, and two battalions of Prussian Grenadiers. The post we occupy is on the Lille road, but I rather think that Valenciennes will be the first object of the campaign. We are throwing up redoubts in our front, which rather indicates a probability of our remaining here till our force is more united, and our camp equipage arrives. I shall prefer the use of the latter to the cantonments we are in at present We have no certain intelligence of the French; but I fancy their advanced post from Lille is about six miles in our front. We hear that Santerre has marched from Paris with 30,000 men. The representation Custine has made of his army gives us grounds to hope for good news from

Mayence. The Dutch are advanced in force as far as Ghent, and the first division of the 21,000 Hanoverians and Hessians, who are, with the British, to form the Duke of York's command, is well on its march to join us. Such a combination against any one country, as will be formed in the course of the next month, was hardly ever known; still, however, I cannot help being of opinion, that a strong cordon on their frontier, and a complete blockade of their ports, would tend more effectually than an invasion to the attainment of the great object of the war. Whenever we move, I take it I shall have interesting news to communicate, and trust it will be good; in the meantime, I have only to apologise for the trouble I have given you with regard to my nag, for whose services I find I shall have occasion.

P.S.—The additional companies to the Guards give Richard Hulse a lieutenancy. He will be in England soon to raise his men, and has the Duke's promise to return to the army. I am sure Mr. Hulse will attribute it to the right motive (a real concern and anxiety for his son's future success), if I take the liberty, through you, of advising him to give the young hero as much French as he can possibly take, while he is in England. Languages are the *sine quâ non* to an officer who wishes to rise above

the common routine of regimental duty; and I have myself felt very severely the misfortune of not understanding German.

May 1.—The French attacked the Austrian and Prussian camp at Vicogne.

May 2.—The French attacked the Austrian advanced post at Rume, and were repulsed with the loss of one piece of cannon.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters. Ten o'clock at Night.
May 5, 1793.

As the Duke is going to send off an extraordinary messenger to-night, I write you a few lines, though, since I wrote to you last, nothing has occurred worth troubling you with. The action of the 1st of May you will have had detailed in the papers. The object the French had in view, was to throw provisions into Condé; as this has not succeeded, I imagine the place cannot possibly hold out long. We have accounts of the safe arrival of our first detachment of Light Dragoons at Ostend, and I suppose they will join us in about a week; in the meantime,

we have a corps of Austrian Hussars and a strong corps of Hanoverian cavalry. Since writing the above, a letter has been discovered for me, which had escaped notice on the first opening of the bag, which arrived about an hour ago. I am much obliged to you for your congratulations, and the part you take in my concerns. The Duke's kindness had relieved me from a situation by no means pleasant, and I wait impatiently for the arrival of my horses, that I may be enabled to take my full share of duty. You will suppose I changed my quarters for the better; instead of a small cantonment at Orcq, we are here in a palace; but the alteration I allude to, is the being relieved from the disagreeable necessity of serving this war in the same line I did during the last. Lord William Bentinck* is to be another of the Duke's aides-de-camp, and I rather think there will be one more. Sir James Murray is the Adjutant-

* Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Aide-de-Camp to the Duke of York. Entered the Coldstream Guards in January, 1791. Served in Flanders with the Duke of York, and with Lord Moira, in the expedition to the coast of France. Governor of Madras, 1803, returned in 1808. Appointed to the Staff in Portugal, and employed on a mission in Spain. Commanded a brigade in Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna. Commander-in-chief of the British Forces in Sicily, and Ambassador 1812-13. Appointed Governor-General of India, 1827. Returned from India in 1834. Member of Parliament for Glasgow, 1835. Died at Paris, June, 1839.

general, and Colonel St. Leger, Deputy; Captain Hewgill, secretary. The Marquis de Bouillé is become almost a part of the Duke's family, without having any actual employment; he is a very gentlemanlike, pleasing man, and a good officer; and, from his knowledge of the country and of the enemy, he may be of infinite service. I am very glad he is with us.

May 8.—The Duke of York marched at one in the morning to the camp at Maulde, with the brigade of Guards, one battalion of Hanoverians, and a strong detachment of Austrian Hussars, in order to enable General Knobelsdorf, who commanded the Prussians at St. Amand, to strengthen his post. The attack at St. Amand began at half-past seven; about mid-day, General Knobelsdorf requested that some of the British might advance to his assistance, the Grenadiers, Coldstream, and 3rd Regiments marched immediately to the encampment of the right wing of the Prussians. The attack was on the left wing, between the Abbey of Vicogne and St. Amand. At about five o'clock, the Coldstream and Grenadiers were ordered to the left, the French at that time having rather the advantage over the Prussians; the Coldstream arrived first, owing to the Grenadiers

having been detached to the advanced post of the camp of the right wing. The Coldstream, after making a considerable progress in the wood, came up to a line of the enemy intrenched and flanked by a battery, which, by a very heavy fire of grape, rendered the attack of the intrenchments impracticable. The Coldstream fell back into the line of the Prussians, and the firing of small arms soon ceased. The cannonade lasted till dark. The Guards occupied the villages on the left of the Chaussée, from St. Amand to Vicogne. The attack had been made on the Austrians without any material success on either side, most part of the day.

May 9.—The British troops returned to the Camp de Maulde.

May 10.—At two in the morning, the Prussians and Austrians carried five of the enemy's batteries; no guns were taken, owing to the enemy's practice of each night retiring their guns in the rear of their batteries, and keeping them always limbered, ready to make their escape. At daybreak, the French army retreated. In the evening, the corps of his Royal Highness returned from the Camp de Maulde to their former camp and cantonments.

May 14.—The first brigade of British cavalry, consisting of a detachment of 212 men from each of the following corps, 11th, 15th, 16th Regiments, Light Dragoons, under the command of Major-

general Dundas,* joined and went into cantonments at Frozennes and Marquain.

May 18.—The Prince of Orange, with eleven battalions of infantry and about 2000 cavalry, arrived at Tournay. The Dutch infantry encamped in front of Tournay, the cavalry on their right.

May 19.—The corps of his Royal Highness the Duke of York marched from Tournay, halted that night at Basielis and the neighbouring villages. The next day the army arrived at Basieux.

May 20.—After passing before the Prince de Cobourg, the troops encamped about half a mile from Basieux. The Prince of Cobourg's head-quarters are at Quievrain. Prince Adolphus, with a detachment of Hanoverians, arrived at the camp the night before. The Duke of York's command amounts to nearly 12,000 men.

* Major-general David Dundas, was at the Academy at Woolwich, and was appointed, in 1752, to assist in the survey of Scotland. Removed to the Line, in 1756. Commander-in-chief from 1809 to 1811. General and Colonel King's Dragoon Guards, G.C.B. Died, January, 1820.

CHAPTER III.

BATTLE OF FAMARS—THE DUKE OF YORK INVESTS VALENCIENNES—TURCOIN CAPTURED BY THE FRENCH—SIEGE OF VALENCIENNES—DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY—ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS—VALENCIENNES SURRENDERS TO THE DUKE OF YORK.

THE French had taken up a strong position at Famars, under the walls of Valenciennes, to the south and south-west of the fortress. They possessed likewise Mont d'Anzain, situated on the north of the town and overlooking the citadel. While they maintained these positions, the place could not be invested; and the Allies, having collected about 80,000 men, determined to make a general attack on them.

Clairfayt was to assault Mont d'Anzain, and the attack on Famars was committed to the Duke of York and General Ferraris. The Duke commanded the first division, and General Abercromby commanded the British troops in that of Ferraris.

Captain Calvert thus describes the attack.

May 22.—The army moved forwards about four miles, and encamped in front of the village of Sebourg. At ten the same night the troops were under arms, and at about midnight they moved off their ground in different columns. The fog was so thick, that it was near half-past five before it was sufficiently dispersed to enable us to view the magnificent scene that surrounded us—the allied army, all in motion, and each column forming its march towards its point of attack, with the utmost order and regularity. The column commanded immediately by his Royal Highness was flanked by two columns of cavalry, the one British and Hanoverians, and the other Imperial. The enemy, on perceiving the army opposite to them, immediately occupied their batteries to dispute the passage of the Rouelle. General Otto, who was sent with a column of light troops to mask Quesnoy, passed the river without much loss; and so effectually did he succeed in that service, as very soon to create a jealousy in that part of the French army which was destined to defend the pass at Maresche, at which place his Royal Highness's column passed afterwards without any loss. Soon after eight o'clock, General Ferraris' column attacked the enemy's advanced works in front of the village of Aulnoit. After some cannonading, the troops advanced to the attack with great spirit; and the cavalry, turning the right flank of the

batteries, charged into them. The French cavalry endeavoured to retake their batteries, but were vigorously repulsed by the Hanoverian and Austrian cavalry. The Duke's column immediately passed at Maresche. The enemy retreated to their camp at Famars. The troops advanced within cannon-shot of their batteries. On reconnoitring the position of the enemy, it was resolved to postpone the attack until dark. In the night the enemy evacuated the works and camp, of which the allied army took possession the next morning; the head-quarters of his Royal Highness the Duke being at Famars, from which place the battle took its name. The same night the enemy evacuated Mont d'Anzain, which had been attempted, but not carried, by General Clairfayt on the 23rd. The Dutch advanced from Tournay, and took possession of Orchies. The Prussians took possession of Hasnon and Marchiennes.

May 27.—The conduct of the siege of Valenciennes having been committed to the Duke of York, his Royal Highness moved his quarters to Estreu.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Estreu, June 4, 1793.

I was in great hopes that we should have been able to celebrate the King's birthday by opening our

batteries against Valenciennes, but so many delays have happened, that until last night we were not able to break ground before the place. Our batteries, I imagine, will be ready in about a week, and then the town will be summoned. You seem so much interested in all that concerns us, and the different situations we are in, that I must inform you that we changed our quarters much for the better when we left Famars. We are here in a very good château, with gardens and a *petit bois* filled with nightingales. At the end of one of the avenues, we have a view of Condé, held closely invested by the Austrians. A road to the right of the house leads to our camp, which embraces all this face of the town, nearly from the Scheldt to the Rouelle. The neck of land from the Rouelle again to the Scheldt above the town is occupied entirely by Hanoverians. Mont d'Anzain is occupied by the Austrians, under the command of General Ferraris. The Prince of Coburg's quarters are at Heine. I believe it is not the Duke of York's intention to fire a single shot at the town till the batteries on every face are completed, and then, in my own opinion, the matter will be soon decided.

A few days ago, I spent a very agreeable morning in taking a long ride over a tract of country, every inch of which has been disputed for this last month. I passed the Scheldt at Escaut pont, and rode to the

village of Bruay—from thence to Raismes is the position of Clairfayt's army, which lay intrenched upwards of a month before Mont d'Anzain. From Raismes we went to the Abbaye de Vicogne. This ground was occupied by the Imperial army on the 8th of May and following days. The abbey is one of the finest buildings I ever saw, totally torn to pieces and demolished by the French. There remains nothing but the walls, the noble architecture and magnificent marble of which appear to have despised their malice. From the abbey we went into the Bois de Vicogne, and found out the ground where the Coldstream suffered so much. I almost wonder their loss was not greater. They were, at the same moment, exposed to a fire from a battery which plied them with grape-shot at the distance of 350 yards, and to a line of infantry which was intrenched in their front. We returned by Mont d'Anzain; and by going up into the belfry of the church, we had a very good view of the citadel and all the west side of the town. The works on this flank appear in good repair and well-constructed; but we have points of attack enough, and the ground here is very much in our favour.

The mail has been due these twelve hours, and I think I shall probably have the pleasure of hearing from England before I close this letter. I am

à l'ordinaire, scribbling away to you a little beforehand, as my epistle will not go till night. The Duke gives a dinner to the commanding officers of regiments to the amount of four score. We dine in a shady walk in the garden—we shall, therefore, at all events, have fresh air. His Majesty's Hanoverian kitchen joined us some time before we left Tournay, with an amazing retinue of cooks and laced footmen.

I conclude you have heard of the exploits of the Dutch. At Turcoin, half the detachment taken prisoners. On the approach of the enemy, three battalions, with their cannon, &c., &c., retired from Furnes; the post was retaken in a couple of days by two squadrons of Hussars. I think it high time the Meinheers should return to their bogs. From such friends and allies, may the Lord deliver us. I really believe that half a dozen battalions of Austrians and as many squadrons of Hussars, would drive them all out of the country.

It is a very great amusement to me to inspect and examine the manners and dress of the different corps we are acting with—the drawings which Captain Cook brought from the South Seas are nothing to some of our friends. Their dress is fully as extraordinary, and their countenances, by continued exposure to the elements, have the true Indian dye; but they are the bravest, hardiest soldiers I ever saw.

I think I have nothing to add but (what they ever have) my best wishes to my friends at Theobalds, and to assure you, my dear Maria, of the constant love and affection of, &c.

June 10.—The troops moved their camp. Ten battalions of Austrians occupied the camp from the Scheldt to the village of Saultain, which is in the rear of their left. The right of the British troops is on the Chaussée, from Valenciennes to Quesnoy. On their left, a battalion of Hanoverian Grenadiers, whose left is very near the village of Aulnoit. A large park of heavy artillery are being assembled in the rear of the village St. Janoc, and depôts of ammunition, with a considerable quantity of fascines, gabions, and other necessaries for the commencement of the siege. The communications to the line of the intended first parallel being finished, on the night of the 13th the trenches were opened. The works on Mont d'Anzain were in a considerable degree of forwardness; and those in front of Famars, though not sufficiently advanced to give much annoyance to the enemy, were sufficient for the protection of the corps occupying that camp. The night of the 13th was particularly propitious, and by daylight, the men had

covered themselves with very little loss. The enemy fired but little during the night.

June 14.—The town was summoned; the commandant and municipality refused to surrender.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Estreu, June 17, 1793.

Our first parallel is complete, and I think nothing can prevent our guns opening on the town to-morrow at daybreak. You may picture to yourself the sort of salute it will be, when I tell you that only in the parallel on the eastern side of the town are thirteen batteries, each containing eight pieces of cannon; two of these batteries will fire hot shot. I cannot help feeling much for the poor women and children. I hope they are well secured in cellars, &c. Nothing can have been more prosperous than our approaches hitherto; we have thrown up communications and works, I dare say to the extent of near three miles, with very small loss indeed; that of the English is only three men slightly wounded by splinters of shells. I speak of the approaches and works on our side of the town only. I am surprised, as you mention Hulse having heard from me, that you had not received the letter I wrote you the 4th

of June, as his, if I recollect right, was of the same date. He is coming out again immediately, and probably, if Valenciennes holds out, may come in for the end of the siege. At his age, I think the more he sees the better, and he cannot learn in a better school than from our Austrian allies, who are the very best troops I ever saw.

I shall be glad to hear the result of a motion my uncle writes me word that Mr. Fox is to make to-day. Till some permanent government is established in France, and some responsible men engaged in the ministry of that country, it appears to me to be as impossible to obtain peace, as it was in February to avoid war.

June 17.—The batteries in front of Famars, which opened on the 15th, after throwing about four score shells, ceased firing, finding their distance too great. At night the fire was heavy from our batteries. The next morning the enemy returned it, keeping up a very heavy cannonade almost the whole day; few men were hurt: the boyaux, in the meantime, were advancing towards the second parallel, which they reached by night. Some sort of magazine was set fire to by our shells, which we threw this night to the amount of 800.

June 22.—The batteries were commenced in the

second parallel. The rain has rendered the transport of the guns and ammunition very laborious. The fire from the garrison these last three days has been trifling.

June 23.—Deserters say that Ferrand, the Commandant, has ordered the ammunition to be spared as much as possible.

June 25.—The town has been on fire four successive nights till the last. The construction of the batteries in the second parallel had been very much delayed by the rain, which fell in great quantities for some days; this morning they were complete. Most of the mortars and howitzers were in their batteries; but from the excessive wetness of the ground, it was not till the evening of the 26th that the guns were mounted.

June 27.—The battery in front of Famars, containing six long eighteens and six mortars, opened on the town to-day, and gave the garrison much annoyance. At daybreak, the batteries in the second parallel were opened; they were of the following weight. Four batteries, containing each eight 24-pounders; four batteries containing each six mortars, or heavy howitzers; one redoubt, containing four 24-pounders and eight howitzers, which, together with the batteries of the first parallel, amounted to nearly 130 *bouches à feu.*

June 28.—At night, the *sappe volante* was begun

in four different places to form the boyaux from the first to the second parallel. This was continued without interruption all night; the next day, the boyaux were carried on by the *sappe pleine*, and at night the *sappe volante* was resumed.

June 30.—At night, or rather on the morning of the 1st of July, the *sappe* was interrupted by the fire from the covered way; this brought a heavy fire from our batteries which were answered by those of the town. The fire this morning was heavier than it had been any time since the commencement of the siege. The garrison of Condé yesterday demanded permission to send a deputation to the National Convention, which being refused the conference broke off. Yesterday the battalion of Hanoverian Grenadiers, who since the commencement of the siege had been encamped on the left of the British, crossed the Rouelle, and joined the Hanoverians at Famars, two battalions of Austrians from Anzain encamped on the right of the Chaussée of Quesnoy, a second line to the Austrians already encamped on the right of the British.

July 1.—This night the *sappe* was advanced to the line of the third parallel; the third parallel being commenced, the low situation of the second parallel prevented the batteries firing, except those on the flanks which extended further than the third parallel. The third parallel was completed on the 8th.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
July 4, 1793.

I don't know whether my friends at Theobalds* will not think they have drawn themselves into a scrape, by the anxiety they have expressed to hear what progress we make, which induces me frequently to write a few lines, when the intelligence they convey hardly repays you for the trouble of receiving the letter—this is precisely the case at present: we are going on, I conclude, as fast as we can, though I confess, not so fast as I could wish, for I begin to be tired of the siege; our third parallel is far advanced, and considering the progress we have made, our loss has not been great. Lord Cavan† was wounded yesterday, but not dangerously. The enemy make an obstinate, but not a spirited resistance; for they have made no sorties, and have never given any material interruption to our works. Our numbers will not allow us to make attacks on all the points that present themselves: we act on the de-

* The residence of Mr. Peter Calvert, Captain Calvert's father, near Waltham Cross in Herts.

† Earl of Cavan, General, K.C., appointed to the Coldstream Guards in April, 1779. Commanded a Brigade in Egypt; was Governor of Calshot Castle. Colonel of the 45th Regiment. Died, Nov., 1837.

fensive only at Mont d'Anzain, and in front of Famars we are not able to avail ourselves of all the advantages the situation presents to us. Custine, having 40,000 men in our front, makes it necessary for the Prince of Cobourg to keep his corps (which, after the detachments he has made for the siege, is by no means *a large one*) compact and ready to act as occasion may require: he has received some reinforcements lately, and expects more. We have it now in our power to make the corps at Famars more secure, for which purpose, four Austrian battalions and some cavalry are posted near Querenain, and the Hanoverian light troops, under the command of Prince Ernest, who were at Querenain, are further advanced towards the enemy's camp, near Bouchain. The Austrian advanced post is Douchy, and the French videttes are within musket-shot of them. We expect our first division of Hessians, which will consist of 4000, the beginning of next week, and the second division the week after. I believe that Custine's army, though respectable in point of numbers, is in no condition to attack the Prince of Cobourg; half his national troops are serving against their inclination; his troops of the line are universally discontented, particularly his cavalry, who are very badly mounted and armed. We hear that the siege of Mayence is at length begun with vigour; the King of Prussia commands it in person; he has two very strong corps

to cover the siege. He ought to carry on the war with *éclat*, for by the constant requisitions he has made for troops, he has much cramped our operations. I am told he has not less than 110,000 men round Mayence. The Prussians have a great deal of lee-way to make up, to regain the military character they established under their late king.

July 10.—Condé capitulated; the garrison to march out prisoners of war on the 13th.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Before Valenciennes, July 23, 1793.

I fear you will begin to be tired of Valenciennes, and everything relating to it; I will, therefore, only inform you that this morning at break of day all the batteries of our third parallel opened on the town, and have been firing, apparently with great effect, ever since. We hope that in about six-and-thirty hours the fire of the enemy will be considerably lessened, and then the globes of compression will be fired; if they succeed, the enemy's mines will be entirely destroyed, and a breach made in the counterscarp of their ditch, which we shall immediately

occupy, with their covered way. The next object of our attack will be their hornwork, behind which, I understand, there is a counter-guard. This, I fancy, we are to leave, and attack a ravelin which covers the curtain; and having once established ourselves there, it will be no very difficult task to batter a breach in the *corps de place*. You are now, with the assistance of the military dictionary, as wise as myself, for in regard to time or probability I never will again venture to form a conjecture when an Austrian engineer is concerned. We hear this morning that Custine, who went to Paris on Marat's death, is confined there, and that his successor is appointed; this is doubtful; but that one of his aides-de-camp deserted to the Prince of Cobourg the night before last is certain. Yesterday I made a most interesting and agreeable excursion with Sir Hew Dalrymple. We sallied out early in the morning to visit the advanced posts of the right of the Prince of Cobourg's army. Now lay aside your military dictionary, and out with your map; we first went to Douchy, whence we saw the enemy's camp near Bouchain. We then went to Denain, famous for the victory gained by Marshal Villars in the year 1712. The modern French have not totally destroyed the column commemorating this event, but have contented themselves with effacing the armorial ornaments. We then went to Escaudain:

from Escaudain the advanced line extends to Marchiennes; but we visited the village of Wallers, on purpose to see two regiments of hussars, called the Emperor's, which arrived two days ago from the confines of Turkey. From Wallers we passed through the Bois de Vicogne to Hasnon, which was the French head-quarters during most part of the month of May, at least till some time after Dampierre's death; it is a poor village, but remarkable for its abbey, which is one of the largest piles of buildings I ever saw; it was begun in the year '79, and completed in '84. It is now all in ruins, the shell only remains; and I am sure I do not exaggerate when I say it would make spacious barracks for at least 4000 men—such an edifice I conceive not absolutely necessary and essential for religious purposes. Finding there was no entertainment for man or horse at Hasnon, we proceeded to St. Amand. In the afternoon we set off again to visit the famous mud baths, which are about three miles from the town, in the Forêt de St. Amand. Conceive a large hot-house frame placed on a bog, and the bog separated into various small cells, over which a tilt like a huckster's cart, in which the patient is placed, and then commits the part affected to the muddy restorative. Here he sits or lies, as occasion may require, for one, two, or three hours at a time; the mud is very nauseous to look at, but does not

stink quite so much as I expected; there are two springs close to one another, both very clear: the one which I tasted is tepid, and, I thought, like the Bath water; the other, which I did not taste, in some degree resembles the Harrowgate. The war has prevented the assemblage of much company this year; the baths and neighbouring buildings are generally occupied by wounded Austrian soldiers. We saw one officer using the bath while we were there; his wound was in his arm; it was immersed in mud, which did not prevent his other holding his pipe, which he smoked during the ceremony. We returned through the Forêt de St. Amand to the village of Bruay, near which we have thrown a new communication over the Scheldt. Our excursion afforded us much amusement, and I shall be gratified if you receive any from the relation of it.

July 22.—A detachment of British artillery, consisting chiefly of long 6-pounders, arrived from Ostend. On the 23rd at break of day the batteries of the third parallel opened on the town, and continued a very severe fire till night; at the same time two batteries opened at Anzain, one consisting of six 16-pounders, *en ricochet*, and one of four mortars. The fire against the town was at this time as follows:

1st parallel.—Ten guns, eight mortars.

2nd parallel.—No. 1. Eight 12-pounders. No. 2. Three howitzers. No. 3. Four mortars. No. 4. Six howitzers. No. 5. Four mortars. No. 6. Eight 24-pounders. No. 7. Eight 24-pounders. No. 8. Three howitzers. No. 9. ——.

3rd parallel.—No. 1. Eight 24-pounders. No. 2. Two howitzers. No. 3. Four mortars. No. 4. Four mortars. No. 5. Four mortars. No. 6. Two mortars. No. 7. Eight 24-pounders. No 8. Eight 24-pounders. No. 9. Six mortars. No. 10. Four 24-pounders. No. 11. Two howitzers. No. 12. Four 24-pounders.

July 25.—At nine o'clock in the evening, three globes of compression, which had engaged the attention of the Miners for ten days past, being completed, were fired with good effect. The troops, which had previously been posted in the trenches for that purpose, immediately advanced to the attack of the covered way, which they carried. In the course of a couple of hours the column on the left made themselves masters of the hornwork, and before daybreak were completely established there.

July 26.—The next morning his Royal Highness sent one of his aides-de-camp to summon the town by the Porte de Tournay. At eight o'clock in the evening the Governor demanded a cessation of arms, which was granted till the next day at

four o'clock in the afternoon, when the Governor sent out articles of capitulation under which he offered to surrender. His Royal Highness sent his answer in the evening, and offered to continue the cessation of arms till the next morning at seven o'clock. During the cessation of arms, the Allies were indefatigable in advancing their works, and establishing themselves in those of the enemy which they had acquired on the night of the 25th.

July 28.—At six in the morning, six deputies, three military and three civilians, came out of the town, with powers from General Ferrand, the Governor, to sign the capitulation as offered by his Royal Highness. They were conducted to head-quarters, and at noon the capitulation was signed. In the evening the hostages were exchanged, and the gates and advanced works given up to the Allies.

TO HIS SISTER.

July 26, 1793.

I have only time to tell you that last night the globes of compression were fired at nine o'clock; as soon as their effects had ceased, the troops stormed and carried the covered way and the hornwork, where they established themselves, and by break of day were completely covered.

Our loss is small. I am sorry to say Ensign Tollemache (son of Lady Bridget) is killed, and Lieutenant Duer, of the 14th Regiment, badly wounded; Captain Warde, of the Guards, is wounded, not dangerously, of which you will inform the Grimstones. The above relates to our attack. The Austrians on our right were equally successful. At daybreak, the Duke, with the hope of saving the inhabitants and their remaining property, and of sparing further effusion of blood, sent me over here to summon the town. Ferrand answered that he must consult the municipality. It is now between four and five. I shall wait his trumpet, which he promised to send, till night, and I hope to have an agreeable postscript to add to this scrawl, which is written with very bad tackle at the advanced post at Mont d'Anzain. Remember me kindly to all at Oxhey.

P.S.—The Duke has just sent me word that Mayence is taken. I hope I shall have an opportunity of giving this news to the Governor of Valenciennes this evening. Adieu.

Head-Quarters, Nine o'clock.

The garrison have demanded a cessation of arms.

July 28.—The next night, his Royal Highness sent me with despatches, containing accounts of this important event, to the King, royal family, and the Ministers. In the night of the 30th I arrived in London, and the next morning had the honour of delivering his Royal Highness's despatches to his Majesty at Kew. I was on this occasion promoted to the rank of Major.

TO HIS SISTER.

Thatched House, St. James' Street,
Wednesday Morning, Two o'clock.

My dear Maria,

I know you will be happy to hear that I have arrived in town with the news of the surrender of the town and citadel of Valenciennes to the Allies, under the command of the Duke of York. Tell Mr. Grimstone that Captain Warde is wounded, but not dangerously. I am in great haste, just setting off to Windsor.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BRITISH PASS THE SCHELDT—INVASION OF FRANCE—DISUNION OF THE ALLIES—AFFAIR OF LINCELLES—THE HANOVERIANS ATTACK ROUSBRUGGE—GENERAL DALTON KILLED—THE AUSTRIANS INVEST QUESNOY—VICTORY OF GENERAL WURMSER—SIEGE OF DUNKIRK—DEFEAT OF COUNT WALMODEN BY THE FRENCH—THE BRITISH RETREAT FROM DUNKIRK.

THE events of the siege of Valenciennes have been described at a length perhaps hardly acceptable to the general reader, though not uninteresting to the military student of the war. No other siege of this period led to consequences equally important. The plan on which it was undertaken involved a considerable delay, but the result was certain. Colonel Moncrieff, the chief English engineer present, was of opinion that the body of the place should be attacked at once; but Feld-Zeugmeister Ferraris, who had distinguished himself at the capture of the camp of Famars, and possessed the confidence of the Austrian Commander-in-chief, was of a different opinion, and it was decided that the fortifications, erected under

the direction of Vauban himself, should be approached according to the established rules of attack. Major Calvert's absence from the army appears to have been very brief. He returned two days before the attack on the Camp de César, in which the French were routed with great loss. His journal is continued on August 6th.

August 6.—At five o'clock, a column under his Royal Highness the Duke, consisting of 16,000 men, marched from the camp before Valenciennes; it passed the Rouelle at Maresche, and Famars, and the Ecaillon at a bridge above Vendegies, and at Sommaing, the Selle at Haussy and Saulzoir, and took up a position in two lines between St. Aubert and Villers en Cauchie, with posts in the villages of Avesne le See, St. Hilaire, and St. Vaast. Head-quarters at Villers en Cauchie—a corps of Hessians took up a position between St. Pithon, and Romerie, to mask Quesnoy.

August 7.—The Duke's column moved from its left at four in the morning, and after some skirmishing, in the course of the day passed the Scheldt at Manières and Crêvecœur; head-quarters at Manières. The same day, Colloredo's column marched from Saulzoir and took up a position at

Naves in order to support General Clairfayt in the event of his making an attack on the Camp de César; but Clairfayt, who had marched from Haspres in the morning, found the passage of the river too well defended to attempt it, and took possession of the village of Ivuy.

August 8.—The Duke's corps, forming three columns, marched with a view of attacking the enemy's intrenched camp on the heights of Bourlon; 1st, English, commanded by his Royal Highness; 2nd, Hanoverians, under Field-Marshal Freytag; 3rd, Austrian, under Prince Hohenlohe. At the village of Marquion, the advanced guard came up with the enemy, who set fire to the village, and by that means gained time, and secured their retreat to the village of Vis en Artois; the Duke's column encamped near Bourlon, which was head-quarters. Colloredo's column advanced near Cambray, making a show of investing it. Clairfayt passed the river at Ivuy, in pursuit of the enemy, who fled from the Camp de César.

August 10.—The corps destined for the command of his Royal Highness marched in two columns from their right. Both columns passed the Censé at Aubanchoeuil-au-Bac, and encamped in two lines between Manchicourt (head-quarters) and Aniche; the corps de réserve at Azincourt. Pickets occupied the villages Fressain, Villers, and Aniche. This day

General Clairfayt, with the whole of the Austrian troops, except those that formed his Royal Highness's corps, returned to their old camp in the vicinity of Valenciennes.

August 11.—The army marched by its right through Sommaing and Marchiennes on the Scarpe, a strong post which had been defended by two battalions of Austrians, and encamped in two lines on the left of Orchies, which was head-quarters. Here we were joined by Count Walmoden's* corps. He had been detached from Valenciennes.

The Allies had now been successful in many of the objects which they had declared that they would accomplish. They had driven the French out of Austrian Flanders and Brabant; and their armies, having captured two important frontier fortresses, stood on French ground, ready to advance on the capital. No republican force, capable of resistance,

* Count Walmoden, born 1769. His father was minister from Hanover to the Court of Vienna. Count Walmoden entered the Hanoverian service. In 1790, exchanged into the Prussian service. When Prussia made peace with France by the treaty of Basle, Count Walmoden entered the Austrian service. He served with distinction in the campaigns from 1796 to 1801. Was at the battle of Wagram. In 1813, Count Walmoden entered the Russian service, and commanded a German Legion. In 1817, he returned to that of Austria, and, in 1821, was sent with the Austrian army against Naples.

interposed between them and Paris, which they might reach in fifteen marches. But the consequences of converting the war of defence and repulsion into one of aggression and conquest, predicted by Major Calvert, in his letter dated Bruges, April 17, had ensued. The whole French nation were united to withstand, to the uttermost, the attack on their native land—to save their country from dismemberment: the dread of this national ruin, banished the fear of other evils less only than this.

The duration of the sieges of Condé and Valenciennes, which would have been avoided had Colonel Moncrieff's counsels prevailed, and which Napoleon, as narrated by Las Cases, declared had saved France; had given the French government time to recruit their armies, and prepare military efforts on the most gigantic scale. The internal state of France was such, that honour, and even security, were to be found only in the ranks of the army; while the violation of the French soil had furnished to the revolutionary government, arguments of irresistible urgency and strength. The entire resources of the nation were placed at their disposal. The system of requisitions for the service of the state, enabled them to seize all property belonging to citizens in easy circumstances; and all Frenchmen were declared, by a decree of the Convention, to be at the service of the country, until its enemies should be driven from their

territory. "The young men shall march to the combat; the married ones shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall fabricate tents and clothes, and attend the military hospitals; the children shall make lint to serve as dressings for the wounds of the patients; while the old men shall cause themselves to be carried to the public squares to excite the courage of the warriors, to preach the unity of the republic, and inspire hatred against kings."

At this period the Allies suffered themselves to be disunited, by mutual jealousies and selfish objects; the successes gained by the bravery of their armies, were to be forfeited by the separate ambition of their cabinets. The Emperor's flag, not that of France, floated over the captured citadels of Valenciennes and Condé, and the Austrians, to the amount of 45,000 men, were besieging Le Quesnoy, while the remainder of their army preserved the communications. Prussia was alienated by a policy which was to render military success subservient to the aggrandisement of her rival in Germany; and the Cabinet of St. James's, we must recollect with regret, sought to acquire a portion of the sea-coast of French Flanders. The allied army, of 130,000 men, which, remaining united, might have given peace to Europe, was divided, and, by their division at this juncture, their enemy was saved.

The measure was dictated by the British Cabinet,

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and, as consequences of the utmost moment have been attributed to it, affecting both the fortunes and duration of the war, the Editor has given, in a note, the observations on the subject contained in the "Victoires et Conquêtes," and those of our own historian, Alison.*

* The French work "Victoires, Conquêtes, Revers, &c.," which the officers of their army and navy regard with such fondness, and consider of such high authority, refers in the following passages to the conduct of the Allies at this period:

"Heureux les Français de ce que les puissances réunies contre eux n'agissaient point avec ce concert qui fait la force des coalitions! Si la mésintelligence n'eût point tenu divisés d'intérêt les cabinets de l'Europe dans leurs efforts pour dissoudre la république, quel eût été le sort de la France?

* * * * *

"Mais pour avoir hésité quand il fallait frapper de grands coups, les puissances étrangères ne tardèrent point à s'apercevoir, qu'à la guerre encore plus qu'ailleurs, le temps perdu ne se répare jamais.

"Malgré la haine qu'inspirait à la saine partie de la nation française la tyrannie conventionelle, les dangers de la patrie et la crainte d'être vaincus, semblaient avoir réuni tous les partis, et leur avoir inspiré un même sentiment, celui de repousser par la force les étrangers qui voulaient les subjuguer et leur dicter des lois.

"Au moment donc où les alliés se préparaient à envahir la république, le Général Houchard, qui avait succédé au Général Kilmaine dans le commandement de l'armée du Nord, voyait accourir dans ses rangs une foule de braves, jaloux de verser leur sang pour la patrie. Mais il fallait du temps pour mettre

Our correspondence details the operations of the British force, numbering with the Germans serving

à profit cet enthousiasme et ce zèle des Français nouvellement arrivés sous les drapeaux. Les puissances alliées pouvaient, en mettant plus de franchise et d'ensemble dans leurs opérations militaires, dissiper facilement ces nouvelles recrues, encore inhabiles au métier de la guerre. Au lieu de combiner sagement leur plan, et de marcher de concert, en avant, à la poursuite de l'armée qui se retirait devant leurs bataillons, les deux généraux-en-chef des armées coalisées se séparèrent, pour agir particulièrement. Le Prince de Cobourg, à la tête des Autrichiens, se dirigea sur Maubeuge et le Quesnoy, pour en former le siège. Le Duc d'York, qui avait sous ses ordres les Anglais, les Hanovriens, les Hollandais, et les Hessois, se jeta du côté des places maritimes de France, dans l'intention d'assiéger Dunkerque, et de s'en emparer. Depuis longtemps, l'Angleterre ambitionnait la possession de cette place, qu'elle avait eue autrefois, et qu'elle avait rendue à des conditions si humiliantes, par le traité d'Utrecht; elle lui semblait le prix le plus avantageux de ses efforts, et un juste dédommagement de tous les trésors qu'elle prodiguait pour le soutien de la coalition contre la république: et peut-être est-ce à cette ambition déplacée que la France dut son salut à cette époque."

Alison remarks as follows. The fidelity of the historian constrains him to speak out on the impolicy of the measures adopted, at this period, by our rulers:

"If the conduct of the Allies had been purposely intended to develop the formidable military strength, which had grown up in the French Republic, they could not have adopted measures better calculated to effect their object than were actually pursued. Four months of success, which might have been rendered decisive, had been wasted in blameable

in the Duke of York's army, 35,000 men, which now quitted the main allied army, and advanced inactivity; after having broken the frontier line of fortresses, and defeated the covering army of France in a pitched battle, when within fifteen marches of Paris, and at the head of a splendid army of 130,000 men, they thought fit to separate their forces, and instead of pushing on to the centre of republican power, pursue independent plans of aggrandizement. The English, with their allies, amounting to above 35,000 men, moved towards Dunkirk, so long the object of their maritime jealousy, while 45,000 of the Imperialists sat down before Quesnoy, and the remainder of their vast army was broken into detachments to preserve the communications.

"From this ruinous division may be dated all the subsequent disasters of the campaign. Had they held together, and pushed on vigorously against the masses of the enemy's forces, now severely weakened and depressed by defeat, there cannot be a doubt that the object of the war would have been gained. The decrees for levying the population *en masse* were not passed by the Convention for some weeks afterwards, and the forces they produced were not organized for three months. The mighty genius of Carnot had not as yet assumed the helm of affairs; the Committee of Public Safety had not yet acquired its terrible energy; everything promised great results to vigorous and simultaneous operations. It was a resolution of the English Cabinet, in opposition to the declared and earnest wish of Cobourg and all the allied generals, which occasioned this fatal division. The impartial historian must confess with a sigh, that it was British interests which here interfered with the great objects of the war, and that by compelling the English contingent to separate for the siege of Dunkirk, England contributed to

to the coast with a view to lay siege to Dunkirk.

August 14.—The Austrians, to the amount of 14,000 arrived and encamped near Orchies, putting themselves under the orders of his Royal Highness the Duke of York. Lieutenant-general Count Alvinzi commanded this corps.

August 15.—The army marched in two columns —the first through Cysoing, the other through Rume, where they encamped. Basieux, headquarters.

August 16.—The army marched in two columns —the first through Lannoy, Roubaix, the other through Touflers, Leers, Watrelos, and encamped on the right of Tourcoin. General Fabri, commanding the light troops, covered the march on the left flank.

August 17.—The advanced guard, composed of the light cavalry, flank battalions, 2nd battalion Hessian Grenadiers, 2nd battalion Starai (Imperial), marched under the command of the Austrian General

postpone for twenty years its glorious termination. Posterity has had ample room to lament the error; a war of twenty years deeply chequered with disaster; the addition of six hundred millions to the public debt; the sacrifice of millions of brave men, may be in a great degree traced to this unhappy resolution."

Dalton, and encamped on the right of the village of Gilleuve.

August 18.—The army marched in two columns —the left by Roucq, crossing the Lys on a bridge of pontoons about a mile above Menin, the right through Neuville and Halluim, crossing the river at Menin. They encamped in two lines on the Ypres road with their left on Menin. In order to cover the march, the Dutch made an attack on the enemy's posts at Lincelles and Blaton, situated on the road from Werwick and Lille, which the enemy had fortified but did not defend. In the evening, however, the enemy attacked both these posts in great force. The Dutch retired from Blaton to Lincelles. On the enemy's approach, they abandoned Lincelles, leaving their guns and ammunition. At this moment, the brigade of Guards, under the command of Major-general Lake,* who had marched on the first notice of the attack, made their appearance. The General in vain endeavoured to persuade the Dutch to stand and rally under cover of the Guards, but nothing could persuade them to show the smallest countenance. He therefore resolved to attack the enemy with the three battalions he had with him, who, marching at a moment's warning out of camp, did not exceed 1200 men. The intrepidity of the troops made up for

* In 1804 created Lord Lake of Delhi and Laswary, and of Acton Clinton, Bucks.

the smallness of their numbers,* and under a most galling fire of grape, they stormed and carried the redoubts, &c., and took ten pieces of cannon, tumbrils, &c., and 70 prisoners. The loss on this occasion included Lieutenant-colonel Bosville, Coldstream Guards, Lieutenant De Prister, killed; Colonels Evans, Doyley, 1st Guards, Lieutenant-colonel Gascoyne, Coldstream; Captains Wathan, Bristow, Archer, 1st; Captain Cunningham, 3rd; Ensign Baily, Coldstream, wounded; men killed, 118 wounded. The 14th and 53rd British regiments, and two battalions of Hessians marched to reinforce General Lake; but the enemy showing no inclination to renew the attack, the Guards returned that night to camp.

August 19.—The English and Hessians at Lincelles were relieved by the Dutch, who destroyed the works and retired. The army of observation under Field-Marshal Freytag,† composed of all the Hanoverians, four squadrons of British cavalry, two battalions of Austrian, Brentano, marched to Ypres and encamped between that town and Poperingues.

August 20.—The army marched in one column,

* The "Gazette" extraordinary states, "From the concurring testimony of prisoners, the enemy had twelve battalions at the post."

† Freytag's army was detached from that of the Duke of York, and acted on his left.

the advaned guard, under General Dalton, encamped with their left to Elverdingen; the main body, after passing through Ypres, encamped with their left on Boesinghen.

August 21.—This morning, Marshal Freytag's force marched against the enemy's posts on the Yser. They lay on their arms till daybreak, when they attacked and carried the posts of Rousbrugge, Rexpoede and Hondschote, with the loss of about 40 men killed and wounded. They took eleven pieces of cannon and about 200 prisoners. The army marched in three columns—1st by Zuydcote, Nordschote, and Ostflaten, from thence along the *chaussée* to Furnes; 2nd, by Zuydcote, Nordschote and Loo, to Furnes; the artillery and baggage by Dixmude. The whole encamped on the north-west side of Furnes, about a league and a half from Gyvelde where the enemy had a strong camp.

August 22.—In the evening, the army under the immediate command of the Duke of York, marched from Furnes. At the same time Field-Marshal Freytag's corps of 18,000 men, which had done very good service on his Royal Highness's left flank during the march from the neighbourhood of Menin, took up a position nearly investing the town of Bergues, after having driven in all the enemy's advanced posts and taken eleven pieces of cannon. The Duke's corps marched in

three columns—the advanced column under General Dalton, followed by that under General Alvinzi, the left column under the orders of Major-general Wernek. At the same time a corps of light cavalry, under the command of Major-general Dundas moved along the strand upon the right of the whole. The enemy made little resistance at their camp of Gyvelde which the troops occupied that night.

August 23.—The next morning the army moved along the dyke (Generals Wernek and Dundas still being on the flanks) and after carrying several intrenchments and small forts with little loss, took up a position with their right on the Dunes, and their left extending in front of the villages of Teteghem and Lefferynchoucke. At a farm-house in front of the latter were his Royal Highness's head-quarters, about two miles from Dunkirk. The march of the cavalry on the strand, was this morning interrupted by a fire from some small French vessels which lay off Dunkirk. They were under the necessity of gaining the Dunes, and resumed their march on the Zuydcote road.

August 24.—It was his Royal Highness's intention this morning to drive the enemy from their advanced post at Rosendal. Soon after eight o'clock, the French were observed to come out of the town in force, apparently with a view of attacking our advanced pickets. General Dalton ordered his corps

under arms to their support, and after a considerable resistance, in overcoming which, the British grenadiers and light infantry, and a battalion of Hessian grenadiers, displayed great intrepidity, the Allies drove the enemy into the town, occupying the ground of which his Royal Highness had designed to possess himself. This evening, an intrenchment was begun which was carried from the Dunes quite to the left of the army with batteries for field-pieces. The flank battalion this day lost Lieutenant-colonel Eld killed, and Captain Williams wounded. The Austrian Lieutenant-general Dalton was killed—an irreparable loss to the service.

August 25.—In the evening I left head-quarters with despatches from his Royal Highness for their Serene Highnesses the Hereditary Prince of Orange and the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg.

August 26.—The remains of Lieutenant-general Dalton, and of Lieutenant-colonel Eld, were interred with military honours.

August 28.—Returned in the evening from Bermerain, the head-quarters of the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg.

August 29.—The 'Brilliant' frigate, with five armed cutters, and the 'Tryal' sloop, lay off the coast.

August 30.—Admiral McBride arrived from England, and having had a conference with his

Royal Highness, returned immediately. In the evening Major-general Prince Reuss, who had arrived on Wednesday evening from the head-quarters of the Prince of Cobourg, set out on his return.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF WALES.

Head-Quarters,
Lefferynchoucke, August 30, 1793.

Sir,

I should not so long have deferred availing myself of the honour your Royal Highness conferred on me by permitting me to address myself to you, had I not on the 25th instant been directed by his Royal Highness the Duke to convey despatches to their Serene Highnesses the Princes of Orange and Saxe-Cobourg.

* * * *

Your Royal Highness will have heard that the Imperialists, having entirely dislodged the enemy from the Forêt de Marmel, General Clairfayt, with a corps of 18,000 men, invested Quesnoy; the trenches were opened on the night of the 27th, and the Austrian engineers are of opinion that the place cannot hold out longer than a fortnight. The garrison have made frequent *sorties*, and constantly fire upon any object that presents itself within range of their guns.

The Prince of Cobourg has his head-quarters at the village of Bermerain, about nine miles south of Valenciennes; his corps of observation is necessarily very much dispersed, as he is under the necessity of covering the whole country from Bavay to Cysoing. The enemy have a camp at Maubeuge, it is reported, of nearly 10,000 men, and the camps which they still occupy at Arleux and Vitry receive daily augmentations, in consequence of the recent decrees of the National Convention, which are enforced with the utmost rigour.

While I was at Bermerain his Serene Highness received intelligence that General Wurmser had gained a complete victory in the neighbourhood of Landau, killing 3000 of the enemy and taking 15 pieces of cannon. The General has advanced as far as Billickheim.

On the morning of the 27th the enemy attacked the Dutch posts, east of the Lys; from three of them they were repulsed with the loss of three or four pieces of cannon, but they carried the post of Turcoin, and took one Dutch gun.

In consequence of the representation of the Hereditary Prince of Orange of the weakness of this part of the frontier, his Royal Highness the Duke is preparing to send him a reinforcement of cavalry, which, with some further aid from the Prince of Cobourg, will, I hope, enable the Dutch

to retain the post they at present occupy till the fall of Quesnoy enables the Prince of Cobourg to afford them more effectual support. Your Royal Highness will participate in the satisfaction with which I inform you that the officers who were wounded in the attack on the post of Lincelles, which did so much honour both to the troops and their commanding officer, are all in a fair way of recovery; I visited them at Menin the day before yesterday. Your Royal Highness will hear with pleasure that Colonel Leigh, at the head of the flank battalion of the Guards, as well as Major Mathews, with the flank battalion of the Line, distinguished themselves very much by the service they performed on Saturday last, when the enemy's advanced post at the village of Rosendal was carried by the right wing of his Royal Highness's Army. We had to lament the death of Lieutenant-colonel Eld; Captain Williams of the 1st was wounded, but not dangerously. The loss which the armies have sustained in the person of the Austrian Lieutenant-general Dalton will not be easily repaired. The enemy have since that day confined themselves within their works, and give us very little annoyance. I hope a sufficient quantity of the necessary articles for the siege will very soon be landed, and that we shall open the trenches in a few days. Our advanced pickets are at present, as

nearly as I can judge, within a thousand yards of the enemy's outworks.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The Duke of York expected to be assailed by the French army now collected in great force in Dunkirk. The following shows the preparation made by his Royal Highness to repel the attack:

Lefferynchoucke, August 31, 1794.

Disposition for the army in case of a general attack upon the front of our position.

As soon as the fleet shall have secured our right flank, the enemy can apparently attack our front only, and this may be expected on the right rather than on the left wing.

If, in case of an alarm after the pickets in the intrenchments have advanced to the support of the outposts, the Lieutenant-general of the day should not find himself strong enough to repulse the enemy with the reserve that is ordered daily in camp, he must immediately report to his Royal Highness, and at the same time give an order to the non-commissioned officer posted in the redoubt of the bridge to light the beacon which is placed there, which signal will be repeated by the beacon placed on the Dunes. Upon this signal, the troops will form in

the places allotted to them, in case of an alarm, in the following order:

ON THE RIGHT.

One Battalion of Staray will immediately occupy the intrenchments between No. 3 and No. 4.

One Battalion of Staray will remain as a reserve at the cross-roads near the sign of "Le Beau Jardinier."

One Battalion, British (viz., Flank Battalion of the line) between Nos. 4 and 6.

One Battalion, Hessian, between Nos. 6 and 7.

Two Battalions, Hessians, as a reserve, near the Dykes, as far as the house of M. Tavannes.

For this purpose, each corps must form communications, in order not to be obliged to march on the Dykes. Farther to the right, from No. 2 to No. 3, one Battalion of Jordis will advance between Nos. 1 and 2, and one Battalion of British (viz., 14th Regiment) from No. 2 to No. 3, as a support.

One Battalion, Jordis, one Battalion, Stuart, two Battalions, British (53rd and 37th Regiments), must be under arms in front of their respective camps, and wait for orders.

Should any one of the Battalions destined for the intrenchments, or as a support from No. 1 to No. 3, be at the time on duty, the General commanding the brigade must supply the place by one of those which remain in reserve. Should this be the case

with the Regiment of Staray, and the 2nd Battalion of the regiment posted at the "Beau Jardinier" be in consequence obliged to advance into the intrenchments, he must in its stead order one of the two Hessian Battalions at the Château de Tavannes to the sign of the "Beau Jardinier."

The cavalry of the right wing and six squadrons of Karaigzay must be under arms in front of their respective camps and wait for orders, sending one squadron to the picket already posted.

Each camp must have convenient communications made to its alarm ground, in order that the great roads may remain perfectly open on each movement; and the commanding officers of regiments must make themselves acquainted with the roads in the rear of the camp convenient for sending off the baggage, and order the necessary communications to be made.

The baggage of the right wing must proceed along the Dunes and assemble at Zuydcote, where it must wait for orders, without passing the canal. The main road on the canal must at all times remain open for the reserve artillery and the troops.

ON THE LEFT.

One Battalion of Joseph Colloredo must advance, on the communication established near the Dyke, into the intrenchments Nos. 1 and 2.

One Battalion of Wentzler Colloredo must advance as far as the road that leads from the white house on the Dyke towards Teteghem.

The remainder of the Austrian troops will proceed, on the communication near the Dyke, as far as the bridge of pontoons, and remain in column, ready to give support to the right or left wing as may be necessary.

The Hessian troops of the left wing are to send:

One Battalion in the rear of the intrenchments Nos. 3 and 4.

One Battalion between Nos. 4 and 5.

One Battalion between Nos. 5 and 6 on the communication leading to it.

The remainder of the Hessian troops remain under arms in front of their respective camps.

One Battalion of British (viz., Flank Battalion Guards) will advance towards No. 7, and the remainder must be under arms, ready to support the corps of Emigrants at Teteghem. One squadron of cavalry will advance to the picket already posted, and the remainder wait for orders in front of their camp.

The whole of the baggage falls back as far as Gyvelde, and there waits for orders, for which purpose each corps must have the necessary communications established in the rear of its camp. The main road on the Dyke remains open for artillery and troops;

and that this may be exactly observed, the English cavalry must furnish 50 horse in case of an alarm, who must receive orders not to suffer any baggage-waggon, on any pretext whatever, to pass on the Dyke from hence to Zuydcote. His Royal Highness will give a particular order for striking the tents, and sending off the baggage as soon as the army marches out.

The general officers commanding brigades are to communicate these instructions to the officers commanding the respective regiments under their orders.

September 1.—The weather was so bad as to oblige the 'Brilliant,' &c., to leave their station.

September 2.—A reinforcement of 200 artillerymen arrived at the Park; every exertion was used to bring forward the guns, ammunition, &c. that were landed at Nieuport.

September 3.—A Lieutenant of the Navy arrived from Admiral McBride, saying that he was ready to sail with the 'Centurion,' 50, 'Sheerness,' 44, 'Quebec,' 'Vestal,' 'Ceres,' 'Orpheus,' frigates; 'Albion,' 'Union,' armed ships; 'Echo,' sloop; 'Vesuvius,' 'Terror,' bombs; and 'Comet,' fire-ship.

September 5.—Marshal Freytag ordered an attack to be made on the enemy's camp, between the villages of Zermezeele and Arnike, near Cassel.

The camp was carried, but not without a considerable loss, which fell chiefly on the left column led by General Fabri, who was badly wounded. He had with him only one battalion and about 80 Hussars. The right column met with unexpected obstacles on their march, and the left had to sustain, unsupported, a conflict with the whole force of the enemy. It was extremely imprudent to make an attack with so small a force on a camp which could receive support from Cassel.

September 6.—The enemy attacked the Field-Marshal's outposts, and at night he thought it prudent to retire to Hondschote. On the march, his Royal Highness Prince Adolphus, and the Field-Marshal were taken prisoners, but rescued. The garrison of Dunkirk made an attack on the right wing of the Duke of York's army this afternoon at three o'clock; the affair lasted about three hours, during which the enemy received much assistance from their small vessels, which, by a constant and well-directed fire, annoyed the right wing of the Allies. The enemy were beaten back before sunset into their covered way. No advantage could be taken of the enemy's defeat, as the instant the Allies advanced, they were exposed to the cross-fire from the ramparts of the town and the vessels. This evening, the 14th Regiment suffered considerably, and Colonel Moncrieff, the chief engineer, received a mortal wound.

September 7.—The enemy attacked Count Walmoden, who, on Field-Marshal Freytag being disabled by wounds, had succeeded to the command of the Hanoverian army, and gained some advantage over him. The enemy took possession of Rousbrugge and Poperingues, crossed the Yser and carried the post of Bambeke. In the afternoon an attack was made on the right wing of his Royal Highness's army; the enemy was again repulsed.

September 8.—In the morning, the enemy made an appearance of a general attack from Dunkirk. It did not begin, however, on the Duke of York's line till three o'clock in the afternoon, when the gun-boats of the enemy got under weigh, and cannonaded the camp of the Allies; under their fire the enemy more than once attempted to turn our right flank, by marching along the strand; but the good countenance of our cavalry, and the steadiness of the troops engaged on the Dunes, prevented their carrying their project into execution. The day shut in as the foregoing one, the enemy being obliged to retire into their works. During the action, his Royal Highness received intelligence of the defeat of the troops under Count Walmoden at Hondschote. The Count sent word that he was retiring with his right to Bulscamp, and his left at the village of S——*, which post he

* Sic orig.

would maintain as long as he could; but from the events of the day, he could not be answerable for the consequences of another general attack. The enemy being in possession of Hondschote and the adjacent country, a retreat from before Dunkirk became a measure of absolute necessity: accordingly, at midnight the army moved, leaving behind them 32 pieces of battering cannon, 300 barrels of powder, and other stores which it was impossible to bring off, or even to destroy. Thus ended the projected siege of Dunkirk. During the time we were before the place, the army lost more men than the siege would have cost. That an undertaking strongly recommended from home, received no countenance or naval co-operation, appeared very extraordinary. This remissness on the part of the government excited much indignation in the army, and no small astonishment among our Allies.

CHAPTER V.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DUKE OF YORK'S RETREAT — BOMBARDMENT OF YPRES BY THE FRENCH—NAVAL OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF THE DUTCH—THE PRINCE OF COBOURG DEFEATS THE FRENCH AT AVESNE-LE-SEC—THE FRENCH DEFEATED AT MENIN—ATROCIOUS CONDUCT OF THE FRENCH.

THE failure of the siege of Dunkirk produced results highly prejudicial to the fortune of the war. In this light it was regarded at the time, and one of the objects in making public these papers will be gained if attention is drawn to the want of arrangement which prevailed in combining the forces of the country, and if, in case we should have the misfortune of being again engaged in war, the chance of failure from such causes is obviated. In remarking on these circumstances, the "Annual Register" says:

"A considerable naval armament from Great Britain was to have co-operated in the siege, but, by some extraordinary neglect, Admiral McBride

was not able to sail so early as was expected. In the meantime the allied army was extremely harassed by the gun-boats of the French. A successful sortie was effected by the garrison on the 6th of September; on the same day the covering army of General Freytag was surprised and totally routed; and that General and Prince Adolphus Frederick both taken prisoners. They were afterwards rescued. The consequence of these disasters was, that as the French were known to be collecting in superior force, the siege was raised on the 7th, after several severe actions, in which the allied forces suffered very considerably."

The French were still more alive than ourselves to the results of raising the siege of Dunkirk. The work which has been previously quoted, "Victoires, Conquêtes, &c.," contains the following observations on the subject:

"On avait prévu si peu le cas d'un siège, que la place était dans le plus grand délabrement, et eût été, sans nul doute, emportée, si la flotille de bombardement se fût présentée devant la ville en même temps que l'armée de terre; mais, contre l'attente du Duc d'Yorck, et malgré ses messages réitérés en Angleterre, la flotille ne parut point, et cette circon-

stance remarquable fut une des causes indirectes de la victoire qu'allaient remporter les Français."

* * * * *

"Désespéré de ce contre-temps, le Duc s'occupa avec activité de rassembler tous les moyens qui pouvaient le mettre à même de se passer du secours de la flotille. Sept batteries furent construites autour de la place assiégée, et il fit faire à ses troupes différens mouvemens pour resserrer davantage la ville de Dunkerque. Plusieurs villages, que tenaient encore les Français, furent emportés par les Anglais, malgré l'opiniâtre résistance des troupes convenues à leur défense. Mais pendant que le temps se consumait ainsi en affaires partielles, le général Houchard rassemblait son armée. Carnot était venu lui-même au quartier-général de Houchard, lui apporter les ordres et les plans du gouvernement républicain, et animer, par sa présence, l'ardeur déjà extrême de son armée."

The consequences of this defeat proved ruinous to the whole campaign. It excited the most extravagant joy at Paris, and elevated the public spirit to a degree great in proportion to the former depression. The dislodging of a few thousand men at the extremity of the line, changed the face of the war from the German to the Mediterranean Sea. The Conven-

tion, relieved from the dread of immediate danger, and the peril of invasion, obtained time to mature its plans of foreign conquest, and organize the immense military preparations in the interior; and Fortune, weary of a party which threw away the opportunities of receiving her favours, passed over to the other side.

September 9.—The army arrived at Furnes without loss. They occupied their former ground, with the addition of a strong corps at the bridge of Adinkerke. The redoubt at the head of it was put in a state of defence. Two battalions of Guards were sent to reinforce Count Walmoden.

September 10.—Count Walmoden's corps took up a new position with its right to Furnes, and its left extending along the Canal of Loo. Ypres was bombarded the night before.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Furnes, September 10, 1793.

The 'Brilliant' being detained for the reception of Prince Adolphus, gives me an opportunity of sending you a few lines. I gave my father an

account yesterday (which he will forward to you) of the unfortunate circumstances which have put us under the necessity of retiring from before Dunkirk. The enemy, after their victory over Marshal Freytag's army, have made a movement towards Ypres, which they attacked yesterday evening. The works of Ypres were dismantled at the same time that the other fortifications of the Imperial towns in the Low Countries were destroyed; fortunately, within this last month they have been in some degree repaired, and I hope the garrison will be able to hold out, at least a few hours longer. His Royal Highness has resolved to march to their succour; accordingly, we move in two columns this afternoon by the route of Dixmude. In the meantime, I cannot be free from apprehension for the fate of Furnes, which must expect the attack of all the enemy's force from Dunkirk. General Abercromby, a very able officer, is left for its defence with all the troops we can spare him. I hope our forward movement will induce the Dutch in this emergency to act with effect; and I am persuaded that if an occasion presents itself, we shall prove to the enemy that, though obliged by circumstances to fall back from before Dunkirk, we are still the conquering army. I do assure you the Duke's character rises very much by this reverse of fortune. His good humour and spirits never forsake him, and he meets the unfortunate events that have

happened with a degree of constancy and resolution that do him infinite honour. He has had many mortifications and disappointments, but I have a presentiment that, though our situation at present is but so-so, he will rise superior to them all. I postpone to a more convenient season giving you—at least, as far as my poor opinion goes—the causes of our disaster; but be assured that every exertion is necessary *at home*, to enable us to oppose the enemy that is come against us, and to prevent Flanders being again overrun by the banditti that infested it last year.

Mr. Fox's sentiments on the ill success of the expedition did not greatly differ from those which dictated the foregoing letter. On April 10th, 1794, he said:

"With regard to the failure against Dunkirk (which they all lamented, as extremely disastrous to the British arms), he rejoiced that no insinuation had been made in the smallest degree disrespectful to the character or conduct of the Duke of York; and that, after the raising of the siege, West Flanders had been recovered under the Prince's immediate orders. What man could do, he had done; but, apprehending that his Royal Highness had not been

properly supported from home, the honourable mover (Major Maitland) called for an inquiry."

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Furnes, September 11, 1793.

In the present position of our affairs, every moment is interesting; therefore I will not let the mail go without a few lines, though I wrote to you yesterday. The night has passed quietly, which has given our troops the refreshment of which they stood so much in need, and I am now under no anxiety: on the contrary, I am confident that if the enemy attack us and present to us any vulnerable point, we are able and ready to avail ourselves of it. They are at Gyvelde, and, we hear, are advanced as far as Bulscamp, on the Hondschote road. They again made a movement towards Ypres, in the course of the night; but I hope they have now no chance of penetrating in that quarter. Still we cannot be without apprehension, for should they break in upon our cordon at that point, they would immediately turn our left flank and make our present position untenable. A forward movement of this army to the support of Ypres, though justifiable by the greatness of the object, must leave Furnes in a state of much

insecurity. Admiral McBride is off Nieuport, but the aid he gives to us now is more in appearance than reality; he can only secure the sea-shore, between which and Furnes there is space for the march of a large army.

A French newspaper (I think of the 6th) announces a very extraordinary piece of intelligence, viz., the surrender of Toulon to the English, in the night of the 26th of last month. It states that no lives were lost on the occasion; that the inhabitants who chose it, and the few troops who remained attached to the Republic, were allowed to depart unmolested; and that twenty-seven sail of English shipping (I conclude ships of war) occupied the harbour, and the troops the town, arsenals, &c. The Constitution formed by the National Convention had been burnt by the common hangman, the day before. If this is true, we have made an acquisition of more essential advantage to the real interests of Great Britain than all the frontier of French Flanders together.

The mail being ordered to be dispatched, I have only time to add that we apprehend the enemy are endeavouring to turn our left flank, which will probably occasion some immediate movement.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Dixmude, September 13, 1793.

Sir James Murray's return to England gives me an opportunity of sending a few lines, and congratulating you on the fall of Quesnoy, which has surrendered at discretion. We moved from Furnes very early yesterday morning, in three columns: the one passed through the town of Nieuport, and encamped with their right near the town, extending their left on the canal towards Dixmude. The second passed the canal, and marching to Dixmude, encamped with their left to the town, their right towards Nieuport, with the canal in their front. The third column, under Count Walmoden, passed the canal at Dixmude, and are encamped from Romen to Closter van Merkem, occupying Fort de Kenocke on the canal; they are likewise to have an advanced post at Loo. In my own opinion, the distance between Nieuport and this place (three leagues) is too great for co-operation, and I think it very probable we may make some small alteration in our position.

In the meantime, I am rather anxious about General Abercromby. He is left at Furnes, with orders to fall back upon Nieuport, if pressed. All was quiet with him yesterday morning, and I sin-

cerely hope that we may be able to occupy the attention of the enemy, and draw them off from Furnes. The latest intelligence leads us to suppose that they have between 15,000 and 16,000 men betwixt Rousbrugge and Hondschote. Besides the army at Gyvelde, their whole force from Lille to Dunkirk may amount to 80,000 men. Yesterday evening they attacked the Dutch posts of Messines, Werwicke, and Commines upon the Lys, but I fancy nothing decisive occurred on either side.

The fall of Quesnoy happens very *à-propos*, and will set the Prince of Cobourg at liberty to send us effectual aid on this frontier. As our time is a good deal occupied, I only add my best wishes to all at Albury.

September 13.—The Dutch troops under the Hereditary Prince of Orange, were totally defeated in the neighbourhood of Menin, which town that Prince abandoned. He retired to Haerlebeke with the reserve of his army, the rest being scattered all over the country, some flying that night as far as Bruges, where the gates were shut against them. The next morning, the Hereditary Prince retired to Deinze, afterwards to Ghent, where he ordered his army to re-assemble on the 19th. General Beaulieu remained between Menin and Courtray. In conse-

quence of the defeat of the Dutch, his Royal Highness marched, with the Gros of the army, to Thorout, sending orders to General Abercromby, who had been left at Furnes, to fall back upon Nieuport and Dixmude.

September 15.—Marched to Rouselaere. The French, who had on the 13th defeated the Dutch army, were this day completely beaten by General Beaulieu with six battalions and six squadrons. Some of the British cavalry arrived in time to share the honour of the victory. The Allies took possession of Menin, the state of which town loudly proclaimed the inhumanity of the enemy.

September 16.—The army moved to Menin. Received intelligence of the victory gained by the Prince of Cobourg, who, hearing that the enemy were advancing from Cambray, Bouchain, and Landrecy, to interrupt the convoy of the prisoners taken at Quesnoy, which surrendered on the 11th, ordered his cavalry to attack them in the neighbourhood of Avesne-le-Sec. The enemy's cavalry immediately fled, and the infantry formed a square. At the first charge the Imperialists killed 1500, when the French gave way on all sides. The Austrians took or killed the whole of the enemy, amounting to 6000 (except 300 who escaped), with eighteen pieces of cannon, all that the enemy had in the field.

On the evening of the 14th, the 19th Regiment, the 57th, and three companies of the 42nd joined.

September 17.—Army halted.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Menin, September 17, 1793.

I wrote to you from Dixmude on the morning of the 13th, and Sir James Murray took charge of my letter. His departure was prevented by the extraordinary events that have since crowded upon us, but I trust my letter found its way to Albury. In the afternoon of the 13th, we received intelligence that the Dutch had been defeated in the neighbourhood of Menin, and that the enemy were in possession of that town. His Royal Highness immediately sent me in search of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, to learn the extent of the calamity, and to induce his Serene Highness, by offers of immediate support, not to abandon Courtray. On my arrival at Thorout (the very first stage), I met many of the fugitives, who, in great numbers (not perfectly assured of their safety at that place), pushed on to Bruges, where their flight was stopped by some British officers, who ordered the gates to be shut on

them. The accounts I received were very different, but all agreed that they had been most completely beaten. I went as far as Deinze, on the Ghent road, in pursuit of a person whom, from description, I imagined to be the Prince of Orange. On my arrival there, I found it was the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, who had assured his retreat by immediately pushing on for Ghent, and that the Hereditary Prince was with the reserve of his army at Haerlebeke, where I joined him at daybreak. His troops were then under arms to retire to Deinze. He has since fallen back to Ghent, where he has ordered his army to reassemble on the 19th. His Serene Highness laid much of the blame of his defeat on General Beaulieu, who, with six battalions and six squadrons of Austrians, lay near Menin; but the General's account is so clear, and his conduct at the time and since so decided and proper, that I fear our Dutch friends must bear it all themselves. I fancy they lost between 3000 and 4000, more prisoners than killed.

The Austrians speak highly of the conduct of Prince Frederick of Orange; and the corps immediately under him behaved well *till* he was wounded. General Beaulieu appears to have covered the flight of the Dutch, and prevented the enemy penetrating any farther than Menin. His Royal Highness, in consequence of this event, marched from Dixmude

on the 14th, sending orders to General Abercromby to quit Furnes, and fall back upon Nieuport and Dixmude.

On the 15th, we arrived at Rouselaere, which had been occupied by our advanced guard the night before. The advanced guard of cavalry immediately moved on to join General Beaulieu, who lay near Menin, and arrived just in time to take part in a victory which that General obtained over the French, and to occupy Menin that night. The army marched here yesterday. The enemy, during the short time they were in possession of Menin, have given a most diabolical example of their boasted philanthropy and fraternity, by destroying every article of every sort they could lay their hands on. Such a complete devastation must have been attended with some labour, for the inside of every house is gutted, and what could not be carried off is maliciously destroyed.

The Hereditary Prince has much to answer for. Whether he could help the misfortune, I do not pretend to judge; but certain it is that, even after his defeat, he was as strong as General Beaulieu, who kept his ground, and finally recovered Menin. The Prince of Cobourg, after having gained a victory over the enemy, has advanced as far as Cysoing, with a view to co-operation with us; and a day or two will, I hope, be sufficient to refresh our men,

who have undergone great fatigue lately. From the junction and co-operation of all our armies, the best consequences may be expected.

The circumstances attending the late victory of the Austrians are, as well as I can learn, as follows:— The Prince of Cobourg, hearing that a corps was assembled from Cambray, Bouchain, and Landrecy, with a view of attacking the convoy of the prisoners from Quesnoy, sent fourteen squadrons of cavalry, who came up with them near Avesne-le-Sec. The enemy's cavalry immediately fled; the infantry formed into a square, and were immediately attacked by the Imperialists, who, at the first charge, killed 1500. The enemy gave way on all sides, and out of 6000, 300 only made their escape. The Austrians took all the cannon the enemy had, viz., eighteen pieces and two culverines.

I am not yet without my apprehensions for our right flank. The enemy are in very great force, and may certainly make detachments from Cassel towards Nieuport; the communication with which place and Ostend appears to me to be absolutely necessary, and their safety the *sine quâ non* of the existence of our army on this frontier. But I dare say our movements depend on better heads than mine, and in them I confide that so essential an object as our communication with the sea will not be neglected.

The news from Toulon gives much satisfaction

Are you not preparing a land force to back the good intentions of the people? We have on this northern frontier, likewise, some Loyalists who are assembled—they say, to the number of 14,000—in the neighbourhood of Aire; and I hope some arrangements are being made to give them support. The intelligence of to-day is, that the enemy are using every exertion to collect a prodigious force near Lille, for the safety of which place they begin to be apprehensive. I hope this object will occupy all their attention, for I fear them on our right flank only. His Royal Highness has ordered their post at Commines to be attacked to-morrow; I understand he means to be present himself. Our light troops will make the attack, supported by three or four battalions. We have been joined, since I wrote to you last, by the 19th and 57th Regiments, complete, and three companies of the 42nd. If the reason given for the remainder of that regiment not being arrived, is true—viz., the *want of transports*—I cannot help thinking there must be some very unaccountable mismanagement in the department to which we have so long fruitlessly looked for naval co-operation.

P.S.—From what the Duke told me to-day, I find it is his Royal Highness's intention to spend part of the winter in England, and I hope he will take his

family with him. I therefore dare flatter myself with the expectation of seeing my friends before Christmas, in which case I shall draw on my friend John for a Brock,* and hope to pouch an old cock partridge or a long tail with him.

September 18.—The army halted. In the night an order arrived from the Prince of Cobourg for a strong detachment to be made from the army under his Royal Highness, to occupy Cysoing, at that time the head-quarters of his Serene Highness. Accordingly, early in the morning of the 19th, a corps of about 9000 men marched under Count Walmoden.

September 20.—The engineers commenced repairing and improving the defences of Menin; and the Allies occupied Werwicke, on the Lys. A corps of upwards of 3000 occupied the village of Mouscron, about two leagues east of the Lille Chaussée, with orders, if pressed, to fall back on Courtray.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Menin, September 20, 1793.

When I wrote to you last, on Tuesday, I flattered myself that, from the approach of the Prince of

* Probably a gunmaker.

Cobourg (his Serene Highness having advanced towards us as far as Cysoing), something decisive was likely to take place in this quarter. I find, however, that I was mistaken, for the enemy have removed their force from the Camp de la Madeleine, and taken a position about ten leagues south-east of Lille, between that city and Douay. The Prince of Cobourg has fallen back to St. Amand on his way to Maubeuge, the siege of which place is, I understand, to commence immediately, and to be carried on, *coûte qui coûte.* The Hereditary Prince of Orange has agreed to lend 10,000 Dutch on this occasion, and I dare say that, with the Austrians, they will do very well in the trenches. There appears to be much good sense in this proceeding of the Prince of Cobourg, as without Maubeuge the acquisitions we have made would not be in a state of security during the winter; but it reduces us to the disagreeable necessity of acting on the defensive only, at least for the present. By the Prince of Cobourg's order, we detached nearly 10,000 men to Cysoing yesterday. As the corps under General Beaulieu has joined us, this does not reduce our numbers more than by 1000 or 1500 men. We are to put this town in a state of defence, and the same is being done at Ypres; but the enemy being in possession of Commines, Warneton, and Messines, that place cannot be considered a good post, and it is probably on that

account that his Royal Highness makes this his head-quarters.

The enemy are increasing their army by every means in their power, pressing into the service every man who is not absolutely disabled by age or infirmities. Yesterday they wantonly set fire to the village of Rousbrugge. I believe his Royal Highness means to send a trumpet to remonstrate on this inhuman proceeding. We are rather alarmed by the non-arrival of the mail, which has been due since yesterday; and the wind having been fair, leads us to apprehend it may have met with some accident. Till the fall of Maubeuge sets us at liberty, the accounts from hence will probably not be very interesting. When anything happens worthy of your attention, you shall hear again.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FRENCH ATTACK WERWICKE—SIEGE OF MAUBEUGE—SUFFERINGS OF THE PEASANTRY—SIEGE OF MAUBEUGE RAISED BY THE FRENCH.

September 22.—We received the news of the defeat of the French by the Duke of Brunswick in the neighbourhood of Landau.

September 23.—General Abercromby joined from Dixmude.

September 26.—His Royal Highness set off this morning at daybreak, to pay a visit to the Stadtholder, who was with the Dutch troops near Ghent. This morning, under cover of a thick fog, the enemy made an attack on the outposts at Werwicke: our loss amounted to 20 killed and wounded, and upwards of 50 prisoners.

September 29.—Sir J. Murray returned from England.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Menin, October 2, 1793.

You express so much anxiety to hear how we go on, that I give you a few lines frequently when I have really no news to make my letter worth the trouble of opening, for we are here very quiet and very dull, except that our outposts at Werwicke are generally attacked every other morning. I very impatiently wait the fall of Maubeuge, when I think that we shall have it in our power to act offensively. The Prince of Cobourg attacked and carried two of the enemy's advanced camps two days ago. He is now before the intrenched camp of Maubeuge, which I hear, is very strong, and likely to be well defended. His Serene Highness has with him twenty-nine battalions of the finest infantry in Europe, and a very large force of cavalry. The Prince of Orange has consented to co-operate with him, and carries with him 16,000 men, whom he represents as very desirous of an opportunity of proving by their gallantry that the misfortune at Menin was owing entirely to General Beaulieu, and not to any misconduct of theirs. We daily expect good news from the Prince of Cobourg. In the meantime, I am not without my apprehensions for the safety of the frontier at

Poperingues, Loo, Dixmude, &c., and many people are under more alarm for our own post, which does not give me the smallest; and I hope my fears for those on our right will turn out to be groundless. Plunder and rapine appear to be the enemy's object in all their incursions into the imperial territory, and the sufferings of the unfortunate peasants who reside on the frontiers are beyond all description. I heartily wish some of our countrymen, who do not appear to be sensible of the blessings they enjoy in residing in a land of liberty and security, and under the protection of a government which is equally the refuge of the high and the low, could be transported for a time to witness the scenes of devastation and misery that we have before us.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Menin, October 6, 1793.

My Lord Elgin's return to England offers me an opportunity, of which I avail myself, of sending you a few lines, though I have no particular news; from the situation of the armies, I hope I shall soon have something important to communicate. The Prince of Cobourg, as I before wrote you, has invested Maubeuge and the intrenched camp; he was

last night joined by the Dutch troops; and the day after to-morrow, I understand, he commences his attack. I have heard the plan is to bombard the camp for a couple of days, and then to storm it.

The enemy have been making every exertion to increase their army, and by the introduction of a guillotine into every town in France, have been tolerably successful. By the latest accounts, they have a camp of 10,000 men at Arleux; they have another at Vitry, which, passing through Montauban and Gaverolle, extends along the *chaussée* from Douay to Arras. This camp they give out to consist of nearly 40,000 men; their best troops compose it, with a formidable train of artillery. To form this corps, many troops have been drawn from Lille and the Camp de la Madeleine; and it is to this army that they look for the relief of Maubeuge. But I am in hopes that point will be decided before they can arrive there, and that if they make a forward movement, their retreat may not be so easily effected.

Yesterday we received intelligence that the enemy, in the course of the night, had very much weakened their posts on the Lys, and that the greatest part of their force on this frontier had fallen back towards Aire. This manœuvre indicates some internal commotion; and I have a great notion that the discontent of the people on the late rigorous proceedings of the National Convention is breaking out in every part;

if so, I don't despair of giving them a hard blow yet, before the campaign is over.

We have been under much anxiety for General Lake, who has been very dangerously ill. He is sufficiently recovered to return to England, where, if the sincere wishes of those who have served in the campaign under his command could have any avail, he would speedily recover, for he is most universally beloved and respected.

October 10.—In consequence of a requisition of the Prince of Cobourg, the troops marched from Menin, leaving a corps of nearly 5000 men for the defence of that place, under the Austrian Lieutenant-general, Count Erbach. The works were at this time considerably advanced, and all accounts coinciding in the reports of the enemy's having assembled all the force they possibly could near Cambray, for the purpose of relieving Maubeuge, left us less to apprehend for the safety of Menin during our absence. The troops were this night cantoned in Pecq and other villages about half-way between Courtray and Tournay. The Austrians, who had marched the evening before under Count Alvinzi, reached the camp near Cysoing to-day.

October 11.—The camp was pitched on a very fine plain, having the right at Basieux and their left

at Cysoing; his Royal Highness's quarters at the Château de Camphin.

The corps which had occupied this post under Count Walmoden formed in the line with the troops from Menin.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Chateâu de Camphin, October 11, 1793.

The camp is once more upon a plain, and should the enemy make an attempt upon it, I have no doubt we should give a very good account of them, but there is no appearance of any intention of the kind at present; on the contrary, they have moved from Vitry, and all the troops they can muster are assembled at Guise, to the amount, I hear, of 30,000 regular soldiers. The numbers of their new levies it is very difficult and perhaps useless to ascertain, for though they would tell in continued operations on a long frontier, I do not conceive they add much to the enemy's force in an action, and that appears to be the event on which the fate of Maubeuge will depend. Jourdan has probably his orders to relieve Maubeuge, *coûte qui coûte*, and he well knows he must not let his own judgment interfere with the wish of his employers. The Prince of

Cobourg will with pleasure give him the meeting whenever he advances into the open country, which he must do in the neighbourhood of Avesne, in his march from Guise towards Maubeuge. It is supposed he will march to-morrow morning, in which case it is probable that on Monday this great event will be decided; and if valour and discipline are to prevail, I feel confident of the success of the Allies.

The Dutch have arrived before Maubeuge, but they refuse to pass the Sambre, and say they are come to besiege the town and will have nothing to do with the intrenched camp. We must not, I fear, in any situation rely much on the exertions of troops who are to choose their service.

The 19th, 27th, 42nd, and 57th Regiments set out from Menin, on their march for Ostend this morning; they are a very fine body of men, much too good for the climate of the West Indies, to which they are destined. The service they are wanted for is, I conclude, urgent, or they would not have been taken from us at this critical juncture.

I am sorry to tell you our noble colonel has had a slight touch of the gout; he was young enough to be running after a hare, which, however, he caught and ate. He has made out the march, I hear, tolerably well, with the assistance of a large shoe.

We are told Lord Howe has thirty sail of the line, and we begin to look with impatience for a

"Gazette" extraordinary from that quarter. I should imagine Maubeuge will be our finale.

October 12.—Halted.

October 13.—The enemy's camp, at Mont Templeuve, was within about five miles of Cysoing; it was reported to consist of 20,000 men, of whom three-fourths were new levies.

October 14.—The Prince of Cobourg signified to the Duke of York his wish that his Royal Highness would approach nearer to him with what troops he could, as the enemy's force daily increased. They had marched from Guise, which was their last place of assemblage, and had taken a position with their right to Avesnes, and left to Landrecy. His Royal Highness marched at noon with the British and Hanoverian infantry, and all the cavalry, except two regiments left at Cysoing. The British infantry now consisted of the brigade of Guards, who were reduced by service and illness to 1400 men fit for duty, and the 37th Regiment; the 14th were left at Courtray, the 53rd at Nieuport. The four regiments lately joined, marched from Menin, the day after his Royal Highness left it, to Ostend, to embark for the West Indies. The Hanoverian infantry consisted of four very weak battalions. With this force, however,

his Royal Highness marched immediately on the receipt of the Prince of Cobourg's letter. The troops encamped that night in the neighbourhood of St. Amand. His Royal Highness remained at Tournay.

October 15.—The troops cantoned in the villages of Curgies, Saultain, Estreu, Sebourg, in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes, which was his Royal Highness's head-quarters. In the night, his Royal Highness received intelligence that the enemy had attacked the Prince of Cobourg, who repulsed them and took ten pieces of cannon; but as the enemy were in very great force, his Serene Highness pressed the immediate march of the corps under his Royal Highness to Englefontaine, which was effected without delay.

TO HIS SISTER.

Tournay, October 15, 1793.

I have only time to tell you that the British and Hanoverian infantry, with a considerable corps of cavalry, marched yesterday at noon, in consequence of the Prince of Cobourg's wishing us to come on his right flank. The troops marched by Marchiennes and Orchies, and we shall join them this evening, when his Royal Highness's head-quarters

will be Valenciennes. The troops will encamp near Curgies, and the next morning we shall proceed with them to Englefontaine, in the skirts of the Forêt de Mormal. Cysoing is held by a corps of Austrians, under Count Alvinzi. The enemy have a camp of superior numbers at Mont Templeuve, but as they are chiefly the new levies, I hope Alvinzi is in no danger from their vicinity. The Prince of Cobourg's head-quarters are at Pont, on the Sambre.

October 16.—The troops arrived at their ground, and were joined by Lieutenant-general Winheim's command of Austrians, which had been considerably lessened by the detachments he had made to the Prince of Cobourg. This morning the enemy again attacked the Prince of Cobourg; but it was soon discovered that their chief force was this day on their right, and that the main point of attack was on the left of Monsieur de Clairfayt. The artillery of the enemy was in great force, and the Allies were driven out of the villages on their left by the incessant fire. These villages were twice retaken with the greatest gallantry; the village of Wattignies, in particular, was retaken by the bayonet, the troops stationed there having expended all their ammunition. In the evening, his Royal Highness received intelligence

from the Prince of Cobourg that the enemy, having made themselves masters of Wattignies, and the other villages, and by that means gained his left, his position was no longer tenable, that it was therefore his intention to retire across the Sambre, and raise the siege of Maubeuge.

CHAPTER VII.

AUSTRIANS PASS THE SAMBRE—ACTION AT LA HAYE D'AVESNE—THE FRENCH CAPTURE WATTIGNIES—GENERAL ATTACK ON THE ALLIES —MISCONDUCT OF THE DUTCH—THE FRENCH ATTACK COUNT ERBACH — THE ALLIES CAPTURE MARCHIENNES — YPRES RELIEVED — SURRENDER OF FORT LOUIS TO THE ALLIES—DISAFFECTION AT GHENT.

October 17.—In the morning, his Royal Highness received intelligence that the Austrian army, under the Prince of Cobourg, including the corps employed in the investment of the intrenched camp of Maubeuge, had passed the Sambre, in the night, without loss. This service was much facilitated by a judicious and spirited attack, made late in the evening on the enemy's right flank, by General Benjowski and Colonel Haddick, with the regiment La Tour and some Hussars, who took twelve pieces of cannon. Our communication with Berlaimont is secured by a strong abbatis, flanked by cannon, which passes through the Fôret de Mormal to the banks of the river.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF WALES.

Englefontaine, October 17, 1793.

The events of the last two days have been of so much importance, and will probably have so material an influence on the future operations of the campaign, that I again avail myself of the honour your Royal Highness did me in permitting me to address myself to you.

You will have been informed, that in consequence of a requisition from the Prince of Cobourg, his Royal Highness the Duke marched on the 10th from Menin, leaving a corps of about 5000 men for the defence of that post, under the command of the Austrian Lieutenant-general, Count Erbach. On the 11th, his Royal Highness's army encamped on a fine plain, having their right near the village of Basieux, and their left at Cysoing. The advanced posts of the right extended to Templeuve, in the Imperial territory, where they communicated with those from the corps at Mouscron. The posts on the left extended to the entrance of the village of Capelle, where they had a communication with those furnished by the corps at Orchies. The enemy's camp at Mons en Pevele, was reported to contain 20,000 men, but three-fourths of these were of the

new levies, who were represented to be very badly armed.

On the 14th, in consequence of a letter from the Prince of Cobourg, the Duke marched with the British and four battalions of Hanoverian infantry, and all the cavalry that could be spared from Cysoing, which post was left to the care of the Austrian Lieutenant-general, Count Alvinzi. The enemy, we understood, had advanced from Guise, which was their general rendezvous, in great force, with a formidable train of artillery, and had taken a position between Landrecy and Avesne, which movement induced the Prince of Cobourg to concentrate his forces as much as possible.

His Royal Highness arrived here yesterday, where we found the Austrian Lieutenant-general Winheim, with a corps considerably diminished by the detachment he had made to the main body of the Prince of Cobourg's army.

On the 15th, the enemy, having established themselves in a wood called La Haye d'Avesne, made an attack upon the right of the Prince of Cobourg's army, which extended along the plain on the eastern bank of the Sambre, nearly opposite Berlaimont. The Austrians retired out of some hamlets and enclosures in front of this position, and, after a heavy cannonade, the enemy being imprudent enough to commit themselves on the plain, were immedi-

ately charged by the Imperial cavalry, and repulsed with the loss of nine pieces of cannon and one howitzer. Your Royal Highness will observe that, after passing through a wood, which I believe is called Le Bois du Prince, the left of the Austrian army was formed in some degree, *en potence*, to the right, and extended to the village of Wattignies. This wing was commanded by General Clairfayt. The attack of the enemy on this side was repulsed, but not with the same advantage that attended the operations on the right, as the wood and enclosures in front of the villages upon the left, prevented the cavalry from being employed.

On the 16th, between nine and ten A.M., the enemy renewed their attack; but, grown wiser from the experience of the day before, they showed themselves in small numbers only, in the skirts of the woods and enclosures, in front of the plain occupied by the right of the Allies; and it was soon perceived that they had carried the greatest part of their force to their right, and that General Clairfayt's left was the real point of attack. I happened to be with the Prince of Cobourg when the affair commenced, and, before I left him, the village of Wattignies had been twice taken and retaken: it was lost owing to the very severe fire of the enemy's artillery; but, in both instances, regained by the good conduct and intrepidity of the Austrians, with small arms, and once

with bayonets. In the evening, the fire of the enemy's artillery became irresistible, and, at night, the Duke received a message from the Prince of Cobourg, informing him that the enemy, having established themselves in Wattignies, and the other villages on his left, had so far gained his left, that he did not think his position any longer tenable, and that it was his intention to recross the Sambre in the night, and consequently raise the siege of Maubeuge. From the immense artillery of the enemy and their numbers, it was natural to apprehend that they would give some interruption to the execution of his Serene Highness's intentions; but I am happy to inform you that this service was completely performed during the night without loss. It was facilitated by a successful attack, made late in the evening, by Colonel Haddick, who drove the enemy as far as the Château de Solre, at the same time that General Benjowski, with the regiment of La Tour and some heavy Hussars, made a vigorous charge upon their right flank. In these two attacks the enemy lost twelve pieces of cannon, ammunition, &c.

It is with much concern that I communicate these disastrous events to your Royal Highness. The communication between our post and that at Berlaimont is assured by means of a strong abbatis, which extends from the left of our position through the

Forêt de Mormal, and is, in different places, flanked by cannon. The country immediately in our front is open, and the natural strength of the position is increased by some flêches, the situations of which appear to have been chosen with much judgment. The consequences to be apprehended from the failure of our designs on Maubeuge will immediately present themselves to your Royal Highness in a much truer point of view than I could place them. The circumstance most to be wished is, that the enemy may be so far elated with their success as to venture to pass the Sambre, and give us an opportunity of regaining what we have lost by a general action, in which, I have no doubt, the gallantry and discipline of the allied troops would prevail over the numbers of the enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARRY CALVERT.

October 18.—The enemy cannonaded our post at Sasseignies from some batteries erected on the opposite side of the river. This day, a strong patrol went beyond Cateau Cambresis, at some distance on the other side of which place they fell in with about 500 horse and a battalion of infantry. Our patrol endeavoured to induce the cavalry to attack them, but in vain, neither were they able to

make any prisoners. This *reconnaisance* was commanded by the Prince of Wurtemberg.*

October 19.—A reconnaisance was made under the command of Colonel Lord Herbert† with no better success. Accounts arrived to-day that the Allies had forced the lines of Weissenburg, and that General Wurmser had taken 25 pieces of cannon. The outposts of our army were, at this time, advanced near to Cateau, and extended to the right of the village of Solesme. The country, in this part, is remarkably open, and favourable for the operations of cavalry.

October 21.—A general attack was made on all the posts of the Allies from Furnes to Douchy, in which the enemy were repulsed, except at Poperingues and Werwicke. At Marchiennes, the attack was repeated in the evening with such violence that the Austrians were obliged to fall back at night on St. Amand.

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* Lewis Eugene, Prince of Wurtemberg. Died, May, 1795. His weakness made him the tool of flatterers, and his bigotry deprived him of the love of his people.

† Lord Herbert, afterwards Earl of Pembroke, K.G., entered the army in 1775. Served with a detached corps under Count Hohenzollern in Flanders. Colonel of the 6th Dragoons, and Governor of Guernsey. Died a General, November, 1827.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Englefontaine, October 22, 1793.

I wrote to Mr. Cholmondeley on the 17th; and as I had written to you on the 15th, I did not think it was necessary to repeat the dose so soon, especially as it was a bitter one. I am sorry to say I have nothing as yet to sweeten the potion. *Au contraire*, yesterday morning, the enemy attacked the post of Marchiennes, from whence they were repulsed with loss. In the evening, however, they renewed their attack, and in such numbers, that it became necessary for the Austrians to fall back on St. Amand, which they did in the night, without loss. The enemy in our part remain very quiet, and, as yet, are peaceable neighbours. "A friend in need is a friend indeed," they say; so the Dutch, the moment they heard of the misfortune at Wattignies, insisted on retreating to Mons, which they have done in spite of every remonstrance, and from whence, I have no doubt, they will retire the moment they hear the enemy have passed the Sambre.

A report is circulated that the Queen of France is murdered. As far as she herself is concerned, I think the sooner an end is put to the unheard-of miseries she endures the better. I see, by a French

paper, her *procès* before the Convention began on the 15th. What will become of her children, Heaven knows!

October 23.—In consequence of orders from the Prince of Cobourg, the Duke of York marched from Englefontaine, leaving General Winheim, with the corps under his command, at that place. The troops halted at Estren and Saultain. His Royal Highness's head-quarters were at Valenciennes. At night, we received accounts that the enemy were in possession of Menin, Count Erbach having been under the necessity of falling back on Courtray. General Wernek, who succeeded to the command at Cysoing, in consequence of Count Alvinzi's illness, sent word to his Royal Highness that his outposts having been seriously attacked the last two days, he had been obliged to take another position about a mile in the rear of his first, near Marquain.

October 24.—The army marched at daybreak. On the march, his Royal Highness was informed by General Wernek that he found himself obliged to retire to the position near Tournay, and as his rear was pressed by the enemy, he requested immediate assistance from his Royal Highness to insure the safety of Tournay. The cavalry was ordered to move on directly to Tournay, and the infantry to

push on for the camp at Maulde, from whence, after having some refreshment, they were to proceed to Tournay. His Royal Highness, on his arrival at Tournay, not finding the necessity so pressing as had been represented, sent an order for the infantry to remain at Maulde during the night, and to march at two o'clock in the morning for Tournay. The cavalry encamped on the left of the Austrians, in front of Tournay.

October 25.—The infantry, which had been left at the camp at Maulde, marched at two in the morning, and joined the Austrian camp in front of Tournay. The cavalry encamped on the glacis of the town. In the evening, intelligence was received that the enemy had attacked Count Erbach at Wevelghem, between Courtray and Menin, without success; it was likewise reported that the enemy were bombarding Ypres. On the 23rd, the Prince of Cobourg moved his head-quarters from Bavay to Villerspol, and the next day to Bermerain. A corps of about 20,000 men was left under the command of General Clairfayt at Bettignies, to observe Maubeuge.

October 26.—The army halted. Count Walmoden left Tournay to take the command of the corps at Mouscron, Wevelghem, &c.

October 27.—The army marched from the posi-

tion before Tournay to re-occupy that between Basieux and Cysoing. The enemy had a corps at the village of Chereng, which on the approach of our advanced guard, retreated across Pont à Tressin, and was pursued by the light cavalry, supported by the Royals and Bays. An Austrian battalion moved on to take possession of Pont à Tressin. The Royals and Bays came up with a detachment of 150 of the enemy's infantry, near the village of Lezennes, and immediately charged and dislodged them. The army took up their ground, and before night, after some skirmishing, the advanced corps occupied all their former posts.

October 28.—The town of Lannoy was attacked by a corps under the command of Major-general Abercromby, who took four pieces of cannon and about 100 prisoners. Our loss was inconsiderable in point of numbers, but amongst the killed was Captain Sutherland, of the Engineers, whose ability in his profession and worth in private life will make him long and sincerely regretted by all who knew him. Lieutenant Thornton, of the Royal Artillery, lost his arm, and Lieutenants Rutherford and Offney, of the Quartermaster-general's department, were wounded, the former by one of our own dragoons, who mistook the Engineers' uniform for that of the enemy. We have this evening heard that the enemy

has retreated from Menin, and that Ypres is relieved.

The Duke of York communicated to the Prince of Cobourg the operations of his army on October the 27th and 28th. His Serene Highness replied in the following letter:

" Monseigneur,

" Je reçois dans l'instant l'agréable nouvelle que votre Altesse Royale daigne me communiquer dans sa lettre du 28 d'Octobre. La satisfaction que j'en ai ressenti ne peut se comparer qu'à la vive et respectueuse reconnaissance dont je suis pénétré pour votre Altesse Royale. Ni l'armée, ni moi n'oublieront certainement jamais que c'est à l'énergie de ses mesures, à ses prudentes et courageuses dispositions que nous devons la défense et le salut de la Flandre. Je supplie votre Altesse Royale d'en recevoir avec bonté mes sincères remercimens, et mes justes félicitations. Elle m'a bien prouvé que sous un chef comme elle, des alliés et des troupes comme les Anglais réussissent glorieusement dans tout ce qu'ils entreprennent. Je suis persuadé que l'ennemi n'a que trop bien fait de ne pas les attendre. C'est avec bien de l'empressement que je saisis cette occasion de lui réitérer l'hommage du profond et

respectueux dévouement avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être,

" Monseigneur,

" de Votre Altesse Royale,

" Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

(Signé) " P. COBOURG, F.M.

" Au Quartier Général
" de Bermerain, ce 29 Oct. 1793."

October 30.—This morning, before daybreak, the enemy at Marchiennes were attacked by a corps commanded by Major-generals Otto and Kray.* The Allies made themselves masters of the place without opposition; the enemy retired into the abbey, from whence they sent a trumpeter, desiring to surrender, on the terms of their officers keeping

* General Kray, a Hungarian, was Colonel in the war with the Turks. Major-general in 1780. In 1797, General Kray was condemned by a court-martial to a fortnight's arrest, on account of the defeat of his army by the French. In 1799, by his brilliant military exploits in Italy, he prepared the way for the successes of Suwarrow and Mélas. In 1800, he was entrusted with the command of the army of the Rhine, in the place of Archduke Charles, but was overpowered by the French, and superseded by Archduke John. Died at Vienna, 1801.

their swords, with which, to prevent the carnage that must have ensued, General Kray very humanely complied. In the evening, the prisoners marched as far as the allied camp, between Basieux and Cysoing, on their way to Tournay, where they proceeded the next morning. The prisoners amounted to 1669; twelve pieces of cannon were taken, and many horses, ammunition, &c.

October 31.—The intelligence of the relief of Ypres was fully confirmed; also that the enemy had retired from before Nieuport, which place we learned, by accounts received on the 1st of November, had been summoned four times in the most menacing and outrageous terms, which were always rejected by the Hessian Colonel Wurmb, who commanded. The enemy, after bombarding the place for four days, retired, leaving behind them four pieces of cannon and two howitzers. The Prince of Cobourg had moved his head-quarters from Bermerain to Englefontaine, his army occupying the heights above Cateau, with their left towards the village of Bousies. His light troops had taken two pieces of cannon, and upwards of 100 prisoners, in an affair with the enemy's outposts.

November 5.—A reconnoitring party, consisting of three squadrons of British heavy dragoons, three squadrons of light, two squadrons Keratchi, one of Hulans, and two field-pieces, went out under the

command of Lieutenant-general Harcourt.* On their approach to Hellemmes, they were cannonaded from the batteries of that place. The enemy's camp behind the village of Flers was seen, but as the ground was irregular, neither its extent nor strength could be judged. After some skirmishing, the party returned, having made one officer prisoner.

November 6.—Intelligence was this day received that the enemy were making large detachments from their army in the neighbourhood of Maubeuge towards Lille, and that the Convention had decided on attacking the Allies before the 15th of the month.

November 8.—Information having been received that a convoy of forage and ammunition was to leave Lille this morning for Pont à Marque, his Royal Highness ordered sixteen squadrons of cavalry, with a detachment of infantry, to endeavour to intercept it. The light cavalry got upon the chaussée beyond the village of Fretain, but, probably from the head of the column having been discovered soon after it debouched from Bouvines, the plan proved unsuc-

* Earl Harcourt, appointed to the 1st Foot Guards in August, 1759, accompanied his father to escort Queen Charlotte to England. Served in the American War, and in Flanders. First Governor of the Military College, afterwards Governor of Portsmouth. Field-Marshal and G.C.B. Died, June, 1830.

cessful. In the afternoon his Royal Highness moved his head-quarters to Tournay. This evening we received information that the enemy had reinforced their posts on the Lys with 4000 men, who were gone into cantonments in the different towns.

November 9.—The British troops marched into cantonments in Tournay and in the neighbouring villages..

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Abbaye St. Martin, Tournay, November 19, 1793.

Since our arrival here we have been quite at peace, our advanced posts have been unmolested, and from every account, the enemy's force immediately in our front is smaller than it has been at any time since the commencement of the campaign. The people of Lille are in want of every sort of comfort and necessary, particularly food and fuel. The discontent has risen to such a height as to give considerable alarm to the Convention, and twelve deputies have arrived to endeavour to appease the minds of the people. However great their dissensions may be, however adverse their political opinions, there is one subject on which, if we may judge from experience, the inhabitants of this northern frontier unite, that is, in a predilection for a republican form of govern-

ment, and a determination to resist, to the utmost of their power, the attempts of the Allies on their territory. I very much doubt whether the foreign war does not furnish them with the only bond of union they have left; and whether, if the dread of the external enemy were removed, they would not now be cutting one another's throats, and perhaps in a very short time gladly have recourse to any settled form of government in preference to the anarchy which exists at present—probably, to the very system of government which is now the object of their detestation; but I am getting quite out of my element, and am deviating from the good old proverb, *a cobbler to his last.*

I am sorry that you attach so much importance to my return to England; for, as the time approaches, many difficulties, I find, present themselves. The troops, if nothing extraordinary happens, will be in winter quarters by the 1st of next month, but all in regard to his Royal Highness's return to England is uncertain, and therefore I beg and entreat you will not expect me, but make your engagements and arrangements without the smallest thought of me. You will easily believe me when I say I shall have the greatest gratification in visiting my friends, but if fate wills it otherwise, I ought to feel myself very fortunate in being in so eligible a situation in Flanders. By the bye, whenever I return I shall

bring you plenty of occupation, for I have purchased as much of Cassini's map as contains the seat of our operations on this frontier, and I shall depend on you to trace our marches on it.

I did not expect that when the campaign closed it would ever have been in my power to have filled your sheet *à l'ordinaire*, but when we write to those we love the pen frequently plays truant, and exceeds the bounds it ought to have observed; by this rule, you may always expect long and tedious epistles.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, November 22, 1793.

I am probably sending you old news when I inform you that Fort Louis has surrendered to the Allies, who have by that means taken 4000 prisoners and 110 pieces of cannon. Independent of the above acquisition, the capture of the place at this time is of the utmost importance: it secures quarters for the Allies in Alsace during the winter; it will very much facilitate the blockade of Landau, and enable Wurmser to sit down seriously before Strasbourg early in spring. The enemy have within these few days considerably reinforced their posts on the Lys, but whether with a view of threatening Menin or securing their own cantonments, I know not.

That you may not be unacquainted with the progress the French are making in the arts and sciences, I enclose you a new French almanac.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, December 6, 1793.

This morning's mail was a great disappointment, as it brought us no confirmation of the news of Lord Howe's success; I cannot, therefore, help having my doubts how that affair will turn out, for I think that, had the intelligence been good, the honest tars would have worked up Channel in spite of wind and weather, to have the satisfaction of imparting it. The mail, however, to me individually, was not a barren one, as it brought me my mother's letter of the 1st, for which I beg you will return her my thanks. The account she gives of herself, though by no means so good as I could wish, is better than the last, and consequently gives me pleasure. Although in a frontier town, we are as dull here as *you* could wish. A rumour reached us yesterday that, on Sunday last, two regiments of the line took possession of the citadel of Arras, having declared for the Royal cause, and that they were joined by all the Loyalists of the town and neighbourhood: this report not being confirmed

to-day, I conclude is groundless. The difficulties that have as yet prevented our taking possession of our winter quarters are now, I hope, likely to be removed, as the Prince of Cobourg has sent very positive orders to Ghent that no time may be lost in preparing for our reception. I think our friends have been rather remiss on this occasion, though, in the conduct of so very large an army, many unforeseen difficulties must necessarily arise.

Now if I find my quarters good at Ghent, I think it will be but kind in me to give you an invitation to pass a month or six weeks with me in spring.

Lord William Bentinck and I had made a very good arrangement, which his accompanying Lord Moira on the expedition overset; but you and his sister Lady Mary were to have been the leading figures in it.

December 14.—The brigade of Guards and Inniskillen Dragoons marched from Tournay by the way of Oudenarde, to Ghent, where they arrived on the 16th. On the same day the Royals and Greys arrived at Ghent. The Blues and Bays arrived the next day.

TO HIS SISTER.

Tournay, December 19, 1793.

You will be surprised at the date of this, but I came here last night on some business of the Duke's, and am scribbling this in expectation of being in Ghent in time for to-morrow's mail. A letter I wrote to my father on Tuesday will, I am confident, give you much satisfaction, as it informs him that an immediate opportunity presents itself of my purchasing a company in the Coldstream. There is some little doubt whether this may not interfere with my remaining in the Duke's service; but as his Royal Highness has been gracious enough to express to the King his wish that I should remain with him, I flatter myself that it will be complied with. You will easily see how many reasons I have to induce me to wish to remain with the Duke, and I dare say will not blame me for using my utmost endeavours to accomplish it. If I do not succeed, I shall return to England after making a short tour to Brussels, &c.

I have been so short a time at Ghent, that I fear I can hardly tell you whether I like it or not. The inhabitants in general do not seem to like our coming, and make many difficulties in giving us quarters. I am myself in a magnificent house,

and the owner appears civil and obliging, and has won my heart by giving me stabling for my two favourite horses in his yard, which was not in the bond. I have not yet had time to visit my friends in the Nunnery, who, I hear, are delighted at an English garrison coming to Ghent.

TO HIS SISTER.

Ghent, Friday Night,
December 27, 1793.

I hear there is good news from India, and that Lord Cornwallis,* who, I am persuaded, was born to be the honour and salvation of the country he belongs to, has sailed to Pondicherry to take upon himself the conduct of that siege, and, by that means, add a wreath to the laurels he has already acquired in the eastern and western hemisphere.

* Lord Cornwallis, Marquis Cornwallis, General, K.G. Died, Governor-General of India, October 5, 1805.

CHAPTER VIII.

EFFECTS OF INVADING FRANCE—THE DUKE OF YORK REJOINS THE ARMY—STATE OF MENIN—MOVEMENTS OF THE ALLIES—MISUNDERSTANDING AMONG THE ALLIES—AFFAIR AT CATEAU—ATTACK ON THE FRENCH POSITIONS—SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF LANDRECY—FALL OF MENIN—THE FRENCH REPULSED AT BASIEUX—DEATH OF GENERAL WINHEIM—RETREAT OF CLAIRFAYT.

TO HIS SISTER.

Ghent, Sunday Night,
January 5, 1794.

As I have some thoughts of going to Brussels for two or three days (if nothing occurs to prevent me), to-morrow or next day, I take up my pen thus early to thank you for your letter of the 26th. Two mails are now due from England, and before I seal this, I hope one or both will arrive, bringing an account of what you are kind enough to interest yourself so much about—my promotion—and also what we must feel much interested about—the evacuation of Toulon. I fear that will turn out a

bad business, and must naturally tend to unite and give spirit to our enemies; and to dishearten, in the same proportion, those Frenchmen whose principles remain untainted with the treasons and crimes of their countrymen. I am likewise very impatient to hear that effectual succour is sent to the Royalists in the Vendée; for, mark my words, if they are not speedily assisted they must fall, and with them our best hopes of bringing this war to a happy termination.

On Caroline's wedding-day, I ought to be ashamed to have written so much without desiring you, which I do with the greatest sincerity, to send her my best wishes for her welfare and happiness, in which I include Mr. Cholmondeley. I perfectly agree with you in wishing that we had a breed of those good-humoured fairies who formerly used to carry people about in their sleep, in which case, instead of writing to you at midnight, I should have been in bed these two hours, waiting with impatience for my aerial conductor, fearing that I might otherwise be too late for the party in Berners Street.

* * * *

I am very glad to hear that you agree with me in regard to the expediency of my remaining abroad; and, at the same time, I assure you I heartily coincide in the wishes you are kind enough to form that his Royal Highness may still visit England in the

course of the winter; but of this I see no symptoms at present. I am convinced it is necessary for every Englishman, and it would be as well for every Englishwoman to leave their own country for a short time, that they might be sensible of their own happiness in being natives of that blessed isle. May we never forfeit by our own folly what Heaven has given us with so bountiful a hand!

The reader will have observed that the latter portion of the campaign of 1793 was not favourable to the Allies.

Colonel Calvert refers, in his letter of November 19th, to the chief bond which united all Frenchmen, and animated the entire nation with irresistible energy and enthusiasm. On looking back at the period, we cannot wonder that every brave and noble spirit in France sought the ranks of the army. At Paris, and in the interior, all was sanguinary, relentless, hopeless oppression. The position of the enemy on the frontier armed the bloody tyrants who ruled France with a despotic power, which they wielded without the smallest commiseration for the sufferings of their countrymen. Hostile invasion—the presence of the foe on their soil—the threat of national dismemberment—the example of Poland—these were arguments unanswerable. They formed

the tower of strength of the rulers of the Reign of Terror. But repel the invader—conquer the enemy —and the conquering army might hope to restore order at home as well as peace abroad.

The desire to escape the horrors which surrounded them, the hope of procuring safety for their families and security for their property, the only chance of arresting the course of dégradation and misery pursued by their distracted country, every interest dear to them, every sentiment of honour and patriotism, all impelled the best and bravest of the French to enrol themselves in the battalions of their country, which were further swelled by the reckless and the rapacious, those who fought for plunder, and those who braved death for the chance of gratifying their savage and brutal passions. The recklessness and terrible energy of the government, the ardour of all the noble-minded in France, and the fury of the worst of its population, all united to increase the numbers and excite the audacity of the armies on the frontier.

Carnot was Minister of War, and directed the efforts of the vast hosts now collected round the standards of the Republic. He had himself repaired to Dunkirk, and aided in repelling the inroad of the British on the French territory. The duration of the sieges of the frontier fortresses; the disunion of the Allies and their lingering military operations;

some partial successes which attended the French arms; the defeat of Walmoden and Freytag, and the retreat of the Duke of York from before Dunkirk; and the victory of Jourdan under the walls of Maubeuge, were all taken advantage of by the genius of the Minister, who exerted it in restoring order, organization, and *morale* to the French armies.

Early in 1794, the Duke of York visited England, and as the King had directed him to bring his aides-de-camp with him, Colonel Calvert, who had now obtained by purchase a company in the Coldstream Guards, had the opportunity of paying a short visit to his family. His journal proceeds with the return of the Duke of York to the army.

March 2.—At night his Royal Highness the Duke of York left London, and arrived at Deal the next morning. The wind being contrary, His Royal Highness remained all day at Deal. The next day he embarked on board the Vestal frigate. At four o'clock the next morning got under weigh, and at noon landed at Ostend, and proceeded that night to Courtray, where Field-Marshal Freytag had his head-quarters.

March 7.—Field-Marshal Freytag resigned the command of the Hanoverians, in which he was suc-

ceeded by General Count Walmoden. General Abercromby took the command at Menin.

The Prince of Cobourg's head-quarters are at Valenciennes; General Clairfayt's at Tournay. The brigade of Guards received their drafts from England, consisting of 764 men.

A considerable body of peasants were employed in re-establishing the works at Menin. "General Abercromby had a post of observation at Werwicke, which had constant skirmishes with the enemy. The patroles on both sides the Lys frequently met; and on one morning the enemy advanced on the Halluin side of the village of Roucq, with upwards of 600 men; but on Colonel Perryn (who commanded the detachment at Marcke, destined for the support of the outposts on the right of the Lys) making his appearance on Mount Halluin, they retired precipitately.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, COMMANDING AT CHATHAM BARRACKS.

Many thanks to you, my dear Sir Hew, for your letter of the 15th; but pray recollect that Saturday being the day after the mail sets off, is the worst day in the seven you can write to your friends abroad,

anxious for domestic intelligence. Your letter arrived only with those written on Tuesday. I feel more grief and indignation than I can express at the unprotected situation in which our trade appears to be. In my opinion, the island of Corsica will not compensate for the loss of the West India fleet, and that appears to be literally left to chance, and by all accounts a very bad chance it has.

In regard to ourselves, I flatter myself we shall very soon make a move by our left, and by that means get into a country where the superiority of our troops may be *effectually* displayed, and I hope never again to shave with the Hill of Halluin before my eyes. Abercromby continues at Menin, with the force I stated in my last. The works are being repaired, the old hornwork is to be completed, and in my opinion will be battered down again in eight-and-forty hours, whenever the enemy choose to establish batteries at the mills, which, without a Star fort on the summit, we can never prevent their doing. The defences on the other side will answer well enough, and it is from this side only that the town, if well defended, can be carried.

I am happy to tell you that Mersfeldt came back to us yesterday. I wish for the good of the service that a little more *douceur* could be introduced into the manners of a certain person.

Your commission shall be executed in regard to the maps; but I wish to see *Le Théâtre de la Guerre* myself before I purchase it, for I hear it is only a bad impression of one sheet of Cassini and two of Ferraris. In that case, perhaps, you had rather not have them. I conclude the maps are to be on linen, and in cases like my own.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters, Courtray,
Tuesday Night, March 25, 1794.

I thank you for your letter of the 20th, which arrived this morning. I believe I wrote you word by last mail that Mersfeldt had returned, and I hope we shall have no more disagreements. In the situation of a certain person I would be as firm as a rock, but I would introduce a certain degree of gentleness in my manner. *Suaviter in modo, fortiter in re.* I fear your friend has not considered the importance of that maxim.

The army—viz., the British—move to-morrow, accompanied by the Hanoverian heavy cavalry. St. Amand is to be head-quarters, with two battalions of Guards. The other two at Hasnon; Abercromby's brigade and all the cavalry are to be cantoned in the neighbourhood. The important post of Menin is to be occupied by eight weak batta-

lions of Hanoverians; if they do not exert themselves they will be forced.

I do not at all dislike our destination. We are on the borders of a good country, and near the Prince of Cobourg's quarters, which remain at Valenciennes. It is surmised on the continent, that Lord Elgin's abrupt departure for England was occasioned by some late determination of his Majesty of Prussia, but you in England will probably be let into the secret of that sooner than we shall here. I fear the event will prove that we are the dupes of his Prussian Majesty.

You will easily imagine I am pressed for time, and will allow me to postpone the remainder of my epistle till a more convenient opportunity.

March 26.—The works at Menin being in some degree of forwardness, the British troops and the Hanoverian heavy cavalry marched, leaving Menin and Courtray to the care of the Hanoverians under General Count Walmoden.

March 27.—His Royal Highness's head-quarters were established at St. Amand. Three battalions of guards are in the town. The Coldstream occupied Hasnon.

March 28. — General Abercromby's brigade marched into their cantonments in the rear of

Marchiennes. The cavalry arrived at their cantonments, which extended from Halluin quite to the Scheldt, some corps being at Escaupont.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
St. Amand, March 28, 1794.

The Guards, line and cavalry, marched as I wrote you in my last. Our friends have been very active in putting Tournay into a state of defence, and I hear as much has been done at Valenciennes; but as yet Mont d'Angin remains as it was, and in my opinion, which, however, I fairly consider to be a bad one, it is very essential that some sort of works should be established on those heights to prevent an enemy erecting batteries to take the works on the eastern face *en revers*. In addition to the force the Duke brought with him, he has, attached to his command, eight or nine very fine Austrian battalions, some Austrian reserve artillery, &c. I think the move and arrangements that are making, indicate the probability of some great *coup*. I like our situation well, but have my apprehensions for Menin, &c. However, the great and the wise appear to be easy on that head. I very often wish you were here, and as often am I happy to think you are where you are.

Charles Fitzroy* impatiently expects the Duke of Gloucester's determination. In the meantime, he is doing duty with the light company, late Ludlow.†

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters, St. Amand,
Very early in the Morning, April 1, 1794.

* * * *

To the question you ask respecting the goodness of temper and propriety of behaviour of the Austrian, I answer, from what I have seen within these few days, that I have my doubts, or rather, I have no doubt, and I foresee the consequence between the two, sooner or later, must be an open breach. I shall keep out of the scrape if I can, but I speak feelingly when I say that with the very best intentions it is impossible always to do so.

The morning of the 29th, very early, the enemy

* General Fitzroy, entered the army in August, 1779. Appointed to 1st Foot Guards in 1788. Served in Flanders in 1793—94, and in Holland in 1799. Aide-de-Camp to the King, Lieutenant-general, and Colonel 25th Regiment. Died, October, 1831.

† Ludlow, appointed to the 1st Foot Guards in May, 1778. Served in America, Flanders, Egypt, Hanover, and Copenhagen. General Earl Ludlow, G.C.B., appointed Colonel of the Scots Fusilier Guards, May 30, 1836. Died in April, 1842.

crossed the Sambre at Ors, and made themselves masters of some of the adjoining villages, particularly Pomereul, where they forced an abbatis, and took some redoubts occupied by our friends the Brunswickers, but without cannon. At the same time, a corps advanced to the heights above Cateau, into which they threw some shells. False attacks were made on the advanced posts near Serain. General Werneck, with the two battalions of Brechenville, attacked and took the redoubts, with five pieces of the enemy's cannon, and, with the assistance of a small body of cavalry, killed, by the Austrian account, 500 on the spot, and took 60 prisoners. Upon this, the corps before Cateau and along the frontier retired, and the enemy on whom the attack was made, effected their retreat across the river. All the advanced posts were re-occupied by the Allies. So the entertainment is begun, and a mettlesome one it will be, I dare say. It is reported that the enemy showed 25,000 men. I believe not in the numbers.

Colonel Craig* returned yesterday. He can probably give you a better account of his Majesty of Prussia than I can, but I have reason to believe that there is no cause to blame the King of Prussia, and

* Colonel Craig. General Sir James H. Craig, K.B., Governor-General of Canada. Died soon after his return from Canada in January, 1812.

that he is ready and willing to perform his part in the general confederacy.

In regard to the new fencible corps that are being raised, I think the measure a very bad one. The men they engage would otherwise generally be in more effective situations, and, with the exception of the militia, which I much admire, I think it very destructive to the discipline and good conduct of the army, to keep corps on foot that are not in every instance amenable to military discipline and liable to be sent wherever their services may be most required. In regard to subscriptions from individuals, although quite the reverse of an admirer of Mr. Sheridan, it appears to me that the Crown should receive no money for the purpose of entertaining an armed force, except through the medium of Parliament, and that any measure that militates against this is unconstitutional.

Prince William of Gloucester* arrived yesterday, attended by young Ferraris.

* * * * *

The Hessians have arrived at Ostend, very *à-propos* in my opinion, for I cannot help thinking the enemy mean to attempt something against the frontier about Ypres.

* Field-Marshal the Duke of Gloucester, appointed Colonel 3rd Foot Guards, May, 1806. Died in December, 1834.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
St. Amand, April 8, 1794.

Though nothing material has happened since my last, I give you a few lines to show you that I do not forget your injunctions. The remarkably wet weather we have had these last ten days, has been the means of keeping both sides quiet in this quarter; but at Werwicke, the enemy attacked our picket yesterday, and the Hanoverian Light Horse (who behaved very well) met with some loss in driving them back. The York Rangers surprised a strong patrol the day before, by forming an ambuscade in the woods between Roucq and Rousbeke, killed 37, and took 8 or 9 prisoners.

The last papers from Paris inform us that Danton and his party are arrested, and accused of being in league with the Duke of Orleans and Dumouriez. The next papers will probably bring accounts of their execution, and then the power will be almost wholly vested in Robespierre.

The recruits for General Abercromby's brigade arrived a few days ago; they much resembled Falstaff's men, and were as lightly clad as any Carmagnole battalion.

You shall hear from me again soon, in the meantime, believe me, &c.

I hope you have received your maps. The Coldstream are moved from Hasnon to the Baths.

April 10.—The army, under the immediate orders of his Royal Highness the Duke of York, moved to the Ecaillon, and cantoned at Vendegies, Sommaing, and the neighbouring villages.

April 13.—His Imperial Majesty arrived at Valenciennes.

April 15.—His Royal Highness the Duke of York, who had still kept his head-quarters at St. Amand, moved to Bermerain.

April 16.—In the morning, the army of his Royal Highness assembled at Bermerain, and, marching in two columns, arrived in the afternoon on the heights above Montez, where the army of the Prince of Cobourg, and likewise the Dutch troops, under the Hereditary Prince of Orange, were assembled. His Imperial Majesty viewed the troops, who, in the evening, passed Cateau, and took up their ground south of the town.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters, Cateau,
Friday Night, April 18, 1794.

I wrote you word on Tuesday that the Emperor

had arrived at Valenciennes, and would review the allied armies the next day. I was not at that time at liberty to inform you that the review was merely a pretence for assembling the troops, and that on the next day a general attack was to be made on the enemy's intrenched positions from Landrecy to Premont. The Emperor saw the troops on Wednesday evening, on the heights above Cateau, which were his Imperial Majesty's, the Duke of York's, and Prince of Cobourg's head-quarters that night.

At nine the next morning the whole army marched. The imperial army, on the left, in two columns, attacked the enemy's posts of Catillon, Mazinguet, and Ribouville, which they carried, and occupied the posts of Le Sart, Barzy, Nouvion, Etreux, and Wassigny, and Grand and Petit Blocus, all which places you will find east and south-east of Cateau. It was near one o'clock before the head of his Royal Highness's column reached the point of attack allotted to him, which was the position in front of the village of Vaux, about two leagues south of Cateau. The country here is much intersected with ravines and hollow roads, which so much impeded the progress of the artillery, that it was not till near three o'clock that the attack was made on the intrenchments on the heights of Vaux. His Royal Highness carried these works, likewise

the village of Bousignies, and in the evening pushed his advanced guard, under General Abercromby, to within half a league of the town of Bohain.

Sir William Erskine,* who commanded the right column of the Duke's army, moved by the road called the Chaussée Brunehaud. His point of attack was the village of Premont, on the left of this chaussée, about eight miles from Cateau, which was defended by two redoubts. Sir William began his attack about three o'clock, having ordered the cavalry on his right to get as much round the enemy's position as possible. The village and redoubts were carried with little loss. Sir William immediately pushed through the woods in the rear of Premont, and leaving five battalions of infantry and six squadrons of cavalry, under the command of General Harcourt, to occupy the position from which he had driven the enemy, and detaching Colonel Vyse† with six squadrons of cavalry to the Catelet, he resumed his march with the rest of his corps, and by five in the evening he took a position in the rear of Bohain, in order to co-operate with the Duke, had circumstances enabled his Royal Highness to proceed at once to the attack of that place. But the fatigue of the troops and the lateness of the hour rendered it im-

* Major-general Sir William Erskine, Colonel 14th Garrison Battalion. Died in 1813.

† Colonel Vyse, 3rd Dragoon Guards. Died in June, 1825.

possible, and during the night the enemy retired from Bohain, which was occupied by General Abercromby, with the advanced guard, very early in the morning.

While these attacks were going on, the Dutch troops under the Hereditary Prince of Orange, advanced towards Cambray, and engaged the attention of the enemy in that quarter. The enemy retired to Guise, which is now their head-quarters.

The advantages of the day, I am happy to tell you, were gained with very little loss on our side; but we much lament the loss of Captain Carleton of the Royals, who was killed in Sir William Erskine's column at the attack of Premont. The reports are not yet come in, but I believe we have taken about thirty pieces of cannon. The consequence of our success was the immediate investment of Landrecy, the siege of which place will be commanded by the Hereditary Prince of Orange, with the Austrian General La Tour under him. The Duke of York will command the right wing of the covering army, and his head-quarters will be at Basuzan. I believe the Emperor will command in person, and that his quarters will be at Ecaillon.

Clinton* goes home, and to him and the Gazette I refer you for more particulars.

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* Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Clinton, G.C.B., second son of General Sir Henry William Clinton, entered the army

April 18.—The investment of Landrecy was commenced and completed the next day, the enemy being driven into the town on all sides, though not without a loss of near 500 men killed and wounded on the part of the Allies.

On the night of the 18th, his Imperial Majesty, his Royal Highness the Duke, and the Prince of Cobourg again took up their quarters at Cateau. Sir William Erskine returned to the camp, which was formed on the heights south-west of Cateau, leaving General Harcourt with a corps of observation between the villages of Maurois and Honnechy. General Abercromby occupied Vaux.

The town of Bohain was evacuated during the night of the 17th, the enemy retiring towards Guise.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

April 22, 1794.

I sent you a hasty account of the transaction of the 17th by Clinton. On Sunday, the enemy were driven into Landrecy; but I fear this service was not

in 1787. Appointed Aide-de-Camp to the Duke of York in 1793. Served afterwards in the West Indies, and, together with Lord William Bentinck, was with the Austro-Russian army in Italy. Served also in India, Sicily, the Peninsula, and at Waterloo. Died, December, 1829.

performed without considerable loss on our side—they say 500.

The investment of Landrecy being completed, it was intended yesterday to withdraw and contract our outposts. Belgarde, who commanded at the posts of Grand and Petit Blocus, was attacked at the instant he was preparing to put this order in execution. The Duke immediately marched to his support, with a brigade of English cavalry and five battalions of Austrians. The affair was just over on our arrival. The Hussars had charged and driven back the enemy, killing nearly 150 and taking four pieces of cannon. In the evening the outposts all retired, as had been intended had the attack not taken place. We saw the enemy retreating over the plain to Guise, which they seem to have surrounded with a line of redoubts. The Prince of Cobourg moved his quarters to Catillon. In my opinion, something of a nature more decisive than the business of the 17th, *must be* done soon.

April 23.—His Royal Highness's command was augmented by four battalions of Hungarian infantry, and twenty-eight squadrons, who encamp and keep open the communications between the left of our camp and Catillon-sur-Sambre.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Cateau, April 25, 1794.

Since Tuesday, as I foresaw was likely, we have been a good deal on the *qui vive*. On Wednesday morning we had information that the enemy had moved in considerable force from the Camp de César, and early in the afternoon we learnt that they had crossed the Selle at Saultzoir, and pushed patrols towards Quesnoy and Valenciennes. The Duke sent orders to General Otto, who had gone out to Cambray on a reconnoitring party with Light Dragoons and Hussars, to get into the rear of the enemy, find out their strength, and endeavour to cut them off. The enemy retired to Villers en Cauchie that night, but occupied Saultzoir and Haussy. Otto finding their strength greater than he expected —about 14,000—early in the evening sent in for a brigade of heavy cavalry for his support, which marched first to Fontaine Autarque, and afterwards to St. Hilaire, and in the night he sent for a further support of four battalions and some artillery. Unfortunately, he confided this important mission to a hussar, who never delivered it, probably having lost his way, so that; in the morning, the General found himself under the necessity of attacking with very

inferior numbers. However, by repeated charges of his light cavalry, he drove the enemy back into their camp, and took three pieces of cannon. He had, at one time, taken eight, but the enemy, bringing up repeated reinforcements of fresh troops, retook five.

Our loss I cannot yet ascertain, but I fear the 15th Light Dragoons have suffered considerably. Two battalions of the enemy are entirely destroyed. The batteries will be ready to open on Landrecy to-night. The place is small, and I should think in ten days will be ours. Since Sunday, the enemy have fired very little, which gave occasion to a *bon mot* of the Austrian engineer Orlandini. A stupid Dutch Major, who had been boring him for a considerable time, at last observed: "On èst assez sûr dans ces tranchées, mon Colonel." "Oh, pour cela," "replied Orlandini, "on ne meurt ici que de l'ennui."

The Emperor and the Prince of Cobourg have moved their quarters to Catillon, and his Royal Highness has taken possession of the Bishop's Palace, where we are extremely well lodged. The country round is a fine open champaign, and the camp, which extends from Rambouilleux, north-west of Cateau, about half a league, round to Catillon on the Sambre (though with some interruptions, as you

may conceive by its extent), is the most beautiful object you can imagine. We shall probably be stationary here for some time; but if the enemy's strength about Cambray increases much, I shall not be surprised if a sudden march becomes necessary.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Camp, April, 1794.

This morning the enemy, to the amount of 100,000, attacked the combined camp. Everywhere they were repulsed. The British cavalry have behaved admirably, turned the enemy's left, and taken thirty-four pieces of cannon. The French General Chapuis, who commanded their left, is amongst the prisoners.

No British infantry engaged.

April 26.—The enemy made a general attack on the camp of the Allies. On their approaching the right of the camp, the Duke of York directed a column of heavy cavalry, consisting of the Regiment of Zedwitsch Cuirassiers, the Blues, Royals, 1st, 3rd, and 5th Dragoon Guards, to turn the enemy, or endeavour to take them in flank, which service they performed in a style beyond all praise, charging repeatedly through the enemy's column, and taking

twenty-six pieces of cannon. The Light Dragoons and Hussars took nine pieces on the left of the Duke's camp.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

April 29, 1794.

I wrote you a hasty line by Murray on Saturday evening, informing you of the success of the day as far as it related to ourselves. At night, we had the satisfaction of hearing that the Imperial army had everywhere repulsed the enemy, and taken twenty-two pieces of cannon, which makes the whole amount taken by this army since the morning of the 17th, *ninety-nine*.

On Sunday, immediately after the *feu-de-joie* for the victory of the preceding day, Landrecy was summoned. The answer of the garrison was a firm resolution to bury themselves in its ruins. I should have told you that, in consequence of information received during the action of the 26th, the Prince of Cobourg immediately detached six battalions and some cavalry, and at night the Duke detached seven battalions and Sir Robert Laurie's* Brigade—viz., Bays, Greys, and Inniskillens—towards St. Amand.

* Lieutenanant-general Sir Robert Laurie, Colonel 8th Light Dragoons. Died, September, 1804.

Yesterday we heard that the French had penetrated by Moucron, and had possession of Courtray, pushing their advanced posts considerably beyond Haerlebeke on the Ghent road. Clairfayt has orders to attack them immediately; and I trust the further they advance, the more decisive will be their defeat, and the more difficult their retreat.

But this ought to be a lesson to those who have the planning of this very important and interesting campaign. According to my idea, as long as West Flanders is without a force adequate to its protection —as long as its security must be effected by detachments from this army, we shall achieve nothing important, but shall ever be arrested in our career, perhaps in the very moment of victory, and be under the necessity of relinquishing the object of our labours from the urgency of the demand for succour on the frontier of the rich and valuable country we leave behind us.

But this is a reflection so obvious, that I think it must have presented itself to those who direct the operations of the campaign. The whole army was under arms this morning; but the different corps that appeared in our front not advancing to the attack, I conceive their appearance was intended to create a jealousy, and to prevent our detaching to reinforce Clairfayt. I assure you that we do not eat the bread of idleness. We by no means expe-

rience the repose that the covering army enjoyed during the siege of Valenciennes.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters, April 30, 1794.

* * * * * *

Clairfayt, I am most truly concerned to tell you, was beaten yesterday. Most critically has Landrecy surrendered to-day. To-night the Duke, with all his army, marches for St. Amand. Sir W. Erskine marched from thence this morning to join Clairfayt at Tournay; so that I am not without hopes that Clairfayt may attack them in the course of to-morrow. By the last accounts, Menin was in our possession.

April 30.—Accounts arrived in the morning that Count de Clairfayt had been defeated near Moucron, with the loss of one-and-twenty pieces of cannon; that the enemy were in possession of Courtray, and held Menin closely invested. At noon the garrison of Landrecy offered to capitulate. The terms were agreed on in the course of the day, and before night the garrison marched out prisoners of war, to the amount of near 6000 men. At eleven at night the whole corps of his Royal Highness the Duke

marched, excepting the regiment of Zedwitsch Cuirassiers. At nine in the morning, the army halted at the camp of Famars, and proceeded that night to St. Amand, which was head-quarters.

May 2.—Halted.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters, May 2, 1794.

We marched at midnight on Wednesday; halted at Famars some hours. In the evening, the troops, already much overcome with the fatigue of the march and of the preceding days, which were marked by frequent alerts, encountered a most heavy storm. They reached this place, some last night and some this morning, much spent. To-morrow we must go and occupy the Camp of Magnan, in order to enable Clairfayt to assemble his corps to act against the invaders. The garrison of Menin cut their way through the enemy, and saved eleven pieces of cannon. With much grief do I find all my presentiments for the fall of West Flanders justified; but it is in vain to look back: we must put our shoulders to the wheel and act with vigour in this critical juncture. Oudenarde is occupied by three battalions of Austrians, and Deinze is in our possession. I hear Pichegru is intrenching himself at Courtray. To

repossess ourselves of that place and Menin will cost some hard blows. Last night, on the march, General Lake fell into a ditch. He has bruised his face, but in other respects is very well.

* * * * * *

The garrison of Landrecy, nearly 6000, as I understand, marched out on Wednesday evening; the particulars of stores, &c., I have not yet heard. Adieu.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters, Abbaye St. Martin,
Tournay, May 3, 1794.

On Saturday, our troops joined the corps that was detached the night of the 26th, under Sir William Erskine, in a camp, the right of which extends to a small eminence in the rear of the right of the village of Blandain; it has the village of Marquain, or rather the hill of Marquain in its centre, and its left is on the heights to the left of Lamain. The left is good, the centre moderate, and the right almost as bad as any position I ever saw; but such as Clairfayt left it we get it. Clairfayt is himself approaching Courtray, but as yet has made no attack. Pichegru is intrenching himself, notwithstanding appearances. In my opinion, Courtray will be recovered without much difficulty. Menin will be the tug; it

is a post of importance to the enemy, from the security it gives to all their posts on the Lys, as well as to Lincelles, Bondues, &c.

The enemy attacked Rouselaere yesterday, and were beaten, with the loss of their guns. Should anything occur before the mail is closed to-morrow, I'll give you a postscript; if not, adieu.

I hope to send you the maps to-morrow, or, certainly, by the next mail.

P.S.—By a letter from General Beaulieu's aide-de-camp to his father in this town, we are informed that the General beat the enemy, near Arlon, on the 30th, and pursued them with great slaughter to the glacis of Longwy. The particulars are not known.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, May 9, 1794.

This morning, I received yours of the 4th. I am sorry to tell you that the blow is not yet struck. The enemy are still at Courtray, and I fear their numbers keep Clairfayt quiet. In the course of the last week, the enemy have established a strong cordon on the Marque. They have repaired the works at Bouvines, and established new ones on the

several passes of the Marque, between Pont à Marque and Pont à Tressin, which are defended by eighteen pieces of cannon. Opposite to us, on the other side of the Marque, the enemy have their camps; one between Pont à Marque and a farm called La Valette; a second from the hill of Sanghin to the Pavée leading from the church of Peronne to Lille; and a third from the Pavée between Sanghin and Lille to the mill of Tressin. The whole may amount to 12,000 men. The old camp of Flers to 15,000.

I rather think that Lake will not accept the brigade if he can help it. I am much hurried. God bless you.

May 9.—The army took up a new position; having the left of their front line near the village of Lamain, their right towards Frozennes. General Buysche's corps was reinforced.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALPYMPLE.

Head-Quarters, May 11, 1794.

Soon after daybreak, we discovered that the enemy were passing the Marque in force. Between seven and eight o'clock they attacked and carried

the village of Basieux, which, however, was well defended by our light troops. The enemy's column advanced through the village of Camphin, to the attack of our left at Lamain. His Royal Highness directed a column of heavy cavalry, consisting of Dundas's brigade (late Mansel's), Sir Robert Laurie's, and the left of Vyse's, to advance by the low grounds on the left of our camp, and to endeavour to gain the plain of Cysoing, and by that means turn the enemy's right. This they effected; but the deepness of the ground, and its being very much interspersed with large patches of cole-seed—the mode of culture of which presents very great impediment to the progress of heavy cavalry—together with the good countenance shown by the French infantry, rendered the attack, in the first instance, ineffectual. However, they still advanced, and entirely turned the village of Camphin, which necessarily exposed their left to the fire of the enemy's batteries, established in front of the village of Gruson on the Marque.

At this time the enemy's infantry began to retreat in very good order from the village of Camphin. A brigade of British infantry was ordered to advance by the route the cavalry had taken, for the support of that corps, and four battalions were ordered to move from the centre of the camp, and by advancing between the villages of Basieux and Camphin, to facilitate the attack intended by the British cavalry.

The enemy's column retreated from Camphin, crossed the high road in front of Basieux, and made for the village of Willem. Our cavalry hung upon them, and, availing themselves of a favourable moment, as they were nearly gaining Willem, Dundas's brigade broke in upon them with great execution. The enemy retired with precipitation across the Marque, leaving fourteen pieces of cannon on the field of battle. The numbers of their killed, wounded, and prisoners I don't yet know, but the former must, I am sure, be considerable. At the same time, the enemy made an attack on the Hanoverians at Dottignies, and obliged them to retreat to Warcoing. At night, his Royal Highness ordered two battalions of Guards to march to the assistance of the Hanoverians, and to put them in possession of the post of Espierres, which is of great importance to us, on account of our communications. This morning, at break of day, it was discovered that the enemy had left this part of the country. The Hanoverians are reinstated at Dottignies, and the Guards returned to camp.

In the action of yesterday our loss was not great, but I must refer you to the Gazette for particulars. Amongst the wounded, Clinton is shot through the thigh. He is in no danger, except of a few weeks' confinement.

I am sorry to say we have no good news as yet

from Clairfayt, except his being joined by the British troops from Ostend under General White. By the bye, they are said to be in a shocking state, badly clothed, and some without firelocks. Every day must naturally increase the difficulty of driving Pichegru from Courtray. He now occupies a position on this side the Lys on the heights near Marque. Adieu.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

May 12, 1794.

I wrote you by Sunday's extra messenger, and Sylvester promised to leave my letter at Rochester. On Sunday Clairfayt approaches Courtray between the Heulle and the Lys. By the precipitation with which the French advanced posts retreated into the town, the Austrians were induced to believe that a rear-guard only was left there, and they endeavoured to follow them with light troops. On reconnoitring, it was discovered that they were in great force on the other side the town. Poor Winheim, approaching too near a battery, was killed by a cannon-shot. I looked upon him as the Abercromby of the Austrian army. I leave you to judge how great a misfortune I conceive his loss to be at this moment. In the afternoon the French came out of the town, formed their line, and a most obstinate engagement ensued,

in which we are said to have gained a victory, as the French at last retired into the town. The victory, however, is dear-bought and fruitless, for Clairfayt lost nearly 1500 men, and the enemy remain in *statu quo*. Yesterday morning Clairfayt repassed the Heulle.

* * * *

I had almost forgotten to inform you that Kinsky, with about 12,000 men, is come to St. Amand; and I don't know whether he is to join us. I hope not, for I have more apprehensions for Orchies, and all our left, than for our individual selves, and I dare say many days will not pass before the enemy make some further attempt. If anything worth relating happens before night, I shall add a postscript. Adieu.

Twelve o'clock Tuesday Night.

Clairfayt has retreated to Deinze, and the Prince of Kaunitz has been defeated, and obliged to retreat to Binch. Surely even the Austrians must at length see, or they will certainly feel, that the security of Flanders ought to have been the very first object with whoever had the planning of the campaign. I believe you and I have ever been of opinion that it is the very *sine quâ non* of all operations on this frontier. Adieu. The moment is, in my opinion, big with events of the utmost importance.

CHAPTER IX.

VICTORY OF PRINCE KAUNITZ—THE DUKE OF YORK CAPTURES MOUVAUX, BUT, BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE AUSTRIANS, RETREATS—PROSPECTS OF THE WAR—ACTION AT BLAUDAIN—OPERATIONS OF PRINCE KAUNITZ—RESIGNATION OF GENERAL MACK—LETTER FROM THE PRINCE OF COBOURG TO THE DUKE OF YORK.

SINCE the review on the plains of Cateau, on April 16th, the Duke of York's army, acting under the orders of the Emperor of Austria, had been engaged in daily hostilities with the enemy; and had been uniformly successful. On April 17th, they had driven the enemy from their position, at Vaux and Premont. They had repulsed the attack made on them at Cateau, on the 26th, when they captured thirty-five pieces of cannon, and the French General Chapuis was among the prisoners. On May 10th, 30,000 of the enemy, elated by their success against Clairfayt, had attacked the Duke of York at Lamain and Marquain, in front of Tournay; the Duke of

York had driven them back, and taken eleven pieces of cannon. The British troops had fully realized every anticipation which their tried prowess and their improved discipline had excited. They went into every encounter with that confident expectation of success, which so frequently leads to it. They were how to experience a reverse; and to any one who is anxious to form a just estimate of the campaign, it is important to consider with attention the circumstances of the battle of Turcoin.

May 15.—General Clairfayt marched towards Courtray, placing his left at Oyghem on the Lys, his right on Ingelmunster; General White advanced to Rouselaere, communicating with Clairfayt's left. Clairfayt communicated by Desselghem and Vichte, with the Hanoverians at Espierres.

His Imperial Majesty arrived at Tournay, leaving the gross of his army at St. Amand. Accounts arrived, that the Prince Kaunitz had beaten the enemy, and pursued them across the Sambre.

May 16.—This day, General Clairfayt moved to the *chaussée* between Menin and Ypres. In the evening orders were issued from his Imperial Majesty, to attack the enemy in five columns to-morrow morning; for which purpose each column will move soon after sunset this night, as far on their respective

routes as their advanced post will admit. Agreeably to the Emperor's instructions, his Royal Highness's columns arrived before break of day at Templeuve.

May 17.—The morning being hazy, it was near seven o'clock before it proceeded towards Lannoy, which was carried with little loss; four battalions being detached to observe Hem. His Royal Highness halted in front of Lannoy, till this detachment had joined; and then, leaving two battalions of Hessians in Lannoy, proceeded to the attack of Roubaix. The town was carried without much difficulty; and General Abercromby, with the advance of the column—namely, the British Guards, O'Donnel's corps, and some British light dragoons—took a position in front of it. His Royal Highness, perceiving no co-operation from the fourth column, and that his left was exposed to all the enemy's force from Lille, Flers, Hem, &c.; and it being known, that the attack of the first column on Moucron had failed, and that the head of the second column was at Watrelos, and the day being far advanced, resolved to proceed no further; and after viewing the ground near Roubaix to be occupied by General Abercromby, had returned to view the ground destined for the remainder of his corps near Lannoy (which was to be his head-quarters), when an order arrived from his Majesty the Emperor, that his Royal Highness should proceed to complete the object of

the instructions of the preceding night by the attack of Mouvaux.

His Royal Highness represented the state of affairs, but the order being positive, he returned to Roubaix, and ordered General Abercromby to carry his Imperial Majesty's orders into execution; in doing which, the grenadiers and light infantry of the British Guards displayed the greatest intrepidity. Supported by the 15th and 7th British Light Dragoons, they stormed, and were in complete possession of the intrenchments of Mouvaux, before Colonel Congreve could possibly give them the assistance he was preparing for them by the establishment of the batteries of the British reserve artillery. The troops that had taken Mouvaux, remained in that position during the night. The brigade of the British line, which on this occasion was put under the orders of the Honourable Major-general Fox,* was directed to take up a position behind Roubaix, and to observe Croix; and five battalions of Austrian infantry covered Roubaix, which was his Royal Highness's head-quarters.

May 18.—Soon after daybreak, the enemy at-

* Hon. Major-general Fox, brother to the Right Hon. Charles James Fox, Cornet 1st Dragoon Guards, September, 1770; Captain 38th Regiment, 1774; Major 49th Regiment, 1777; Lieutenant-colonel 38th Regiment, October, 1778; Colonel 10th Foot, 1795. Died in July, 1811.

tacked the advanced corps of General Otto's column, which occupied a position in the rear of Roubaix, the suburbs of which town were in possession of his light troops. At about eight, the Austrians gave way, and the attack commenced on his Royal Highness's right, and at the same time, the head of the enemy's column from Lille reached the hamlet of Le Fresnoy, and by that means nearly effected a junction with the column from the Lys, and cut his Royal Highness's army. Colonel Dévy had carried away two battalions, which formed his Royal Highness's reserve, to General Otto's column, and the remainder of the Austrians were evidently beaten.

The Duke's first idea, on perceiving the disaster, was to join the Guards; but that was impossible. He then endeavoured to join the brigade of the Line, but being nearly through the town of Roubaix, he perceived the enemy in possession of the suburbs. He next made for Watrelos, expecting there to find General Otto, and from him to receive his own two battalions, and some further asistance for the relief of the Guards. The village of Watrelos was without troops, and when his Royal Highness had nearly passed through it, he was fired at by the enemy, and the officer of Hussars, who was riding by his side, fell, his horse being shot. At length, his Royal Highness arrived at Leers, where he found General Otto. The British infantry effected their retreat, but

not without a considerable loss of artillery and men.

The failure of this attack may be attributed to the little connection between the columns, and the distance that the fifth column had to march, precluding the possibility of any connection with the third. The order for his Royal Highness attacking Mouvaux, under all the circumstances above stated, can only be accounted for by a determination to sacrifice the third column for the purpose of giving relief to General Clairfayt (who had been ordered to cross the Lys, and advance toward Lincelles), without waiting to know what success had attended the operations of the other columns. This night the army returned to their former camp.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, May 19, 1794.

The detail of the transactions of yesterday and the day before, would take up more time than I have at my own disposal. But I must inform you, to enable you to be quite master of the subject by reading the "Gazette," that the attack was made in five columns: the first, under General Buysche, by Dottignies to Moucron; the second, under General Otto, by Leers,

Watrelos, to Turcoin; the third, under the Duke of York, by Lannoy and Roubaix, to Mouvaux; the fourth, under Kinsky, to force Bouvines, detaching to his right in the first instance, to cover the Duke's left by masking Lille, and in the second in conjunction with the fifth column (Archduke Charles, who was to pass at Pont à Marque) to attack the enemy's camps of Flers and Lampaupont, secure all the passes of the Marque, cover the Duke of York's left flank, and co-operate with his Royal Highness in forcing on to the Lys. Many circumstances, in my opinion, conspired to render the success of this plan almost impossible. It could not, I think, be reasonably expected that the column passing at Pont à Marque could perform their very long march, and the different services expected, in time to afford any protection to the Duke's left. It was known pretty early in the day that Buysche's attack on Moucron had failed. At between five and six in the evening, the head of the Duke's column was in front of Roubaix, of which he was in possession. Feeling that he had no support or co-operation on his left, and knowing that the head of Otto's column was only at Watrelos, he resolved to proceed no further. He had viewed the ground intended to be occupied by his advance—namely, the brigade of Guards, O'Donnel's corps, and some light dragoons—and was on his return to Lannoy, and had actually viewed the ground destined

for the gross of his corps, near Lannoy, which was to be his head-quarters, when a positive order from the Emperor arrived for the attack of Mouvaux.

Nothing can equal the madness that dictated this order, except the blind obstinacy with which it was persisted in, in spite of every representation. With a heavy heart the Duke returned to Roubaix, and ordered General Abercromby to carry the order of his Imperial Majesty into execution, which gave an opportunity for the greatest display of gallantry to the flank battalion of the Guards, as you will have seen by the "Gazette."

The next morning the enemy, in force, attacked Otto's advance, consisting of five battalions, in their position in the rear of Turcoin, and his light troops in the suburbs of the town, which they forced, and advanced on the Duke.

Our corps was then situated as follows—and its very critical position was fully represented to the Imperial head-quarters. Four battalions of Guards, in the intrenched position of Mouvaux; the brigade of the Line, in the rear of Roubaix, observing Croix; two battalions of Hussars, left to occupy Lannoy; two battalions of Austrians, being the Duke's reserve, lent for the instant at the pressing solicitation of Colonel Dévy, and carried by him, contrary to every order, to General Otto's column; half a battalion in Roubaix, whence they were driven by the French.

The remainder of this battalion and two other Austrian battalions, which were all the infantry the Duke had, engaged and were evidently worsted by the enemy. Congreve's battery formed with its left on Mouvaux, its right protected by four companies of the Guards, and the Coldstream were drawn from Abercromby for the moment, and joined on the right the four companies of the 3rd, to repulse any attack on that quarter, and keep up the communication with the right.

Such was our situation when the head of the enemy's column from Lille entered the hamlet of Le Fresnoy, by that means gained the rear of the Coldstream, completely cutting off Mouvaux.

At the moment the Duke perceived the disaster, the Austrians in his front were giving way. The first idea that suggested itself to him was to gain Mouvaux and join the Guards, but this was impossible; the next, to form any body of troops for the purpose of giving relief to that corps. With that view, we tried to pass Roubaix, and to join the brigade of the Line, but the enemy was in possession of the suburbs. The Duke then made for Watrelos; expecting there to find Otto, and by him to be furnished with the means of succouring the Guards. We found no troops in Watrelos, but having almost passed through the village, we received a fire from the enemy, which wounded the

officer of Hussars' horse, who was riding by the side of the Duke. After many difficulties and perplexities, we were fortunate enough to reach Leers, where we found General Otto.

The conduct of the British infantry does them the greatest honour. Their retreat could not be effected without a heavy loss of men and artillery. I most sincerely hope that the heavy disaster which has fallen so undeservedly on us will be a warning to our allies; for while the same loose, unconnected, unmilitary system is persevered in, while such rashness and such childish obstinacy are the striking characteristics of their councils, nothing but loss and disgrace can attend the arms of his Imperial Majesty.

The Emperor has done us a bit of justice, in publicly acknowledging that the Duke's column was the only one of the five that completed the service expected from them; and I believe the conduct of the British troops has excited the admiration, and perhaps jealousy, of the whole Austrian army.

Lake continues very indifferent. Poor Ludlow is as well as can be expected after the loss of his arm, which he bore with the most heroic fortitude.

God bless you, my dear Sir Hew. My indignation is excited to a pitch I can hardly describe, by the reflection of what we have suffered by the ob-

stinacy, ignorance, and pride of those who take the direction of the war.

In the account of the Campaign by Captain Jones of the 14th Regiment, are the following remarks on this engagement:

"May 18, 1794.

"The few troops who were immediately with the Duke were soon compelled to give way before such superior numbers, nor was it in his power, with every effort he could make, assisted by Colonels Calvert, Hewgill, and Childers, and a number of the most able officers in the service, to rally them; and at that moment the advanced parties of the column from Lille showed themselves in the road between Roubaix and Mouvaux: therefore it was impossible to succeed in the attempt which the Duke made to join the brigade of Guards.

* * * *

"The ability and coolness with which Lieutenant-general Abercromby and Major-general Fox conducted their corps, under such trying circumstances, did them much honour; and it must be a great satisfaction to the British nation that the column under the Duke of York's command executed to the fullest extent their intended part of the operation, and that in the check which they afterwards sus-

tained, the conduct of the British troops entitled them to the warmest expressions of gratitude and admiration on the part of his Imperial Majesty."

And the observations on this action in "Victoires, Conquêtes, et Revers:"

"Ce fut à Tournay que les alliés arrêtèrent ce fameux plan d'attaque qu'ils nommèrent emphatiquement *plan de destruction*, parce qu'il ne tendait à rien moins qu'à l'anéantissement de l'armée française. Il est vrai de dire que si le prince de Cobourg eût voulu renoncer à son système favori de morcellement et de colonnes multipliées, il plaçait le général Pichegru dans une position très critique."

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, May 20, 1794.

I wrote yesterday to my father and to my uncle, but as, in these critical times, I conceive intelligence from this quarter must be interesting, I do not like the mail should go without a few lines from me to my friends at Theobalds. The public "Gazette" will give you a very true and minute account of the transactions of the 17th and 18th. Those of the

latter were as unpleasant as you can conceive, and I found myself in a situation which it has been my good fortune never to have been in before—namely, in a beaten army.

I had, last year, an opportunity of seeing the Dutch and Hanoverian armies in the same state, but the sensation is very different when the blow falls on ourselves. We have the consolation of knowing that no fault can be imputed to us, and that our loss was occasioned by the obstinate folly of others. No mobbed fox was ever more put to it to make his escape than we were, being, at times, nearly surrounded; and I am sure you will be happy to hear that I am perfectly well, and have only lost in the scramble a horse of little value, with a portmanteau, &c.

The future prospects of the war are not very bright; and if the system of acting adopted by our Allies is not changed, it must, in the common course of things, become darker and darker. However, we will hope for the best, and that the arrival of the Prussians on the frontier will give a turn to affairs. I hope the steps the Administration are taking at home will be attended with success, and that a dozen of the ringleaders of the seditious clubs will be hanged; if not, the part adopted by Government will have a very bad tendency, and those who are disaffected will be encouraged by the difficulty at-

tending detection to persevere in their execrable designs.

I hear Robespierre has published a most seducing address to his countrymen, congratulating them on the pleasing prospect of all Europe being very soon brought into the very same agreeable state of enlightened philosophy which has already bestowed so much happiness on the people of France, and setting forth to their heated imaginations the heartfelt exultation every Frenchman will experience on the reflection of having been an agent in the attainment of so much happiness for his fellow-creatures. In the meantime, to keep up the spirits and attention of the people till this blessed epoch arrives, I find they have resolved on the accusation of Madame Elizabeth, the late King's sister, which will probably be very soon followed by her execution. In the midst of all these scenes which are exhibited on the continent, I congratulate myself in the reflection that my own country remains internally at peace, and in the possession of every blessing that a mild and free constitution can bestow.

Pray tell my mother that I will write to her very soon.

May 22.—The enemy advanced by Nechin and Templeuve, and attacked the camp of the Allies

between five and six in the morning. At ten, the attack became general on the line from our redoubts in the rear of the village of Blandain quite to the Scheldt. The enemy refused their right the whole day, and had a corps, consisting apparently of two brigades of infantry and some cavalry, in front of the village of Willem, for the purpose of covering the right of their attack. From ten A.M. till nine at night, the fire both of artillery and musketry was heavier than the oldest soldier on the field had ever before witnessed. At seven, the brigade of the British line (almost all the troops in the left wing having previously been brought down to the right) were ordered to advance upon Pont à Chin. After a few discharges, they pushed on with their bayonets, and, as far as their numbers went, carried all before them. Had this order of attack been adopted by the Allies in general, the day would probably have ended in the ruin of the French army.

Between nine and ten P.M., the enemy retired into the camps from which they had marched the preceding night, but the labour of the day had been too severe to admit the possibility of any pursuit.

May 23.—Count Walmoden marched with 5000 men to take up a position to cover Oudenarde and communicate with General Clairfayt, who had fallen back to his old position near Thielt. The army took up a new position nearer Tournay.

May 25. — Intelligence arrived of the Prince Kaunitz having gained a victory over the left wing of the French army near Mons the day before. His Highness took 3000 prisoners and 41 pieces of cannon, ammunition, &c. The French army retreated across the Sambre, and Prince Kaunitz followed them; but finding them too formidable, both in point of position and numbers, to venture an attack upon them, he re-crossed the Sambre, taking a position to cover Mons.

May 26.—A corps consisting of ten battalions and some cavalry marched, under the command of the Prince of Waldeck, to augment the corps already at Orchies, and the following day the army were employed in intrenching themselves in the smaller position in front of Tournay. The trees near Frozennes were cut down, and the approach of the enemy from Pont à Chin was prevented by two redoubts near the *chaussée*, which, by means of an intrenchment, communicated with the redoubts thrown up by the British army in front of Orcq the preceding year. Upon the left, intrenchments were thrown up in the rear of the village of Lamain.

May 28.—The Earl of Yarmouth, accredited to his Imperial Majesty, arrived at Tournay.

May 29.—Further detachments were this day made, for the purpose of reinforcing the army on

the Sambre. General Mack announced his resignation, in consequence of the Empéror's proposed departure from the army the next day.

May 30.—His Imperial Majesty left Tournay, meaning to visit General Clairfayt, and then to proceed to the army on the Sambre. The Prince Kaunitz had retired from this army, and the command of it was given to General Alvinzi. General the Prince of Waldeck was appointed Quartermaster-general to the Austrian army.

The tranquillity of our outposts, as well as all the accounts from the frontier, assured us that the enemy had made very considerable detachments to the eastward. As the Imperial army on the Sambre amounted to upwards of seventy battalions and fifty squadrons, the public expectation was raised to the highest pitch.

Accounts were received that the enemy had erected batteries against Charleroy.

Before the Emperor left his army at Tournay, the following letter was written by the Prince of Cobourg to his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

"Tournay, ce 27 Mai, 1794.

"Monseigneur,

"J'ai reçu aujourd'hui une lettre de Milord Comte d'Elgin, qui me fait part de l'impression

qu'ont fait à Bruxelles, et généralement dans le public, des bruits qui s'y sont répandus sur la coopération de votre Altesse Royale, de ses généraux et de ses troupes, aux évènements qui ont eu lieu dans les journées du 17 et du 18 de ce mois. Ces bruits sont de nature, ainsi que s'exprime Mi Lord Elgin, à faire croire, et *l'on se permet même d'insister, que son Altesse Royale a exposé sa colonne témérairement et contre les conseils qu'on lui a donnés.* Je me suis empressé, Monseigneur, de mettre sur le champ sous les yeux de Sa Majesté la lettre du Comte d'Elgin. Ce monarque lui a accordé toute l'attention qu'elle mérite, et m'a ordonné de ne pas perdre un instant pour écrire a votre Altesse Royale sur un objet qui tient autant à cœur à Sa Majesté. Elle m'enjoint de donner à votre Altesse Royale les assurances les plus positives que non seulement elle est parfaitement satisfaite de la manière pleine de zèle, d'intelligence, d'ensemble et de valeur, dont votre Altesse Royale, ses braves généraux, et ses braves troupes ont exécuté tous les mouvements qui ont eu lieu, successivement dans les journées du 17 et du 18, mais qu'elle lui donne par cette lettre le témoignage certain, et bien décidément irrécusable, que votre Altesse Royale n'a fait aucune marche, aucune attaque, aucune manœuvre, qui n'ait été une suite essentielle de la disposition générale, ou qu'elle n'ait engagé votre Altesse Royale

à faire par les messages successifs, que dans le courant de l'affaire, elle a reçu de la part de ce monarque.

"L'ordre général, émané de Sa Majesté, Samedi dernier, a prouvé déjà jusqu'à l'évidence à quel point ce monarque rend à votre Altesse Royale la justice due à ses éminentes qualités, et aux services si brilliants et si distingués, qu'elle rend à la cause commune, avec un courage et un dévouement bien digne de son auguste nom—cet ordre a prouvé, d'une manière non moins positive—le cas infini, que Sa Majesté fait des généraux et des troupes sous les ordres de votre Altesse Royale—et combien elle a été surprise et indignée d'apprendre qu'on se permet sur la conduite ou la coopération des troupes de Sa Majesté Britanique dans les journées du 17 et du 18 Mai, des jugemens et des propos, qui ne répondissent pas entièrement à l'estime et à la considération que ces troupes doivent inspirer. La présente lettre que j'ai l'honneur d'écrire aujourd'hui à votre Altesse Royale est une confirmation bien authentique des sentiments qui ont dicté l'ordre général en question, et ne peut que faire cesser tous les bruits qu'on se permettrait de répandre et qui d'ailleurs ne sont pas faits pour porter la moindre atteinte à la réputation personelle de votre Altesse Royale ou à celle des armées Britaniques. Organe des intentions, et de la volonté d'un monarque aussi

juste qu'éclairé—je m'acquitte avec d'autant plus d'empressement de ses ordres qu'ils me mettent à même d'offrir sur le même objet à votre Altesse Royale, l'hommage de mes sentiments personnels et celui du respectueux dévouement avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être,

"Monseigneur, de votre Altesse Royale,

"Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

"PRINCE COBOURG, F.M."

CHAPTER X.

DEFECTION OF THE AUSTRIANS—FRENCH INVEST YPRES—OPERATIONS ON THE SAMBRE—SANGUINARY DECREE OF THE FRENCH CONVENTION —ORDER OF THE DUKE OF YORK—GENERAL CLAIRFAYT REPULSED AT ROUSELAERE—CRITICAL SITUATION OF THE ALLIES—INACTIVITY OF THE AUSTRIANS — STATE OF FLANDERS — THE FRENCH RETREAT ACROSS THE SAMBRE, BUT AGAIN ADVANCE—YPRES SURRENDERED TO THE FRENCH—CHARLEROY SURRENDERS—THE ALLIES EVACUATE GHENT—RETREAT OF THE ALLIES—PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF HOLLAND.

We shall find that from this time the contest assumes a new and lowering aspect. The Emperor has quitted his army, and is on the road to Vienna. Interests declared to be purely Austrian govern the counsels of the Imperial Cabinet. The Netherlands are to be relinquished, partly because the inhabitants do not evince attachment to the Emperor; partly because the country is so distant from Austria, and difficult to retain against the enterprising and increasing armies of the French Republic; partly, perhaps, because it is hoped that acquisitions nearer home may compensate the loss of provinces so distant and so little affected.

Those, therefore, of the inhabitants who have remained faithful to their Imperial Sovereign are to be abandoned to their merciless foes. The Emperor's engagements with Holland and Great Britain are to be violated. The British army, inconsiderable in numbers when compared with the Republican hosts, are now to sustain the conflict alone, unaided by those in dependence on whom they engaged in and hitherto maintained it.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, June 3, 1794.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 26th of May. You will probably be informed before this time of the events that have happened since the Emperor has left us and Mack has resigned. We are here on the strict defensive, intrenching ourselves up to our teeth. For some days the enemy have shown little inclination to disturb us, and I believe the banks of the Sambre will afford the next interesting intelligence.

* * * *

I really have no time to write more. Colonel Craig being away and Craufurd ill, gives me more business than I can well get through.

June 4.—Accounts arrived of the operations of the armies on the Sambre. It appeared that the enemy had retired from Charleroy, and fallen back from before the Imperial army; but that they had effected their retreat, without any considerable loss either of men or guns. This evening Marquis Cornwallis arrived at Tournay.

June 6.—Lord Cornwallis left Tournay for Brussels. News arrived of the investment of Ypres. Orders were sent to General Clairfayt, at Thielt, to concert measures with Count Walmoden, at Oudenarde, for the relief of Ypres. Six battalions of Austrians were detached from the army near Mons, to reinforce Clairfayt.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, June 6, 1794.

The Prince of Kaunitz's army, which is now commanded by Count Alvinzi, has relieved the town of Charleroy, which the enemy were bombarding, and they have been obliged to repass the Sambre, but I fear without any loss of men or guns. The mountain has therefore produced . The French have nearly invested, and are at this moment bombarding Ypres. Clairfayt and Walmoden are

ordered to march for its relief. We are dying for news from the fleet. There is a report, but as I shall certainly go wild if it proves true, I choose to disbelieve it as long as I can, that our Portuguese fleet is taken.

Lord Cornwallis left us this morning for Brussels. He is quite recovered, and looks remarkably well. His arrival on the Continent gives me much pleasure.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

June 6, 1794.

By some strange accident, your letter of the 27th arrived only this instant. In consideration of the levity and thoughtlessness of youth, I forgive you your negligence, and truly say I hope you will improve as you grow older.

The tranquillity of our outposts, and all accounts from the enemy's frontier, assured us that they were detaching largely to the eastward; and the Austrians having, by detachments from this and other armies, assembled upwards of seventy battalions and fifty squadrons near Mons, the attention of all *this* world was directed to the important operations on the Sambre.

The Prince of Kaunitz retired in disgust and discontent, and was succeeded in the chief command by

our old friend Alvinzi, whose perpetual anxiety or indecision little qualified him, in my opinion, for a command in chief.

The Emperor left us on the 30th, first to visit Clairfayt and then to go to Mons, to be present at the general attack to be made on the 2nd or 3rd on the enemy on the Sambre. His Imperial Majesty was accompanied by Mack, who, having resigned to the Prince of Waldeck, was to plan and superintend this grand attack as his finale. His Imperial Majesty, after defeating the enemy, was to proceed into Germany, to invigorate, by his presence, the preparations for sending reinforcements to this frontier.

In the meantime, the enemy advanced to Charleroy, which they bombarded; but, on the evening of the 3rd, we had the satisfaction of hearing that the enemy's right had been obliged to fall back, that Charleroy was completely relieved, and that in a few hours we might expect to learn the event of a general action, which was about to commence when the courier set off. On the 4th, the account we so anxiously expected arrived. It stated that the enemy had been driven back, but I fear without any loss of men or cannon, and the day ended with a violent quarrel amongst the Austrian commanders. You know how difficult it is to learn the real truth, and are aware that the bulletins published at the Imperial head-quarters, by authority, are generally such exag-

gerations and so very wide from the truth, that I should be very much ashamed to see "Harry Calvert" subscribed to them. I have no doubt that ere many days the French will attack the Allies near Mons.

The latest accounts from Ypres state that the enemy are bombarding the town. Clairfayt and Walmoden march to-day for its relief. I believe it is a feint to draw us from hence, which is the true object of their views, but I hope that the importance of the Scheldt has by this time become evident even to an *Austrian* capacity.

I am very happy that Lord Cornwallis is on the continent, for I have more reliance on his ability, wisdom, and judgment than on the collective sagacity of the whole of his Imperial Majesty's army or even Cabinet.

The National Convention have decreed that from this time no quarter shall be given to any Englishman or Hanoverian, and hand-bills containing the decree have been distributed throughout their army. I think that by moderation much good may accrue to us from this manœuvre of the Convention. By disclaiming any idea of following an example so atrocious, we may awaken the sparks of honour yet remaining in the French army, and we may at all events point out to what an extent it is made the tool of its sanguinary employers.

I have this moment received yours of the 2nd.

I should be very happy to give any information in my power to any person in Mr. Pitt's administration and confidence; but you must be aware how much the idea of a letter being subjected to the eye of a third person takes off from the ease and satisfaction of writing it. You will therefore remit letters of mine only when you think they contain important information, and then I shall rely on the candour of those who read them, and that they will bear in mind that I am in general under the necessity of writing in the utmost haste.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION DECREED

"That no English nor Hanoverian prisoners shall be made."

* * * *

And the decree was to be accompanied by an address to the armies of the Republic, which concluded with the following paragraphs:

"When the event of battles shall put in your power either English or Hanoverians, bring to your remembrance the vast tracts of country English slaves have laid waste. Carry your view to La Vendée, Toulon, Lyons, Landrecies, Martinique, and St. Domingo, places still reeking with the blood which the atrocious policy of the English has shed.

Do not trust to their artful language, which is an additional crime, worthy of their perfidious character and Machiavelian Government. Those who boast that they abhor the tyranny of George, say, can they fight for him! No, no, Republican soldiers, you ought, therefore, when victory shall put in your power either Englishmen or Hanoverians, to strike; not one of them ought to return to the traitorous territory of England, or be brought into France. Let the British slaves perish, and Europe be free."

The Duke of York's General Order in reply to the Decree was as follows:

"Head-Quarters,
"Tournay, June 7, 1794.

"His Royal Highness the Duke of York thinks it incumbent on him to announce to the British and Hanoverian troops under his command, that the National Convention of France, pursuing that gradation of crimes which has distinguished the periods of its government as the most calamitous of any that has yet occurred in the history of the world, has just passed a decree that their soldiers shall give no quarter to the British or Hanoverian troops. His Royal Highness anticipates the indignation and horror, which will naturally arise in the minds of the brave troops whom he addresses, upon receiving this

information. His Royal Highness desires, however, to remind them, that mercy to the vanquished is the brightest gem in the soldiers' character, and exhorts them not to suffer their resentment to lead them to any precipitate act of cruelty on their part, which may sully the reputation they have acquired in the world. His Royal Highness believes that it would be difficult for brave men to conceive that any sort of men, who are themselves exempt from sharing in the dangers of war, should be so base and cowardly as to seek to aggravate the calamities of it upon the unfortunate people who are subject to their orders. It was, indeed, reserved for the present times to produce to the world the proof of the possibility of the existence of such atrocity and infamy. The pretence for issuing this decree, if even founded in truth, would justify it only to minds similar to those of the members of the National Convention. It is, in fact, too absurd to be noticed, and still less to be refuted. The French must themselves see through the flimsy artifice of an intended assassination, by which Robespierre has succeeded in procuring that military guard, which has at once established him the successor of the unfortunate Louis, by whatever name he may choose to dignify his future reign. In all the wars which from the earliest times have existed between the English and the French nations, they have been accustomed to consider each other

in the light of generous as well as brave enemies, while the Hanoverians, for a century the allies of the former, have shared in this reciprocal esteem. Humanity and kindness have at all times taken place the instant that opposition ceased, and the same cloak has been frequently seen covering the wounded, enemies as well as friends, whilst indiscriminately conveying both to the hospitals of the conquerors.

"The British and Hanoverian armies will not believe, that the French nation, even under their present infatuation, can so far forget their character as soldiers, as to pay any attention to a decree, as injurious to themselves, as it is disgraceful to the persons who passed it. In this confidence, his Royal Highness trusts that the soldiers of both nations will confine their sentiments of resentment and abhorrence to the National Convention alone; persuaded that they will be joined in them by every Frenchman, who professes one spark of honour, or one principle of a soldier; and his Royal Highness is confident, that it will only be on finding, contrary to every expectation, that the French army has relinquished every title to the fair character of soldiers, and of men, by submitting to and obeying so atrocious an order, that the brave troops under his command will think themselves justified, and indeed under the necessity of adopting a species of warfare,

for which they will then stand acquitted to their own conscience, and the world. In such an event, the French army alone will be answerable for the ten-fold vengeance which will fall upon themselves, their wives, their children, and their unfortunate country, already groaning under every calamity which the accumulated crimes of unprincipled ambition and avarice can heap upon their devoted victims.

"His Royal Highness desires that these orders may be read and explained to the men at their successive roll-callings."

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, June 10, 1794.

The bombardment of Ypres continues heavy. Clairfayt as yet has made no attempt for its relief. He represents the enemy as too strong for his corps. He is this morning joined by six battalions from the Sambre, which I hope will enable him to attack to-morrow. We move at noon to-day, to create a diversion in his favour, leaving the care of the camp and town to the Dutch Hussars and cavalry under Otto.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Afternoon, June 10, 1794.

The march of the troops was prevented by the enemy's appearing on the plain of Cysoing.

* * * *

A diversion will be made in Clairfayt's favour by sending a small corps to Pecq to-morrow, from whence the light troops will push as far as they can. We are reduced to a melancholy alternative; but considering the smallness of our force, and the decided importance of the Scheldt, I believe the Prince of Cobourg has resolved for the best.

June 10.—The cannonade and bombardment of Ypres continuing very heavy, the greatest part of the army in front of Tournay was ordered to strike their tents, and be in readiness to march at noon. The move of the troops was prevented at that time by the appearance of the enemy on the plains of Cysoing, and as an attack was made in the evening on the advanced posts of Orchies and Bachy, the intended movement was laid aside. The number of our troops employed in this expedition, could not have exceeded 11,000; and the left column, which was to

have been under the command of the Duke of York, and whose destination was to have attacked Moucron, and thence to have proceeded to the attack of the enemy's camp at Haerlebeke, would necessarily have been exposed during the march to all the force the enemy could have collected from the post in front of Lille, and from Lille itself; and on arriving at the point of attack, it must evidently have given its left flank to the enemy's post of Halluin, to Menin, and indeed to all the posts on the Lys.

His Imperial Majesty returned this night to Tournay.

June 11.—Intelligence arrived that Clairfayt had been attacked by the enemy the evening before, near Rouselaere, and had fallen back to Thorout. Count Walmoden was at Thorout.

The enemy attacked Orchies this evening.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, June 13, 1794.

The mail not having arrived, probably deprives me of the pleasure of a letter from you; but I will not let the messenger set off, without giving you a few lines, as my friends at Oxhey will naturally be anxious to hear how matters are going on in Flanders.

The force the enemy have in our front, and the importance of the post we occupy, have prevented our making any movement for the relief of Ypres. That service has necessarily been committed to Clairfayt.

He had a most positive order to attack this morning, with which, I believe, he has complied, as a very heavy cannonade has been heard, which lasted from four o'clock till nine. The event has probably decided the fate of Ypres; and we shall be informed of it, before I close this. If he is successful, we shall soon be able to recover Courtray, and having by that means contracted the line of our defence, we must wait till reinforcements enable us to recommence offensive operations against the enemy.

I much lament that the Austrians could never be made to comprehend the absolute necessity of putting this place in a state of defence. Had the works now being constructed, been completed six months ago, Tournay, like Lille, would have given protection to the whole frontier, and secured the Scheldt; and the greatest part of the army, now necessarily detained for its defence, would have been at liberty to give protection to Ypres, or any part of the frontier threatened by the enemy. But the Austrians have a *façon d'agir* of their own, from which nothing can drive them.

The mail has arrived without any letter for me, of

which I must complain, at this critical period, so full of treasonable attempts at home, and nautical events at sea, and considering the regularity with which I write. I hear, however, from others, with infinite satisfaction, that Lord Howe has taken six sail of the line, and sunk two; and that there is reason to hope our cruisers and frigates may intercept other ships of the enemy, on their return to Brest. Now is the time for Lord Moira's expedition.

Half-past Ten.

No news from Clairfayt. I augur well, however. We know to a certainty, that he attacked this morning in five columns.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, June 13, 1794.

As I wrote you word on Tuesday, the proposed march on Moucron and Haerlebeke was laid aside. The more I consider it, the more I am convinced that, had the plan been carried into execution, the left column must have been exposed to a force which, in all probability, would not only have defeated the object of its march, but made its return to this place very uncertain.

During the whole of the day before yesterday, the

enemy had the troops of the camp of Flers (about 8000), *au bivouac*, on the chaussée, from Lille to Lannoy. The instant we had formed our line of march, these troops, augmented by all the force they could draw from Turcoin, Roubaix, Watrelos, and their other posts, which (the object of our attack being once ascertained) they might have left almost without troops, would have been on our flank, and probably they would not have been idle during our attack on Moucron. Supposing we carried Moucron, our next object was the camp of Haerlebeke, the right of which would have fallen to our lot.

In our attempt to turn this, we should necessarily have had in our rear the posts of Roucq and Lincelles; and on our left flank, those of Rechen Halluin; and in short, Menin, and all the posts of the Lys. I leave you to judge what chance of success remained, under these circumstances, for our column, composed of about 6000 men. In my own opinion, the only diversion likely to succeed, that we could have made in Clairfayt's favour, would have been by passing about 10,000 men over the Scheldt, close to the town, without packs or baggage of any kind, and recrossing the river, leaving the river Espirette to cover our left flank, and joining Count Walmoden (who should have had orders to advance at the same time) on the road from Courtray to Oudenarde, about four miles from the former.

Our retreat on Tournay would have been perfectly secured by the Espirette, which must have been occupied by a couple of thousand men, at least, and probably the appearance of 12,000 or 15,000 men so near Courtray (who would have advanced, if an opportunity presented itself) might have been attended with good consequences.

In the present state of affairs, I think we could not have done more than this, consistently with the security of Tournay, which I conceive ought to be the *first* object of all the Allies. The bad policy which we have so frequently lamented, of not having put this most *important* place in a state of defence, must now be apparent to all the world. For its security, we have been under the necessity of forming an intrenched camp, the defence of which necessarily prevents any active operations of the corps under the Prince of Cobourg's immediate orders. By the unaccountable supineness in regard to Tournay, instead of acting like Lille, which gives security to the whole frontier, it is become rather an incumbrance to us at this critical moment, when every possible exertion is necessary for the preservation of West Flanders. I am so impressed myself with the absolute necessity of preserving Tournay, that I cannot help adding a few lines to this, with a view of making you of my opinion, if you are not so already.

You will observe that, should Ypres fall, and the enemy get possession of Tournay, there is no single fortress from hence to the mouth of the Scheldt. which will prevent them immediately over-running the country and taking possession of the left bank of the Scheldt, from this place quite to the sea. The prospect of little opposition and much plunder would soon considerably augment their force; Nieuport could give them little apprehension, Ostend less, and the Dutch garrisons of L'Ecluse, Hulste, &c., sooner or later, must fall. The Scheldt would become their frontier, and their industry and activity would soon render it a most formidable one; and the accession they would acquire of coast, and of one of richest countries in Europe, would give them advantages which can hardly be computed; while their vicinity to Holland must excite the greatest alarms for the safety of that country, where, as you know from personal observation, the hateful doctrines of French republicanism do not excite the horror they deserve.

From all these considerations, had I the misfortune to have anything to do with his Imperial Majesty's councils, the security of the Scheldt should be my "Delenda Carthago:" but I fear far other views prevail amongst the ministers of that Prince. His leaving the army at so critical a moment, has not tended much to gain him the confidence of his

subjects, and has had no good effects on the troops—I mean the Austrians, for I don't believe our honest fellows care half-a-crown for any emperor or king but their own. The Emperor arrived here on the night of the 10th, and set off again at noon the next day—it is said, for Germany.

Having inflicted on you so considerable a bore with my speculations, I must return to sober matters of fact. Clairfayt was attacked the afternoon of the 10th, and fell back from his position near Rouselaer to Lichterveldt, near Thorout; I cannot find that he lost any men or guns. On the night of the 10th he was reinforced by six battalions from the Sambre, and he has the most positive orders to attack, *coûte qui coûte*, as this morning, probably in the course of this day, the fate of Ypres is decided. For my own part, I confess that the want of energy that appears in the Austrian army, gives me more apprehension than the exertion of the enemy. The Prince of Waldeck, the successor to Mack, is ill, and nobody appears desirous at this critical moment to step forward and act for him; and you know it is against all the principles of Austrian etiquette for a commander-in-chief to presume to act or think for himself.

The accounts from the enemy's frontier induce us to believe they are augmenting their force immediately opposite to us. They have a camp of 7000 men on Mons en Pevelle, which keeps Orchies in hot water;

and Orchies, in my opinion, as the key to the camp of Maulde, and consequently to the pass of the Scheldt at Monfaigne, is a post of infinite consequence. You will be surprised by so long an epistle; the fact is, that I am endeavouring, by bark and keeping myself quiet, to get rid of a feverette which has been hanging on me for some time. Though the body is still, the spirit is uneasy, and you are the poor victim on whom its ill humours are discharged. I hope Lady Dalrymple is perfectly recovered. Hulse has joined in high feather; he was received by the brigade with three cheers. Ruddock* continues Major of Brigade, and he has taken Captain Cooke,† of the 1st Regiment, as his aide-de-camp. Ludlow recovers fast, and is much gratified by the company of his brother, who has come over to escort him to England whenever the surgeons permit his departure.

* F. G. Ruddock, Major of Brigade, appointed to the 1st Foot Guards, June, 1785. Retired with the rank of Lieutenant-colonel, April, 1805.

† Captain Cooke, 1st Guards. Major-general Sir George Cooke, K.C.B., appointed to the Guards in October, 1784. Aide-de-Camp to General Hulse in Flanders, served in Holland in 1799, in Sicily in 1806, at Walcheren in 1809. Served in the Peninsula, and lost his arm at Waterloo. Died a Lieutenant-general and Colonel 40th Regiment in February, 1837.

Adieu, my dear Hew! I shan't close this till the last moment, in hopes of news frow Ypres.

P.S.—Upon reading over my scrawl, I appear to insinuate a want of confidence in Clairfayt; *au contraire*, I trust much in his abilities, and I dare say his retreat to Lichterveldt was prudent, and made with a view to receive the reinforcements on their march to join him from the Sambre.

Since writing the above, we have received the accounts of Lord Howe's success. I need not tell you the pleasure it has given us all. We may hope that some of the enemy's disabled ships will be intercepted in their way to Brest. I would not leave them a cock-boat to go to sea in.

I think it not impossible that the gallantry of our fleet may be rewarded by falling in with the French West India fleet of last year, which, I am told, is now on its passage from America. I hope that Government will take some notice of the brutality of the late decree of the Convention in regard to giving us no quarter. You will probably see in the papers, the order his Royal Highness gave out in consequence of it; and I hope we shall prove, by our conduct, that we are as superior to our enemies in humanity as in every other quality that dignifies human nature.

Half-past Ten,

No news from Clairfayt. A violent cannonade was heard from four till nine o'clock this morning, and then ceased entirely, from whence I augur well.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

June 14th, 1794.

Clairfayt attacked yesterday in two columns. At first, he was successful, and took ten pieces of cannon. The force of the enemy prevailed afterwards, and he was obliged to fall back on his old position at Thielt without effecting his object—the relief of Ypres. All here are furious against him. He has lost no guns, and, I believe, few men. They say that, contented with the first advantage, he took no precautions to repulse the attack which the enemy made, but which they did not follow up. I fear the fate of Ypres must soon be decided. You know all the consequences as well as I do. Good night.

When shall I hail you Major-general?

June 14.—Count Walmoden was directed to proceed along the right bank of the Bruges canal, and

to take up a position, for the security of Ostend, between that town and Bruges.

The reader may recollect that Colonel Calvert had been requested to consent to his letters being occasionally seen by a friend of Mr. Pitt. He was now invited to submit his views to Mr. Pitt himself, and, in consequence, he wrote as follows:

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, June 14, 1794.

* * * *

The state of Europe at this period must more or less engage the attention of every man; and to us on the borders of the infatuated country which has given rise to the war, the pernicious consequences to be apprehended from every accession to its territory present themselves with double force.

It is essential, at this moment, that the government of every country should be energetic and popular; but that the Government of the Low Countries should not be deficient in these qualities, is the concern of every power in Europe, particularly of Great Britain, and still more so of Holland, to

whom Flanders and the States of Brabant afford the firmest barrier against the encroaching enemy.

It is notorious that the Imperial Government in the Low Countries is indebted for the very small portion of popularity which it obtains, to the dread of the ravages of the lawless invader only, and that it has not energy sufficient to punish the traitors who are known to exist in the heart of its dominions. It has become the subject of public notoriety, that there is a very large party in the Cabinet of his Imperial Majesty who have been bold enough to avow their sentiments that the abandonment of this valuable territory would be conducive to the real interests of the House of Austria, and who advocate the withdrawal of the Imperial armies which have been engaged in its defence.

You well know, Sir, that protection and allegiance are reciprocal obligations, and you are sensible that even the enthusiastic loyalty of our own countrymen would scarcely brook such conduct on the part of our Government. I leave you to judge the effect these circumstances must have had on the minds of the inhabitants of these countries. I can assure you, from observation, that they are generally, and particularly towards the frontier, an industrious, worthy people; that they abhor anarchy, and are zealous admirers of their constitution, which, however, they conceive, in many instances, to have been very much

infringed upon. Those amongst them who, in the year '89, were leaders in the patriot war, are, at this moment, not the least zealous supporters of the House of Austria, not from having changed their opinions, but from the preference they give to the established Government, however oppressive they may conceive it to be, to the introduction of the wild anarchy prevailing in France.

Let the war end as it may, it will for years to come be essential for the general tranquillity of Europe, that Flanders and Brabant should present a barrier equally against the opinions, and the views, and the arms of France. Such a barrier, Sir, I conceive is to be formed only by the hearty concurrence of the inhabitants; and that I almost dare assure you would not be wanting, were the principles of their constitution respected and adhered to, and had they a Sovereign to whom they might look with *confidence* equally for the preservation of their own rights, and for protection from their enemy. If, Sir, the Imperial Cabinet views the loss of these rich provinces with the indifference which has been attributed to it (and which unfortunately many circumstances have lately concurred to prove), it is not impossible that the Emperor might without much difficulty be induced to resign the sovereignty of them to some prince, possessed of the ability and inclination to defend them. And I should imagine

it would in that case be equally the interest of Great Britain and Holland, from particular and local considerations, and of the Emperor and King of Prussia, from a wish to prevent the promulgation of French principles and influence, and to preserve the general tranquillity of Europe, to become the united guarantees of the safety of the Low Countries.

I am aware, Sir, that it is not in my power to afford any information to you, except from observations which my being on the spot gives me the opportunity of making. The only consideration I wish to submit to you by this letter is, the importance of erecting in this country an obstacle against any irruption of the arms, as well as any promulgation of the principles of France, which can only be effected by establishing a government which may at once secure the liberties and properties, engage the affections, and call forth the strenuous support of its inhabitants.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
June 17, 1794.

General Beaulieu having joined the Prince of Orange and Alvinzi on the Sambre, a general

attack was made yesterday—that of our left under Beaulieu was completely successful; and though I understand some check was received on the right, the day ended favourably for the Allies. The enemy retreated across the Sambre, evacuating all their posts on this side, and leaving on the field of battle twenty pieces of cannon, thirty-five caissons, and, according to the Austrian accounts, 7000 dead. Be that as it may, I hope that success will enable us to make some vigorous attempt for the relief of Ypres, and that it may prove not yet too late.

I have heard that the Convention have rescinded their decree in regard to giving us no quarter, and, on the contrary, have decreed that any French soldier who shall be guilty of inhumanity towards any English, Hanoverian, or Hessian prisoner, shall be instantly guillotined.*

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* Les soldats Français étaient loin de partager le délire, souvent atroce, de ceux qui gouvernaient alors la France. Le décret qui ordonnait de ne plus faire de prisonniers Anglais venait d'être promulgué dans les armées, et avait été reçu avec une sourde indignation par des hommes généreux qui se promettaient bien de ne pas le mettre à exécution de sang-froid, mais qui, liés par cette obéissance passive dont on fait une vertu nécessaire à la guerre, n'avaient point osé fair éclater les sentimens que faisait naître en eux une loi aussi barbare qu'impolitique."—*Victoires, Conquêtes, &c.*, Vol. III, p. 58.

June 19.—Accounts arrived, that notwithstanding the victory on the 16th, which by the Austrian report was so decisive, the enemy had recrossed the Sambre in great force, and again invested Charleroy.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Tournay, June 20, 1794.

In consequence of the *decisive* victory on the Sambre, gained by the Allies on the 16th, the greatest part of the army here moved on the afternoon of the 18th in two columns under the Archduke Charles and the Duke of York, the whole under the command-in-chief of the Prince of Cobourg, with the view of making a vigorous effort, in conjunction with Clairfayt, for the relief of Ypres. The two columns halted about midnight at Escaneffe and Pottes. This corps was in some degree to be replaced at Tournay by four very strong battalions, which were to arrive there from the Sambre on the morning of the 19th.

On the 19th, accounts were received that the enemy had the day before repassed the Sambre, and had engaged the Allies with such advantage, as enabled them once more to form the investment of

Charleroy, and that the four battalions promised to Tournay were necessarily detained for the purpose of covering Mons. In consequence of this intelligence, we immediately returned to our formed camp, leaving Ypres to its fate.

The Prince of Orange makes an attack to-day. I cannot disguise from you my apprehensions that the operations on the Sambre will finally terminate as those on the Rhine did last year, when Wurmser was beaten and driven out of the country, amidst repeated victories. I am no croaker, but believe me, my dear Sir Hew, our affairs are become very critical, and will be more and more so every day: should the enemy carry their point on the Sambre, and avail themselves of their success with judgment, there will be little time for deliberation, and it will then be too late to be convinced, of what I have been long persuaded, that the safety of all Europe, but particularly of England and Holland, demands that *the security of West Flanders should have been the first object of all the Allies*, and that the French should never be allowed to establish themselves on one foot of Flemish ground. Should *imperiosa necessitas* oblige us to abandon the Sambre and the Scheldt, what is the next point of *ralliement*? The frontier of Holland; but, depend on it, every league we retreat has a very injurious influence on our cause, and considerably lessens that reliance on the superior

quality of our troops, which it should be our study to maintain; while the expectation of little fighting, and the hope of plundering these rich provinces, will much facilitate the augmentations of the enemy's force. I have observed with great concern, and mentioned to other people besides yourself, that the enemy's plan of operations is materially different from that of last year. It is more united, has more consistency, and bears no longer the marks of the irruption of a banditti, except in the one article of plundering, in which they follow carefully the example afforded them by the Allies on many occasions, but particularly in the month of April in presence of his Imperial Majesty.

There is yet time, I think, to establish our affairs, but it must be by the vigorous exertion and perfect unanimity of all parties. The pernicious effects of the Emperor's departure are observable amongst his troops, and must have spread much alarm among the inhabitants of these countries, who have a right to look to him for protection. It is reported, with what truth I know not, that everything belonging to his Imperial Majesty at Brussels is prepared for departure. All these circumstances have much effect on the public mind, and keep Brussels in a constant state of alarm; and as there are not wanting people who make constant reports to the French of what passes in the Low Countries, must have a material

influence on the operations of the enemy, and tend considerably to give encouragement and spirit to their exertions.

I have kept this letter open till the last moment, in hopes of giving you an account of Ypres; but we are still in a state of uncertainty in regard to that place. It is generally believed, from the account of the peasants and deserters, that it surrendered on the 17th; but I have an account of the 18th from Poperingues and Dixmude, which leaves room for hope.

Colonel Craig sets off for England to-morrow. Had that been decided before I wrote the former part of this, you would not have had so long an epistle from me. Ludlow sets off to-day. He is surprisingly well.

June 21.—The Prince of Cobourg announced to his Royal Highness the Duke that, owing to accounts from the Sambre, he was under the necessity of marching immediately, with all the force he could take from Tournay, to the assistance of the Hereditary Prince of Orange. His Royal Highness offered to make a part of the expedition with the British troops; but this the Prince of Cobourg refused, not choosing to leave any of the Austrian

troops under his immediate command at Tournay. In the evening, the corps remaining under the orders of the Duke of York changed their ground, and took a smaller position near Tournay. N.B.—The left of the camp extremely ill-placed.

June 23.—In the night, accounts arrived that General Clairfayt had been attacked, and had been under the necessity of falling back from the posts of Thielt and Deinze (both of which were strongly occupied by the French) to Ghent, and that the enemy were advancing against Oudenarde. His Royal Highness was left by the Prince of Cobourg to defend as far as possible the course of the Scheldt from Oudenarde to the environs of Condé, with a force inadequate by two-thirds to the important services expected from him. The town of Tournay, instead of affording protection to its environs and giving strength to the frontier, was, owing to the shameful negligence which had retarded every necessary preparation for defence, the unfinished state of the works, and many other circumstances, rather an encumbrance than a *point de ralliement* at this critical period. The prospect, however, of having our communication with Holland and the lower parts of the Scheldt cut by the enemy forcing either Oudenarde or Ghent, rendered it impossible for his Royal Highness to remain any longer in his position before Tournay. The fate of Ypres is

decided, that town having surrendered on the 18th by capitulation, though it was not till the 23rd that the event was perfectly ascertained.

The conduct of the Imperial Government towards the States of Brabant and Flanders presents itself, on this occasion, in full force, and, in every unprejudiced mind, must excite sentiments of contempt and abhorrence. It has been the ill-judging policy of the House of Austria, in different treaties, for this last century, to sacrifice the interests of these unfortunate countries by curtailing their natural advantages, by distressing their trade, and discountenancing their manufactures. It has been the infatuated policy of the same House recently to take from the inhabitants the power of defending themselves, by disarming them, by dismantling their towns, and laying open their frontier to the irruptions of their enemy; and it has been reserved for the present Emperor to show the possibility of a Sovereign quitting the head of his army in a moment of defeat, and abandoning his subjects when they were in the greatest need of his protection. Whatever the language of the flatterers of the present age may be, the page of history will do justice to the demerits of Francis II., and will brand with the infamy it deserves the Imperial Cabinet of the present day.

June 24.—His Royal Highness the Duke marched from the position before Tournay, leaving as much

force as he could possibly spare for the defence of that town. The distress of the inhabitants on seeing the departure of his Royal Highness, to whom they had been long accustomed to look as their surest refuge and protector, will be easier imagined than described; and the feelings of his Royal Highness and of the British army in general, demonstrated the contrast between a prince of the House of Brunswick and an English army, and that Sovereign who was the first to set the example of quitting the frontier in the hour of danger.

The army halted and encamped this night in the rear of the town of Renaix, which was head-quarters. The enemy advanced a corps to-day to the neighbourhood of Oudenarde, which they summoned. Another corps attacked Clairfayt at Ghent, and advanced as far as the Bruges Gate, but were repulsed. The chief part of the action occurred between that gate and the bridge of the canal, which the Allies, in their precipitate retreat, had neglected to draw up. Count Walmoden was directed to move towards Ghent to co-operate with Clairfayt for the defence of that place.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Renaix, June 24, 1794.

I never was in so bad a humour to write. I don't know whether I am most overpowered with compassion and sorrow for the wretched inhabitants of the frontier we have left, or with indignation and rage against those whose negligence, infatuation, and ignorance, have brought on the calamities that hang over this unfortunate country.

Yesterday, the enemy obliged Clairfayt to fall back to Ghent. They attacked him again to-day, but were beaten back. They have summoned Oudenarde to-day.

You will perceive that we could no longer remain at Tournay, We have left all the troops we could possibly spare for the protection of that place, but the unfinished state of the works, and total negligence of preparations for defence, do not allow us to look for a long resistance if it is vigorously attacked. May the authors of these calamities meet the punishment that they deserve.

I am too angry, too sorry, and too much fatigued to add anything but that

I am most truly yours,

H. C.

June 25.—All remained quiet this day.

June 27.—Accounts arrived that the allied armies, under the command of the Prince of Cobourg, had made an unsuccessful attack on the enemy on the Sambre the day before, and had been under the necessity of falling back to Nivelles at night, Charleroy having surrendered. The same day, we received intelligence of the arrival of the Earl of Moira at Ostend.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Renaix, June 27, 1794.

It is some time since I wrote to you; but the events of the last month have afforded little subject of pleasant correspondence, and I never wish to present you with any other. However, that you may not conceive that you are out of my mind, I am determined to write to you to-day. From the firing we have heard, I fear that Ghent has been again attacked this morning. Count Walmoden's junction with Clairfayt assures, I hope, the safety of that town for some time at least; though its great size, and the ruinous state of its fortifications, make its defence before a numerous enemy very difficult. Here we are, with an inclination to do everything

and assist everybody; but, alas! our numbers and the extent of our charge defeat our wishes. The enemy have, this morning, advanced again to Oudenarde; and, by showing themselves in different places on the left bank of the Scheldt, between Oudenarde and Espières, keep us in continual check. I do assure you, the grief I feel for the fate of the wretched inhabitants of this devoted country almost oversets me.

The lamentations of the people of Tournay on the departure of the Duke and the British troops, to whom they have long been accustomed to look as their only *sure refuge* and protection, were beyond all description. They gave a strong mark of attachment and gratitude to his Royal Highness on the disastrous 18th of May. When the Emperor returned, little notice was taken of him; but as the Duke passed through the streets, every house poured forth its inhabitants in token of their joy on his safe return.

The shameful negligence which has pervaded every preparation for the defence of this place, gives us little reason to flatter ourselves with the hopes of the possibility of its holding out long should it be vigorously attacked. How the flatterers of the day may reconcile all these events to his Imperial Majesty, I know not; but the page of history will record, in the person of Francis II., the possibility

of a *Sovereign* leaving the head of his army in the hour of defeat, and abandoning his wretched subjects, involved in a war on his account, in the moment of all others when they had most the right to claim his protection. History will brand, with the infamy it deserves, the Imperial Cabinet of this day, whose conduct has done more prejudice to the cause we maintain (and in the maintenance of which is involved everything that is dear to us) than could have been effected by the arms or arts of the infatuated country which is the cause of the war.

I hope to send you, in a postscript, good news from the Sambre. All we know at present is, that the Prince of Cobourg was engaged in a general attack at seven o'clock yesterday morning. The event must decide the fate of this country, on which you may rely that the happiness of our own materially depends.

Adieu! In great haste.

Twelve o'clock at Night.

I must inform you, with much concern, that the attack of the Allies yesterday, on the enemy's posts on the Sambre, has been productive of no good consequences.

Lord Moira* has landed at Ostend. We wished him, from circumstances that have lately happened, on the Scheldt in preference.

June 28.—The enemy appeared in great strength on the heights opposite Oudenarde. There was a good deal of firing in the course of the day, and the French more than once possessed themselves of part of the faubourg.

July 1.—A conference was held at Braine la Leud, the head-quarters of the Prince of Cobourg, between the princes commanding the different armies of the Allies. In the evening, the enemy turned the right flank of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who lay at Roeulx, and obliged his corps to retreat.

July 2.—The enemy took possession of Mons. The Prince of Cobourg fell back to Waterloo, the Prince of Orange to Tubize. This movement naturally exposed all the corps on the Scheldt to

* Earl of Moira, Marquis of Hastings, General, K.G., G.C.B., entered the army in 1771. Served in the American War. In 1778 was appointed Adjutant-general to the army in America. In 1793, commanded an expedition to Brittany to co-operate with the Royalists. Served in Flanders in 1794. Appointed Governor-General of India in 1817. Constable of the Tower, and Colonel of the 27th Regiment. Died, 1826.

be taken *en revers;* consequently, the corps which had retired from Orchies and Marchiennes to the camp of Maulde, fell back that night to Leuse and Ath.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
July 2, 1794.

I have only a few minutes to thank you for yours of the 26th. The situation of public affairs here is very bad; the country, the army—in short, everybody and everything that has the power of reflection, has lost all confidence in the Austrian Government. I am willing to believe that the Austrian army have been, and are as much the dupes of the infernal cabal, to which his Imperial Majesty has been weak and, I may say, wicked enough, to give up his understanding (if he has any) as ourselves. The enemy were yesterday marching both on Namur and Mons. Much firing has been heard from these quarters today, particularly about Mons, on the preservation of which depends the possibility of our keeping the Scheldt; and on our keeping the Scheldt, depend consequences the importance of which to all Europe, but particularly to Great Britain and Holland, is, I believe, beyond all computation. I really, my dear friend, feel more than I can express from the scenes

passing before my eyes. The general distress of these unfortunate, deserted people is truly shocking, and the calamities of individuals, who are particularly known to us, affect us doubly from the consciousness of its not being in our power to promise them any relief. I hope the day of retribution will come, and that the tenfold vengeance of Heaven, called down by cries of whole provinces, deserted, abandoned, and betrayed, will fall on the heads of the cursed authors of these evils. Lord Cornwallis arrived yesterday. It is the only good news I have to send you.

Where are the Prussians? is the general question. I am sure I know not; but of this I am convinced —this is the moment of *effectual* succour, and perhaps even now it will be too late.

Lord Moira is at Ghent.

July 3.—His Royal Highness marched from Renaix, in obedience to the Prince of Cobourg's orders, abandoning Oudenarde and all the posts on the Scheldt. His Royal Highness halted at Grammont. This day the Austrian garrison evacuated Tournay, and the town was taken possession of by the enemy.

July 4.—The town of Ghent was evacuated by the Allies, and immediately possessed by the enemy. General Clairfayt marched to Alost. Count

Walmoden to Dendermonde. His Royal Highness marched to Lombeke.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Lombeke, July 4, 1794.

As I have no pleasure in being the recorder of our own disgraces and losses, I shall tell you in a very few words that the storm that has been long gathering over this ill-fated country has at length burst. All is terror and dismay amongst the wretched inhabitants, and desolation will quickly follow. In three short days we have lost, without firing a shot, Marchiennes, Orchies, Tournay, Oudenarde, Ghent—in short, everything except Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and Condé, between Brussels and the French frontier. We retired in obedience to the Prince of Cobourg's orders, and *he says* the enemy's force in his front was such as to leave him no alternative. So much for the acquisition procured by the expenditure of so much labour, blood, and treasure last year. So many concurring circumstances exist, that I can hardly help adopting the idea universally credited throughout this country, and pretty generally in the army, that some foul play, and some very dark designs, exist in a certain quarter.

I do assure you that the events of the last fortnight have vexed me to such a degree, that I am hardly fit to be your correspondent; so adieu. I do not see one ray of light in this dark prospect; but as a *bon mot* is always worth something, I will conclude with an answer made by a French prisoner on being asked if he knew who the Emperor was, as he passed through Frankfort in his shameful or rather shameless retreat: "Apparemment Monsieur est quelque émigré des Pays-Bas."

Set about a subscription for the unfortunate wretches who, being deserted by their Sovereign, are now turned naked and unprotected on the wide world. Their cause is that of humanity, and well worth the consideration of Britons.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Lombeke, July 4, 1794.

The fate of this wretched country is at length decided. The enemy were allowed to make themselves masters of Mons without an action, the Prince of Cobourg falling back from Braine la Leud to Waterloo; the Hereditary Prince of Orange at the same time retreating to Tubize. On the evening of the 2nd, the troops which had previously fallen back from Orchies and Marchiennes to the camp of

Maulde, crossed the Scheldt, and began their retreat. Yesterday morning, in conformity to orders from the Prince of Cobourg, we broke up our camp, abandoned Oudenarde, and marched to Grammont. The same morning Tournay was evacuated, and taken possession of by the enemy. The same fate attended Ghent this morning. To-morrow we march to Asche, and where we are to stop, who will venture to say? No enemy has appeared before us since Sunday night, when they retreated from before Oudenarde; but the Prince of Cobourg represents the enemy opposed to him as so strong as to make resistance useless. Thus in three days, with the exception of Condé, Valenciennes, and Quesnoy, into which the Austrians have thrown garrisons, have we lost the fruits of a long, laborious, expensive and bloody campaign, and, indeed, half a second. I have my suspicions that all is not fair; that there is much folly and ignorance in a certain Cabinet, we know full well, and I believe there is at least an equal proportion of villainy.

The scenes that are daily passing vex me to a degree that makes me a very bad correspondent, and in the dark cloud that surrounds us I do not see one ray of light to cheer us, or the smallest grounds for building a hope of repairing our losses.

July 5.—Halted.

July 6.—His Royal Highness marched to Asche. Count Walmoden remained at Dendermonde; the Earl of Moira at Alost. General Clairfayt marched to Anderlecht, near Brussels.

July 7.—In the evening the army moved in three columns.

July 8.—Halted in the morning at Edeghem, the head-quarters at Temps.

July 9.—Marched again at midnight, and the next morning the head-quarters were fixed at the château of Contich; the corps under the Earl of Moira, forming the first line in front of the village of Waerloos. The Hessians occupied Malines, under the command of Lieutenant-general Dalwig.

July 10.—The Marquis Cornwallis sailed from Antwerp in the 'Hawk' sloop. In the evening his Royal Highness visited the forts on the left bank of the Scheldt, and appointed Major-general David Dundas to the command of these forts and the town of Antwerp.

TO HIS SISTER.

Château de Contich,
Half-way between Antwerp and Malines,
July 10, 1794.

I cannot let my Lord Cornwallis return to England without thanking you for your letter of Thursday, and for the anxiety you express about us. I have for some time, and with much sincerity, wished for peace; but I neither wish for it nor expect it under the present circumstances; and as you know we are all great politicians, if I were Mr. Pitt, I would use every means in my power to rouse the Allies: I would strain every nerve, and drain Great Britain both of men and money rather than permit the French to re-establish themselves in Flanders. A barrier must somewhere be opposed to their principles, their vices, and their arms; and in my humble opinion, we had better engage in this great contest on the banks of the Scheldt, than on those of the Thames. There has been much want of military ability, much bad policy, and more villainy; but still the importance of the stake should induce us to endeavour to inspire others with the same energy and good faith which have directed our own operations. I have great happiness and pride in believing that the conduct of the Duke of York,

under these arduous circumstances, has been such as to do honour to himself and to his country. His sentiments have been expressed with candour and firmness, and they have always tended to give protection and support, and to abandon nothing till driven to that sad necessity by irresistible force. I look upon Lord Cornwallis's presence at this critical period as one of the most fortunate circumstances of the Duke's life; for I had rather that he should have the approbation of that great and good man, than of any other on this side the grave.

In a few days we shall have with us twenty-three battalions of British infantry, and nearly forty squadrons of British cavalry. The Dutch will naturally do all they can; and if we get up some Prussians, and the Austrians get *new commanders* and fresh views and ideas instilled into them, and the Emperor can be made to call out the strength of the country, I do not despair of writing to you from Tournay before the 1st of October. I hear the enemy have taken everything from the inhabitants. How much has the poor pusillanimous reptile who is the cause of all these evils to answer for!

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Château de Contich, July 14, 1794.

In the present situation of affairs, I am naturally inclined to believe you look for letters with as little satisfaction as I feel in writing them. However, I must send you a certificate of our being in the land of the living, though on the borders of a country not fit to live in. Our camp, which is secured by the Scheldt and Rupel, is notwithstanding very badly provided with water, so that I should not be at all surprised if we are under the necessity of moving it. The rank of the officers of the corps that has joined under Lord Moira, promises to be productive of very great inconveniences. As yet the two corps are kept distinct, Lord Moira forming the front line. *Entre nous*, I believe he intends to return to England very soon. Thus has Government deprived itself of his very able services, by granting such preposterous rank. Some other arrangement, I conclude, will soon be made in regard to the rank of his officers and staff. General David Dundas is sent to Antwerp, and has charge of the forts on the left bank of the Scheldt, which have been left in a very indifferent state; but as the parapets are generally sound, and the

inundations appear to answer, I hope we shall soon be secure on that side.

Lord Cornwallis fell down the river on Thursday evening, in the 'Hawk.' His arrival in England will put ministers in possession of all the facts relating to the ruinous, disgraceful operations of the last three weeks; and his testimony will, I am persuaded, prevent the Duke of York and the British army from being in the smallest degree implicated in the guilt, or sharing in the reproach, that will most deservedly fall on the fools and villains who have directed them. The Prince of Cobourg has desired to have a conference with the Duke this day; and as your friend Craig accompanies His Royal Highness, I conclude that he will by to-morrow's mail give you some little idea of what is likely to be done; but I can affirm from experience, that no reliance is to be placed on the solemn assurances of some of the leading members of the assemblage. The messenger who arrived the day before yesterday not having chosen to encumber himself with the bag of army letters, left them on the road, and they have never made their appearance, and I think probably never may. Your epistles generally come in the box: I therefore conclude I have lost no production of yours. * *

Send me some news; the most acceptable will be the probability of Lord Cornwallis's return to

the Continent. Explain to me the reason of the recruits joining the army without arms or any appointments necessary for soldiers. I am often asked the question, and can't resolve it.

I congratulate you, and the army in general, on Mr. Wyndham's appointment as Secretary-at-War; and the nation on the accession of the Duke of Portland and Lord Fitzwilliam to administration.

P.S.—The Duke returned early this morning, without having reached the Imperial head-quarters. The extreme badness of the roads, and other obstacles, prevented his prosecuting his journey; and I understand, from Colonel Craig, that his Royal Highness was so ill on the road with the spasms he was subject to last year, that he was very glad to return. Is it not extraordinary, that not a single gun-boat has come up to Antwerp, though the defence of the reverse of the Dyke, leading up the river from the Tête de Flandre, can only be effected by their means, in the present state of the citadel? In my opinion, the citadel and the forts on the Scheldt should be put into such a state as to secure them at all events, and by that means to leave us a door to re-enter the Netherlands.

Many thanks for yours of the 4th and 7th, which are just arrived. Adieu!

A great deal of firing this morning towards Malines.

July. 15.—The Dutch army, which was on the Dyle, retired from their position, and took up a new one on the right bank of the lesser Neethe. Lieutenant-general Dalwig retired from Malines. Which of these corps first quitted their position is uncertain, as they respectively throw the blame on each other; but in the afternoon the enemy were in complete possession of the Dyle, they passed through Malines, and attacked and carried the village of Waelhem. Lieutenant-general Sir William Erskine was sent to take the command, but unfortunately before his arrival General Dalwig had burnt the bridge of Waelhem, which prevented any attempt to dislodge the enemy, except by cannonading and musketry across the river. The Earl of Moira marched with the first line to Duffel. Count Walmoden occupied Liere with the Hanoverians.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE EARL OF MOIRA.

Head-Quarters,
Château de Contich, July 16, 1794.

Since I had the honour of writing to your Lord-

ship, his Royal Highness has received information that the Hessian General Dalwig has abandoned the town of Malines; that being the case, it is not his Royal Highness's wish that you should engage the troops under your command in an affair that might be attended with a heavy loss. His Royal Highness leaves it to your judgment how far it may be expedient, under those circumstances, to attempt the recovery of Malines, and in that you will be in great measure guided by the information you will be good enough to obtain, whether the Dutch have or have not re-occupied their position on the Dyle; as in case the Dutch have not advanced on that river, the chance of success would be too precarious to justify the risk of any considerable loss for the recovery of Malines.

July 20.—His Royal Highness received information that the Austrians had withdrawn from Diest, and that the Prince of Cobourg was assembling all his force and marching on Maestricht; in consequence of which the Hereditary Prince had fallen back, and the left of our position at Liere became unavoidably exposed to every attempt of the enemy. The next day his Royal Highness went to Antwerp, to hasten the removal of the magazines and stores,

and prepare matters for the march of the army on the day following.

Lord Moira left the army.

July 22.—The whole army marched and encamped near Deurne, about a league from Antwerp. Every exertion was made for the removal of the magazines, and in the evening the forts on the left bank of the Scheldt were evacuated without loss.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Antwerp, July 22, 1794.

At length the *coup de grace* is given to the Imperial dominion in the Netherlands, and probably not a foot of these countries will remain to the House of Austria in eight-and-forty hours. The day before yesterday his Royal Highness learnt with much surprise and indignation that the Prince of Cobourg was withdrawing with his whole force, and marching on Maestricht. The Hereditary Prince of Orange, who occupied the right bank of the larger Neethe, on our left, immediately fell back, which made it absolutely necessary for the Duke to abandon the Neethe and the Rupel this morning, and to break up his camp of Contich. The army encamp to-night near this town, and I conclude we shall bend our course to-

wards Breda to-morrow. The only means of re-occupying the Low Countries will be the Dutch fortresses, and how long they will remain ours who can tell? I fear our loss at this place in magazines will be heavy. If the Austrians keep their promise in regard to placing a sufficient garrison in Maestricht, and the Prussians advance upon our right, I think we need have no apprehensions for Holland; but I confess I can see no probable remedy for the losses and unparalleled disgraces the Allies have incurred in this campaign.

I hear we may expect Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville here in the course of to-day, and that they are accredited to Vienna. I hope they may succeed in rousing the Austrians, but I doubt it, for I don't believe there exists in the Imperial Cabinet one spark of honour, honesty, or common veracity.*

The news of the surrender of Nieuport has reached us. I am much concerned to inform you that 300 men of the corps of Chartres formed part of the garrison, and I am afraid there can be no doubt in regard to the fate of these unfortunate men.

* The Cabinet of Vienna, secretly inclined to peace, delayed giving any definitive answer to the proposals of Mr. Pitt, and meanwhile entertained secret overtures from the French Government.—*Alison*, Vol. II, Ch. XVI, p. 509.

Lord Moira returns to England, on account of the disproportionate local rank given him last year, which will always deprive his country of his services on the Continent. Is there any chance that Lord Cornwallis will join us?

CHAPTER XI.

THE BRITISH QUIT FLANDERS, AND RETIRE BEHIND THE AA—DUPLICITY OF THE AUSTRIANS—THE DUTCH ROYAL FAMILY—THE FRENCH ENTER HOLLAND—BARBARITY OF THE FRENCH TROOPS—TREACHERY OF THE AUSTRIANS—FALL OF ROBESPIERRE—OFFENSIVE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRINCE OF COBOURG—ATTACK ON THE DUTCH—RESIGNATION OF THE PRINCE OF COBOURG—SURRENDER OF SLUYS, VALENCIENNES, AND CONDÉ.

July 23.—THE army marched at break of day. At about nine or ten in the forenoon the total evacuation of Antwerp was effected. The magazines of hay, which could not be removed, were destroyed. In the afternoon the army encamped on a plain, in front and rather to the left of the village of Calmthout, which was his Royal Highness's head-quarters.

July 24.—Owing to the extreme depth of the sand, the army was obliged to halt, to allow the baggage and reserve artillery to get ahead. The Earl

Spencer,* Mr. Grenville,† and Colonel Ross‡ passed the head-quarters, on their way to Vienna.

July 25.—The army marched and encamped on a plain which extends in front of the village of Rukveen, behind the Learse Verst. A corps was posted at Wouw, half-way between Bergen-op-Zoom and Rosendal, which was head-quarters.

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* George John, second Earl Spencer, born September 1, 1758. Succeeded in October, 1783. Died, November 10, 1834. Many years First Lord of the Admiralty during the administration of Mr. Pitt. Father of Lord Althorp, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Earl Grey's administration.

† The Right Hon. Thomas Grenville, brother of the Marquis of Buckingham and of Lord Grenville, great-uncle of the present Duke of Buckingham. Born in 1755. Died in December, 1846. Employed on a diplomatic mission to Prussia early in the present century, and nearly lost in the ice at the mouth of the Elbe. Bequeathed to the country a fine library, which is in the British Museum.

‡ Alexander Ross, Ensign 50th Regiment, February, 1770; Lieutenant-colonel, July, 1783; Aide-de-camp to the King, October, 1783; Colonel 89th Regiment, 1797; Colonel 59th, 1801; General, January, 1812. Died in December, 1827. Served in Germany in 1760, and in the American War as Aide-de-camp to Lord Cornwallis; was Adjutant-general to the King's troops in India during the administration of the Marquis Cornwallis.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE LORD ST. HELENS,*

AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AT THE HAGUE.

Head-Quarters,
Rosendal, July 29, 1794.

His Royal Highness the Duke of York having done me the honour of laying his commands on me to make to your Lordship, from time to time, such communications as I conceive to be interesting, I ought to apologize to you for not having transmitted to your Lordship, on the evening of the 27th, the result of the conference his Royal Highness held that day with the Stadtholder and the Hereditary Prince of Orange. Lord Elgin undertook to give you that information, I therefore thought it unnecessary to trouble you with a letter.

I am now to inform you, that in consequence of the arrangement made on the 27th, his Royal Highness's army will march to-morrow morning, and will probably arrive on the third day at the proposed position behind the Aa. Our right will be *appuiéd* on the inundation formed round Bois-le-Duc, and our left will extend toward Le Marais de Peel, which his Royal Highness is assured is impracticable for cavalry or artillery, and may, without

* Alleyne Fitzherbert, created Baron St. Helens in 1791.

much difficulty, be rendered equally so for any considerable force of infantry.

From the best information we can obtain, we have reason to believe that the force the enemy have collected for the purpose of carrying on operations against the Duke of York and the Hereditary Prince of Orange amounts to 60,000 men; but there appears to be no immediate intention of making any attempt on this part of the country. On the contrary, the enemy are rather carrying their force to our left; and I flatter myself, the movement his Royal Highness proposes to make, will defeat their views on that quarter.

The change of situation and language necessarily renders our information rather defective, which I shall use every means in my power to remedy.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Rosendal, July 29, 1794.

I am perfectly of your opinion in regard to the Austrians. A most complete change of men and measures must take place before we can reasonably expect any good from that quarter. Lord Spencer can form no idea of the extent of their duplicity,* and will consequently be duped, unless he avails himself

* *Vide* note, p. 281.

of Colonel Ross's experience. I hope your information in regard to the Dutch is exaggerated, and that they will be persuaded to make every exertion possible for the preservation of their properties and lives, though I confess I believe they will require some backing. The country in the rear of our present position, and to the right of it, is naturally strong by the inundations, and rendered more so by the many fortresses. We shall therefore quit it, and leaving its defence to the Dutch, we shall very soon transport ourselves to a part of the frontier more liable to the inroads of the enemy, and where the exertions of our army may be more effectual.

On Sunday I accompanied his Royal Highness to Breda, where we met the Stadtholder, the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and the two Princesses. The Duke has invited the Hereditary Princess to spend some time with her sister at Oatlands, where she will be more free from the anxieties and disquietudes of the war, than she can be in Holland. As I sate opposite to her at dinner, I can assure you from personal observation that she is one of the most beautiful young women I ever saw. She appears in a very bad state of health, and I dare say would find great benefit in a temporary relief from the detestable country which it is her lot to inhabit. We are going to dine at Breda again to-day, and

to-morrow the Stadtholder and the Princesses return to the Hague. I have just seen two of the corps of Loyal Emigrants, who made their escape from Nieuport the day the garrison surrendered. Three hundred of their unfortunate comrades fell into the hands of the enemy. They say that the French General wished to spare their lives, but that the Commissioner of the Convention insisted on a rigid execution of its decree. The crimes and successes of these people keep pace with each other, and they appear to have found a guarantee for the one and the other in his Imperial Majesty.

July 30.

P.S.—The news that arrived yesterday at Breda has prevented our marching to-day. The enemy had made a successful inroad into the country called the Catsand, by that means turning the fortress of Sluys, which they will probably besiege. It is necessary to know the effect this disastrous event will have on the minds of people in Zealand before we move. Flushing is now divided from the enemy merely by one of the mouths of the Scheldt; and though that can be secured by small craft, we have much to apprehend from the political sentiments of the people. Adieu!

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Rosendal, July 30, 1794.

It was arranged that the army should march this morning, on what point I dare say your own sagacity will suggest to you. The plan is deferred by the very disagreeable news received yesterday that the enemy had made a successful inroad into the country called the Catsand, by that means turning the fortress of Sluys (which they will probably besiege), and causing much apprehension for the fate of Zealand, where, I fear, the minds of the people are not as steady as we could wish. From these considerations, the Duke has complied with the request of the Prince of Orange, and the army will not move at present. I am afraid the Dutch fortresses are very defective in point of garrison. I need not describe to *you* Bergen-op-Zoom, the Lines, and *still less* Steenbergen. I dare say you agree with me that they require at least 6000 men for their defence, and I fear they have not, independently of us, as many hundred, and I know their corps of artillery in Bergen-op-Zoom consists of 27 men. Desperate evils require desperate remedies; and in my opinion the evacuation of all the Dutch forts in maritime

Flanders would be the wisest measure we could adopt, if it could be effected without considerable loss. In that case, we should be obliged to commit the preservation of Zealand to a flotilla, and all sorts of small craft, with which I would fill the most southerly mouth of the Scheldt; and I should hope that, by the union of the troops drawn from the forts in Flanders with the corps under the immediate command of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, Bergen-op-Zoom, Willemstadt, Breda, in short all that line of fortresses, might be secured for the instant without crippling and dismembering the army under the Duke; for I think that the very existence of the Republic depends upon our army being kept in such force as may enable us to march against the enemy upon whatever point they may attack. If a sufficient body of troops could be assembled to occupy the many fortresses on this frontier, they would enable us to bid defiance to the enemy, at least for a time; but there are parts of the frontier of the Republic which can only be secured by the presence of a numerous and active army. I am more anxious for the preservation of this country since I have been presented to the Hereditary Princess. How our princes could be so blind as to allow so much beauty, and, if the accounts I have heard are to be credited, and if her countenance is not very deceitful, so much worth

and good-nature, to be carried off by a Dutchman, I cannot conceive.

I went to Bergen-op-Zoom on Saturday; the old barber, my landlord, was rejoiced to see me, and asked kindly after the old gentleman who used to come and breakfast in the saloon adjoining his shop. I told him you were enjoying what was proper for your years, *otium cum dignitate*, which, in due time, I hope will be my portion.

August 4.—The army marched at break of day, and took their camp on the plain in front of the village of Ousterhout.

August 6.—Orders were given to strengthen the position by field-works, &c.

August 7.—The Hessians marched and took a position west of Breda, to give security to that part of the country, while the Dutch are engaged in an expedition for the relief of their fortresses in Flanders.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Ousterhout, August 7, 1794.

His Royal Highness having told me that it was

his intention to write to you himself, I did not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship with a letter to inform you that the army marched from the camp near Rosendal on the 4th, and the same day occupied a camp about a mile and a half in front of this village. I am happy to inform you that there is every appearance of our being well supplied with water and every other necessary in our present camp, and I hope that in this position we shall give ample security to Breda and Bois-le-Duc, and at the same time deter the enemy from making any serious attempt on Bergen-op-Zoom.

We have received information that the enemy has formed two corps on the Meuse, each consisting of 30,000 men: the one is engaged in observing Maestricht; and the other, with a very formidable artillery, occupies the part of Liège on this side the river.

From the best information we can obtain, the enemy appears to entertain no immediate intention of advancing either upon us, on Bois-le-Duc, or Breda, though the siege of the latter place was decreed by the National Convention on the 17th of last month.

An officer, who deserted from the enemy's 9th Regiment of Hussars, informs us that the force of the enemy's armies of the north, including those of the Ardennes and the Moselle, amounts to 240,000

men, which, according to his account, are disposed of in the following manner: 50,000 are engaged in the investment of the towns of Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy and Condé; 20,000 are employed at Nieuport and Ostend, or quartered in different parts of the Netherlands. Of the remaining 170,000, 60,000 are in the environs of Antwerp, of which 2000 are advanced towards Rosendal, but the *gros* of the army is encamped about a league on the other side of Antwerp, on the road to Malines. The cavalry of this corps he does not estimate at more than 3500, and they are generally very badly mounted; the chief reliance of their army is on their artillery, which is numerous, well-appointed, and ably served.

The account this officer gives of the army of the Vendée, is, that it exists, to the number of 60,000, under the conduct of three brothers of the name of Chouan; that they constantly find a secure refuge in the impenetrable forests of Brittany, whence they make frequent attacks on the army of the Convention in that quarter, which amounts to nearly 100,000 men.

From the different accounts we have received, it appears that the enemy act with great rigour throughout the country which they have lately acquired, but at the same time, not without policy.

They allow no man to possess more than the bare necessaries of life, and every article that can be made use of for any military purpose is in requisition; and by an Act of Convention, all persons are obliged, under pain of death, to exchange all the specie in their possession above ten louis and a half, for assignats. If time is given them to carry this Act into execution to any extent, the fatal consequence must be that, from interested motives, the inhabitants will become well-wishers and supporters of that Government, the existence of which can alone give any value to the paper for which they have been obliged to exchange their more solid property.

It appears to me, my Lord, that if the Articles of Union between Great Britain and Corsica, which so strongly testify the moderation and disinterested views of the former, were at this time dispersed into France, it might be attended with beneficial consequences. I shall take the liberty of suggesting this idea to his Royal Highness; and if it should be honoured with his approbation, I shall request to have some copies of the articles sent over for that purpose.

I hope that your Lordship will be successful in your endeavours to establish a post between the Hague and his Royal Highness's head-quarters, for which the very serious inconveniences we experienced

in the former part of the campaign, from the delay and miscarriage of our letters, make me particularly anxious.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Ousterhout, August 8, 1794.

I am very sorry to find by your letter of the 31st, that independently of heat and multiplicity of business, which have for some time past been common to us all, you have indisposition to complain of. The latter evil I hope you have got rid of, the first I hope will last these three months, and the second I am sure you will have till the war is over. You will have heard that on the 4th we marched from our camp near Rosendal to one about a mile and a half in front of this village. In our present position, I hope we shall deter the enemy from making any serious attempt on Bergen-op-Zoom, and at the same time give security to Bois-le-Duc and Breda, though the siege of the latter place has been decreed by the Convention.

The accounts we hear of the behaviour of the French to the wretched people who have been abandoned by their Sovereign are truly shocking. Excessive contributions are levied with the most unrelenting rigour, permanent guillotines are erected

everywhere; we are assured that not less than 150 men and women have suffered at Tournay alone.

All these events much depress my spirits; and the reflection that we are still obliged to keep a connection with, and indeed to have a reliance on, those whose ignorance and villainy (for there has been a mixture of both) have occasioned these calamities, is, in my opinion, a subject of very serious and well-founded apprehension for the future. Unless the Emperor has the wisdom and firmness to change men and measures, I see no light through the cloud that surrounds us; and as I conceive his Imperial Majesty to be totally destitute of these two qualities, it is an event rather to be desired than expected.

I have just at present causes enough of uneasiness without going into public affairs; but the scene of misery is so near, and many of the sufferers are so well known to us, that it is impossible to remain insensible to the tragical histories that each day brings to our knowledge.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Ousterhout, August 10, 1794.

The reports of yesterday stated that the enemy

were daily receiving very considerable augmentations to their force in the environs of Antwerp, which information has been confirmed by the intelligence of this morning. It appears that troops have been drawn to this quarter from the side of Tirlemont and from West Flanders. A camp which the enemy had between Oostmaal and Hoogstraten, which consisted of 15,000 men and thirty pieces of cannon, has likewise fallen back to join the main army, the force of which is stated to amount to upwards of 30,000 men. Their camp extends about two leagues, and is situated between Antwerp and Liere. Their cavalry is encamped in front of their line, about a league and a half from Turnhout, from which place they make constant patrols.

It is universally believed in the French army that a forward movement will take place in a very few days.

I think it right to inform your Lordship that a report is circulated, that it is not the intention of the Dutch to defend Breda, and that their preparations for that purpose have been discontinued since our arrival in this camp. I mention this merely as a matter of report, without knowing whether there is the least foundation for it; but at this critical moment I conceive it to be very essential that the Government of the country should not relax, even in

appearance, from that energy which the existing circumstances demand, and that no room should be given for the misrepresentations of disaffected persons.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
August 11, 1794.

We have this evening received information that the enemy have made a retrograde march, and that the position they now occupy is between Tirlemont and Malines, being four leagues distant from Antwerp, Turnhout, and Hoogstraten. Their force amounts, on the highest computation, to 40,000 men, and their camp is represented to be defended by fifty pieces of cannon.

The cause assigned for this retreat is a jealousy of a forward move which the Prince of Cobourg is said to have made, and it has probably been hastened by the disturbances in Paris, which have put a period to the life of Robespierre and the power of his party. As it is his Royal Highness's intention to write to your Lordship on the subject, I need not detail the circumstances attending this very extraordinary event.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Ousterhout, August 14, 1794.

The intelligence of the 11th not being confirmed the next day, I began to suspect its authenticity, which I was the more easily induced to rely on, from the probability of the news from Paris having been productive of such a movement. The intelligence contained some inaccuracy. I am, however, assured that the corps which the enemy had in the neighbourhood of Liere made a movement to the eastward on the 6th, and continued their march towards Tongres the next day.

The following is the state of the enemy's force opposed to us, according to the best information that I can obtain: They have a camp at St. Job, consisting of 12,000 men; on the 12th this corps was ordered to hold itself in readiness to move. On the heath between Rosendal and Wambergen there is a camp of about 10,000 men, and the country between the roads which lead from Antwerp to Rosendal and from Antwerp to Bergen-op-Zoom is occupied by 7000 or 8000. This, with a few men in Antwerp, Liere, Malines, and the forts on the

Scheldt, constitutes, I believe, the whole of the enemy's force in this part of the country.

* * * *

Since writing the above, information has reached me that the camp of St. Job has fallen back to Antwerp; that the enemy have no corps of any strength advanced in front of that town; that they are employed in passing artillery over the Scheldt; and that appearances strongly corroborate the universal report in their army—namely, that in consequence of the disturbances in France, it has become necessary for the Army of the North to approach their own frontier.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Ousterhout, August 19, 1794.

Though the prospect of affairs in this country makes me most melancholy, and affords as little satisfaction in reading as there is in writing my epistles, I must thank you for yours of the 14th, the contents of which, however, are not of a nature to dispel the gloom. If the accounts from Spain are true, I fear the worst consequences are to be apprehended from the introduction of Jacobin principles in that country; and if the army is infected, I see no means of eradicating them. The report of the health

of our army in the West Indies is very alarming, and the appearance of those battalions who sent their flank companies and detachments of picked men to form that army, marks very strongly the impolicy of the measure. Of this the 38th Regiment, and some others I could mention, are distressing instances.

Have you read the Prince of Cobourg's proclamation, in which he imputes the calamities which have been occasioned by the ignorance, pusillanimity, and villainy of certain people round a certain weak, silly Sovereign, to the unfortunate deserted people of the Netherlands? It is the most impudent paper that ever was published, and in my opinion cuts off every hope of cordial co-operation, by which alone offensive measures and forward movements can be rendered practicable; in short, it completes the measure of infamy, for it tells the inhabitants between the Meuse and the Rhine, that if they do not give all they have, their gracious Sovereign is resolved to plunder and then abandon them: of the possibility of which measure their brethren in the Low Countries furnish them a recent example.

I shall be very happy when I have wherewithal to make my letters palatable. In the meantime, remember it is an act of charity to bestow half an hour on yours, &c.

The proclamation was addressed to the Germanic circles, and it told them that:

"The inexhaustible resources of France, its innumerable cohorts, the inactivity of a blinded people (the Belgians) who would not listen to the paternal voice of their *good* Prince, and the secret practices of some of their ambitious representatives, are the causes which have forced the Imperial armies to retreat.

* * * *

"If, like the inhabitants of the Belgian Provinces, they should suffer themselves to be misled by secret seducers, he and his army should be obliged to pass the Rhine, and leave them a prey to their enemies, and *withdraw from them*, without ceremony, *whatever the enemy might find among them for subsistence.*"

On August 17, the Emperor presented a memorial to the circle of the Upper Rhine, soliciting their aid, stating that his own resources were utterly unequal to the contest, and speaking of the King of Prussia having received a large subsidy from England, and yet having never brought his troops to act.

TO HIS SISTER.

Ousterhout, August 19, 1794.

I have no good news to send you from this quarter. The Prince of Cobourg's late proclamation has extinguished the glimmering light that I saw, or fancied I saw, through the gloom that surrounds us. It is a most impudent publication. His Serene Highness, after most unjustly imputing to the inhabitants of the Netherlands the disasters and disgraces that have marked the operations of the army under his command, tells the good people of the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, in very plain terms, that if they do not give their property and themselves to their most gracious Sovereign, his Majesty, with the same paternal care that he extended towards their brethren in the Netherlands, will rob and plunder, and then abandon them to their enemies. I daily thank God I am an Englishman, and pray that the time may arrive when it may no longer be necessary for us to have connection with the fools and villains who are playing the principal parts on the Continent of Europe. I have long been of opinion that we have more to apprehend from the misconduct and duplicity of those whom we call our friends, than from the

prowess of our enemies. The proof is, that in all parts where we acted by ourselves we have been successful; the reverse has been the case in every instance where we have relied on others. You will perceive I am rather bitter on this subject; but the miseries I have witnessed, and the little probability I see of their being redressed, and the impudence with which certain people come forward who ought to sink in their own imbecility (if nothing worse), I confess excites my indignation.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Ousterhout, August 19, 1794.

The enemy have augmented their force in our front, and made several movements within these last five or six days. Their band was generally to their right, and at one time we were assured they were marching with their whole force on Maestricht. The day before yesterday we discovered that the movement to their right was made (probably to deceive us) with about 6000 men, and that their main force still continued in our front. That day a sergeant of the 16th Light Dragoons deserted. Yesterday the enemy attacked nearly all the advanced posts of our and the Dutch army. They penetrated

between Alphen and Cham, and had an opportunity of making a few discharges at our cavalry, from some field-pieces, before they were driven back. In the evening we re-occupied all our advanced posts, and the enemy has this morning retired from before our right. They appear to have carried all their force to our left, which is certainly the point on which we have most to apprehend. We had thoughts of moving when the sergeant deserted, and it was probably from his information that this general *reconnaissance* originated. They may have various views on our left, or they may only mean to mask us, while they are carrying on some serious operation against the Austrians on the Meuse. The changes in their government appear to have no influence on their military proceedings. I suppose, however, that Barrère cannot survive many weeks, and on his fall I think there will be room for a party of a different complexion. In the meantime, if some vigorous steps are not hastily adopted, Valenciennes and Condé must fall; and with them our only hopes of regaining our frontier this year. The Prince of Cobourg's last proclamation surely is very little calculated to give spirit and confidence, either to the people to whom it is addressed, or to those unfortunate victims of Austrian policy, who have been so cruelly abandoned to their enemies.

Some Danish officers in the service of Hesse-

Cassel, have received orders to leave this army directly, the reason assigned being a rupture between Great Britain and Denmark. In that case, will not considerations for the safety of Hanover have a material influence on the future operations of our army? I lament most sincerely to hear the news from the West Indies; such a finale to the campaign is melancholy indeed. I feel much in a public point of view, and much for my old friends of the Welch Fusileers, many of whom, I fear, have fallen victims to the yellow fever. It is not from you alone I learn the ravages that disorder has made in our army. I fear they are hardly adequate to the defence of their conquest, which, unless powerful reinforcements are sent, will be in the utmost danger.

Sluys still holds out. I hear the enemy have lost many men in an unsuccessful storm, and suffer much from sickness; while the garrison is healthy, has lost very few men, and has no idea of surrendering. I believe a joint expedition is to be undertaken for their relief.

Something is in agitation in the enemy's camp. Whether the blow is to be struck at us or at the Prince of Cobourg, to-morrow or next day will probably decide.

August 28.—The enemy made a general attack on the outposts. Before noon, they carried and

established themselves at the post of Strybeck. From the force they showed, it appeared to be their intention to attack our camp; and from the direction of their columns, it was evidently their plan to turn our left. In the evening, his Royal Highness assembled a council of war, where it was unanimously agreed that, as the object of the position of Ousterhout—namely, giving time to the Dutch to put Breda and Gertruydenberg in a state of defence, was accomplished, it would be imprudent to risk an action in the position, and give to the enemy the possibility of cutting our communication with Bois-le-Duc. The army marched at night, having been previously joined by the Hessians (detached on the 7th instant), and the next day, in the afternoon, encamped with their right to the village of Giersberge. His Royal Highness's quarters are at Helwirt.

August 30.—The next day, we continued our march, and encamped on the river Aa, having the village of Heeswyk in front of our right. Head-quarters at Uden.

August 31.—News arrived that his Serene Highness the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg had resigned the command of the Imperial army, which devolved on Count Clairfayt as senior officer.

General Beaulieu arrived at Uden.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Ousterhout, August 28, 1794.

* * * *

The last week of our residence at Ousterhout was enlivened by the return of the Princesses of Orange to Breda. They dined twice with the Duke; and you will think they inherit some of the warlike spirit of their great ancestor when I tell you that they waited, on Wednesday, till the reports were received from the outposts, and then came over to Ousterhout, and passed in review the whole army, which was under arms for the purpose. In the evening, they went as far as Gertruydenberg, on their way to the Hague.

We left with regret our former camp. The village where we had our head-quarters was very convenient; and owing to the bowers and walks which the men had made round their tents, the camp had become quite a beautiful object, and, what was of more consequence, the wells we had sunk furnished to us a plentiful supply of good water, a circumstance not very usual in this country. You will perhaps be surprised to hear that I am now quartered in a nunnery, but you will recollect that

Uden and the country round it belong to the Elector Palatine.

You will probably have heard that the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg has resigned the command of the Imperial army. Who is to succeed him in that very arduous office is not certain; but, at present, General Count Clairfayt has the command.

There is a report that Sluys is relieved, the confirmation of which we anxiously expect. I shall rejoice at any check that is given to the unparalleled success of the French. I hope I have written intelligibly; but my friend Clinton* has been all the time chattering at my elbow, and joins me in love, &c.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Uden, August 31, 1794.

* * * *

We have left Breda and Gertruydenberg in a state that precludes any apprehension from a sudden attack; and I cannot suppose the enemy will dare to sit down before either while we are thus in a position for their relief; but had I been the director, I should have preferred a position with my left on Fort Isabel, and my right (covered by some closed

* Sir Henry Clinton.

redoubts) extending on the plain, to the one we at present occupy — the town of Bois-le-Duc always giving me the string of the bow if the enemy made any attempt on the Marais de Peele.

* * * *

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Uden, August 31, 1794.

On the morning of the 28th, the enemy made an attack, which was nearly a general one, on all the outposts of his Royal Highness's army, as well as on those of the Hereditary Prince of Orange. Before noon, the enemy had carried and established themselves at the post of Strybeck; and from the strength of their columns and their direction, it was evident that they were advancing in very considerable force, with a view to attack our camp, and gain our left flank. The reports of various deserters confirmed this conjecture, and made the strength of the enemy amount to upwards of 50,000 men. In the evening, his Royal Highness held a council of war, where it was unanimously agreed that the great object for which we took the position of Ousterhout —namely, giving time to the Dutch to put Breda

and Gertruydenberg in a state of defence—being accomplished, it would be imprudent to risk an action in this position, and to render it possible for the enemy to cut our communication with Bois-le-Duc, the consequence of which, in case of defeat, must have been a retreat through the lines of Gertruydenberg, which, with so numerous a cavalry and artillery, must have been a measure of great difficulty, and under such circumstances, would probably have been attended with considerable loss; and it would have confined, for some days, the operations of the only army which, at this critical moment, can be relied on for the protection of the Republic.

Accordingly, we marched on the night of the 28th; and the next day, at noon, we encamped to the eastward of the village of Giersberge. We continued our march yesterday morning, and in the afternoon took a camp on the river Aa, having the village of Heeswyk in the front of our right. Our position is not exactly the one which was formerly intended, his Royal Highness being of opinion that while the Austrians are at Weerdt, our present position is better calculated for keeping up a communication with them than the proposed one, which can, at any time, be occupied in a few hours by throwing back our left. One of our advanced posts is at Helmond. This movement has been effected without interruption from the enemy.

Both Breda and Gertruydenberg are in such a state as to leave no room for apprehension from any sudden attack; and I cannot suppose the enemy will dare to sit down before either while we remain so *à portée* for their relief.

The apprehensions which his Royal Highness entertained for his left flank are, we find, fully justified by the enemy's having advanced a considerable corps to Loemel, from whence they had made strong detachments of cavalry to Einhoven.

September 1. — Head-quarters moved to Berlicom.

September 4.—Mr. Wyndham, the Secretary-at-War, arrived at Berlicom.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Berlicom, September 5, 1794.

Before you receive this, the disagreeable news of the surrender of Sluys will have reached you. The effect this event may have in the States of the Republic, particularly in Zealand, is very obvious; but a much heavier calamity makes us almost forget this loss, though in itself of great importance.

Yesterday we received the confirmation of a rumour which had reached us some days before, viz., that the enemy were in possession of Valenciennes and Condé. The terms under which they were surrendered were, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war, and retire into their own country, and serve no more during the present war. The loss of ammunition and artillery, and particularly of artillerymen, is very great. We have lost stores to a great amount, which were left in Condé, and the Dutch a large quantity of artillery which they had lent to the Austrians. Till this time, I have entertained a hope, and have seen the possibility and probability, of our being able, by a united and vigorous forward movement, to repair the losses of the former part of the campaign; and though I was not sanguine enough to look forward to any conquest, I thought we might re-establish ourselves before winter on our former frontier. I confess this last calamity has extinguished all my hope. I shall be very glad if those whose abilities and experience enable them to form a more just estimate of our situation, see things in a different point of view; and I shall with the most heartfelt satisfaction retract an opinion which I give you with the deepest concern.

Mr. Wyndham arrived here yesterday, and will stay about a week. I wish I could have an hour's

conversation with you, for I have many things at this time that I should wish to mention to you, which I dare not trust to paper.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Berlicom, September 5, 1794.

You will have heard that Sluys has surrendered. The Dutch Governor did himself much honour by insisting that the Hanoverians of his garrison should be included in the capitulation. He was at first strenuously opposed by the barbarian who commanded the siege.

The rumour we have had for some days of the surrender of Valenciennes and Condé, was yesterday confirmed. Their loss at this critical moment is, in my opinion, most decisive, and extinguishes the hope I have long entertained, that by a united, vigorous forward movement, we might regain the losses of the former part of the campaign, and before winter, re-establish ourselves on the Scheldt.

A letter bearing such dismal tidings cannot be too short. Adieu.

CHAPTER XII.

REVERSES OF THE ALLIES—SECRET UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN FRANCE AND AUSTRIA—DEFENCELESS STATE OF HOLLAND—THE BRITISH RETREAT ON GRAAVE — LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WESLEY ENGAGED — OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH—SURRENDER OF BOIS-LE-DUC TO THE FRENCH—POSITION AT NYMEGEN.

COLONEL CALVERT'S letters show the grief and indignation felt at the British head-quarters, and felt the most keenly by the best informed, on account of the disgraceful reverses attending the arms of the Allies, and the calamities brought on the unhappy inhabitants by the conduct of those who ought to have been their defenders. Austria sought only her own aggrandizement. This motive had led her to appropriate the captured fortresses of Valenciennes and Condé; and how clearly the French saw through these transactions, may appear from the comments of their own General, Marescot:

"A la fin du rapport que le général Marescot fit sur la prise de Valenciennes et de Condé, le lendemain même de la capitulation de cette dernière place, on trouve les réflexions suivantes. Ainsi se sont évanouies comme un songe les spéculations ambi-

tieuses que les puissances coalisées avoient faites contre la France. Sous le prétexte de secourir la famille des Bourbons, elles en voulurent dévorer l'héritage. Si l'Empereur n'eût pas armé et combattu pour ses propres intérêts, eût-il dépensé aux quatre places que nous venons de lui reprendre, des sommes immenses qui se sont élévées jusqu'à plusieurs millions, pour mettre dans l'état le plus florissant leurs fortifications et leurs bâtimens militaires; dépenses qui ont été jusqu'à raser des montagnes qui commandaient leurs remparts. Si l'Empereur eût eu l'intention de remettre ces places, n'y eût-il pas établi pour commandans des seigneurs français émigrés. Y eût-il fait rendre la justice en son nom? Enfin eût-il fait graver avec tant de soin ses armes sur toutes les portes? Il est aisé de conclure de tout ceci que les puissances coalisées n'ont pour but, dans la guerre cruelle qu'elles nous font, que de démembrer la France, et de la partager entre elles. Mais la constance, le courage, les moyens supérieurs des Français triompheront de tous les obstacles. La première nation du monde ne souffrira point que son territoire soit envahi on démembré, et au milieu des orages de la guerre la plus terrible et d'une révolution sans exemple, elle saura maintenir, avec calme et liberté, le genre de gouvernement qu'elle croira le plus propre à assurer sa gloire et sa prospérité."

The French did vindicate the glory of France, and as soon as Austria perceived that she could not retain

her Flemish territories without a severe and doubtful struggle, she at once abandoned them and her Allies, and turned her views towards acquisitions nearer home.

This is the true clue to the disastrous history, the progress of which Colonel Calvert watched with such bitter vexation.

What would have been the feelings of the British commander and his army, had they known that which the faithful page of history records—that the reverses of the allied arms, the loss of the fortresses, the misery inflicted on the countries that were the seat of war, the defeat of our own army, so small in comparison with that of the enemy, were all the result of concert and understanding between the Cabinet of Vienna and that of Paris? Alison says:

"The Imperial Government desired an accommodation, in order to concentrate their armies and attention on Poland.

* * * *

"They had definitely determined on the abandonment of the Belgian Provinces, and were now only desirous of extricating themselves from a contest in which neither honour nor profit was to be obtained. A secret understanding in consequence took place between Cobourg and the French Generals, the conditions of which were, that the Austrians should not be disquieted in their retreat to the Rhine; and the Republicans should be permitted, without molestation,

to reduce the few great fortresses which had been wrested from the Republic in the preceding and present campaigns."

While the Austrian Government pursued the measures which it considered the most advantageous for its interests, altogether irrespective of the welfare of its Flemish subjects, and its Allies, Dutch or British, the national characteristic of the Dutch concurred with the little popularity of the House of Orange in favouring the French invaders.

Colonel Calvert never ceased to insist on the absolute necessity of energy on the part of the Dutch Government and army, as well as on that of his own, in order to afford any chance of successfully resisting the French; but his urgent remonstrances do not appear to have had any effect in obtaining either more precaution and preparation against danger, or more vigour in meeting it.

The most obvious means of defending their country were neglected by the Dutch. Their fortified places were not repaired; plans of the frontier, the seat of war, were not made; trustworthy intelligence was not conveyed to head-quarters; their fortresses were feebly defended, nor do they appear to have opposed any effectual resistance in the field to the enemy invading their territory. The Austrians were retreating to the Rhine. The French army was amply provided with arms and stores of every sort, taken in the Flemish and Dutch fortresses; and the corps

hitherto engaged in these sieges now swelled the hosts advancing against Clairfayt and the Duke of York.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Berlicom, September 9, 1794.

I have to thank your Lordship for two letters, the latter of which was delivered by the Baron de Rolle, to whom I shall with much pleasure show every civility and attention in my power.

As bad news is sure to make its way fast enough, I did not think it necessary to trouble you with a letter on receiving the melancholy intelligence of the surrender of Condé and Valenciennes; I confess I cannot but look on this misfortune, at this critical juncture, as the most heavy that could have befallen us, and it will require all the ability, unanimity, and force we can bring forward to avert the evil consequences that may naturally be expected to result from it.

There appears to have been no great change either in the strength or position of the enemy in our front for some days. Their main army occupies a position, the right of which is near Baerle, Cham is nearly their centre, and their left falls back towards Zundert. A considerable corps covers Turnhout, where the enemy has erected a hospital. General Pichegru

has his head-quarters at Hoogstraten, which is covered by a corps of 4000 men, and from the best accounts we can obtain, I should imagine the whole force of his army amounts to about 40,000. A report we received yesterday mentions that a corps of 8000 men, which was destined for the maritime part of Flanders, received a counter-order at Loenhout, and are returned to join the main army under Pichegru.

It appears that the troops engaged in the reduction of Sluys, are those formerly destined for embarkation at Dunkirk; these, joined to a considerable detachment which marched from Ghent, form the corps which summoned the fortresses of Hulst, Sas de Gand, and Phillipine, on the 31st of August. The main body of the army is encamped at Kapricke, their advanced posts occupy Assenede and Zelden Zat, from whence they patrole up to the gates of Sas de Gand. The troops have formed a new road from Kapricke to Bassevelde, which, it is reported, will be the head-quarters, for the purpose of carrying on the sieges of Phillipine and Sas de Gand at the same time. The heavy artillery having been moved on the 27th and the 28th of last month from Ypres towards Ghent, gives a degree of credibility to this report. It appears to be the enemy's intention to retain the country they have acquired, for they are forming a new canal from Zuydcote to Furnes, which will be navigable in the course of this month, and is calculated to facilitate the communication between

Dunkirk and Nieuport. The enemy is likewise engaged in repairing the fortifications of Ypres, Menin, Courtray, and Tournay, and is adding *revêtements* of brick to the works the Austrians erected this and the last year.

The army employed in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes and Condé, under the orders of General Bonneau, which amounted to nearly 40,000 men, after leaving small garrisons in these fortresses, is directed to move forward, with a view, it is conjectured, of acting on the Meuse.

The taxes in Brabant and Flanders, which had been suspended by Richard, Représentant du Peuple, are re-established and doubled by a decree of the Committee of Public Safety. Independent of these permanent taxes, every province is ordered to pay into their treasury ten millions of livres in specie or bullion by the 7th of this month. Your lordship will concur with me in regretting that the events of the campaign have given to the enemy the opportunity of drawing such resources from this unfortunate country, and I hope that all parties will now see the absolute necessity of infusing all the energy possible into the operations of the Allies in Flanders.

September 10.—The enemy drove in the Dutch

posts at Helwirt, and showed themselves in front of our outposts.

September 12.—A patrole from Boxtel captured two of the French Etat-Major at Oosterwyk.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Berlicom, September 13, 1794.

The day before yesterday the enemy attacked the Dutch picket, at Helwirt, and drove them into Fort Isabel: the same day they showed themselves in front of our advanced posts, and had various skirmishes with our light troops.

A patrole which was yesterday made from Boxtel, proceeded to Oosterwyk, where they were fortunate enough to capture two officers of the Etat-Major. The report they make is as follows: The army under General Pichegru's immediate orders is divided into four columns, of which one, consisting of about 8000 or 10,000 men, is left to keep the garrison of Breda in check. Pichegru was yesterday in march with the other three, and was expected to take his head-quarters at Oosterwyk last night: this force they estimate at about 50,000 men. He does not appear to be so well provided with artillery as their armies usually are, but he has a heavy train at

Malines. The corps engaged in the reduction of Valenciennes and Condé consisted of nearly 50,000 men. They are marching in three divisions, two of which are destined to act on the Meuse, and one is expected very shortly to join Pichegru. The prisoners assure us that Pichegru's orders to attack his Royal Highness are positive. They inform us that a considerable embarkation of troops has taken place at Dunkirk and Ostend, but this latter information appears to be a matter of hearsay. The reports from the outposts this morning induce us to imagine that the enemy have made a retrograde movement—at least, they have not advanced. If their intention is really to attack us, they will probably not choose to cross the Dommel and the Aa in our front, but will rather move upon Helmond, and there cross the Aa, which they will make an *appui* for their left during their march towards us; or else, they will make a sudden attempt on Crève-cœur. The south-west face of the latter is rendered very attackable by the operation of a dyke run across the branch of the Aa (which naturally forms the wet ditch of the fortress) for the purpose of forming the inundation of Bois-le-Duc. Had the dyke been formed below, instead of above Crève-cœur, I conceive the inundation of both the fortresses would have been effected at the same time.

I have waited on General Doughlas who commands at Bois-le-Duc, by his Royal Highness's order, to represent to him that, owing to the change of language and other circumstances, I am apprehensive that our intelligence may be very defective, and to request his assistance in procuring some new channels of information. General Doughlas assured me that he was very willing to give us any assistance in his power; but that the disaffection of the people in this part of the country was so great, that it was entirely out of his power to be of any service to us in the present instance.

I need not represent to you how very essential it is that our intelligence should be good at this time, and I request the favour of you to be so kind as to interest yourself in procuring us Dutch agents for that purpose, if possible. The neglect of our Allies on this subject renders it more necessary for us to bestow on it the utmost attention. I beg your lordship will be good enough to direct any messengers or travellers to take the route of Bommel instead of Heusden, the latter not being safe, while the enemy continue in such force between Breda and Bois-le-Duc.

September 14.—In the afternoon the enemy passed the river Dommel, and attacked and carried the post of Boxtel, occupied by our light troops,

under General Düring. The enemy passed at Michel Gistel, and advanced towards our posts on the Aa, particularly towards Middelrode.

September 15.—At midnight, General Abercromby marched with the reserve of the army, for the purpose of proving the real force of the enemy, and of re-establishing the outposts, if possible. The General approached to within half a league of both the posts of Boxtel and Michel Gistel; but finding the enemy advancing in great force, he retreated with his corps by Middelrode to camp. The accounts we received from deserters and prisoners, made the enemy's numbers amount to about 80,000 men; and stated that Pichegru was moving his columns towards our left, under cover of the attacks made on our outposts. Upon the assurance of this intelligence, his Royal Highness resolved on breaking up his camp, and gave the necessary orders for effecting a retreat upon Graave during the night. The army began to move in two columns, at four in the afternoon, and at nine the rear-guard, under General Abercromby, with the reserve and outposts, left the camp.

"On the 1st of September," says Captain Jones, in his campaign of 1794, "the Duke of York changed his head-quarters to Berlicom, and the

army remained unmolested in their camp until the 14th, when the enemy made an attack on all the Duke's outposts along the Dommel; and that at Boxtel, which was the most advanced, was forced, with considerable loss to the Hesse-Darmstadt troops, who occupied it. As the line of outposts on the Dommel could not be maintained while the enemy were in possession of Boxtel, the Duke found it necessary to regain it if possible, as without that post his position near Berlicom would not be tenable.

"He therefore, on the 15th, ordered Lieutenant-general Abercromby to march with the reserve to regain the position; but on his arrival there, he found the enemy in so great force, that he could not attack them, and he was obliged to retire; for General Pichegru had not laid siege to Breda, as was supposed, but made a forced march with his whole army, and intended on the next day, to attack the left of the British with 80,000 men.

"The Duke did not think it prudent to hazard an action with so great a disparity of numbers, for at that time he could not muster 20,000 fighting men."

This night attack on Boxtel will be recollected with interest, when it is known that the illustrious Commander, whose loss we can never cease to deplore, was then first engaged with the enemy.

The editor remembers to have been told by his father, that he rode up and delivered to the Duke of Wellington his orders, the first time that the Duke went into fire, which the editor believes to have been on this occasion. In the spring of 1850 the editor requested Lord Charles Wellesley to ask the Duke whether that was the case. The Duke replied that Lord Strafford could give more correct information on the point than any one else. Accordingly, the editor called on Lord Strafford, taking with him Sir Harry Calvert's letters of the period, and his maps, in order to recal the circumstances as minutely as he could to Lord Strafford's recollection. When he had read the letters and journal, and pointed out on the map each place mentioned, and told Lord Strafford what Sir Harry Calvert had said, his lordship replied that he recollected perfectly what took place, that the account was quite correct, and that about three weeks before the death of Sir George Murray, who was a Lieutenant in the 3rd Regiment of Guards in 1794, he and Sir George and the Duke had been talking over the events of the campaign, and that Sir George reminded the Duke of the position of the 33rd, drawn up to cover the retreat, at the end of a lane through which the Guards were retiring. The Duke was then Lieutenant-colonel Wesley, commanding the 33rd Regiment, in which Lord Strafford was a Lieutenant. The regiment had left Cork in May,

and landed at Ostend, whence they joined the British army, under the Duke of York.

The retreat was effected without loss, and the next morning the whole army crossed the Meuse at Graave, except the light troops, who remained in front of the town, under the command of General Hammerstein. His Royal Highness took his quarters this night at Graave, and the army encamped nearly parallel to the river, having its right near the village of Wichen.

September 17.—His Royal Highness moved to the Château de Wichen. The Count d'Artois arrived at head-quarters.

September 18.—The Hessians are detached to Batenburg, the Hanoverians to Afferden; the 54th Regiment marched to Graave; the British Light Dragoons crossed the river, and encamped at Asselt. The outposts were drawn nearer the river.

Colonel Calvert was sent by the Duke of York to communicate personally with General Clairfayt. The four succeeding letters refer to this visit to the Austrian head-quarters. In this expedition he was accompanied by Mr. Pelham.*

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* Mr. Pelham, afterwards Earl of Chichester, was Irish Secretary with Lord Northington in 1788, and with Lord Campden in 1795, and subsequently Home Secretary, Postmaster-general in 1807. Died, 1826.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK.

Maestricht, September 19, 1794.

In consequence of the badness both of the roads and horses, we were some hours longer on our journey than your Royal Highness might have expected. On our arrival here, we found that Count Merfeldt was ill, and had retired from the army; but having been fortunate enough to meet Count Orlandini, who has just arrived from General Clairfayt, and is to remain in the garrison, it is from him that I receive the information which I have the honour to transmit to your Royal Highness.

Yesterday morning the enemy forced the post of Durbuy on the Ourte, and by turning General La Tour's left, obliged him to fall back on Hervé. Upon this information, Count Clairfayt thought proper to march with his whole army. The baggage has taken the route of Rol-le-Duc, Juliers, and Bercheim. The head-quarters will this evening be at Wiltre, a village between Aix and Rol-le-Duc. It is supposed that the army will follow the route of the baggage, and that La Tour will fall back to-day on Aix-la-Chapelle. General Kray has orders to throw into this town this evening, eight complete battalions of Austrians, viz., Regiment de Keuhl, Michel Wallis, Stein, and Wentzel Coloredo; which,

with five hundred cavalry—viz., hussars and Kiratchi Light Horse—remain under the orders of Lieutenant-general Klebeck and Major-general Kempen. Kray himself joins the main army. The Dutch garrison consists of 1500 men, after sending away the emigrants. Orlandini further informs us that the works are in good repair, and that they have provisions for three months. but that he apprehended a failure of ammunition; he expects the town will be invested in a very few days.

Mr. Pelham joins me in thinking it proper to inform your Royal Highness, that on expressing our surprise that General Clairfayt did not attack the corps of the enemy which has crossed the Meuse, Count Orlandini said, it is generally believed that no decisive orders on that head had been received from Vienna.

We are this moment setting off to follow the head quarters of Count Clairfayt, and we conceive we shall meet your Royal Highness's wishes in remaining with him till we can in some measure ascertain his Excellency's intentions. Count Orlandini assures us that the enemy are advanced in some force as far as Stavelot.

TO HIS SISTER.

Aix-la-Chapelle, September 20, 1794.

The best return that I can make for the letters I am in your debt, is to give you some account of my expedition, which, from its beginning, promises to be an eventful one. For reasons which I assigned in a letter I wrote my mother on Tuesday night, my journey was deferred; but early on Thursday morning we left head-quarters. I say *we*, for I am fortunate enough to have a very agreeable companion, and a very great assistant in the business I am come upon, in Mr. Pelham, who accompanied Mr. Wyndham on a visit to his Royal Highness. Owing to the badness of the roads and horses, we did not arrive at Maestricht till yesterday noon. The enemy being in possession of all the country on the other side the Meuse, obliged us to come by Venlo and Ruremonde. On our arrival at Maestricht, we found that Count Clairfayt had that morning marched from Fouron-le-Comte; that the French had crossed the Meuse, and driven General La Tour from his post of Durbuy on the Ourte, and by that means obliged him to fall back on Hervé. General Kray, who covered Maestricht, was to retreat in the evening, and to leave 8000 Austrians with 1500 Dutch to form the garrison of the town, which they suppose will be

invested in a few days. We set out in the afternoon in search of General Clairfayt, and as soon as we ascended the hills on this side Maestricht, we perceived that the enemy had made an attack on Kray, who, however, I doubt not, under cover of the night, made good his retreat.

We have sent to learn where General Clairfayt's head-quarters are to be this evening, when we intend to join him. I much fear by the route of his baggage, that he points towards the Rhine. If Clairfayt is not strong enough to act immediately on the offensive, both sides of the Meuse must be in the enemy's possession, and I tremble for Venlo, Ruremonde, and Maestricht itself. While Pichegru remains in our front, with 80,000 men, we cannot, you will conceive, grant any assistance to the Austrian General.

I have had a letter from Captain Bristow, who was taken prisoner by the enemy, on the 15th. He is not wounded, and is very well treated, which I dare say will be the case with all officers who fall into Pichegru's hands; his conduct being very different from that of the generals whom we have hitherto had opposed to us.

Head-Quarters,
Groesbeek, near Kranenburg,
September 23, 1794.

We were detained six hours in Aix-la-Chapelle by

the drunkenness of our postillion, whom, in the universal confusion attending the retreat of the armies, it was impossible to replace. However, on the evening of the 20th, we reached General Clairfayt, at the Couvent des Capucins, at Weltem. General La Tour was so severely attacked at Hervé, that, though he beat the enemy, Clairfayt resolved to march the next morning. We left him on his route for Rol-le-Duc, thence to Juliers; and I dare say that yesterday the whole Imperial army was behind the Roer, and Maestricht left to defend itself the best way it can. I am very much hurried, and therefore can only add my sincere concern for all these disastrous events, which have not come on me by surprise; for from the day we left Tournay I had my apprehensions, but the surrender of Valenciennes and Condé made me despair.

September 21.—The army moved; the Hanoverians proceeded to Wel. The British encamped between Heumen and Mook. His Royal Highness's head-quarters at Groesbeek; General Abercromby, with the second line, at Gennep; the advanced posts withdrawn across the river, and only pickets left in front of Graave.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
September 23, 1794.

I have only a few minutes to inform you that on my arrival at Maestricht, on the 19th, where I was sent to have some conversation with General Clairfayt, I found he had moved his army from Fouron-le-Comte that morning, in consequence of the enemy having forced the passage of the Ourte, at Durbuy, the preceding evening, and by that means obliged La Tour to fall back on Hervé and Harry Capelle. Clairfayt threw into Maestricht eight complete battalions and 500 cavalry, which, with 1500 Dutch, form the garrison. More particulars I dare not trust to paper. On the 20th, La Tour was again attacked in his new position; and though he repulsed the enemy, Clairfayt did not think it advisable to expose him to the renewal of the attack, which the enemy threatened the next morning. On the 21st, when we left Clairfayt, La Tour had retreated to Aix-la-Chapelle. He was on his march to Rol-le-Duc, whence he intended marching on Juliers, and placing his whole army behind the Roer. He is obliged to extend his left quite down to the Rhine, to cover Bonn, and will communicate by detachments with the Imperial army on the left bank of

the Moselle. The enemy appear to be strong everywhere. The surrender of Valenciennes and Condé has put them in possession of the finest artillery and the most ample magazines of all sorts, and the harvest in the Low Countries has filled their granaries.

One article of the capitulation of Valenciennes is sufficient to blast the best of causes, and to throw a very dark shade on the Austrian name. The emigrants are given up to their relentless enemy.

I conclude that by this time Maestricht is invested, but I hardly think the enemy will dare besiege it before they have dislodged Clairfayt from the Roer, which I flatter myself they will find a difficult task. Adieu, my best wishes attend you and yours, as you well know.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Wednesday Night, September 24, 1794.

Your last of the 15th, which is just arrived, reproaches me with not having half answered your former one of the 8th. The fact is, I have been much employed, and have had very little time to bestow on those to whom I give it with the most pleasure, my friends. I wrote you a few lines (all I could) yesterday. Our crossing the Meuse, and the

reasons which induced his Royal Highness to take that resolution, will have been explained in the "Gazette;" but, take this from me, the measure was not adopted till it was not only approved, but forcibly urged by the principal officers of the army.

The precise sum the worthies you mention have received from the Convention is not exactly ascertained even on this side the water; but the one having a command in Italy, and the other being now at Clairfayt's head-quarters, there is no doubt that if not already sufficiently enriched, they will know how to make their own terms *pour l'avenir*. The pecuniary assistance talked of for his Imperial Majesty depends on Parliament; consequently, nothing on that subject can be fixed or arranged till the 4th November.

I confess, my dear Hew, I see a dark cloud gathering round us, and the sun of my hope set with Valenciennes and Condé. One article of their capitulation, by which the unhappy emigrants are delivered to their merciless enemies by those who were bound by every tie of honour and humanity to defend them, brands the Allies with a degree of infamy that can never be effaced, and can only be palliated by the most exemplary punishment of the delinquent who gave them up; and I sincerely hope that his Imperial Majesty, by a signal act of justice,

will preserve himself from any share in the ignominy of the transaction.

We hear, this evening, that the French have invested Bois-le-Duc. According to my ideas of military matters, they should make demonstrations only against us, and Venlo should be the real point of their attack.

* * * *

I conclude you know that the Count d'Artois is a volunteer with this army. I have been away from head-quarters this last week, and have therefore only seen him once. He appears a polite, gentleman-like man.

Mr. Wyndham and Pelham set off for England by way of the Hague to-day.

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Groesbeek, at Night, September 28, 1794.

To give you the news of the day in three words (for I have not time for more), the enemy have possessed themselves of Crève-cœur. The effect of this on Bois-le-Duc, and its utility to the subsequent designs of the enemy, I need not explain to you.

Thank you for your letter of the 22nd, and for

the trouble you have taken about Jackson. Is it not shameful that a man who is able and willing to render essential service where it is so much wanted should be rejected, or meet with difficulties from a parcel of bigwigs who, lolling in their chariots in London, call themselves military surgeons, military physicians, and military directors? A notable instance we have of their discernment and impartiality in the person of the gentleman who has the care of the lives and limbs of his Royal Highness and his family.

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM WYNDHAM,

SECRETARY-AT-WAR.

Head-Quarters,
Groesbeek, September 30, 1794.

I return you many thanks for your letter of the 27th. The observations it contains are, as you remark, very obvious ones, and perhaps for that very reason it is the more essential that they should be frequently repeated. I do and shall always feel myself much indebted to you for your assistance and advice on any occasion.

By the unanimous and decided opinion of the general officers whom his Royal Highness assembled

on Prince Frederick's arrival, the plan suggested by him was deemed impracticable. Had it been attempted, the enemy must inevitably have been apprised of something being in agitation, owing to the time necessary for assembling the army; and as we have only one bridge and only one fortress by which we could pass, they must have known, for many hours before we could have arrived at the point of action, the object we had in view; and it was the opinion of all the generals that, having arrived there, the relief could have been only temporary, and of little avail. As we have not a sufficient force to leave a corps to insure our return by the route by which we should have advanced, our retreat, in case of accident, must have been very precarious; and I do not think I hazard an ill-founded opinion in believing it possible that we might have been reduced to the necessity of forcing our way to the Lines of Steenbergen. The calamitous consequences of such an event to the affairs of Holland, it is needless to point out.

It is a circumstance almost beyond belief that, in this moment of imminent danger, the Dutch have not taken the precaution to have a survey of their frontier made by some intelligent officers, by which means those who direct their affairs might have been enabled to make a just estimate of the danger to be apprehended on each point. The neglect of

Crève-cœur, a fortress undoubtedly of the utmost importance, induces me to believe that no such survey exists. Yesterday I waited on his Serene Highness the Prince Frederick, to represent (which I did on the 14th in regard to Crève-cœur) the necessity of putting Fort St. André in the best possible state of defence, which is rendered more essential by the unfortunate surrender of Crève-cœur.

The Duke has ordered one battalion of British, of those troops on their route from Zealand, to throw themselves into the Bommeler Waard, and has consented that two more of the battalions under the orders of Colonel Nugent* shall remain on the right bank of the Waal, as a reserve to the corps in the Bommeler Waard and the garrison of Fort St. André.

I hope that the demand which his Serene Highness has made of heavy guns, for the defence of the right bank of the Waal, will be instantly complied with; for, though very much inclined to hope for the best, I wish to be in every respect prepared for the worst.

* Colonel Nugent entered the army in 1773. Colonel of the 85th Regiment (Bucks Volunteers) in March, 1794. Served in the American War, in Flanders, in Jamaica in 1801, and Commander-in-Chief in India, 1811; Colonel 6th Foot; appointed Field-Marshal, November, 1846; Baronet and G.C.B. Died, March, 1849.

The Duke sent Colonel Craig to General Clairfayt on the 28th, and I shall be very happy if his return gives us reason to rely on Clairfayt's hearty and effective co-operation: in the meantime, his Royal Highness has thought it prudent to direct Count Walmoden to proceed no farther up the river than Wel, unless an actual attempt of the enemy to pass the river between him and Venlo should demand the immediate exertion of his corps.

General Abercromby is at Afferden, and the reserve at Gennep. Sir William Erskine has committed to his observation the course of the river from hence to its confluence with the Waal. His Royal Highness has ordered a bridge to be established at Nymegen, which, I am assured, will be completed to-night, and another at Schenckenschans.

Will you permit me to say that I very earnestly wish that the arrangement on which I had some conversation with Pelham could take place. It is certain that, from ordinary men being placed in such situations, many evils might be expected; it is from the perfectly honest, upright, and elevated characters of the persons alluded to, from their devotion to the service of the King and country, and the mutual regard that I know they entertain for each other, that I dare augur the best of consequences.

The times, my dear Sir, are of a complexion that

demands the exertion of all that is good and great, and it is only by uniting and employing the *best* and most *precious* materials we have, that we can hope to stem the torrent that threatens all Europe with ruin.

* * * *

Pray tell Pelham that I am prevented to-day, but will soon thank him for his letter.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Groesbeek, September 30, 1794.

My Lord,

I hope the want of time will plead my excuse for using the liberty of enclosing to your Lordship an open letter, and requesting that after perusing it you will be so good as to seal and forward it by the present messenger. In addition to the contents of this letter, I think it right to inform you that the Baron de Rolle called on me this morning, and informed me that the Count d'Artois had received many letters assuring him that the French had a very powerful and numerous party in the Republic of Holland, and warning him to be on his guard. These accounts coincide too much with those we have lately received to leave me at ease on this subject. I am persuaded that the same evil exists at this moment in

Holland which lately threatened the subversion of our own Government, and it can only be averted by the same energy and decisive mode of proceeding to which we had recourse. The Baron de Rolle informs me that he has it from very good authority, that in case of our removing from hence, the garrison of Graave, on being bombarded, would surrender. It is currently reported that there is no provision in the town. At this moment, when people's minds are much alarmed, a report of that nature does infinite mischief; and I am too little instructed in the affairs of the Republic to be able to contradict it.

I fear the public accounts from the West Indies are very dismal. Individually I suffer much from an account I received this morning, which informs me that the regiment in which I spent the earliest part of my life (the Welsh Fusileers) has lost nine officers, and two hundred men by sickness, since its arrival at St. Domingo. The 41st Regiment has lost thirteen officers; this dreadful malady, together with the ill-will of the inhabitants, whom the rapacity of our commanders, I am assured, has exasperated against us, will, I fear, expose our late acquisitions in that quarter to the most imminent danger.

His Royal Highness has directed the messengers from head-quarters to pass in future by the Hague, agreeably to your proposal.

I am sure you will excuse my requesting your Lordship's assistance in urging on the Stadtholder, and his ministers, the absolute necessity of sending supplies of guns and ammunition to the Waal, and of watching with the attention the importance of the object demands, the progress of the enemy's clandestine designs in Holland.

October 3.—In consequence of intelligence that the Austrians under Count Clairfayt had been obliged to abandon the Roer, and place themselves behind the Erff for the purpose of passing the Rhine, his Royal Highness sent orders to Count Walmoden and General Abercromby to return from Wel.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
October 3, 1794.

I am sorry to inform you that we have received the very disagreeable intelligence of Clairfayt having been forced to quit his position behind the Roer. I know none of the particulars; but the consequence probably will be the absolute necessity of our passing the Waal, and I fear we must not be much surprised

at the fall of Maestricht, as the retreat of the Imperial army removes all hope of its relief.

Bois-le-Duc, Breda, Graave, and even Bergen-op-Zoom, will be left in a very precarious state. We may hope much from the season being so far advanced; but it appears a decided point, that without the aid of the Prussians, the Allies have not a force competent to withstand the numbers opposed to them.

October 4.—At night the reserve quitted Gennep, and the next morning marched into the intrenched camp of Nymegen. The same morning Count Walmoden arrived at Gennep, as did likewise General Abercromby.

October 6.—His Royal Highness moved his head-quarters to Nymegen. The reserve passed the Waal, at Nymegen, and marched down the right bank in order to occupy the Bommeler Waard, and the banks of the river opposite Bommel. Five regiments newly raised had arrived there from Zealand; and these corps, with the reserve of the army, occupied from Tiel to the neighbourhood of Gorcum.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

The Hague, October 7, 1794.

I wrote you a few lines on Friday, informing you of the news just received from Comte de Clairfayt, and that he had retreated behind the Erff; this could only be a preparatory movement to his passing the Rhine, which his corps at Ruremonde was ordered to do without loss of time, at Dusseldorf. In consequence of this misfortune, his Royal Highness recalled Count Walmoden and General Abercromby, who at the requisition of Count Clairfayt had gone up the river nearly as high as Venlo, with a very considerable corps, for the purpose of giving an *appui* to his right, and enabling him to act offensively with his left. General Clairfayt having quitted his position, the object of this movement no longer existed, and the position of our army became untenable, the enemy having gained our left. The reserve of the army, consisting of the brigade of Guards, General Balfour's brigade, and eight squadrons of British Light Dragoons, marched from Gennep to Nymegen on Saturday night. They were to cross the Waal yesterday morning, and to march down the right bank of that river till they came very nearly opposite to St. André, where I imagine they will arrive to-day. On Sunday morn-

ing Count Walmoden and Abercromby occupied the position at Gennep which the reserve had left; and his Royal Highness had not absolutely determined, when I left him, how soon he would pass the Waal, which would naturally depend much on the reports of those generals: but he will certainly keep open the communication with Graave as long as he can. The enemy are besieging Bois-le-Duc. Their operations against that place are much facilitated by the unfortunate surrender of the fortress of Crève-cœur. The season and the badness of the weather are *our best allies*, and I hope that, by their assistance, we shall keep the enemy on the other side of the Waal this winter; but the alarm in this country is very great. Deputies have arrived from several of the provinces, petitioning for peace on any terms that can be obtained. They are to have their public audience to-day. Though their propositions will be easily overruled, their appearance cannot but encourage the enemy, and diminish the very small portion of spirit which remains in the country.

The points on which I think that we have most reason to dread the enemy, are first, at the Bommeler Waard, which, however, I am persuaded will be well defended; and, secondly, between Emmerik and Wesel. The Prussian garrison at the latter place does not exceed above the half of what is absolutely requisite for the defence of the place. I

think the Duke cannot extend further than Emmerik: therefore, unless the Prussians or Austrians will send a corps to communicate with us at that place, a gap will be left for the Sieur Pichegru, of which he will, I doubt not, avail himself.

I am sorry that all my letters are of such a sombre cast; but if I write what I see, what I hear, and what I feel, they cannot be otherwise. There are many things so very mysterious, such, for instance, as the surrender of Valenciennes and Condé, Clairfayt's retreat without a decided battle for the relief of Maestricht, &c., that it is impossible to judge what the spring is that puts the machine in motion. In my own belief, the Prussian subsidy was the most ruinous measure that we could have adopted; that it has been useless, circumstances have fully proved, and I am persuaded many evils have originated from it not yet discovered; for, depend on it, an English guinea is an article no German Prince can withstand, and when a subsidy is in view, it bewilders their senses and leaves them no inclination for exertion, except for the attainment of it.

I hear famous accounts of the partridges and long-tails. I hope a few will be left for breed, for I shall with great pleasure exchange my sword for my Manton and the society of my friends, whenever circumstances permit; but I confess that the present aspect of affairs is such that we seem to be further

removed from such a prospect than we were on the first embarkation of the Guards for this country.

I came here yesterday to see Lord St. Helens, and shall set out on my return to-night.

Pray remember me to all my friends at Albury.

The reserve remain on the right bank, of the Waal, which does not appear clearly stated in my letter.

I should add that the Stadtholder told me last night that he had succeeded in his wish of arming the people *en masse*. In the Bommeler Waard, where the country is much intersected with ditches, armed peasantry, mixed with good troops, will be of infinite service.

The reader will recollect the quotation, showing clearly enough "the spring that puts the machine in motion." It is difficult not to feel indignation, even sixty years after the event, at the inhumanity and duplicity of the Austrian Government, in sending their own soldiers to fight a battle which they were determined to lose, and in permitting us to carry on the contest without informing us of their relations with the enemy. And we had scarcely less cause for dissatisfaction and complaint against our Prussian allies. The minister, Haugwitz, consented that the Prussian army should quit the neighbourhood of the Rhine, and advance to the scene of

decisive operations in Flanders. But the General, Marshal Möllendorf, had secret orders from his Court, the object of which was to render nugatory the promises of the minister. Möllendorf engaged his army in an useless and feigned expedition against Sarrelouis and Kaiserslautern, at the very time when he knew that Jourdan was advancing, by forced marches, with 40,000 men, to the scene of action on the banks of the Sambre. When the British and Dutch Commissioners, Lord Cornwallis and Kinckel, visited the Prussian army, they reproached Möllendorf with the breach of faith of the Prussian Government, and with a fact they had recently discovered, that, instead of 62,000 soldiers, as stipulated by treaty and paid by the Allies, only 32,000 received daily rations at the army. Möllendorf denied the charge; recriminations ensued on both sides, and they separated, mutually exasperated, Lord Cornwallis declaring that he would suspend the payment of the British subsidy.*

TO COLONEL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

The Hague, October 7, 1794.

On Friday last came the funeral dirge from Count Clairfayt; and his last dying speech (but not his

* Alison.

confession) announced that having been attacked on several points, of which three were forced, he was under the necessity of retreating behind the Erff, which is, I conceive, preparatory to his passing the Rhine; this, I doubt not, he has effected by this time.

Our reserve passed the Waal at Nymegen to-day, and I left the Duke yesterday consulting with Walmoden and Abercromby how long he might keep a corps between the Meuse and Rhine, for the purpose of maintaining the communication with Graave. The reserve are to occupy the right bank of the Waal nearly opposite St. André. We shall have a strong corps at Nymegen, and thence stretch to Emmerik. And who will meet you there? you say. The Author of all good will, I hope, turn the hearts either of Prussians or Austrians, and induce them to do us that good turn in which their own interest is so deeply involved. Matters are in a very indifferent state, I assure you; it is an awful period, and I hope those at the helm have a good look-out. In my own opinion, our Allies should be as much the object of their attention as our enemies.

I came here yesterday to see Lord St. Helens, and shall set out on my return to-night or early to-morrow. I am in doubt whether I am not writing to a Major-general, but the messenger passed me on the road. Five more regiments are on their road to

join, without field-pieces, without ammunition, and many without arms! Adieu, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

October 11, 1794.

"I cannot suffer a messenger to go without thanking you, my dear Major-general, for your letters of the 2nd and 6th, which arrived yesterday, lovingly together. They shall be answered to-night. At present I burn with indignation. Bois-le-Duc has surrendered. That, you will say, is bad enough, considering of how great consequence this event must naturally be in the future operations of the enemy. The reason why it surrendered is not yet explained, but what has moved my spleen (and indeed all my inside) is, that there are 300 unfortunate emigrants shut up in the citadel, which is a place of no strength. I shudder to look forward to the fate that awaits these wretched people.

Amongst all the losses and disgraces of the campaign, I think the conduct of the Allies in regard to the emigrants is by far the most degrading feature.

The dyke, which leads up the right bank of the Waal to the point of separation of that river from

the Rhine," requires three weeks unremitted labour to put it in the state in which it ought to be at this critical moment. Not yet begun! To you, who know the Dutch, this is credible; to others, past belief.

October 7, 8.—The whole army marched into the intrenched position before Nymegen. General Abercromby went to take the command of the troops in the Bommeler Waard.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Nymegen, October 9, 1794.

* * * *

Of public news, I can only tell you that the Austrians are all across the Rhine, and that they now declare their intention of defending the banks of that river, in which, as it is the boundary of the Emperor's own dominions, I conclude that they will keep their word. Let me give you a trait of that monarch, which, in my opinion, forms a very worthy and consistent finale to his political and military career for the year 1794. He has directed that none of those people who, from their attachment to the House of

Austria, and from the part they have taken in its support, have been driven to the cruel necessity of abandoning their homes and possessions in the Netherlands, shall be allowed to seek an asylum in any part of his hereditary dominions. If there is one human being on the face of the earth who has done more prejudice to the cause of sovereigns, and who has furnished more arguments in favour of democracy, than another, it is his Imperial Majesty.

I returned from the Hague this morning. I spent two days there very pleasantly with Lord St. Helens, who is a remarkably agreeable man. One day we dined at Court, and the other had Lord Broom and Mr. Cox, who is travelling with him, to dine with us. Lord Broom appeared a good-humoured, gentleman-like young man; and his travels have only tended to augment his natural preference for his own country. I strongly suspect either the heart or the head of every Englishman who receives any other impression from going abroad.

October 10.—General Harcourt, with General Dundas's brigade and 16th Light Dragoons, crossed the Rhine, in order to occupy the country round Emmerik.

October 11.—General Abercromby re-occupied

the post of St. André (which had been abandoned from some mistake of orders) without any loss. By means of rafts, the enemy had passed a corps across the river, under cover of batteries erected on the left bank of the Meuse opposite Alphen, and occupied the post of Dommel. The left bank of the Meuse at Alphen entirely commands the opposite one. It was, therefore, impossible, without engaging in a serious operation, to prevent the enemy passing troops and cannon across the river at that place.

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Nymegen, October 12, 1794.

The enemy having gained so respectable a *place d'armes* as Bois-le-Duc, will naturally become more enterprising, and we ought to redouble our vigilance and exertions; but there is a torpidity and a want of exertion amongst the Dutch which is beyond all belief.

Yesterday, I rode with the Duke up the right bank of the Waal to the point of separation of the Rhine and that river. In my own opinion, it would require three weeks' unremitted labour to put the Dyke, which runs parallel with the river, in a proper state of defence; but as yet this very essential work is

not begun. We expect Prince Frederick of Orange to-day, and I hope he will remain on the spot, and endeavour to awaken in his countrymen a sense of their real situation, and of the absolute necessity of opposing to the enemy the same degree of activity which marks every movement *they* make. I confess I fear the national characteristic will carry it even against self-preservation.

General Harcourt, with a considerable corps of cavalry, crossed the Rhine the day before yesterday. He will fix himself between Emmerik and Wesel. We hope Möllendorf will make detachments to Clairfayt's left, and by that means enable him to send troops to occupy the right bank of the Rhine as far as Emmerik.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Nymegen, October 12, 1794.

My dear General,

I sit down with a determination to answer your two letters, and that I may not be interrupted, I take the night before the mail day, rather than trust to the hurry of the morning.

You will have heard that, by some mistake, Fort St. André was abandoned. The Duke directed

Abercromby, who commands in that quarter (having with him the infantry of the Reserve, together with the five new regiments lately arrived), to re-occupy it, which he did yesterday morning under the cover of a very heavy cannonade, without any loss. His Royal Highness intends this fort shall be put in a respectable state, *vis à vis* the enemy, having its gorge very open. The next time the enemy make an attack on it, our troops have only to retire, and the French, on their entrance, will come under the fire of a battery at Rossum, in the Bommeler Waard, of another on the right bank of the Waal, and of a third established on a small island in the Waal, which, I think, will preclude the possibility of their remaining there.

I believe I informed you that General Harcourt had passed the Rhine the day before yesterday, with about 2000 cavalry, to take post on the right bank of that river beyond Emmerik. The remainder of the troops are encamped in front of the intrenched camp of this place. It appears to me that there are such natural disadvantages attending this intrenched camp, owing to the commanding ground on its left, that it cannot be long tenable against a superior enemy; and it is only against superior numbers that an intrenched camp is necessary. The season of the year and moistness of the weather are our best, I am persuaded, our surest allies. With their

assistance, I hope that we shall prevent the enemy from passing the Waal; but I am very apprehensive for the towns on the Meuse, and the possession of them will give the enemy quiet winter quarters, and a facility of opening the next campaign, the advantage of which to them is beyond calculation. The Dutch are as much in earnest to defend themselves as their natures will permit; that is, they have given the Stadtholder authority to cut their dams, and that negative sort of exertion is, I believe, their *ne plus ultra*.

In regard to another campaign, I most sincerely hope that those who have the administration of our affairs at this awful period will have learnt, from dear-bought experience, the very little reliance we can place on real co-operation from our Allies. The Prussian subsidy was useless, as the event has too clearly demonstrated; but I believe the evils it has produced, independently of our being duped out of our money, are not to be told, for I am quite convinced that, from the moment that cursed treaty was published, the first object was not to beat the French, but to cheat the English. The situation of his Prussian Majesty's empire and *subjects*, I believe, now prevents his completing his engagements, even were he so inclined; and, take this from me, the abandonment of Flanders is too favourite a measure with the prevailing party in the Imperial Cabinet

(which I believe to be the most profligate and debauched in Europe), to be put aside by subsidy, and it is a measure in which the army acquiesce with pleasure. In short, I really believe that whatever share of public spirit and public virtue remains on the earth is exclusively concentrated in Great Britain. Let us trust to nothing but God and ourselves; for I repeat it again and again, *there is nothing else left on which we can rely with safety.*

Crawford is unwell, but not superseded. We expect to see him out again soon; but if he follows my advice, he will rather winter at Lisbon than in the bogs of Holland.

Balfour's reception was gracious, and I believe that he likes and is liked. He very handsomely offered his services on any occasion in which they might be wanted, and they were accepted. He went down to cover the Bommeler Waard before Abercromby could get there with the Reserve.

I am sorry that all my letters are of a character so triste—all that I hear, see, and feel is so, to the last degree. We want artillerymen, we want a general officer at the head of the artillery, we want drivers and smiths; we want three major-generals of infantry; we want a commanding engineer of rank and experience; we want a total reform in our hospital; we want, at least, two out of the four brigades of mounted artillery with which his Grace of Richmond is

amusing himself in England; we want a total stop put to that most pernicious mode of bestowing rank on officers without even the form of recommendation, merely for raising (by means of crimps) a certain number of men, to restore to the army those independent and disinterested feelings, and those high principles which should actuate a soldier, and form the basis of the military discipline of a free country, and to relieve deserving officers from the intolerable grievance of seeing men without merit, without family, or the smallest pretension to any military ability, pass over their heads, and arrive at a very high, and till now a very respectable rank in the army, solely through the medium of a rascally crimp.

I put a double cover to your letter to have the satisfaction of informing you that the fate of the emigrants of Bois-le-Duc is not quite so deplorable as we had reason to fear. Pichegru sent them word that he did not wish their death, and that if they marched out mixed with the garrison, no notice would be taken of them. This plan was adopted till that rascal Jourdan rode into the ranks, accompanied by some Dutch deserters, and pitched on thirty, whom he instantly massacred. The rest escaped.

Tuesday Morning.

P.S.—Since writing the enclosed, we have an

account of 10,000 Austrians being in march to join us, and every moment we expect Clairfayt to consult how they may be best employed. For this reason, no move is made at Nymegen, and if we can prevent the enemy's erecting any batteries to annoy our bridge till the arrival of this reinforcement, we may yet drive them from before Nymegen, and by the same *coup* give security to Graave. This is a most anxious minute. It is quite a race. I am very sorry to tell you that Abercromby was yesterday wounded in the arm in the attack made on Fort St. André. I know no particulars, but the fort was not carried when we last heard from thence.

Venlo has surrendered—the garrison being at liberty to serve again. I do not disguise from you that I have more apprehensions than hopes about Nymegen; because the preservation of the bridge is the point that must decide the possibility of the troops remaining there, and that is rendered very precarious by the causes mentioned in the former part of my letter.

I am very happy to tell you General Abercromby's wound is slight.

October 19.—This day the enemy made a general attack on our advanced posts, west of Nymegen, between the Meuse and the Waal, from which, after

a very firm resistance, our troops were at length obliged by superiority of numbers to retire. In this retreat the infantry of the Prince de Rohan suffered much; and the 37th Regiment retreating along the dyke from Druten, mistaking the enemy's Hussars for the Hussars of Rohan, allowed them to approach without resistance, by which means the greatest part of the regiment, with one colour, and the field-pieces, fell into the enemy's hands. In the evening the outposts were established at Benningen, Neder Bosch, &c.

October 20.—The next morning the outposts were again contracted, the right being placed at Weurd, Hees, &c.

October 21.—The head-quarters moved to Arnheim.

CHAPTER XIII.

DEFEAT OF CLAIRFAYT—THE BRITISH PASS THE WAAL—GENERAL ATTACK ON THE BRITISH POSTS—ATTACK ON FORT ST. ANDRÉ —COUNCIL OF WAR—CONFERENCE OF THE DUKE OF YORK WITH GENERAL CLAIRFAYT — INACTION OF GENERAL WERNEK — THE BRITISH MAKE A SORTIE FROM NYMEGEN—THE DIET OF RATISBON —LOSS OF NYMEGEN—DISPOSITION OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA.

THE course of the Austrian army at this period was marked by defeat and retreat. Colonel Calvert's visit to Count Clairfayt had not inspired him with any confident hope that success would attend the Imperial arms. He seems to have been of opinion that both the army wanted commanders of greater ability, and the Cabinet statesmen of more upright character.

Towards the end of September, Jourdan had advanced with the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, and

on October 2nd he had defeated Clairfayt at Ruremonde. Of this battle, Alison says that it "decided the fate of Flanders, and threw back the Imperial army beyond the Rhine."

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, October 21, 1794.

The news of Clairfayt's loss was much exaggerated. He informed me that he computed it at 4000 men and about a dozen pieces of cannon; but he has crossed the Rhine, and my own opinion is that it will be a very difficult task to persuade him to come back again; but to be of that opinion as firmly as myself, you must have imbibed the same suspicion and contempt that I feel for his Imperial Majesty, and for the Austrian Cabinet.

* * * *

The business of the day before yesterday has, I sincerely hope, put an end to the campaign. Deserted by one ally and cheated by another, we are unable to cope with our enemy; and unless he attempts to pass the Waal, I fear it will not be in our power to offer any interruption to his operations. The loss of the 37th Regiment is very severe; not

above two officers and eighty men escaped. If the French do not force the Waal in the course of the next three weeks, I am assured the weather in this country will be too bad for any military operations; and then I think it more than probable that the Duke will go home, and I hope his Majesty will, as last year, be gracious enough to direct him to bring his Aides-de-camp with him.

Adieu, my dear Maria. It is with difficulty that I have found time to write you these few lines.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Nymegen, October 22, 1794.

As I should be sorry to let the mail go this evening without thanking you for yours, I am availing myself of half an hour's conference the Duke is holding with Count Walmoden, and, in a cold room, with bad paper and worse pens, am remembering my humble duty to you. In regard to the affair of Sunday, I have little to add, because the singularity of a British battalion with its guns, on a dyke, being forced and almost entirely destroyed, or taken, by about fifty or sixty hussars, will, I dare say, strike you as forcibly as it did me. At the same time, I am sure that the commanding officer acted as he thought

for the best; and it is one of those calamities of which the less that is said the better. There was only the want of a little experience. I think, by the bye, we have learnt from the Austrians to extend our outposts too much, and had we been opposed to a more enterprising enemy, we should have received many lessons in the course of this disastrous campaign. Clairfayt has at length resolved to make a detachment to our left of considerable force. It will arrive in time to assure the safety of the interior of Holland; but I much doubt whether it will enable us to undertake any offensive operations.

On Monday the troops passed the Waal, and took up their cantonments on the right bank of that river, except the corps which remains in the Nymegen position, under Count Walmoden's orders, of which two British brigades form a part.

Have little reliance on Nymegen. The town is in no state of defence in any one particular, and there are natural defects in the exterior position, which I fancy are not to be remedied by art. I have better hopes of Graave. That town has, I believe, at last received its supplies. The Governor talks boldly, and I hope that he will act in the same manner. Not a shadow of excuse has his Serene Highness of Hesse-Phillipsdorf for surrendering Bois-le-Duc, and I fear that many emigrants were put to death in cold blood when the enemy took possession. Of all the

disgraces which have fallen on the Allies in this campaign, surely it is the most deplorable that those who had thrown themselves upon our protection, whom we were bound by every tie of honour and humanity to defend, have, in almost every instance, been sacrificed. Witness Nieuport, Valenciennes (more famous than any), and Bois-le-Duc.

Is there any chance of seeing you in Flanders? Fox abates nothing of his zeal and military ardour, and seems to court the din of arms: so far as that goes, you are safe. I do not conceive that any circumstance but a total change of commanders on the Continent will remove him.

In regard to myself, I am quite ready for my Manton gun, pointers, fireside, and society of my friends; but, I take it, much is to be done before these can be attained.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, October 24, 1794.

* * * *

General Balfour is returning to England in a few days, on some urgent private business, and, if I mistake not, returns with strong favourable impressions of the Duke of York, which I dare affirm will be the

case with all liberal, candid men who have intercourse with his Royal Highness.

You will see Balfour. He will give you a statement of the situation of affairs on the Continent, and he will, I doubt not, make the same faithful representation to our rulers; for much do I fear that, in spite of the most damning evidence, there still remain in certain quarters grains of confidence (which bear in them the ruin of our country) in the most unprincipled and deceitful, and now the most ineffective, imbecile Cabinet that ever disgraced the political annals of Europe.

I rely on your writing frequently and copiously during the next interesting four weeks. Reward my past services, for I have none to offer now.

I join with General Balfour in urging Dr. Jackson's appointment as physician to this or the West India Army. For our own sakes, I wish the former; for the sake of our suffering friends in the West, the latter.

* * * *

October 25.—The Stadtholder and Prince Frederick of Orange arrived at Arnheim.

October 27.—The enemy made a general attack on the outposts before Nymegen, and, in the after-

noon, drove them under the protection of the intrenched position.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Monday Night,
Arnheim, October 27, 1794.

My dear Hew,

Though almost knocked up, I must thank you for yours by the last mail; and, at the same time, give you a hint how we are going on.

The day before yesterday, the enemy made a *reconnaissance* in front of Nymegen, which ended in some skirmishing of the advanced posts. Yesterday, a detachment of their Hussars advanced so near as to give our cavalry an opportunity of charging them, of which they availed themselves, and killed about thirty of them. To-day, at noon, the enemy made a general attack on all the advanced posts, and before dark obliged them to fall back under cover of the intrenchments, as the enemy embraced the whole of the position. I have no doubt they will establish themselves during this night, and that they will bring up a considerable quantity of artillery. I believe it is the opinion of every military man who has seen the position of Nymegen that there are defects in it which render it untenable against superior artillery;

and the Dutch, notwithstanding the strongest repeated remonstrances of the Duke, have neglected the opportunity which was given them of putting the town in a state of defence.

I am glad that the Stadtholder, by being of our party to Nymegen this morning, had an opportunity of being an eye-witness of the truth of the representations that have been made on this subject; and, without the gift of prophecy, he might form some judgment of the consequences likely to ensue from the remissness of which we have so much reason to complain.

The Dutch have desired to take the defence of the Bommeler Waard on themselves. The Austrians arriving in force at Wesel, enables us to concentrate our force, but I much fear too late for any offensive operations.

I have this instant a letter from Balfour, who is at Tiel. He says the enemy attacked Fort St. André this morning. He did not know the particulars. The cannonading continued when he wrote. The Duke hears the Russians have defeated the Poles. This, it is imagined, may have a good effect in setting the King of Prussia at liberty to co-operate with us if he chooses; but, from woeful experience, I believe he will not choose it. I hope there is too much spirit, too much good sense in our Government to continue the dupes of Europe. I repeat it again, and

again, and again, we have nothing to rely on but Providence, and our own exertions. The main object, I am persuaded, with some of our Allies is not to beat the French, but to cheat the English. Would that those whose province it is to guide the helm were as firmly persuaded as I am of this truth. Your remark on the Vendée is too true; and I am sorry to say that our new levies, in spite of every attempt to restrain them, stain the character of the British army; for though there are no English in the corps to which I allude, yet being in our service, they are all called British by the people of this country.

A council of war is sitting on the events of the day. It is midnight, and I have much to write, and no small inclination to sleep. So, Adieu.

I have no reason to believe that Fox has any idea of resigning his employment here. If you are to be on the staff, take care and lay in for a Flemish truncheon, in preference to a West India sugar-cane. Once more, Adieu.

I have lost my great coat, hairy cap and wig; the latter you may replace by sending me one of Cuningham's best (top of St. James's Street), lined with cotton.

October 28.—The enemy, having embraced the whole of the position the night before, this day advanced a corps on the eastern dyke, probably with a view of establishing a battery on that dyke for the annoyance of the bridge. After a contest of some hours, the enemy gave up the point, and our troops kept their position. Count Clairfayt arrived at Arnheim, and returned to his own head-quarters after having held a conference with his Royal Highness and Count Walmoden.

October 29.—Lord Paget's* regiment succeeded the 63rd Regiment in their quarters at Arnheim, that regiment having marched to Nymegen.

October 30.—General Wernek (under whose command the corps of Austrians, which was on its march to join us, was placed) arrived at Arnheim.

October 31.—The next day he returned to his corps, it having been resolved, in consequence of the representation the General made of the impossibility of his acting till the 7th, that, instead of proceeding to Nymegen, he should cross the river by a bridge

* Field-Marshal Marquis of Anglesea, K.G., G.C.B., Colonel of the Blues. Entered the army as Lieutenant-colonel in 1793; joined the army in Flanders in command of the 80th Regiment in 1794; was in Holland in 1799; went to the Peninsula in 1808 in command of two brigades of cavalry; brought up the rear of Sir John Moore's army in his retreat to Corunna; was at Walcheren, and lost his leg at Waterloo.

to be erected at Wesel, and proceed from thence to co-operate for the relief of Nymegen.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, November 1, 1794.

I am much concerned to inform your Lordship, that the hopes which I expressed in my last letter, that the arrival of the Austrians would in a very few days enable us to undertake an offensive operation which might give security to Nymegen, and relief to Graave, are, at least for the present, disappointed. General Wernek has declared that it will be impossible for him to bring the corps under his command, consisting of 10,000 men, to Nymegen before the 7th of the month; and that when arrived there, he thinks an attack on the enemy will be very doubtful as to its event, and attended with many risks. In this opinion he appears to have been supported by most of the general officers who formed the council of war at Nymegen yesterday, who have given to his Royal Highness their sentiments in writing, of which I dare say he will transmit a copy to your Lordship.

The offer General Wernek has made is this, that he will either advance to Nymegen with his own

corps, and be ready to co-operate with us on that point on the 7th of the month, which plan, however, is by no means consonant with his opinion; or that he will on that day cross the Rhine by a bridge to be constructed at Wesel, with a corps of 30,000. If this latter plan is adopted, he engages that, the day after to-morrow, he will cross a considerable corps of cavalry for the purpose of preventing the enemy collecting their magazines in the Duchy of Cleves, and of giving every possible interruption to their convoys from Venlo; the march of which, owing to the badness of the weather, must be an operation of infinite difficulty, and must present many favourable opportunities for the attacks of a corps of cavalry. At the same time, this corps will be employed in making the necessary preparations for the reception of the army which he engages shall pass on the 7th, the advanced season of the year rendering it absolutely necessary that they should be put under cover.

Impressed as his Royal Highness is with the importance of Nymegen, and with the necessity of making every exertion to render the attempts of the enemy before it ineffectual, he naturally adopted, and gave the preference to the arrangement which appeared to lead with the greatest promptitude to that object, and was much disappointed, by this unexpected delay, which becomes the more dis-

tressing from the very bad state of the works of Nymegen, and other circumstances which I have already detailed to your Lordship. The possibility of making the attack immediately, without the assistance of the Austrians, has more than once suggested itself to his Royal Highness's mind; but as the whole force of infantry which could be collected for that purpose, after leaving a bare sufficiency for the defence of the Waal, and for the necessary protection of the works during the attack, would not exceed 13,000, I fear it could not with any degree of prudence be carried into execution.

Under all these circumstances, his Royal Highness has decided to adopt the plan suggested by Lieutenant-general Wernek, which indeed (as no aid can be derived from that General before the 7th) appears to be the only alternative. In the meantime every exertion will be made to retain the position of Nymegen, on which so much depends; and that we may be provided against the worst that can happen, his Royal Highness has ordered the ground on the river opposite Nymegen to be accurately surveyed, and has given directions that every obstacle which labour and art can effect shall be immediately formed there to stop the further progress of the enemy, in case they should succeed in driving us from Nymegen before the 7th. I am sorry to inform you that in that case every local advantage would be on the

enemy's side, and though I am no engineer, I am convinced it will require every exertion to counteract the superiority they will derive from this circumstance.

The moment it became a decided point that neither plan presented any hope of co-operation from the Austrians, there remained, in my opinion, no room for hesitation in regard to which should be adopted.

Independently of the difference of the force proposed to be brought forward, there are many advantages to be derived from the operations of an army crossing the Rhine at Wesel, which, from local circumstances, could hardly be expected from the most successful uncombined attack at Nymegen. If we can give the enemy a blow, I am persuaded that the season and the distance they are from their magazines, will preclude the possibility of their making any further attempts this year. At the same time, it is needless to disguise that the uncertainty of what may be the event of the next ten days, renders this the most anxious period we have experienced in the course of this unfortunate campaign.

As the messenger goes off unexpectedly, and I have not time to write a second letter, I will request the favour of your Lordship to send this, under cover, to Mr. Wyndham, who, from the interest he takes in our operations, both personally and

publicly, will, I feel assured, receive favourably every information, however imperfectly it may be conveyed.

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, November 3, 1794.

* * * *

A ray of hope has shone across us these last few days, but I much fear that it will disappear without affording us any lasting cause for rejoicing. The only chance of being able to undertake any offensive operation depends on our keeping the position of Nymegen for a certain time, and every hour renders the possibility of our remaining there more precarious. It would be needless to recapitulate the mortifying disappointments we daily experience, and I shall only add that I have many more fears than hopes in regard to Nymegen, the possession of which place is at this moment of more importance to us than I can or must explain to you. I confess I see public matters in a very dark point of view; but I am willing to hope that, by being so much engaged in them, and personally involved in the unremitting torrent of ill-success which has borne us down for these last five months, I see through a darker medium than the circumstances justify, and as

standers-by usually see more of the game than those who play, I rely on the wisdom of our ministers at home; but I am in my own mind perfectly persuaded that they must look for no hearty co-operation either from the Emperor or the King of Prussia, and that every guinea we pay to those sovereigns is so much money absolutely thrown away.

* * * *

November 4.—The enemy having formed a trench and a work within about five hundred yards of the position, in the afternoon Count Walmoden ordered a sortie to be made, which service was performed with the greatest gallantry. The British employed were the 15th Regiment Light Dragoons; 8th, 27th, 28th, 55th, 63rd, 78th Regiments of infantry. The effect produced by this sortie was merely a trifling delay of the enemy's operations, for on the morning of the 6th he opened two batteries, which, though at a considerable distance, much annoyed the bridge. In the night the greatest part of the garrison, with their field-pieces, was withdrawn; there were left in the town (under the command of the Dutch General Hahe) 4000 men, of whom 2000 were British, each regiment furnishing a picket of 120 men, the whole under the command of Major-general de Burg and Lieutenant-colonel McDonald, 55th; Strutt, 54th;

and McKenzie, 78th Regiments. An aide-de-camp was despatched to General Wernek to ascertain the real state of that officer's preparations for co-operation, and the exact time when it could take place. General Wernek's answer arrived the next day, stating the 16th of the month as the earliest period on which he could propose to be in the neighbourhood of Nymegen. As the state of the town of Nymegen made it *utterly impossible* to hold out till that day, orders were sent for its evacuation during the night.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, November 7, 1794.

On the 4th, the enemy having formed a sort of trench, and having got a work in great forwardness, within five or six hundred yards of the position of Nymegen, Count Walmoden ordered a sortie, which was executed with the most distinguished gallantry. The British employed were the 8th, 27th, 55th, 63rd, 78th infantry; 15th Light Dragoons. The troops assaulted, and carried the enemy's trenches under a very heavy fire of grape and musketry, without returning a shot. The "Gazette" will give you further particulars, and likewise the loss we have to

lament on this occasion. Brilliant as this affair may be in itself, I am sorry to say that the only effect it produced was a trifling delay in the enemy's operations; for notwithstanding a very heavy fire that has been directed against them ever since, yesterday morning they opened two batteries, which, though at a considerable distance, so much endangered the bridge, that it was necessary to withdraw most part of the troops and field artillery during the night. I am happy to tell you that this service was effected without loss. The troops left in the *town* (for the position is necessarily given up) amount to 4000 men, of which the half are British, each regiment having left a strong picket, under the command of the three eldest Lieutenant-colonels, viz: McDonald, 55th; Strutt, 54th; McKenzie, 78th. By the bye the first is a most excellent officer. I am so perfectly persuaded that we have nothing effective to look for from the Austrians, that I sincerely hope the remainder of the troops will be withdrawn from Nymegen to-night, though I feel that with Nymegen we lose every hope of any forward move for the relief of Graave. I have never thought it very likely that the General who, with 60,000 men and upwards, crossed the Rhine, leaving Maestricht to its fate, losing Cologne, Bonn, &c., and all the country between the Rhine and the Meuse, early in September, would in November re-cross the Rhine with half his army, and

under many disadvantages, to fight the battle which he declined six weeks before with everything in his favour. Surely, my dear friend, the calamities of the campaign must open the eyes of our rulers, and impress them with this truth, that not the smallest reliance can be placed on the King of Prussia, or Emperor; they are absolute swindlers.

The proceedings of the Diet of Ratisbon, as detailed in the "Leyden Gazette," breathe the most pacific spirit. The Elector Palatine proposes that Germany shall declare that she has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of France; that she shall recall to that nation her declaration of having no wish to make conquests;* that the causes of the war being thus removed, a peace may be obtained, for which purpose Germany shall request the interposition of their Swedish and Danish Majesties. Where will all this end, my dear friend? I shall not be surprised if we take the field, next spring, sole combatants in the contest. I shall admire our dexterity in accomplishing this point; but I am persuaded we had better fight alone than with the Allies who have so shamefully, or rather so shamelessly, and fatally deceived us in the course of this most unfortunate campaign.

* See the declaration of the Ministers assembled in Congress at Antwerp.

P '.—The enemy's fire sank two boats of the bridge—one yesterday evening, one in the night. The damage was soon repaired, and the bridge remains in *statu quo*.

The loss of Nymegen was the subject of bitter complaint on the part of the Dutch against the British army and government. In considering whether the complaint was justified, and the blame thrown on the Duke of York duly awarded, the circumstances adverted to in the foregoing letter ought to be taken into account.

The place is commanded by rising ground on the south-east; and the Dutch, notwithstanding the most urgent representations, had neglected to put it in a state of preparation to resist such a powerful army as came against it.

The fortresses which the Dutch had so easily surrendered, and those of which, in accordance with their shameful secret treaty, the Austrians had permitted themselves to be despoiled, had amply provided the French army with heavy siege artillery, ammunition, and stores of every kind; and these were all brought to bear against the only power and the only army which, in steady pursuance of treaty, agreement, and declaration, withstood the augmented hosts of republican France.

The Austrians knew the condition of Nymegen, and of the army under the Duke of York. They were aware that, without effective co-operation from them, Nymegen and the line of the Waal and Rhine could not be maintained; but, as Colonel Calvert has observed, "it was not likely that the General who, with 60,000 men and upwards, crossed the Rhine early in September, leaving Maestricht to its fate, losing Cologne, Bonn, and all the country between the Rhine and the Meuse, would in November recross the Rhine with half his army, and under many disadvantages, to fight a battle which he declined two months previously, when he had every advantage."

The reader will not fail to remark how earnestly and incessantly Colonel Calvert impresses on every one with whom he communicates, that reliance is not to be placed on our Allies. "I repeat it again, and again, and again, we have nothing to rely on but Providence and our own exertions."

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

November 9, 1794.

I have this moment received yours of the 3rd; and as the post day is frequently a day of hurry, I anticipate it to reply to the questions, which, by the bye, you never put to me before.

The command of our outposts during the whole campaign has been entirely detached, and separate from the duty of the Line; and the corps that composed them always and invariably fell under the command of the Hanoverian Major-general Hammerstein, who was assisted in that service by an excellent officer of Light Cavalry, Major-general Linsingen. The outposts were generally occupied by light troops; but on a requisition from General Hammerstein, at different periods, regiments from the Line have been sent to take a share of the duty, when the extent of the posts happened to be too great for the corps he commanded, these regiments, in that case, always falling under General Hammerstein's command.

The want of general officers to command brigades has, in this army, been an evil of the most serious nature, and has been attended with the very worst consequences. From the time Lord Cathcart* left us—which, if I recollect right, was about the 23rd

* Earl Cathcart, K.T., entered the army (7th Dragoons) in June, 1777, and proceeded to America. Extra Aide-de-camp to Sir Henry Clinton; Colonel 29th Foot in December, 1792; Colonel 2nd Life Guards, August, 1797; Brigadier-general with Lord Moira in the expedition to Normandy in 1793; with the Duke of York in Flanders in 1794; in Hanover in 1805, and commanded the expedition to Copenhagen in 1807; afterwards Ambassador to St. Petersburg. General in January, 1812. Died, June, 1843.

of July—till Generals Balfour and De Burg joined, which was the latter end of September, we had five brigades of infantry of the Line, with one major-general (Stewart), for General Fox is too much occupied in his staff employment to be reckoned as a major-general, though his zeal induces him to come forward as such whenever he can.

In this time, the command of brigades devolved on young men newly come into the service, whose years and inexperience totally disqualified them for the situation. I could mention lads of one-and-twenty who had never been on service before. Be assured, the Duke made the most urgent and repeated representations how much the service was injured by this circumstance; but the two most active months of the campaign were allowed to pass without any redress; and then, at that late period, two major-generals came out, in lieu of the four that were wanting; and, at the same time, an augmentation to the army of those regiments which were sent from Lord Mulgrave, made a fifth absolutely necessary.

The want of general officers is always a great detriment to the service; but in this army particularly so, where the field-officers are many of them boys, and have attained their rank by means suggested by government at home, which, I am sure, have never directly or indirectly received the smallest countenance from the commander-in-chief in this

country: consequently his Royal Highness cannot be responsible for their youth and inexperience.

The unfortunate affair of the 37th Regiment, which you say is the subject of much conversation, and which I declined entering much into from notions of respect and delicacy to a very deserving young man, their commanding officer, happened as follows: The 37th Regiment, on a requisition from General Hammerstein, was sent as a reinforcement to the corps under his orders, and occupied the post of Druten. In the course of the night before the attack, Major Hope* sent word by a letter to the Adjutant-general's office, that he had intelligence that the enemy was considerably reinforced, and he had reason to apprehend that he should be attacked in the morning by a force which, unless he received a reinforcement, rendered the possibility of his keeping his post very precarious. This letter was delivered at General Craig's, who was absent at the time, and his servant received it, and kept it till the morning without bringing it to head-quarters (for which he was sent to the provost), and in the morning Major

* The Honourable Charles Hope, Major 37th Regiment in 1794; Lieutenant-colonel 3rd June, 1794; exchanged to 28th Light Dragoons, 1799; appointed to 7th Dragoon Guards in the same year; Colonel 1st January, 1800; Major-general October, 1805; Lieutenant-general 1st June, 1818; Colonel of a Battalion of the 60th Regiment in 1812. Died a General in December, 1828.

Hope was attacked, and after well defending his post for some hours, fell back, and gained the dyke, by which he was to retreat. The letter not being received was an unfortunate circumstance, which, in the absence of the Adjutant-general, certainly ought to have been provided against; and in regard to the *support* of the post, it might or might not have had an influence, according to circumstances. But in regard to the calamity which befel the 37th Regiment, in my opinion, it had absolutely none, because the regiment having gained the dyke without any considerable loss, in that situation they were in security; for, certainly, a battalion of infantry, with their field-pieces, on a dyke, might defy all the Hussars in Christendom. I am so convinced of this, that though much support might have been necessary for the maintenance of the post, I am satisfied that none could have been requisite to secure the retreat of the regiment, having once gained the dyke with their artillery, a situation in which increase of numbers would only have impeded the progress of the troops. The news of the 37th having been forced, and the letter which had been detained by General Craig's servant, reached his Royal Highness about the same time. He immediately desired General Fox to take the superintendence of the retreat, and ordered the Buffs to march on the dyke, together with the 63rd Regiment, to be disposed of as General Fox thought

proper, and rather with a view of re-occupying the posts which he might determine to secure, than with any idea that their presence would be necessary for the safety of the 37th Regiment.

I am very glad that, by your letter of the 3rd, you pointed out to me the necessity of entering so minutely into the details of this unfortunate affair; and I wish you could inform critics, if they are in a situation to give us redress on the subject, that General Stewart is ill, General De Burg wounded, and that General Balfour is at this moment actually the only Major-general doing duty with five brigades and five unbrigaded battalions of British infantry. Adieu, my dear friend.

November 10.

The news of the surrender of Maestricht, which we received yeterday, will probably have reached you. I understand the garrison have the same terms as that of Bois-le-Duc.

The Prince of Brunswick has declined the command that was offered. I concluded he would; for I think no officer with a grain of character to lose, would risk it on the co-operation of the Prussians and Austrians, and I trust no minister with a grain of sense will persevere in bestowing the riches of our country on these deceitful mercenary bankrupts.

* * * *

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, November 11, 1794.

I am sorry to inform you the Duke of Brunswick has declined the command of the Allies in Holland. I am not surprised that an officer, possessing such a military character as his Serene Highness does, should refuse to risk it on the co-operation of such deceitful allies; and I sincerely hope no British minister will be so unwise as to persevere in subsidizing Powers whose unprincipled villainy has counteracted every exertion of the British nation, and has involved us in a train of calamities not paralleled in modern days.

The surrender of Maestricht is not likely to induce the Duke of Brunswick to change his mind. If this event is followed by the fall of Graave, the enemy will have the course of the Meuse, and can bring their magazines, ammunition, &c., from France to the very scene of action. I shall not speculate on the very dark prospect which these events present for the spring of '95, for I am sure the old proverb was never more exemplified than at this moment, "Sufficient for the day are the evils thereof."

* * * *

With much grief I see accounts of the horrid transactions at Warsaw. Without knowing much of their principles or politics, I naturally feel much interested for a people who are suffering from tyranny and oppression, and whose object appears to have been merely the establishment of their own liberty, without any internal injustice or any interference with the government or principles of other countries. Doubtless for wise purposes, Providence seems in each instance to permit the cause which appears to us the most unjust to predominate.

* * * *

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, November 12, 1794.

As I dare assure myself, you will be persuaded that this letter is dictated by an earnest desire of placing affairs before you in their true point of view, I have the less scruple in submitting to your better judgment a few observations which I am enabled to make, by being on the spot, respecting the situation of Holland.

It is needless to remark that the present is a most awful period, and let the causes of the almost unexampled calamities which have marked this campaign

be what they may, the fact is that the very existence of the Republic of Holland is at stake; and, however unnatural and impolitic it may be that other European powers should be willing to allow this country to be conquered, Great Britain appears the only one that takes a sincere and disinterested part in her preservation. The danger of Holland is much augmented by the numerous parties that exist in the heart of the country against the Stadtholder, some of whom, I fear, carry their faction so far as to prefer even the introduction of the French to the legal authority of the Princes of Orange.

The government of the country does not possess the energy adequate to the punishment of these domestic traitors, and, which is still more to be lamented, the power of the Stadtholder is so fettered by forms, regulations, and local privileges, as to prevent his making the necessary exertions with the expedition requisite to give them effect against the enemy. Under these circumstances, the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief was certainly a most wise measure, and if armed with sufficient powers, he might have obviated many of the impediments to exertion which have so materially influenced the calamitous events on this frontier.

I am much concerned, but not at all surprised, at the Duke of Brunswick declining the command that was offered him; and, in my opinion, the same

motives that actuated his Serene Highness will ensure a refusal from every officer whose military character is such as to make him a proper subject for a trust of such infinite difficulty and importance.

The fall of Maestricht and that of Graave, which must probably happen ere long, will give to the enemy the complete course of the Meuse, and the facility for transporting their military stores from magazines which they will doubtless form, with their usual activity, at Givet and Namur, and of bringing them without labour or risk, under the protection of Maestricht, Venlo, and Graave, to the very scene of action. In regard to their subsistence, I fear they are too abundantly supplied by the fruitful provinces of which they are in possession to require any further aid; but whatever articles are wanting, they will receive by the same conveyance. There is therefore every reason to believe that, without any rigorous proceedings, which we might flatter ourselves would endanger the power of the Convention, France will, very early in the spring, have a numerous and well-appointed army on the banks of the Rhine, ready to undertake the conquest of the Low Countries.

The expectation of individual advantage will allure many adventurers, and the prospect of national honour and riches will stifle the voices of those who wish for the re-establishment of peace; and the re-

moval of the seat of war will naturally render their arguments less efficacious on the public mind.

In order to withstand this torrent, it is necessary that we should be no longer amused by negotiation and promises, but calculate fairly what resources we have to stem its impetuosity. The first power that presents itself for this great object would naturally be the Emperor; but the character of his Imperial Majesty's Cabinet is such, and the state of his army is so different from what it has been, and from what it ought to be, that I imagine no man will, for a moment, listen to any proposition that can be made from that quarter.

To the Prussian Cabinet, perhaps you will say, as little confidence is due; but it is certain that the Prussian army is in a state capable of exertion, if the means can be found of making it upon mercenary principles (for certainly, upon every political and moral principle, it is so already), the interest of his Prussian Majesty to engage heartily in this cause. The reflection of his near alliance to the House of Orange must actuate him as it did in '87; and by a sum to be paid by Great Britain and the States-General, on *the performance* of the service, I should imagine that he might be induced to send his army into Holland, and to take upon himself the preservation of the country; and the imminence of the danger would probably induce the States to face the

necessity of giving to a Prussian commander-in-chief powers which, from motives of jealousy, they would withhold from one of their own princes. The knowledge of such an arrangement having taken place for their protection would cheer the low in spirit, who, I am sorry to say, in this country are numerous; and Great Britain, relieved from the very heavy expense of an army on the Continent, could give greater scope to her exertions elsewhere, and would be enabled to make her attacks on other more vulnerable points with irresistible force.

Whenever the wind changes, you will be so overwhelmed with letters, that you will not be sorry that my political rhapsody is at an end.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK'S OPINION OF THE WAR — SURRENDER OF MAESTRICHT—CRITICAL SITUATION OF HOLLAND—MISTRUST OF THE AUSTRIAN ALLIANCE— GREAT FROST IN HOLLAND — WINTER CANTONMENTS — SIEGE OF GRAAVE — OPERATIONS ON THE WAAL — SICKNESS AMONGST THE TROOPS—GENERAL WISH FOR PEACE—CAPTURE OF THE BOMMELER WAARD BY THE FRENCH—CONFERENCE OF THE ALLIES—BRITISH EVACUATE HOLLAND.

So manifestly were the divisions of the Allies, and the defection of the Prussians, the cause of all the disasters of the campaign, that the Duke of Brunswick himself did not hesitate to ascribe them to that cause. On January 24, 1794, he wrote to Prince Louis of Prussia in these terms:

"I have been enveloped in circumstances as distressing as they were extraordinary, which have imposed upon me the painful necessity of acting as I have done.* What a misfortune that external and

* He had relinquished the command-in-chief of the Prussian army.

internal dissensions should so frequently have paralysed the movement of the armies at the very time when the greatest activity was necessary. If, after the capture of Mayence, they had fallen on Houchard, whom they would have beaten, they would have prevented the march of troops to the north, and, by consequence, the checks of Dunkirk and Maubeuge. Sarre-Louis, ill-provisioned and destitute, at that period, of any shelter from a bombardment, would have fallen in fifteen days. Alsace thus would have been turned by the Sarre; the capture of the lines of Lautern would have been more solid: and if the republican army of the Rhine had been, by that means, separated from that of the Moselle, Landau would infallibly have fallen.

"I implore you to use your efforts to prevent the undue separation of the army into detachments. When this is the case, weak at every point, it is liable to be cut up in detail. At Mayence, the fruits of the whole war were lost; and there is no hope that a third campaign will repair the disasters of the two preceding.

"The same causes will divide the Allied Powers which have hitherto divided them; the movements of the armies will suffer from them as they have suffered; their march will be embarrassed, retarded, prevented; and the delay in the re-establishment of the Prussian army, unavoidably, perhaps, from poli-

tical causes, will become the cause in the succeeding campaign, of incalculable disasters."

In requesting to be relieved from the command of the army, in his letter of January 6, 1794, to the King of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick uses terms equally forcible. He speaks of his "unhappy experience, that want of connection, distrust, egotism, and a spirit of cabal had disconcerted the measures adopted during the two last campaigns, and still disconcerted the measures of the combined armies.

* * * *

"When a great nation," adds his Highness, "like that of France, is conducted by the terror of punishments and by enthusiasm, an unanimous sentiment and the same principle ought to prevail in the measures of the coalesced powers. But when, instead thereof, each army acts separately and alone, of its own accord, without any fixed plan, without unanimity, and without principles—

* * * *

"Heaven preserve your Majesty from great misfortunes! But everything is to be feared if confidence, harmony, uniformity of sentiments, of principles, and of action, do not take place of the opposite sentiments, which have been the source of all misfortune for two years past. My best wishes

always attend your Majesty, and your glory will be my happiness."

TO JOHN CALVERT, ESQ.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, November 13, 1794.

Since I wrote to you last, we have received the news of the surrender of Maestricht. We had reason to hope this event would have been delayed ten days or a fortnight longer, when the advanced period of the season would have rendered it impossible for the troops employed in the reduction of that place to have engaged in any further operations this year. However, if the Dutch stand to their mark in the Bommeler Waard, I have no doubt that the Rhine and Waal will put a stop to the progress of the enemy till spring.

The Austrians constructed a bridge at Wesel, and occupied Burik, in the first instance, for the purpose of co-operating for the relief of Nymegen, and in the second, for the purpose of securing to the Allies the passage of the Rhine whenever circumstances might enable them to recross that river and commence offensive operations. I am sorry to say they have been driven across the Rhine, if our reports are true, in a very disgraceful manner. The

enemy are in possession of Rheinfels; there remains, therefore, no passage of the Rhine between this and Mayence. I need not point out to you the impediments this circumstance may give to our future operations.

* * * *

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, November 20, 1794.

I am very sorry to observe that the reports which Lieutenant-colonel Don has made to his Royal Highness appear to justify the political sentiments which I ventured to lay before your Lordship some days ago. I am afraid we have absolutely nothing to hope from the Emperor; and I wait with the most anxious solicitude (from a conviction of its importance) to hear that the King's Ministers are impressed with this truth before the meeting of Parliament commits them, or renders it necessary to declare what line they mean to pursue.

Of the possibility or expediency of making peace or of carrying on the war, I do not pretend to be a judge: but that all co-operation from the Austrians, however obtained, under whatever articles or restrictions, will be fallacious, and entirely inadequate to

the great object of the war, I think any person with a common degree of observation may venture to affirm; and I do not imagine that any man at all conversant with the subject, will deny the imminent danger that threatens the very existence of the United Provinces.

I believe I mentioned to your Lordship that the enemy had made several detachments from Nymegen, which gave room to imagine they had some immediate enterprise in view: as they have not as yet made their appearance on our flanks, I begin to give credit to the general report, which assures us that the French army is gone into cantonments.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Arnheim, November 20, 1794.

I must not let this mail go without thanking you for yours of the 10th, though, in truth, there is not news enough stirring here to fill a paragraph of a patriotic paper; and the wind appears to blow too steadily from an adverse point to give us reason to expect to hear shortly from England, which I am particularly anxious to do, as the last mail brought me an unsatisfactory account of my mother.

Colonel Don is returned; and I conclude you will

receive from General Craig the news he has picked up in his tour. About six days ago, the enemy made considerable detachments both up and down the river from Nymegen. As we have no accounts of their appearance on our flanks, I begin to credit general report, which says that they are gone into quarters till spring, or perhaps till the severity of the weather, by rendering the rivers passable and inundations of little avail, may enable them to undertake some offensive operation.

I have few apprehensions for the winter, but I confess that every day augments those that I entertain for the spring, before which, the possession of Graave will have given the enemy the complete navigation of the Meuse, and the facility of transporting all their military stores, without labour or risk, to the very seat of action.

Your quotation is a very pertinent one; but, I assure you, I do not share in that mania of credulity which appears to possess the minds of too many; and I am persuaded that any co-operation from the Austrians, however obtained, under whatever articles it is granted, will prove fallacious, burdensome in the highest degree to Great Britain, and totally inadequate to the object for which we engaged in the war.

The Emperor is as much a bankrupt in men and money as he is in fame; the German Princes are

poverty-stricken, and the state of their finances is fully as well known to the National Convention as to their own officers, who make no scruple of holding a sort of conversation, expressive of their sentiments, but indecent and improper to a high degree. Thus much between ourselves. I believe the wish for peace is very general in Germany as well as in Holland, and people are encouraged by the moderation of the late acts of the Convention to hope that it may be concluded.

We English are always excepted from these views of pacification; and I am convinced that we shall do better to stand forward singly in this great contest than to embark in another campaign with allies, whose want of ability, exertion, principle, and honesty have stigmatized the year 1794 with a degree of infamy, and loaded it with calamities, which will long be felt in Europe.

The frost has set in sharp, and there has been ice enough this morning to tempt Ferraris, and that species of thread-paper adventurer, but not adequate to the support of a 24-pounder, myself, or any other weighty article; consequently, as yet, not fit for any military purpose.

Considering that I had not one word to say to you, except to thank you and praise you for the wigs, which arrived safe (of which one encircles the brows of Sir W. Erskine, *vice* laurel, which has not blown

this year in the Low Countries), I think that I have spun out my epistle to a decent length before I subscribe myself with much truth, &c.

In the preceding letter, allusion is made to the setting in of that remarkably severe and lasting frost which covered with ice the natural defences of Holland, and enabled the French to conquer the country. Colonel Calvert had repeatedly adverted to the season of the year, the moistness of the climate, the wetness of the ground, the impossibility of carrying on military operations at that time, as "the best, nay, the only allies on which the British could rely." This reliance was now to fail them; and canals, morasses, and even rivers being frozen, Nature herself aiding a powerful and numerous enemy, to whom an ill-affected population opposed no spirited resistance, Holland was to be overrun with a facility which must have astonished the conquerors themselves.

We cannot refuse our admiration of the energy and military virtues of the French army, commencing a winter campaign after eight months of nearly ceaseless fighting, and advancing into their enemy's country when they so urgently needed repose; but we must recollect that the system on which the

French Republican Government carried on the war, was to disregard the sufferings of their own armies, and to deprive them of the provisions and comforts almost necessary to existence in that inclement winter, and that their soldiers knew these would be found in the towns of Holland.

In considering the war, these circumstances must be borne in mind. The reasonable expectations of the British commander led him to anticipate that the season would render Holland inaccessible. His calculations were disappointed; and the French, with their usual adroitness, lost not an hour in availing themselves of the facilities unexpectedly afforded to them for invading the country.

In the ensuing letters, it will be seen that Colonel Calvert sought to impress on Lord St. Helens his own convictions of our critical position in Holland, and of that which he had repeatedly asserted, the folly of placing any reliance on the co-operation of Austria.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Arnheim, November 29, 1794.

I am much obliged to you for your favour of the 27th, and the invitation it contains. I can assure your Lordship I look back with too much

pleasure to my last visit to the Hague not to wish to repeat it; but I fear that, even if his Royal Highness should have thoughts of taking me with him, it will not be in my power to have the honour of accompanying him at present, for I have been an invalid for some time, and do not yet go out of the house.

You flatter me much by expressing an inclination to compare notes with me on political subjects. I can assure you I regret with the utmost impatience the confinement which prevents my deriving information from you, for to me, I confess, the game on the continent appears completely up. I firmly believe that, by the imbecility of his measures, and by the low cunning of his unprincipled advisers, his Imperial Majesty is at this moment reduced to a situation which precludes the possibility of his affording us effectual co-operation, even could he by magic be released in an instant from the factious crew that surrounds him, and could the same power extend to the elucidation of his head, and to the rectification of his heart; but as the days of enchantment, as well as those of chivalry, are over, we must look to ordinary means for the repletion of the Imperial Treasury, and for what is yet more essential, for a restoration of that discipline, that patient fortitude, and that exemplary good conduct which were so

peculiarly the characteristics of the greatest part of the Imperial army.

I confess I was one of their most enthusiastic admirers, and I still think that the Hungarian and Bohemian soldier unites more essential military qualifications, than any being I ever met with; but their best officers are *deeply disgusted;* the generality very much tired of the long, uninterrupted wars in which they have been engaged; and the *whole* regarding the possession of Flanders and Brabant as injurious to the real interests of the House of Austria. Under these circumstances (which I dare assure your Lordship are not exaggerated), can we allow ourselves to be amused with expectation of assistance from the Emperor? It will require the most exact economy to recruit his exhausted treasury, and it will demand a certain time, with the greatest attention from the most capable officers he can procure, to rescue his gallant army from that wretched state of *délabrement* to which it has been reduced by the narrow policy of his Cabinet, which appears to extend its baneful influence over everything that has the misfortune of belonging to his Imperial Majesty. His Royal Highness is writing to your Lordship concerning our affairs; I therefore need take up no more of your time.

* * * *

TO HIS SISTER.

Head-Quarters,
Arnheim, December 1, 1794.

We have not an atom of news, and every day more and more convinces me that the enemy will postpone their designs on this country till the return of the spring, and the arrival of reinforcements and stores from France enable them to act with decisive energy; and then—but I will not anticipate misfortunes, which I hope the wisdom of our administration will avert, though I am much alarmed by a piece of communication which is made by a Government paper to the public with some degree of exultation—namely, that we have 30,000 Austrians in our pay. I have seen enough to be pretty decisive in my sentiments, that all efficient co-operation from that quarter is hopeless.

The grenadiers of the Guards and the Coldstream Regiments are come into quarters here, and the different corps are getting into the best cantonments they can; but the accommodations are bad, and I fear that during the severity of the season, which fortunately has not yet set in, the soldiers will suffer. Every relief is being prepared for them that the circumstances will admit. I rather think the Duke will keep his head-quarters here; indeed, I hope he

may, for in the present temper of the people of Holland, Arnheim is a more proper and more agreeable quarter for us than any of the large towns, where the inhabitants are more numerous and more disaffected. I have likewise a private reason, which is, that my four nags are at this moment standing in as good a stable as they could have in England, which, let me tell you, in these times is a consideration of no small weight, which you will comprehend the easier when I inform you that Arnheim does not afford amusement of any kind, or any one object to call our attention from the important one in which we are engaged.

December 2.—His Royal Highness the Duke of York left Arnheim for England.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD ST. HELENS.

Arnheim, December 4, 1794.

By a report of the 1st, which I showed to his Royal Highness before he left Arnheim, I am assured that, independent of a corps of 15,000 which the enemy detached some time ago from their army opposite to us, with a view probably of giving

us a jealousy for Bergen-op-Zoom and Gertruydenberg, they have brought reinforcements into that part of the frontiers of France. Their force in the vicinity of these two places now amounts to upwards of 20,000 men. Their posts are strengthened, and are exceedingly attentive on the left bank of the river, and it is imagined that as soon as Graave has surrendered, attempts will be made to pass the Waal at various points. The enemy have assembled near 150 boats (which, as they are the property of the inhabitants, are probably small ones, and must have been secreted from our notice) in the canal which empties itself into the Rhine between Emmerik and Schenckenschans; they have many boats and the materials for the construction of a bridge at the village of Druten, and they are employed in the construction of vessels in the basin of Nymegen.

The fire at Graave has been uninterrupted and heavy these last six-and-thirty hours. I am assured the enemy have sixty-two pieces of ordnance before the place. They have thrown a bridge over the Meuse at a place called Overlangel. General Moreau, who commands the siege, has his quarters at Ravenstein. Barracks are being erected for the cavalry on the heaths between Breda and Bois-le-Duc. I think this is all the intelligence I have to communicate to you, and the difficulties of obtaining any information

are so multiplied both by our friends and enemies that I begin to despair.

If the Duke of York's stay in England is protracted beyond a very short period, we expect his orders to follow him. I am patriotic enough sincerely to wish that his Royal Highness's immediate return may render this measure unnecessary, for I am persuaded his presence will remove many difficulties to which the service is subjected.

I must remark to you that the accounts that reach us of the constant correspondence carried on between the Governor of Wesel and the French, bear a very extraordinary appearance; they may probably be exaggerated, but every pass of the Rhine is at this moment of such very great importance that we may be excused for holding ourselves much on our guard, and the transactions of the campaign unfortunately fully justify, what I abhor from my heart, suspicion.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK.

Arnheim, December 4, 1794.

* * * *

The enemy are constructing vessels in the basin of Nymegen, and endeavour by drums and music to draw off the attention of our post on the opposite

bank of the river from the noise with which their work is unavoidably attended. * *.* *, persists in the belief that the enemy will attempt the passage of the Waal at different points immediately after the surrender of Graave. The fire at that place has been heavy and uninterrupted these last-six-and thirty hours.

FROM HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK.

London, December 8, 1794.

Dear Calvert,

I have but an instant to return you many thanks for your letter of the 4th, which I have just received, and to inform you of our safe arrival here on Saturday morning, after a very pleasant passage of twenty-six hours. I found the Duchess perfectly well at Oatlands. I went at once to Windsor, and was most kindly received by His Majesty. With regard to my situation, and what I have learned of the intentions concerning me, you will hear more by another opportunity. Remember me to all friends.

Believe me, dear Calvert,

Yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

December 11.—The enemy made a general attack on the Allies, on the Waal, and in the Bommeler Waard. Their boats were driven back without effecting a landing, except at the point of the Rhine and Waal; at this place they found means to land and to possess themselves of a battery occupied by the Hanoverians. Major* at the head of the pickets of the day, attempted in vain to retake the battery, and fell in the attempt. Lieutenant-general Buysche was more successful at the head of three battalions which he assembled for the purpose; but the brave old General was amongst the killed.

TO HIS SISTER.

December 11, 1794.

* * * *

I am very sorry to inform you that this morning, under cover of a thick fog, the enemy crossed the Waal, near the point of separation of that river and the Rhine, and made themselves masters of one of our batteries, from which they were not driven till they had destroyed the guns. Two Hanoverian battalions charged them repeatedly with the bayonet before they drove them out of the battery, and Lieutenant-

* Sic in orig.

general Buysche, a fine gallant old man of near fourscore years of age, is killed. The Hanoverians being cantoned in that quarter, no British troops were engaged. A heavy firing has been heard all day down the river towards Fort St. André, but as yet we do not know the particulars of what has passed. Probably the firing there is a feint to draw our attention from the part where the attack was made. A sad prospect for winter quarters after an eight months' campaign.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK.

Arnheim, December 15, 1794.

I beg leave to return your Royal Highness my thanks for the honour of your letter, which I received last night.

I never had a doubt that your reception from his Majesty would be most gracious, and I am persuaded that information of facts alone is necessary to unite all the unprejudiced part of mankind in the opinion that no part of the disgrace and misfortune which have marked the progress of this unfortunate campaign can be attached to your Royal Highness, or to the troops whom you have commanded.

I desired Hewgill to acquaint your Royal Highness

that I proposed going to Lord St. Helens the beginning of this week, and crossing the water by the Saturday's packet, if I did not find any directions from your Royal Highness to the contrary at the Hague. I shall accordingly set off on Wednesday, by which time I hope we shall have received the Friday's mail.

Sir James Pulteney arrived here last night; he has left Lady Bath at Bremen, and proposes setting out on his return to that place on the day after to-morrow: thence they make the best of their way to Rome.

I am very much concerned to inform your Royal Highness that the sickness of the army daily increases. There is a fever prevalent with which many of the peasants are infected, and the closeness of the cantonments very much augments the difficulty of stopping its progress amongst the troops.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Arnheim, December 20, 1794.

Since the 11th the enemy have been very quiet; but I conceive that this calm is the forerunner of a storm, and that a second attempt will, ere long, be made to pass the river. Every arrangement is made to give them a warm reception, but this continual

state of preparation harasses the troops most terribly. The sickness increases; the number of invalids is lessened only by death, which seems to be in straight league with the General Hospital; and I fear that the winter, which is generally supposed to afford ease and comfort to the soldier, and recruit him after the fatigues of the summer, will prove more destructive to this army than the campaign has been. The easterly wind has cut off all communication with England, and left us entirely in the dark respecting what is going on there. I am told it is quite the fashion to forget there is such a place as Holland, or a British army on the Continent. My friends appear to have given very much into the *ton;* in the meantime, I am resolved, though with a very heavy heart, to remain here till the first or second week in January. The length of my confinement, and the critical period of it, at times reduce my spirits to a very low ebb. I am willing to flatter myself that the remedy I have recourse to contributes its full share in this operation, for I should be sorry to believe that they could be so much affected by a circumstance in which self only is concerned.

I hope you will conceive my anxiety, and let me have a very full and particular account of what is going on in England. I shudder for the next intelligence from the West Indies and Corsica. The

Austrians are come close on our left; three battalions are in this town, the grenadiers of the Guards being sent out to make room for them.

P.S.—All the foreign, especially the German, papers breathe peace. They attribute to the Court of London the delay in opening the preliminaries; but from the little information that reaches us of what passes on your side the water, peace appears to be quite out of the question. What is your opinion on this subject? I do not pretend to judge of the expediency or possibility of making peace or carrying on war; but I deprecate from my soul another campaign on the Continent, in which any reliance is to be placed on Austrian co-operation.

FROM HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK.

Oatlands, December 22, 1796.

Dear Calvert,

Many thanks for your letter, which I received on Friday, and by which I find that the French still mean to make another attempt to pass the Waal. Both Walmoden and Harcourt appear alarmed. I confess, however, that I do not see the possibility of it, if proper care is taken.

I am very sorry to hear that you have been obliged

to consent to continue three weeks longer in confinement, as I had hoped to have seen you over here before this time. Nothing is as yet settled concerning me, but I think a very few days will determine my fate.

I have not time to add more at present,

Ever yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

TO HIS SISTER.

Arnheim, December 25, 1794.

I received your fugitive piece of the 11th, and you probably very soon afterwards learnt that it was my doom to experience the joys of a Christmas in Holland. The easterly winds that have lately prevailed have very much interrupted our communication with England, and as the period is interesting to us all, and particularly so to some, this circumstance, united with the freezing of our faces, cutting of our lips, &c., keeps us in a degree of ill-humour, which is certainly very conducive to health, and (particularly in cold weather) promotes the circulation of the blood. The thermometer was yesterday at 8°, and this morning we have the appearance of a heavy fall of snow. The quantities of ice which come down the rivers, keep us in daily expectation

of their being frozen over, and consequently render a greater degree of vigilance and alertness necessary. The hardships experienced by the infantry of the army are great; the duty, owing to the numbers of the sick, becomes very severe, the badness of the accommodations, the scarcity of fuel, and the intenseness of the cold, give us little room to hope for any amendment. But I hear it is the fashion in England to represent this army as in a perfect state of security and comfort; and that truths of a very contrary nature have lately, for *the first time*, found their way to his Majesty's ear.

I cannot see without much concern that Government have resolved to guarantee the Imperial loan of six millions. From this I conclude that it is resolved to push the war *à toute outrance.* Of the policy or impolicy of this determination, I do not pretend to be a judge; but I do not believe that a subsidy to his Imperial Majesty is the means by which this ruinous war will be brought to a happy and an honourable conclusion.

There is a story prevalent here, of which you may probably know the truth—namely, that three regiments embarked on the 15th of September at Plymouth, for the West Indies; that they remained there for *want of convoy,* till the 1st of December; that they then disembarked, so reduced by sickness as to be unfit for service; that, in the meantime, the

French sent 3000 men to the West Indies. *If this is true*, I dread the next accounts from that quarter, which will probably be of a nature to mark the period of Lord Chatham's presiding at the Admiralty, as the most disastrous of any in the naval annals of Great Britain. I say *if this is true*, because so many falsehoods are propagated that it is impossible to know to what we may give credit; and I always am very backward to believe accounts so injurious to our governors, and prejudicial to the governed.

Your answer to this will certainly not find me at Arnheim, for about this day week I shall set off for the Hague, whence, if I find no news of the Duke's immediate return to the army, I shall bend my steps towards England. So direct under cover to His Excellency the Lord St. Helens, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador and Minister Extraordinary at the Hague.

December 27.—Intelligence arrived that the Dutch General had allowed himself to be surprised in the Bommeler Waard; that the enemy having passed on the ice, had made a general attack, and were in complete possession of the island and town of Bommel. They pursued the Dutch across the Waal, which had become equally practicable, and established themselves at Tuil.

September 30.—A considerable corps of British and Hessians, under the command of Major-general David Dundas, attacked the enemy, and obliged them to abandon Tuil and recross the Waal. The Allies were not in sufficient strength to attempt the recovery of the Bommeler Waard. They took four pieces of cannon. The enemy carried the Lines between Breda and Gertruydenberg, and at the same time made themselves masters of the rich country of Altena, whence it is probable that the wants they have for some time experienced will be amply supplied.

The commissioners sent from the States-General, MM. de Rapläer and Brantzen, are received at Bois-le-Duc. The French generals inform them that they have no authority to accede to an armistice or enter into any negotiation for peace.

The commissioners are permitted to pass on to Paris, but not in a public capacity. They submit to this indignity.

January 1, 1795.—I left Arnheim, and arrived the next day at the Hague.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK.

The Hague,
Tuesday Night, January 6, 1795.

I am sorry to inform your Royal Highness, that the intelligence received from the army since I last had the honour of writing to you, has by no means tended to lessen the apprehensions entertained for the safety of the country. The enemy, having crossed the Waal in considerable force, created much uneasiness, but the alarm has been raised to the greatest height by a report received from Prince Frederick this morning that the right of the army under the command of General David Dundas had retreated from Asseren and Leerdam, and had fallen back to Vianen, this movement having given the enemy the opportunity of turning Gorcum, and of attacking that place on its weakest point. His Serene Highness had himself retired to Schoonhoven, where he waited with much anxiety the operations of the enemy, which he could not but apprehend, if directed against Gorcum, would prove successful.

The messenger from the army whom we expect every minute, will bring certain intelligence respecting the transactions on the Waal. In the meantime, the thaw, added to Lord St. Helens' arguments and

prudence, has given a degree of tranquillity to the Stadtholder, and for the present appeased the alarm which threatened to produce the most ruinous and destructive measures.

The Princes of Orange desire to hold a conference with Lord St. Helens and the Generals Alvinzi, Walmoden, and Harcourt at Utrecht tomorrow night; Lord St. Helens has proposed to me to accompany him, and I conceive that I shall meet your Royal Highness's wishes by attending his Lordship, and bearing the result of this important meeting to you without delay.

The conference above referred to was the last meeting of the Generals of the Allies. The Low Countries yielded to their fate. The Stadtholder and the Princes of the House of Orange, with a very few of their adherents, took refuge in England, and the States-General concluded peace with France, or rather, resigned their country to the absolute disposal of the existing French Government, destroying by that means the balance of power which the princes of Europe had, during the last two centuries, conceived it their first interest to maintain.

The British army, under Count Walmoden and Sir David Dundas and General Abercromby, re-

treated out of Holland, crossing Guelderland and Over Yssel during the rigours of a most inclement winter. It was a march of fearful suffering, and not alleviated by any friendly sympathy or aid from those whose country we had sought to defend. The Dutch peasantry inhabiting those dreary and inhospitable provinces were enemies more cruel to our exhausted soldiers than the victorious French army who harassed and pursued them. But the retreat testified to the admirable discipline, as well as the courage of the British. Excesses were committed by some foreign battalions in British pay, which brought us some undeserved discredit, and by the French emigrants who accompanied our retiring army; but our own regiments maintained their discipline unshaken by reverse, and the rear-guard was often formed by the 33rd Regiment, under the command of Colonel Wesley. On February 12, the main body of the British army crossed the Ems at Rheine, and reached Bremen on March 27 and 28. On April 10 they embarked for England.

The foregoing papers were ready for the press when the volumes edited by the Duke of Buckingham, "The Court and Cabinets of George III.," were published, referring to many circumstances which are the subject of Colonel Calvert's correspondence.

Mr. Grenville's letters from Vienna are especially curious and important, and show the motives which animated the Austrian Cabinet, and produced measures which, during the latter months of 1794, aroused Colonel Calvert's indignation, and, as we have seen, drew from him reiterated expressions of the most bitter complaint.

Mr. Grenville's, and others in the collection, are so much calculated to interest the readers of this volume, and to illustrate and explain the affairs of which it treats, that the dates are subjoined of those to which the editor would direct attention; they show the writer's opinion of the conduct of our Allies at this time, their mutual jealousies, approaching very nearly to hostility, their faithlessness and double-dealing towards ourselves, and the absence of that manly energy and cordial unanimity without which all prospect of successfully carrying on the contest with an enemy so united and energetic as France was hopeless:—

Lord Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, July 9, 1794.

Mr. Thomas Grenville to the Duke of Portland, Vienna, August 24, 1794.

Mr. Thomas Grenville to Earl Fitzwilliam, Vienna, August 30, 1794.

The Marquis of Buckingham to Mr. Thomas Grenville, August 31, 1794.

Mr. Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, Vienna, September 1, 1794.

Mr. Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, Vienna, September 15, 1794.

Mr. Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, Vienna, September 22, 1794.

Lord Malmesbury to Mr. Thomas Grenville, Frankfort, October 2, 1794.

In a letter dated July 19, 1794, Lord Grenville says, speaking of Lord Cornwallis, whose opinion, under the circumstances, was perhaps more entitled to respect than that of any other man, "he is returned from Flanders, speaking highly of the Duke of York, and far otherwise of the Austrian generals, to whom he, and all mankind in Flanders, impute all that has happened. It is a whimsical circumstance, and hardly to have been foreseen, that in a war which we carry on conjointly with Austria, the great want which we experience should be that of Austrian generals of capacity sufficient to command the excellent troops which are acting in the Netherlands."

A careful consideration of Colonel Calvert's letters, together with the corroborating testimony contained in the "Court and Cabinets of George III.," and an examination of the sentiments of statesmen of various parties and opinions, and of contemporary writers abroad, will go far to convince the reader of

that which has been asserted in the introductory chapter of this work to have been Sir Harry Calvert's firm opinion, that blame for the failure of the war was not to be attributed to the Duke of York or to his army.

On December 30, 1794, Mr. Canning said: "Most of the failures which attended us in the last campaign must be imputed to the defection of our allies, and also to the uncommon number, exertions, and irresistible force of our enemies, a force of which history has no parallel." And Lord Auckland "had no hesitation in attributing our present position to the disjointed, ill-combined, and discordant conduct of the Allies."

The Duke acted under the orders, either of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief on the spot, or of our own Cabinet in London. The army never failed in doing everything that valour and fortitude could effect. For the exercise of the higher qualities of military ability, no opportunity was given to the Duke of York. The planning of the campaign, the direction of the war, was not entrusted to him. He had only to carry out the orders given to him.

On one occasion only did he hold an independent command.

The siege of Dunkirk was decided on at home. In consenting to lead the expedition against that place, the Duke of York could never have calculated

that the siege train would not arrive from Woolwich in time to co-operate with his army, or that French gun-boats would be permitted to impede his operations. He could not have anticipated that his Imperial Ally and commander, instead of affording him aid and co-operation, would have left him, in June and July, 1794, to defend the line of the Scheldt, and later the frontier of Holland, with forces insufficient by two-thirds for that duty, withdrawing the Austrian armies towards Maestricht and the Rhine, in the words of the Marquis of Buckingham (Weymouth, August 31, 1794), "abandoning the Duke of York to certain ruin, if the winds and the circumstances of the country had not permitted Lord Moira's army to arrive just (and only just) in time to cover their retreat and communications."

The moral to be learnt from the whole story of these campaigns is the imperative necessity of wise direction and efficient support from home in all matters connected with war. Implicit reliance may be reposed on the good conduct of the army, but the *Militia Foris* is not sufficient without the *Consilium Domi*.

This is the lesson to be repeatedly enforced in a country constitutionally governed, and where party and personal interests are so liable to interfere with the union of statesmen at home for the purpose of

rendering our arms triumphant abroad. If we do but look back at our military operations during the present half-century, and consider those in which we have met with checks and reverses, we shall trace those checks, not to the misconduct of the troops, but to mistakes which might have been obviated by those who directed the war. Either the war itself ought to have been avoided, or inefficient commanders have been appointed, or due supplies were not sent. On no one occasion has the historian had to write, "Here the army failed in doing its duty."

In no country more than our own is gratitude generously bestowed on those who serve us well in the field; but it is but too true that, in many instances, we have failed in giving to our armies the means of achieving success. If these letters have the effect of drawing attention to this important truth, and if causes of failure such as here portrayed are avoided in future, one main object of their publication will have been effected.

But it is not too much to believe that the disasters of the unhappy campaign of 1794 contributed to afford to us the experience which aided in rendering our arms triumphant in future wars.

The Duke of Wellington was then serving in command of the 33rd Regiment, and his intelligent

and careful observation must have detected many circumstances in our political and military operations likely to impede their success, and against which he was thus taught to provide when he was placed in command; and those who are acquainted with the conduct of our military affairs at home are well aware of the unremitting and not unsuccessful efforts made while the Duke of York was Commander-in-Chief to remedy many of the lamentable defects under which the service suffered at the period to which this volume refers.

CHAPTER XV.

COLONEL CALVERT PROCEEDS ON A MISSION TO BERLIN — HAS AN INTERVIEW WITH THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK—OBTAINS INFORMATION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND FRANCE—SUBSTANCE OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK—LETTER TO LORD HARRY SPENCER, RELATIVE TO THE POSITION OF AFFAIRS IN BERLIN.

In April, 1795, Colonel Calvert was sent on a mission to Brunswick and Berlin, the object of which was to make a new treaty with the King of Prussia, and to induce him, if possible, to take the initiative in placing the Duke of Brunswick at the head of the armies of the Allies. His MSS. on this mission convey information on the views of various eminent individuals, and elucidate our political and military history at this period.

TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

Saturday Night, Twelve o'clock,
Sheerness, April 11, 1795.

I have received your letter of this day, with the enclosed project of treaty; and agreeably to your

direction, I return to you the project which had been delivered to me previous to my leaving London.

TO WILLIAM HUSKISSON, ESQ.,

UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE.

Saturday Night,
Sheerness, April 11, 1795.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of this date, and shall certainly take the liberty of troubling you on the terms you are kind enough to suggest.

I sincerely hope the report stated in General Harcourt's despatch is groundless, for I conceive that his Prussian Majesty's coming in person to the army would indicate a determination to take upon himself a part which would certainly, on every account, be much more advantageously filled by the Duke of Brunswick, and consequently add considerably to the difficulty of our negotiation on that point. At the same time, I should draw this favourable conclusion from the circumstance, that his Majesty was in earnest, and preparing for vigorous and decisive measures.

I shall follow the hint you furnish me with in your letter, and request the continuation of commu-

nications from you; for with the most anxious wish for the success of our negotiation, and feeling very strongly the great importance of it, I cannot but entertain many doubts of my own ability in conducting it, and a sincere desire to avail myself of the aid of those who are better informed than myself.

TO HIS SISTER.

Sheerness, April 12th, 1795.

Very fortunately, the wind, which for some days has been due east, has got round to the west; and if it holds, we have the prospect of a good passage. The tide will not serve for going out of the harbour till the afternoon, so that we shall not be able to get through the Swinn till daylight to-morrow. The 'Cobourg' is appointed to carry us, and my voyage is rendered less irksome by the company of Colonel Hislop, who is going from the Prince and Princess of Wales to Brunswick. I hope we shall be able to arrange matters so as to return together, for I don't think my business will detain me much longer than his, and he has promised not to mind a few days.

* * * *

It has just occurred to us that bedding is not an unnecessary article on board our vessel; and having

rejected the offer of the old Scotch lieutenant, who commands her, of half his bed (which, by the bye, considering my propensity to be sick, was a very liberal one), I must set out in quest of some apparatus of that kind.

If an opportunity offers, I shall write to you as soon as we land. If you don't hear from me, suppose that I am busily employed in the object of my mission, and using all the expedition I can to get back to my friends.

TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

Saturday Night.
Brunswick, April 18th, 1795.

I have the honour to inform you that I disembarked at Stade on the afternoon of the 16th, and that I arrived here this morning.

It is with infinite concern that I find the report which is circulated in every part of the country through which I have passed, of his Prussian Majesty having entered into a treaty with the French, is well authenticated; of this transaction I doubt not you have accounts from other quarters; but the uncertainty of conveyance, and the importance of the subject, induce me so far to intrude on your time as

to state for your information particulars which I have received from his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick.

It appears that the treaty, which his Serene Highness says he has reason to believe is actually signed (though as yet no official notification has been made to him on the subject) is rather an agreement for the cessation of hostilities, not an absolute treaty of peace. But a line of demarcation has been drawn as a temporary boundary between the Prussians and the French, with the extent of which his Serene Highness is not entirely acquainted, but he understands that it runs from Emmerick to the Roer, including on the Prussian side his Majesty's territories between the Rhine and Meuse, and comprehends the Northern German Principalities. It is agreed that both parties shall keep armies of observation, that of Prussia being on the Ems, and that on the final ratification of this treaty, and not before, the French shall enter into any negotiation his Prussian Majesty may wish to set on foot on the part of the United Provinces. Although this cessation of hostilities must very considerably counteract the object recommended to Lord Henry Spencer, I by no means consider it an absolute bar to the final completion of it; for I am well assured there is a strong party at Berlin, who wish for a continuance of the alliance, and that the King himself does not consider

the dissolution of it without a degree of regret and apprehension on those points which are particularly the objects of my mission. The Duke of Brunswick expressed himself in the warmest and most liberal terms; and I conceive you may be assured that his Serene Highness's sentiments are such as you wish them, and that you may rely on his taking any part the acceptance of which is not likely to prove a subject of jealousy and displeasure to the King of Prussia. His Serene Highness is of opinion that I had better not carry any letter from him to Berlin, and appeared much to wish that his name should be first mentioned from another quarter.

I shall proceed to Berlin without delay, and as soon as I can be the bearer of any decisive intelligence, shall return to England with the utmost expedition.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS FIELD-MARSHAL, THE DUKE OF YORK.

Saturday Night,
Brunswick, April 18, 1795.

I have the honour to inform your Royal Highness that I arrived here this morning, and have had an interview with his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick.

As Mr. Pitt directed me to correspond officially with Mr. Dundas, and informed me that the contents of my letters would always be immediately imparted to your Royal Highness, I need not trouble you with a repetition of what I have written to Mr. Dundas this day. I must, however, mention to your Royal Highness that the Duke of Brunswick's sentiments on the points on which he conversed, coincide most entirely with yours. His opinion respecting the King of Prussia and the Prussian Government was expressed almost in the same words as your Royal Highness made use of, and he much lamented that a negotiation with his Prussian Majesty had not been entered into under your Royal Highness's auspices, as he doubts not that it would have produced the greatest advantages to the Allies.

His Serene Highness appears fully aware of the ruinous consequences which might eventually ensue from a combination of the Prussians and French; and expressed in the warmest terms his personal attachment to Great Britain, and his devotion to the great and common cause which should unite and direct the operations of every power in Europe. I shall proceed immediately to Berlin, but, at the same time, I confess with much apprehension for the subject of my mission.

Substance of a Conversation with his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick, at Brunswick, 18th of April, 1795.

His Serene Highness in general terms expresses very strongly his surprise at the conduct of the Court of Berlin, respecting the treaty with France, which his Serene Highness has no doubt is actually signed, though no official communication has been made to him of that event. His Serene Highness sees the danger to which his Prussian Majesty exposes himself by this desertion from the grand alliance, and the ruinous consequences which are likely to ensue to the Allies in general. He is of opinion that a greater public service cannot be rendered than the warding off this blow, which threatens so great a diminution of force and influence to the Allies; and he is inclined to believe that this is still practicable, as he knows that there exists a very considerable party at Berlin who are sincerely desirous of the continuance of the alliance; and he is persuaded that his Prussian Majesty himself views with no small grief and apprehension the prospect of its dissolution. His Serene Highness has not the particulars of the treaty, but has reason to believe that it is rather an agreement for a cessation of arms, than an

actual treaty of peace. A line of demarcation is drawn, which is to serve as a temporary boundary between the Prussians and the French. It runs from Emmerick to the Roer, including on the Prussian side his Prussian Majesty's territory between the Rhine and Meuse, and comprehends all the Northern German Principalities. Both parties are to keep armies of observation, that of Prussia being on the Ems; and in this state affairs are to remain until a general pacification can be effected. On the ratification of this Convention, the French are to listen to anything his Prussian Majesty may wish to urge on the part of the United Provinces. His Serene Highness, by a private letter from M. de Hardenberg, understands that that minister is instructed, in the first instance, to sue for a restitution of the property of the House of Orange.

His Serene Highness approves the project,* wishes much caution and delicacy to be observed in the article of mustering the Prussian Army, of which, however, he acknowledges the necessity, avows himself strongly attached to Great Britain, and entirely devoted to the cause of the Alliance. He wishes not to come forward in any light which may give offence to the Court of Berlin, and that in case he accepts the high situation offered to him, he should, in the first instance, be named from that quarter. He re-

* The Treaty of which Colonel Calvert was the bearer.

commends the utmost delicacy on this point. He has lately received a very kind letter from the King of Prussia, expressing a wish to employ him in case of a renewal of hostilities. He thinks that his name, or any letter from him in this stage of the negotiation (in the success of which he is much interested), would be prejudicial. His Serene Highness views the possibility of a combination between Prussia and France as absolute ruin to himself and the other neighbouring princes. His Serene Highness fears that Jacobin principles are making great progress in the Prussian dominions.

He very strongly recommends, in case of the object of the negotiation being happily effected and the Alliance renewed, that some Minister, of the first rank and abilities, should be placed near his Prussian Majesty, with orders to be as little absent from the Court as possible. He believes the present negotiation with France was entered into quite contrary to his Majesty's real wishes, and that it is entirely the work of the prevalent party.

TO THE RIGHT HON HENRY DUNDAS.

Berlin, April 21, 1795.

I had the honour of writing to you from Brunswick, on the night of Saturday, the 18th, and as I

sent the letter by estafette to the army, I ventured to enter pretty fully on the subject of my mission. As this goes by the Hamburgh post, I shall only inform you that I arrived here last night, and take the liberty of referring you for particulars to Lord Henry Spencer's despatch in cyphers. It appears to me that there remains one chance of some benefit being derived from my arrival here, and that a very short period must determine that point.

Colonel Calvert remained at Berlin only a few days; on his return to Brunswick, he had another conversation with the Duke, of which the following is the substance.

April 27, 1795.

His Serene Highness has received two very friendly letters from his Imperial Majesty. Monsieur de Lambert, formerly general officer in the French service, but at present employed by Russia, passed through Brunswick four days before, on his way to Berlin, with offers from the Court of St. Petersburg, which, had they arrived three weeks sooner, would have been highly acceptable to the King of Prussia, and such as the prevailing party must probably have acceded to; they contain, however, no promise of

pecuniary assistance. At present they can be productive of no immediate good consequences.

His Serene Highness thinks a total rupture with Prussia to be avoided, if possible—advises strongly that the project should remain with Lord Henry Spencer, with discretionary orders to make use of it as he may find an opportunity.

His Serene Highness is of opinion that, under the existing circumstances, and under the orders which accompanied the project, Lord Henry Spencer could take no further steps in the business than he did. Though *necessity* may have obliged his Prussian Majesty to enter into this treaty with France, his Serene Highness cannot believe that any circumstance will induce him ever so totally to depart from his former sentiments and connexions as to engage in an alliance with the French.

His Serene Highness confesses, however, an observation which I made on one of the articles of the treaty not to be unfounded, and to give reasonable cause for alarm; that, namely, which stipulates that the Allies shall not continue the war on the line of demarcation agreed on by the contracting powers, and consequently takes from the Allies the faculty of acting on the point most essential to their interests, and on which the enemy is the most vulnerable.

His Serene Highness believes that the party in the Prussian Ministry, who have been so forward in

making the peace, have insinuated to the King that they have good reason for believing that on the conclusion of the present treaty, the French will consent not only to a restoration of the property of the House of Orange, but likewise in some degree to that of its power.

His Serene Highness is persuaded that these expectations are fallacious, and raised merely to induce the King to accede to the treaty; and further observes that a re-establishment of the power of the Stadtholder, under the limitation which would probably be proposed by France, and under the influence of that country, is a circumstance from which no security would be derived to the Allies in general, and no advantage to Great Britain.

His Serene Highness is persuaded that the influence of Great Britain, properly exerted and managed, must ever be the prevailing one in the northern parts of Germany.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD HENRY SPENCER,

ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AT BERLIN.

Brunswick, April 27, 1795.

You will, probably before this time, have heard of the arrival of M. de Lambert, a French general-

officer, at present in the service of Russia, whom I met on the other side of Magdeburg on his way to Potsdam. From the intelligence which I have been able to obtain, it appears that this officer is charged with despatches from the Court of Petersburg to that of Berlin, which, had they arrived three weeks ago, would have been highly acceptable to one person, and the offers they contain would not have been rejected by others, who are not so well inclined to the general interests of Europe. Colonel Hislop tells me that an officer of the York Rangers passed through Brunswick a few days ago from Stade, and informed him that orders had arrived to defer the embarkation of the emigrant corps assembled at that place.

TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

Stable Yard,
St. James's, May 5, 1795.

I did myself the honour of writing last to you from Berlin on the 21st of April. At the same time, Lord Henry Spencer sent a despatch in cypher stating his apprehensions that the overtures with which I was charged arrived too late to be attended with the success which the liberality of his Majesty's offer would probably have insured, could they have

been imparted to the King of Prussia previous to the signature of the ratification of the treaty. Lord Henry Spencer has transmitted by me a despatch to Lord Grenville, which will explain to you all the steps he took with the view of inducing the King of Prussia to give him an opportunity of explaining without any ministerial interference the favourable intentions of his Majesty, and I apprehend that under the existing circumstances, and under the order which accompanied the project, you will be of opinion that his Lordship was not at liberty to do more.

It remains only for me to inform you that, after waiting till the evening of the 24th, I left Berlin and returned to England by the way of Brunswick. His Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick very graciously granted me a second audience on my return, and I enclose the substance of this conversation, as well as of that with which his Serene Highness honoured me on the 18th of April.

TO LORD HENRY SPENCER,

ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AT BERLIN.

Stable Yard,
St. James's, May 8, 1795.

I reached London on Tuesday, and lost no time in delivering your despatch and in making my report.

I have the satisfaction of informing you that I have reason to believe that the Ministry are perfectly satisfied with the steps which your Lordship took, and are of opinion that, under the existing circumstances, and under the orders with which the project was accompanied, you could not have done more.

I mentioned to the Duke of Brunswick your sentiments upon the only measure that remains to be adopted, which entirely agree with his, and I had the additional weight of his opinion in the representations, which I have taken every opportunity of making very forcibly, of the good policy of leaving the project with your Lordship, with discretionary powers to act as opportunities may present themselves.. The unsteadiness of a certain personage, which has operated so much against us, may perhaps hereafter be in our favour; and I hope all parties see the propriety of holding ourselves in a state of readiness to avail ourselves of every turn in the politics of the Court of Berlin.

I believe that the best news I can send you is that all the corps of British infantry have reached their destination. Although their passage has been tedious, I do not understand that it has been attended with any loss.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX

THE defence of the country, in case of hostile invasion, is a matter of such infinite interest and importance, that I venture to add my father's papers containing his observations on the subject, and the preparations made in August, 1796.

It is not to be supposed that the measures which were prepared fifty-seven years since are such as would now be adopted: if they were, the prudence and propriety of publishing what follows might be questioned. The descriptions of the natural features of the country, which of course remain unchanged would be applicable to such emergency at any time; but the mode in which the defence will be conducted must be altogether altered.

There are persons in the present day who fear

that adequate preparation has not been made to resist an invasion. Their fears may be allayed by the knowledge, that at a period when such a danger was imminent, preparations were made vigorously, though silently, by those whose duty it was to provide them. It will not be apprehended that men who learnt the lesson of active war under the eye of our late illustrious Commander, and who were taught by him how the administration of military affairs could be most effectively conducted at home, are neglectful of their high duties in the superintendence of our national defences. The mantle of their great master has now fallen upon them. That his calm and provident spirit has been infused into their minds will, we trust, be proved by their successful efforts in this all-important work.

I have often heard my father describe the alacrity displayed by all classes of people in coming forward, with entire devotion of person and property, to defend the country. Young noblemen were eager to serve as subalterns in the militia; labouring men formed themselves into volunteer associations. Men treated as nothing the precedence of rank and position; their sole object was to bring forward their entire means for the defence of the country.

My father was one day sitting in his room at the Horse Guards, when a stranger was announced. A plain-looking old man walked in, and desired a

few minutes' conversation. He said that he had eighty-five covered eight-horse waggons, with teams and drivers all complete, which he wished to place at the disposal of the Government, without any remuneration; and which, on the shortest notice, he would send anywhere, where they could be of use. My father inquired his name. "Mr. Russell," was the reply. Some of my elder West country readers may recollect how Russell's well-appointed huge waggons travelled down the Bath and Exeter road before Mr. Brunel accomplished his noble undertaking towards the far west.

Thus, while persons in authority were arranging their plans of military organization, the nation, as one man, were tendering the Executive their best services. Aware of the blessings enjoyed in this country, attached to the institutions and government under which they lived, all classes showed a vigorous determination to avoid that ruin and misery which had befallen the unhappy inhabitants of other countries, who had been deceived into welcoming foreign invaders by the idle expectation of relief from all labour and distress, and of far happier systems of government.

The land forces which in August, 1796, were at the disposal of the Government to resist invasion, amounted to 118,633 men. Guards and garrisons, 49,219; Militia, 42,000; Irish brigade, 4,414; Fencible infantry, 13,000; Fencible cavalry, 10,000;

besides this we had in the colonies 77,868; and in India, paid by the Company, 10,000.

In the ensuing year, 60,000 more Militia were raised.

The first mentioned 118,633 men were stationed in the various districts hereafter named. They were not moved at once to the posts which they were to occupy in case of invasion; but barracks were prepared in the most suitable localities, and the Government did not hesitate to take on itself the responsibility of ample preparation against the threatened danger.

The next two pages, taken from my father's autobiographical memoir already quoted, will introduce to the reader his papers on the defence of the country.

In the course of this summer, (1795), the Duke of York attended by Major Henry Clinton and myself, visited Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. His Royal Highness reviewed and inspected the troops in the southern district, under the command of the Duke of Richmond, proceeding along the coast from Brighthelmstone to Dover, from thence to Chatham, and crossing the Thames at Tilbury, continued his tour into the eastern district, reviewing the troops at Warley, under the command of Marquis Cornwallis. His Royal Highness next visited the northern dis-

trict, reviewing the troops at Sunderland, Tynemouth, and the environs, commanded by Sir William Howe. His Royal Highness passed two days at Southampton, inspecting the army assembled at that place, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby, for an expedition to the West Indies. Here the Prince of Wales met his Royal Highness, and reviewed the troops. The Commander-in-chief's tours closed this year by an inspection of the Lines of Plymouth, and its dependencies; and a review of the troops in the western district, commanded by Lord George Lennox, the Governor of Plymouth.

At the end of this year the Duke of York intimated to me, that his Majesty had most graciously proposed to appoint me Deputy Quartermaster-general of the Forces. On this occasion, as well from a sense of my own unfitness for the situation, as from a feeling for Lieutenant-colonel Charles Crawford, who was at the time absent on a mission with the Imperial army, I felt it incumbent on me humbly to represent to the Commander-in-chief, that I was indebted for this honourable mark of the King's approbation to his Royal Highness's recommendation; but that I knew, and I believed his Royal Highness might recollect, that the appointment in question was the object of Lieutenant-colonel Crawford's particular solicitation. The Duke was kind enough to mention the subject again to the King, and his Majesty was

pleased to nominate Lieutenant-colonel Crawford to be Deputy Quartermaster-general, at the same time laying his commands on me to do the duty of the office during his absence, and most graciously condescending to assure me of the appointment of Deputy Adjutant-general whenever it should become vacant.

I should have mentioned that on the command of the army, at the commencement of this year, having been conferred on the Duke of York, he had most graciously made me the offer of being his secretary, which I begged to decline, preferring to remain one of his Royal Highness's aides-de-camp.

In April 1796, I was appointed Deputy Adjutant-general of the Forces. I continued to do the duty of deputy in both the departments most part of this year. The business in the Quartermaster-general's office began to be extremely interesting, as it was judged expedient to take measures for repelling the attack on our coast, which it was now confidently reported the enemy meditated, and, by previous arrangements, to prevent the confusion which the landing of the enemy was likely to produce; and, above all, to prevent his availing himself of the resources of the country.

Description of the Country.

To the southward of the Thames there are three remarkable ridges of hills, which run from east to west, through the counties of Kent, Sussex, and Surrey.

The first or southernmost range is generally known by the name of South Downs, and is about four or five miles in breadth, and extends from Beachy Head, Long Bridge, Lewes, Beeding Bridge, Steyning, Houghton Bridge, Cocking, and Maple Durham, towards Winchester. It consists entirely of chalk, beginning in high cliffs at Beachy Head, presents through its whole course a steep face towards the north, and slopes gently towards the British Channel on the south.

The second or middle range begins at Fairlight Head, near Hastings, and extends by Battle, Heathfield, Mayfield, Rotherfield, White Cross, and St. Leonard's Forest, towards Hyndhead. This range consists chiefly of clay, beginning with cliffs of that sort of earth, with red freestone intermixed at Fairlight Head, and slopes gradually to the south on one side, and to the north on the other. It is not so high as the South Downs already described, nor the north range of chalk hills, which come next to be

mentioned. These hills are, however, in the centre of the country south of the Thames. Here the rivers take their rise, those on the south side forcing their way through the South Downs to the sea; those on the north side making their way in the like manner through the north range of chalk hills to the river Thames.

The third range begins at Dover. Its southern edge extends by Folkstone, Wye, Lenham, Maidstone, Godstone, Gatton, Reigate, Dorking, Guildford, and Farnham towards Alton, where it is flattened, and loses the appearance of a range.

These hills consist entirely of chalk, beginning in high cliffs at Dover. They present universally a steep face towards the south, and slope gradually towards the Thames on the north.

The country comprehended between this range of chalk hills and the South Downs is (excepting the clay hills) in general, low, and the soil being stiff clay, is everywhere extremely deep and impassable. This low tract of country is known by the name of the Wealds, or Woodlands of Kent and Sussex, that part of Surrey included being much of the same nature as the Wealds, though the soil partakes not so much of the clay.

To the southward, and parallel to the great range of chalk hills, there runs a smaller ridge, which begins near Ashford and extends in a north-westerly direc-

tion, raising Coxheath, Golding, Meresworth, Seven-oaks, Kenthatch, Tilbestraw Mill, Outwood Windmill, Leith Hill, Ewhurst Windmill, and Hascomb Hill, towards Hyndhead. This range is lower than any of the three already mentioned. It consists of gravel intermixed with clay, presents a steep face to the south, and slopes gently towards the chalk hills to the north. We shall distinguish it by the name of the Midland Range.

These are the principal ranges which remarkably divide the country to the southward of the Thames. There are, nevertheless, others of smaller note, such as the bank of clay, which, beginning at Sandgate Castle, near Folkstone, extends to Hythe, Aldington, Appledore, Playdon, and Winchelsea, to Pett Church, where it joins the great range of clay hills near Fairlight. This bank or ridge is not high, but presents a steep face towards the south, and has formerly been the boundary of the sea, which has gradually retired and left the marsh lands dry that now lie between it and the foot of the bank.

These lowlands are known by the name of Romney Marsh, Walling and Guildford Marshes, and Pett Level. They are separated from the Wealds by the above-mentioned bank, and appear to have been formed by the strong tides that set alternately past the high headlands of South Foreland and Beachy Head. The current in the flux and reflux constantly raising

the mud and gravel, and throwing it gradually into the eddy of the adjoining bay, where, being undisturbed, it has settled, and now forms this extensive plain.

There is another tract of marsh lands, which extends along the foot of the rising grounds of Sandwich, and thence, along the sides of the river Stour, to Reculver on the sea-coast. This level is in some places two, and in others three or four miles over, and has formerly been overflowed by the sea, thereby forming what is called the Isle of Thanet, though no otherwise such than by a ditch joining the Stour to the sea at Reculver, an old Roman station (the walls of which are yet in part remaining), on the point of land where probably they used to pass over into the island.

The marsh lands are almost entirely without hedges or trees, being no otherwise enclosed than by the ditches full of water, which serve to drain them.

Between the foot of the South Downs and the sea-shore, there runs a long, narrow tract of level country, which begins in a point at Brighthelmstone, and becomes by degrees broader, as it extends westward to Chichester, where it is broadest, being there about seven or eight miles over. This district of the country is much enclosed.

In like manner, between the skirt of the north range of chalk hills, and the river Thames, there runs a tract of country in general level.

It has been mentioned that the sources of the rivers are in general in the range of clay hills, which extend from east to west along the middle of the country, and that they take their courses southward and northward to the sea, and to the Thames, according to that side of the hill on which they respectively rise. But what appears very remarkable is, that though the two ranges of Downs which run parallel to the clay hills, are higher than those hills, and each presenting a steep face towards them, and being of a hard substance, would seem formed as two immense natural barriers, to obstruct the passage of the rivers in their courses to the sea and the Thames; yet all those rivers have forced their way directly through the chalk hills, opening large gaps, or valleys through which they glide southward and northward, instead of taking their courses eastward, along the level country.

The rivers in this manner intersecting the great ranges of chalk hills, divide them into natural divisions or districts. The South Downs, as far as they extend in Sussex, are, by these intersections of the rivers, divided into five distinct parts —namely:

First, that between Beachy Head and the river Cuckmere, which begins to enter the chalk hills at Long Bridge, near Alfriston.

That between Cuckmere and the river Ouse, which penetrates the range at Lewes.

That between the rivers Ouse and Adur, the latter of which begins to force its way through the Downs at Beeding Bridge.

That between the Adur and the river Arun, which opens its passage at Houghton Bridge.

That extending from the Arun westward by Cocking and Maple Durham into Hampshire.

The tide flows up the rivers which thus divide the chain of South Downs; they are consequently deep, all except the Cuckmere being navigable for barges for a considerable way up the country, much higher than the north edge of the Downs. By this means each separate division of the Downs becomes a sort of intrenched camp, the strongest front being towards the north, as the hill is steepest that way.

In this range there are some few small openings, besides those through which the rivers pass, particularly at Pyecomb and Saddlescomb, between Lewes and Beeding; at Highden Place, between Beeding and Houghton Bridge; and at Duncton, between Houghton Bridge and Cocking. Through those small gaps, there are easy communications from the Wealds, or level country, to the villages within the Downs; for though each town or village under the hills on the north side, has a road or path, by

which the inhabitants ascend to the top, and even take up carts, yet they are generally very steep, narrow and difficult.

Though the general slope of the Downs from the north towards the sea on the south, is gradual, yet the interior part is far from being smooth and regular, being everywhere broken and interrupted with deep valleys and intervening ridges, which begin near the summit on the north, and branching out like fingers on a hand, grow gradually deeper as they descend towards the south. These valleys or hollows are without running water, but it is in them that the small villages are situated, and here only the ground is enclosed, the rest being entirely open. There are likewise many roads crossing the Downs, in almost all directions from the sea to the Wealds, which are firm and dry the whole year round; but, on account of the steepness of the ravines, they generally lead either along the bottom or the top of the intervening ridge, it being very inconvenient to cross directly from one ridge to the other.

All that tract to the eastward of the river Adur, is almost without wood. Between the rivers Adur and Arun, there is a large wood beginning near Holt, and extending westward to within a mile of Arundel, in which is included Augmering Park. That district, from the river Arun westward, is the most irregular and woody, being, in a manner, one

continued forest, in which is comprehended Arundel Park, Slindon Park, Norewood, Northwood, Red Copse Wood, and Charlton Forest, which last extends three or four miles, and joins with Bore and Waltham Forests in Hampshire.

The north range of chalk hills is, in general, ten or twelve miles over, and like the South Downs, is divided by rivers which pass through them in their course towards the Thames in six different parts—namely:

That between Dover and Wye, where the river Stour enters the range.

That between the Stour and Halling, where the Medway begins to force its way through the range.

That between the Medway and Otford, where the river Darent penetrates the Hills.

That between the Davent and Dorking, where the river Mole, in forcing its way through the range, sinks in a cavity of the chalk.

That between the Mole and Guildford, where the river Wey opens for itself a passage towards the Thames.

That extending from Guildford, by Farnham, to Alton, where the chalk, in its course westward, flattens, and loses the appearance of a range.

This chain of chalk hills differs in some respects from the South Downs; being in extent broader, and in general more enclosed. There are, nevertheless,

considerable spaces where the ground is quite open; particularly the eastern extremity, near Dover, Folkstone and Barham, and in the middle, near Croydon, Epsom, and Banstead. The most considerable woods along this range are those between Canterbury and Boughton, and between Sittingbourne and Boxley Hill, near Maidstone.

Besides the valleys through which the rivers pass in their course towards the Thames, the only opening in the whole extent of this range is a small one near Gatton in Surrey; and in the neighbourhood of Charing, in Kent, the chalk hills are lower than ordinary.

With regard to the Midland Ridge, it may be observed that it is likewise divided by the rivers which intersect the north range of chalk hills, into certain distinct parts; but as they will be easily seen in the map, it seems unnecessary to enumerate them. It may be further observed that the tide not flowing up the rivers, the Medway excepted, which divide the north range of chalk hills, they are not so deep, and consequently not of the same importance towards covering the flanks of an army, as those are which intersect the South Downs.

The Principal Positions for an Army Employed in the Defence of this District.

To point out the principal positions for an army with some degree of method, it will be necessary to divide the south-east part of the coast into certain districts, to show the most accessible place, or places, in each, and from these to suppose that an enemy is endeavouring to advance into the country.

The coast may be divided into five parts, viz.:

1. From the Isle of Thanet to Folkstone, which comprehends the eastern extremity of the north range of chalk hills.

2. From Folkstone to Fairlight Head, which includes the space between the north range of chalk hills and the clay hills.

3. From Fairlight Head to Beachy Head, which includes the space between the eastern extremity of the clay hills and the South Downs.

4. From Beachy Head to Chichester, comprehending the shore parallel to the South Downs.

5. The last division is mentioned in the observations on the south-west district.

Along the shore of the Isle of Thanet there are cliffs of chalk which are highest at North Foreland, and become gradually lower to Gore End on the

north side, and Cliff End on the south side, where they disappear. From the isle to the mainland there are several outlets: the first along the shore from Cole Harbour to Reculver, impracticable for carriages; the second by Sarre Bridge, along Sarre Wall to Canterbury; the third by Cliff End and Stour to Sandwich, where there is now a stone bridge over the Stour.

From Sandwich to Deal by Walmer Castle, the shore is flat and open, with a gravelly beach, which runs the whole way. At Walmer Castle the cliffs of chalk begin again, and gradually increase in height by Dover to near Folkstone.

In this space, the only accessible places (excepting Dover Haven), from the shore under the cliffs to the high ground at top, are at King's Down and St. Margaret's Bay; but these gaps being small, the communications this way are very narrow and difficult, and might be easily rendered impracticable. The posts along this part of the coast are Sandown, Deal, Walmer, and Dover Castle, where the two last are commanded by the neighbouring high grounds. Although that part of Kent between Canterbury and the east shore affords no position naturally strong for an army that would make front towards Sandwich, Deal, or Dover, yet, if a landing were apprehended near Sandwich or Deal (which, supposing the fleet out of the question, is the part of the coast of easiest

access) the opposing army might be assembled, the centre or main body on the heights near Nonington, a corps on the right near Hougham, between Folkstone and Dover, and a small one on the left near Reculver, to guard the *débouchés* of the Isle of Thanet.

From this, if we suppose the enemy to have made his landing good, and that he is pushing on with a superior force, the proper place to make the first great stand would seem to be behind the river Stour, along the heights of Boughton Hill, having the right flank towards Shottenden Windmill and Eastwell Park, the centre behind Harbledown, and left extending towards the sea near Herne. Canterbury should be covered as long as possible by fortifying the heights on the farther side of the Stour, which command that city. The next position might be taken (though here the situation is not equally advantageous) on the heights behind Faversham, the right extending towards Statisfield, and the left near the sea. From Faversham to the Medway the country is not otherwise strong than from its closeness: therefore an army that had been under the necessity of retiring westward would naturally get behind that river at Rochester, and take its position (the strongest between Dover and London) along the chalk hills, with the right behind Halling, the centre behind Stroud, and the left extending along the heights of the Hoo.

The dockyards at Chatham seem here to be neglected; they are situated on the farther side of the Medway, and are only covered by the Lines at Brompton, of a slight construction, and though every means were used to remedy their defects by strengthening the Lines themselves, throwing up redoubts in the most advantageous situations in front, fortifying Rochester Castle, and such other posts on that side of the river as might appear convenient to occupy for the purpose of covering the dockyard as long as possible, yet it would still seem improper to risk a general engagement with so great and impassable a river immediately in the rear.

To preserve the dockyard, to prevent the enemy getting possession of the mouth of the Medway, to keep them at a distance as long as possible, and to make the risk less, in case of coming to a general engagement, it might perhaps be eligible to endeavour to fortify a position somewhere about Sittingbourne, where the country is narrow, having the right flank to the top of the chalk hills, and the left to the sea beyond Milton Creek.

If the army were obliged to quit its position behind the Medway at Rochester, which can scarcely ever be supposed, unless an enemy turned it from some other quarter, it would make its next stand behind the Darent, having Dartford in

front of the left. The centre in two divisions behind Farningham, and along the heights by Chelsfield Windmill, with the right on the ridge of chalk hills towards Dunton.

In this position, as the high ground at Dartford Branch commands the passage of the Darent, this ground should, if possible, be kept possession of by fortifying it. That division of the army at Chelsfield Windmill would occupy a very high and commanding situation, and be posted upwards of a mile from the banks of the Darent, to avoid the commanding ground which extends along the east of that river by Shoreham towards Otford; therefore in this and all similar situations, the fords and all accessible places should constantly be guarded by detachments or advanced posts of light troops, which would form a chain in front.

After retiring from the Darent, the left wing of the army would occupy Shooter's Hill, extending from Plumstead to Eltham. The centre in two divisions would take front on the heights of Chiselhurst and Holwood Hill, and the right would occupy the ridge of the chalk hills in the neighbourhood of Knockholt.

In this position, as the army is again supposed to be posted on the most commanding ground at a considerable distance from the banks of the small river Cray, the chain of advanced posts would run

along that river by Crayford from Foot's Cray, St. Mary's Cray, &c.

The last position is that behind the river Ravensbourne, the left running along Dulwich Hills, the centre in two divisions, occupying the skirts of Norwood and heights of Addington Trees; the right wing would keep possession of the ridge of the chalk hills, near Chelsham and Botley Hill, which in all the positions is considered as the great point of *appui* for the right flank. As Blackheath commands the passage over Deptford Creek, it would seem necessary to keep possession of it as long as possible by fortifying it.

The principles on which this theory of movements is founded are these,—that in all the positions, the front is naturally strong, and might by art be made still more so; the right flank is in great measure secured by being constantly placed on the ridge of the chalk hills, and the left by being *appuyed* to the sea, supposing always that an enemy has not been able, by any superiority there, to get possession of the Thames. In such an event, it would be necessary to fortify the banks of the river on both sides, especially from the mouth of the Medway upwards, to prevent the possibility of the enemy's landing troops in the rear of the left flank.

In like manner, if the enemy by extending to his

left flank beyond the bounds of the chalk hills, should endeavour to turn our right flank, a large corps, particularly of light troops, might constantly occupy the midland ridge, which runs parallel to, and between the chalk hills and the Wealds.

In the first position, this corps may be supposed to be posted near Hythe or Lymme, next at Ashford, then at Broughton or Coxheath; and if obliged to cross the Medway about Maidstone, West Farleigh, or Yalding, it would necessarily occupy the most advantageous posts upon that part of the ridge which extends from Maidstone towards Sevenoaks and Kent Hatch, constantly combining its movements with those of the army.

At Folkstone, the chalk cliff ends, and the bank of clay begins which divides the marsh lands from the Wealds. Sandgate Castle is situated immediately under this bank, and consequently is commanded by it. From this, a beach of gravel runs along the shore to Brockman's Barn, where the sea wall begins, and extends by Dym Church to Romney, where the gravelly beach takes place anew, and extends round Dungeness to the Jew's Gap. Here again the sea-wall begins, continuing to Rye Haven, from whence to the end of the cliffs to Fairlight Head a beach of gravel runs along the shore.

Besides Sandgate Castle, already mentioned, and

the small sea batteries at Folkstone, Hythe, Romney, and Rye, there are no posts along this part of the coast. Rye being situated on a rock, and almost surrounded by the sea at high water, is capable of being made strong. It is, however, subject to the inconvenience of being too near the heights of Playdon.

If an enemy were to attempt a landing on this part of the coast, the most likely place would seem to be near Hythe or Rye; for though the water is so deep off Dungeness that ships of any burthen can come almost close to the shore, yet it being next to impossible to move through the middle of the marsh lands, an enemy would be reduced to the necessity of advancing along the sea-walls by Dym Church and Brockman's Barn, on one side towards Hythe, or by the Jew's Gap on the other side toward Rye, in order to endeavour to get possession of one of the ridges, and to make his movements as long as possible in that direction. An enemy would find it very difficult to penetrate through the heart—that is, through the low part—of the Wealds; this district of the country being extremely close, and, except in the middle of summer, almost impassable, and in the winter season generally under water by the overflowing of the Medway and its branches.

An army that was to oppose an enemy in this quarter would first take post on the bank of clay,

which affords good positions for confining them in the marshes; and for this purpose it might be divided into three corps, whereof the right-hand division would occupy the end of the great range of clay hills near Fairlight Head, with the ports extending towards Winchelsea and Rye. The centre would take post near Appledore, so as to cover the access into the middle of the Wealds, and the left would take its position on the height near Hythe or Lymme, so as to keep up the communication with the centre along the bank of clay, in which situation it would likewise be in readiness, either to gain possession of the north range of chalk hills, or to move by Ashford towards Maidstone along the midland ridge, according as circumstances required.

It is to be supposed that an enemy, in whatever quarter he landed, would always endeavour to push towards the capital. In the present case, after having got through the Wealds, he would still be obliged to pass the Medway, and to force his way over to the midland ridge, and then over the great range of chalk hills, for which reason, if the three corps above-mentioned were obliged to retire, they would do it in such manner as first to defend the banks of the Medway—for example, at Edenbridge, Tunbridge, and Maidstone—which river, by means of locks or dams, might be so raised as to form an inundation in front.

The midland range would come next to be defended at Kent Hatch, Sevenoaks, and Mereworth, and then the great range of chalk hills near Westerham, Dunton, and Wrotham. This being the great rampart, and almost the last obstacle to surmount between the coast and the capital, it is to be supposed that an enemy should not be easily able to force it against an army that was in possession of the top of the ridge, with all the gorges and other accessible places. And in order that the army might move with greater ease and rapidity on either flank, as the enemy's motions might make it necessary, large openings should be made along the whole extent of the ridge for at least two columns, and bridges of communication should be laid over the river.

But if, notwithstanding all precautions, an enemy should gain possession of the chalk hills, which would give him an evident advantage with regard to the command of the ground, yet still one other stand might be made between this ridge and London. The left occupying the former position on Shooter's Hill, the centre extending by Chiselhurst to Bromley and Clay Hills towards Elsmore End, and the right running along the height of Norwood, by Streatham Common, to Tooting.

An army in this position would have again the advantage of the ground against an enemy that was advancing towards London; but as no river or deep

ravine runs in front of it, every measure in the way of fortifying would become necessary, in order to make it tenable. If the left wing and centre were obliged to retire from Shooter's Hill and Bromley, the last position of all would be that from Blackheath along Dulwich Hills, and Norwood by Streatham Common towards Tooting.

The cliffs which extend from Fairlight Head become gradually lower towards Hastings. A considerable high bank (in several places rocky) does, however, continue along the shore by Bulver Hithe towards Landing-Gate, when it disappears. The ground from thence along Pevensey Bay, by Langley Point, to the sea-houses near Eastbourne, is flat. Here the cliffs of chalk begin, and rise higher and higher to Beachy Head. Along the extent of the shore from Hastings to the Sea-houses, there runs the whole way beach of gravel, which is highest at Langley Point.

Except the battery at Hastings, there is no post along this coast. Pevensey Castle is very extensive; great part of the walls still remain, and being surrounded by swampy meadows, or levels, it might from its situation be made strong.

Let it be supposed that a landing was apprehended between the great range of clay hills and the South Downs. The opposing army would seem to be properly enough divided into three corps, whereof the

right-hand division posted at Eastbourne would be destined to prevent the enemy getting footing on the Downs, and to communicate by means of intermediate posts, with the centre division posted between Pevensey and Bexhill, so as to cover the access into the middle of the Wealds of Sussex. The left-hand division would take its position near Hastings, so as to defend the end of the clay hills, and in case of necessity would occupy the ridges of them in retiring.

These three corps, after quitting the coast, would make their next stand about the Witch Cross, with the right towards West Houthley, and left along Ashdown Forest, towards Crowborough Beacon. For though the ascent to the clay hills is gentle and gradual, yet he that is in possession of the summit has an evident advantage.

The next position for an army would be on the midland ridge, with the right towards Outwood Windmill, the centre at Tilverton Hill, and the left near Kent Hatch. If the enemy indicated a design of turning the right flank, by penetrating through St. Leonard's Forest towards Dorking, or Guildford, in this case the right of the army would occupy the midland ridge, at Ewhurst Windmill. In like manner, if the enemy pushed to turn the left flank by Tunbridge, then the left flank of the army would occupy the heights at Sevenoaks.

If an army were necessitated to quit the midland

ridge, its next position would be on the great range of chalk hills, having the right behind Reigate, the centre behind Godstone and left behind Westerham. If the enemy seemed to push towards the gorge of the Mole at Dorking, then the army would march by its right, to occupy Boxhill and the White Downs, being the high grounds on both sides, which form that gorge. In contrary circumstances the army would march by its left towards the gorge of the Darent, to oppose the enemy that might then be approaching from Sevenoaks.

An enemy having got over the great barrier could only be resisted in the last position, whereof the point of Norwood may be supposed the centre. If they pushed to turn the right, then the right wing would occupy the heights of Wimbledon, and Combe Place, *appuying* their right on Richmond Park. If they attempted to turn the left, then the left wing would take post at Shooter's Hill, or Blackheath and Dulwich Hills, as before described.

N.B.—Pollard's Hill between Streatham and Croydon affords a position for an advanced corps before the centre.

From Beachy Head the chalk cliffs continue along the shore without interruption (except at the mouth of the Cuckmere and Seaford Bay) but become gradually lower to Brighthelmstone, where they disappear. From thence, westward to Chichester,

the shore is everywhere flat, and the sea ebbs out a considerable way at low water. This part of the coast is entirely without posts, except the batteries in Seaford Bay, and the mouth of the river Arun. If it were imagined that an enemy would attempt on any part of the coast of this division, the army might assemble, the right at Chichester, the centre at New Shoreham, and left at Newhaven or Seaford. Though the South Downs, which now become the scene of action, slope gently to the Channel, and present, as has been before mentioned, their steep face towards the north, yet the command of the ground being still in our favour, an enemy that had landed on the coast might be opposed with advantage, till such time as we had been obliged to quit the Downs retiring over the northern edge. The ground then becomes much in favour of an enemy, who is in possession of this range of hills, as each division of them forms a sort of intrenched camp, having the steep front of the chalk hills before it, a deep river on each flank, and the sea in the rear. It is true that the country between that ridge and the sea, of which the enemy would then be master, is but of small extent, and yet by the chain of old posts, which remain to this day along the top or northern edge of the Downs, it is evident that this very part of the country has at some time been possessed by an enemy, probably Ella and his Saxons, who,

when these posts were occupied, had not been able to penetrate farther into the country. These redoubts served not only to defend the Downs against the inhabitants, but were at the same time so many looks-out, from whence they could see over the whole extent of the Wealds, and even as far as the range of chalk hills in Surrey.

From the South Downs, if we suppose an enemy to advance towards the capital, the most likely routes for him to take are these:—viz., 1st., from their right by Lewes, East Grinstead, and Godstone; 2nd., from their centre by Beeding, Horsham, and Dorking; 3rd., from their left by Midhurst, Hyndhead, and Guildford. On the first route, the position which an army would necessarily occupy to oppose them, would be the same as described before, namely, on the clay hills near the Witch Cross, on the midland ridge at Tilverton Hill, on the chalk hills at Godstone, and last of all, at Norwood or Streatham.

The middle route is the least likely, as it leads through the deepest part of the Wealds; the positions, however, to intercept an enemy on the road are likewise the same as before—St. Leonard's Forest, Ewhurst Windmill, the chalk hills on both sides of the gorge at Dorking, and the heights of Wimbledon and Streatham. In the route from their left, after having passed the Downs at Cocking, the first position might be taken at Fardley Hill, between

Midhurst and Haslemere, the next at Hyndhead and the Black Downs, then on the ridge of chalk hills on both sides of the gorge at Guildford, and last of all at Wimbledon, the right wing extending to Richmond, along the heights of Petersham Park.

From the foregoing observations, it will appear that, as the movements are generally supposed to be conducted along the summits of the ranges of hills, the camps or positions are therefore constantly situated on high ground, and consequently are in many instances badly watered, especially where the soil is chalky. The reason is, that almost all except the great rivers, periodically run underground. The inhabitants call a rivulet of this description a nail-burn, being a small brook that runs at certain times only. They generally begin to pour from their sources in the spring months, running with a considerable current till autumn, when the channel becomes gradually dry. Of these nailburns, those of Barham Downs and Eltham, in East Kent, are very remarkable, as also that which rises behind St. Rook's Hill in Sussex, and passes by Havant and Chichester. When these rivulets dry up, the inhabitants are supplied only by wells (dug some of them to an immense depth in the chalk), and rain-water collected in ponds made for that purpose.

Such situations for encamping large bodies of

cavalry would on this account be extremely inconvenient; but if we suppose an enemy in this country, these are the positions which there would be a necessity of occupying, unless we gave up what is the natural and only strength with regard to the circumstance of the ground.

At the bottom of the chalk hills, in front of the Kent and Surrey range, and in the rear of the positions on the Sussex Downs, there is constantly running water. If, however, from the nearness of the enemy, the troops could not water in front, the infantry would then have their supply, as the inhabitants have, from the wells and ponds, and there would be a necessity for encamping the cavalry in many instances, at a considerable distance in the rear. But it is supposed in general that an army when obliged to water in front, might do it in safety under cover of the advanced posts or a corps of light troops.

General Defence of the Southern District.

Except in East Kent, the east part of the South Downs, and that part of Surrey near Banstead and Epsom, the country to the south and south-east of London is in general so close, and in many places so woody, that large bodies (of heavy cavalry especially)

could not act; but along the skirts of Surrey and Hampshire and towards the west, the country is much more open, and consequently more adapted to the operations of cavalry.

Supposing our enemies to have the design of invading this country, and that they can collect troops and vessels in the different ports of the Channel, sufficient for its execution, the part of our coast most exposed to such an attempt, is that which extends from the mouth of the Thames to the Isle of Portland. Beyond that, the Channel increases in breadth, the coast of Dorset is of dangerous approach, as is also the greatest part of Devon and Cornwall; and to effect their design, any armament from Brest must escape our grand fleet; and any armament from the bays of Brittany must elude our squadrons at Jersey and Guernsey, at Portland, Torbay and Plymouth. To the northward of the Thames, from the length of the voyage, and the risks of the navigation, it is thought the enemy cannot make any attempt whatever in small vessels, as the coasts of Essex and Suffolk, and beyond them, must be secure if we are vigilant from our naval stations at the Downs, the mouth of the Thames, Yarmouth, and at whatever other intermediate point is found proper.

From the Thames to the Isle of Portland, there are several marked divisions of the coast to be made, beginning from the northward.

1st. The coast from Whitstable by Reculver, to near Margate, is low and in many places accessible. Canterbury is in this neighbourhood, and affords great resources.

2nd. From Margate, where there is a battery, to Ramsgate, the shore is bounded by high cliffs; in some parts there is a sandy beach under them, but on the whole, it may be deemed inaccessible. The harbour at Ramsgate is very fine and capacious but dry at low water; it is defended by some guns in battery on the cliffs. There is also a battery at Broadstairs.

3rd. From Ramsgate to Walmer Castle the shore is low, the beach in general shingle, and such, that in moderate weather, vessels may run ashore on Walmer. Deal and Sandown Castles, with two temporary works, have large cannon mounted, and defend the shore to Sandwich. Beyond that, to Ramsgate, which is a considerable extent, there are no batteries, and the best landing. Sandown Castle is a respectable work, capable of good defence, and should be defended to the last extremity.

The other two castles are not in so good a state, but still may be maintained. The temporary works are of a slight construction.

Whatever force might attempt a descent between Whitstable and Walmer, must, it is thought, issue from the ports of Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and

perhaps from the Scheldt, but in so doing they must cross our fleet in the Downs.

If that point and the Thames are sufficiently guarded, they can hardly expect success, and must expose themselves to much risk, without a chance, in the first instance, of establishing a communication with France.

4th. From Walmer Castle, by Dover to Sandgate Castle, a mile beyond Folkstone, is one continued high and commanding cliff, which may be considered as inaccessible, although there is a sandy shore under the cliff in several places between Dover and Folkstone, and Folkstone and Sandgate.

A mile to the eastward of Folkstone, the coast forms an indifferent bay of small extent, where the surrounding heights are low, and in all this line, this is the most accessible point; it is defended by a new battery of three guns. Folkstone itself has a sufficient number of guns, and is not readily approached. Sandgate Castle is commanded, and in a very indifferent state of defence, except as a sea battery.

At Sandgate Castle the cliffs cease, and the high ground continuing behind Hythe, Lynn, Bilsington, and through the Isle of Oxney at a great distance from the sea, bounds Romney Marsh, and continues into Sussex.

5th. From Sandgate, round by Dungeness to the

harbour of Rye, a bank of shingle bounds and secures the low country, which might be inundated in great part both by the sea and by the land waters. The principal sluices are near Dym Church, where for several miles the shingle is necessarily supported by an earthern wall, and if those sluices were prepared and defended by proper works their effect might indeed become of the greatest importance.

On every part of the beach, in favourable weather, vessels may be run ashore. The coast road from Hythe, by New Romney to Lydd and Rye, is exceedingly good; but the other roads in the marsh are very indifferent, and in the winter impracticable for artillery.

The present defence of this part of the coast consists in a battery at Shorne Cliff, near Sandgate, and in three temporary redoubts on the shingle bank before Hythe, mounted with heavy guns, about a mile from each other, but not of a moment's defence whenever the enemy, in any considerable force, has gained a landing. From these, by Dym Church to Dungeness, there are no defences. At Dungeness, there is an enclosed work, not very substantial, and some flanking batteries.

Towards Rye Harbour, there are no works or road, except along the shingle and the sands when the tide is low.

The mouth of Rye Harbour, formed by the river

Rother is difficult of access, and is defended by a small battery. The tide flows a great way up this river; which offers shelter to any number of small vessels. From thence to Hastings, the shore continues accessible, but is commanded by the high grounds.

6th. For two or three miles on each side of Hastings, Fairlight Heights form cliffs, which overhang the shore, but from thence receding from it, they take a direction behind Bexhill into Sussex, and at a distance bound Pevensey Level, which is a low country of the nature of Romney, but not so broad and extensive, stretching from the neighbourhood of Bexhill to Eastbourne, near Beachy Head.

The whole of this line presents sand and shingle on the shore, of the same nature as Romney Marsh.

At the two extremities, Hastings and Langley Point, are considerable batteries. In the intermediate space, there are no prepared defences but what the natural strength of the country presents, the low part of which it would be difficult to pass, and it may be inundated.

7th. At Beachy Head, the South Down chalk hills terminate on the sea, and form a range of high cliffs along the shore quite to Brighthelmstone. In that space, there are a few accessible places, but of no

great extent, and defended by batteries, as Cuckmere, Seaford, Newhaven, and Rottendean.

Newhaven, which is the port of Lewes and the river Ouse, will afford shelter to a large number of small vessels.

The South Downs are themselves open sheep pastures, four or five miles in breadth. Their north side, which is high and steep, overhangs the woody, enclosed, strong country of the Wealds of Sussex, and from thence they slope gradually their whole breadth towards the sea. They are cut through at different distances from north to south by several rivers, coming from the interior country, as Cuckmere, the Ouse, the Adur, the Arun. They begin at Brighthelmstone to recede from the shore; and passing behind Arundel and Chichester, continue their direction into Hampshire.

8th. From Brighthelmstone quite to Bognor and Selsea, the shore is low and accessible in moderate weather, the beaches are favourable, and the country is dry and fine; nor are any batteries established except at Brighthelmstone, Little Hampton, at the mouth of the Arun, and at Selsea Bill. The mouths of the Shoreham, Arundel, and Selsea rivers, afford shelter for small vessels.

It may be observed that to this whole circle of coast from Selsea to Reculver, London may be considered as the common centre, being from no

point less than sixty, or more than seventy miles distant.

9th. From Selsea to Portsmouth, and from thence to Christchurch, the whole coast is so covered by Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight as to offer no probable point of attack; and the same may be presumed of Poole Harbour, which is good and spacious, together with Studland and Swanage Bays in its neighbourhood, quite to St. Aldham's Head.

10th. From St. Aldham's Head to near Weymouth, the coast is guarded by very high cliffs, and is dangerous to approach. The beaches and bays of Weymouth and Portland are good. The island itself is strong, and not to be approached but from the bay; and from thence round by Abbotsbury to Lyme, is a most dangerous shore.

In all this range of coast, the most eligible points for the enemy to land at, with respect to their future advance in the country, appear to be:

1st. In the neighbourhood of Sandwich and the Isle of Thanet.

2nd. From Folkstone to Dungeness.

3rd. From Rye Harbour to Hastings and its neighbourhood.

4th. The neighbourhood of Eastbourne.

Further to the westward, the length of the passage

increases, although the shores of Brighthelmstone, Shoreham, Arundel and Chichester, present points of descent in favourable weather.

From these places, Portsmouth might possibly be the immediate object.

The points from which an enemy would endeavour to establish his communication, which must be protected by a considerable force, would, in an order of preference, be

1st. Ramsgate and Deal.

2nd. Folkstone and Hythe.

3rd. Rye and Hastings.

4th. Eastbourne.

To the westward of these, in proportion as he could cover them, Newhaven, Shoreham, Arundel rivers, and Pagham Harbour, offer shelter to small vessels and the intermediate places of landing.

It is imagined that any attempt to land—

1st. Between Whitstable and Dover, must be made from the ports of France and Flanders to the eastward of Calais.

2nd. From Folkstone to Beachy Head, from the ports of France between Calais and Dieppe.

3rd. From Beachy Head to Chichester, from the ports between Dieppe and Cherbourg.

4th. On the Isle of Wight or near it, from the ports between Dieppe and Cherbourg.

5th. To the westward of St. Aldham's Head,

from Cherbourg, Granville, St. Malo, and the Channel ports of Brittany.

Jersey and Guernsey are surrounded with danger, and require the most vigilant attention for their preservation. The previous acquisition of them would very much facilitate the attempts of the enemy.

The Nore, the Downs, Portsmouth, Portland, Torbay, Plymouth and Falmouth are considered as the only good and safe roadsteads for fleets and large ships along this extent of coast; but it is presumed that in moderate and favourable weather, there are many safe places of anchorage on this coast, as on both sides of Dungeness and under Beachy Head, and that all such situations on the enemy's coast as can tend to give check to whatever may issue from their principal ports are well known and considered advantageous, as the same wind which conveys him away facilitates his immediate pursuit.

The occasional appearance of two or three of our two-deckers off their principal ports in the Channel would tend much to keep them in awe.

Our great stations of the Downs, St. Helens, Portland, Guernsey, give much security to everything within their reach, but the want of a certain anchorage on our shore, leaves the three most exposed and important points of all—Dungeness, Hastings and Beachy Head, liable to be unprotected at the critical moment, when, in the absence of our cruisers, a

severe gale of wind for a few hours may waft over a considerable body of the enemy (suppose 20,000), and give them an opportunity of seizing a point of our coast, perhaps of sending back their vessels, and establishing a communication within a night's sail of single vessels.

In the arrangement of our naval force, these and many other local considerations, unknown to landsmen, will undoubtedly be provided for in the best manner; but it never can be too much enforced that the security of the coast from Folkstone to Beachy Head, is, before all others, the most important object.

Did one side or other of Dungeness Point always afford anchorage for a small squadron, the security of this line would be complete.

The stations at St. Helens, St. Marcon, Guernsey, Portland, Plymouth, and the distance from the enemy's coast certainly give great security to everything westward of the Isle of Wight, and the island itself cannot be too carefully guarded against surprise in the absence of our principal fleets and detached squadrons, for could an enemy in force establish himself on this island, and effectually disturb or prevent the anchorage between it and the mainland, the greatest inconvenience and distress would arise.

The most eligible points of descent have been stated as:

1st. Between Whitstable and Sandwich.

2nd. Between Folkstone and Dungeness.

3rd. Between Rye and Bexhill.

4th. Between Pevensey and Eastbourne.

5th. Between Brighton and Chichester.

From such points of descent, their most advantageous and eligible lines of operation appear to be:

1st. If landed in East Kent and in possession of Canterbury, from thence to Chatham along the country between the south side of the chalk hills and the sea. As the Medway must be formidable and well guarded at Chatham, a passage is to be forced about Maidstone, the line continued down the river to communicate with Chatham, and from thence along the great road by Gravesend, Dartford, Blackheath, towards London.

The great advantages on this line are, that the right flank is in security the whole way, and also the left as far as Chatham, being supposed to move along the ridge of the chalk hills, and the possession of Chatham, Woolwich, Greenwich are successively in view, as well as the command of the Thames when arrived at Gravesend.

From Maidstone the enemy may also proceed by the direct road of Wrotham, Farningham, Foot's Cray, Eltham, or he may go still farther on till he gains the great road from Sevenoaks, through Farnborough and Bromley. These two last routes throw him

farther off from the Thames, and the advantages attending its neighbourhood, and leave both his flanks more uncovered in situations favourable to cavalry.

2nd. If landed between Folkstone and Dungeness, he could not be supposed prepared for proceeding at once to Ashford and Maidstone. He would first make himself master of East Kent and Canterbury, and proceed along the great line already described, or if he moved on Rye, which is not probable, he would follow the same line as if he had debarked at that place.

3rd. If landed about Rye, Hastings, and Bexhill, two great routes present themselves. From Rye by Newenden Bridge to Hawkhurst, and from Hastings by Battle and Silver Hill to Hawkhurst. From thence a great route leads through Cranbrook, and over Cox Heath to Maidstone. If the enemy takes such direction, or otherwise from Hawkhurst, two contiguous routes lead to Tunbridge, one through Lamberhurst, and the other through Wadhurst and Tunbridge Wells. From Tunbridge the great route continues through Sevenoaks and Bromley.

4th. If landed near Pevensey and Eastbourne, the great route proceeds through Hailsham, Heathfield, Mayfield, Frant, Tunbridge Wells to Tunbridge,; and from Eastbourne, Hailsham, or Heathfield he may gain Lewes, Uckfield, or Maresfield, on another great route.

5th. If landed near Brighton and Shoreham, many excellent roads lead to the capital.

There are two through Lewes, and by Maresfield and Chailey, which unite at Witch Cross, and from thence proceed by Grinstead, Godstone, and Croydon. One by Ditchling and Linfield, parallel to, and at no great distance from, the other, to which it unites near Felbridge. One through Clayton, Cuckfield, and Crawley to Reigate, and from thence either to Croydon or Sutton. One through Henfield, and another by Shoreham and Steyning, which connect near Shermanbury, and again these divide, one by Handerness and Crawley, to Reigate, the other by Horsham and Dorking to Epsom.

Three general, and in many places, good communications, parallel to the coast, cross and connect all these routes, and facilitate the change from one to the other.

1st. From Steyning, by the South Downs, to Lewes, Horsebridge, Henfield, Battle to Hastings.

2nd. From Horsham, by Handcross, Cuckfield, Linfield, Maresfield, Heathfield, Burwash, Hawkhurst, Cranbrook, Smarden, Charing, Faversham.

3rd. From Dorking by Reigate, Godstone, Westerham, Sevenoaks, Malling, Maidstone, Sittingbourne.

There is also a good communication from Lewes

to Heathfield, and from Tunbridge to Wrotham and also to Maidstone.

6th If landed at Arundel, or between that and Chichester.

From Arundel, there is a great road through Pulborough to Horsham and Dorking, another to Petworth; and from Guildford there are two roads; one through Awfold, the other through Chidingfold.

From Chichester there are two roads, one through Petworth, the other through Midhurst and Haslemere to Guildford.

The next great route from the westward, is that from Portsmouth through Petersfield and Guildford to London.

From Chichester there is also a parallel great route, in no place very distant from the shore, through Arundel, Shoreham, Brighthelmstone, Lewes, Firle, to Eastbourne.

There are numbers of small, collateral country roads, which are in general narrow, deep, and very indifferent, except on the Downs, and open parts of the district.

Thus, the many roads which lead from the different points of this great circumference of coast, from Margate to Chichester, as they approach their common centre, London, are united at about thirty miles from the capital in eight principal ones, and

there enter on the chalk range of hills, at Stroud, Wrotham, Barham's Court, Westerham, Godstone, Reigate, Guildford, from which points of a smaller circle, they all tend towards London.

These several roads, according to the point of the coast from which they depart, cross all or some of the high or parallel ranges of the country which so remarkably divide it, and afford so many advantageous and defensible positions.

They are, beginning with the most northerly:

1st. The great chalk range, which, stretching from Dover and Folkstone by Wye, Lenham, Maidstone, Wrotham, Godstone, Dorking, Guildford, Farnham, joins with the extensive chalk country of Hampshire. This range presents a strong and steep face to the south, and slopes gradually towards the Thames on the north.

2nd. The midland range, which, beginning near Ashford, runs at a small distance from the other by Ulcomb, Coxheath, Mereworth, Sevenoaks, Kent Hatch, Tilverton Hill, Outwood Windmill, Leith Hill, Ewhurst Windmill, and Ascomb Hill towards Hyndhead. It consists of gravel intermixed with clay, is of a less height than the others, presents a steep face to the south, and slopes more gently towards the north.

3rd. The range of clay hills begins at Fairlight Head over Hastings, and extends by Battle, Heath-

field, Mayfield, Rotherfield, Crowborough, Witch Cross, and St. Leonard's Forest towards Hyndhead. It consists chiefly of clay, in some places intermixed with red freestone. It slopes gradually, but more so to the south, and many branches extend from the principal trunk, which form strong and wooded ravines.

In this range, the rivers of Kent, Sussex, and Surrey take their rise. Those on its south side find their way through the South Downs to the sea; those on its north side force their way through the midland and north chalk range to the Thames. On the summit of this range there is a great extent of open forest ground, as about Heathfield, Crowborough, Ashdown Forest, St. Leonard's Forest.

Issuing from this range, there is a low clay one, which connecting behind Winchelsea and Rye, forms Playdon Height, and crossing the Isle of Oxney, behind Appledore, bounds Romney Marsh, and extends by Bilsington, Aldington, Lynn, Hythe, to Sandgate Castle, near Folkstone. The south face of this range is abrupt, and to the north the general face of the ground is gradual and easy towards Ashford.

4th. The South Downs, or range, extends beyond Beachy Head, by Longbridge, Lewes, Beeding Bridge, Steyning, Houghton Bridge, Cocking, Maple Durham, into Hampshire. It consists entirely of chalk, is

universally high and abrupt facing to the north, and slopes gently and gradually towards the Channel where the coast is low, except from Beachy Head to Brighton.

Between the South Downs and the clay range lies the low, deep, and woody country of the Wealds of Sussex, terminated at the sea by Pevensey Level; and between the clay range and the midland range lies a similar country called the Wealds of Kent, terminated in the same manner by Romney Level. These wealds were formerly held as impassable for six months in the year, and though most of the cross-roads are so still, yet the great and some of the collateral routes, are not inferior to those of other countries.

It is a remarkable circumstance that a continuation of all these ridges is to be found on the opposite shore of the Channel, from whence they pursue a similar direction into France.

Annexed, on opposite pages, are a few relative circumstances that would attend the movements and positions of two armies, the one (marked A*) pursuing its progress, the other (marked* B*) opposing it.*

A.

1. An army, provided as we have supposed, landed on an hostile shore, and meeting with a certain degree of opposition, would not be inclined to attempt at once a rapid advance through an intricate country towards its great and ultimate, but distant object. Nor could it possibly execute it under the wants it must feel. It would first endeavour to seize and occupy such a district of country as might considerably lessen these wants, and it would expect the possibility of receiving farther reinforcements before it proceeded.

2. It seems evident that the enemy's most desirable prospects and advantages begin from the east of Kent, and diminish in proportion as they are obliged to land to the westward. We have already observed the little probability of their attempting

Annexed, on opposite pages, are a few relative circumstances that would attend the movements and positions of two armies, the one (marked A) *pursuing its progress, the other (marked* B) *opposing it.*

B.

1. From the moment of the most distant appearance of the enemy every interior spring is put in motion; intelligence is quickly circulated, and every one should know the part to take.

Removals from the vicinity of his attack take place. Troops move to oppose his descent, and more distant ones to sustain them. Whatever belongs to Dover Castle, enters or remains behind it. He is supposed to accomplish his landing with or without loss. All the batteries and guns in his neighbourhood, that must fall or cannot be employed against him, are in due time to be destroyed.

The troops continue to assemble in the first and nearest favourable position to oppose his progress, detach parties to watch and harass him, and use every exertion in protecting and driving the country.

2. Whether the enemy can land between Whitstable and Deal, or between Folkstone and Dungeness, we have presumed that his future line of operation will be the same, and that he will begin by seizing upon East Kent. The force he will find

or effecting a descent between Whitstable and Deal, while we are fully guarded and possessed of the Downs; (nor do we suppose there can be a possibility of his surprising and maintaining that anchorage by any force he can send from Flushing). Could he accomplish this with a large force, he would immediately seize Canterbury, the key of the country; he would possess Ramsgate and the whole coast to Folkstone and Hythe (except Dover Castle and Sandown); and if he found the heavy guns in that space not effectually spiked, he might turn them upon and dislodge our shipping from the Downs. He would endeavour to occupy and fortify Boughton Hill and woods, secure the gorge of the way leading to Ashford; communicate by posts along the top of the chalk range to Folkstone, where, and upon the heights above Hythe, he would strongly intrench himself, and consider this as his nearest and best communication with France, although on the open beach. In this situation he might expect reinforcements; and within the tract of country which he then enclosed, he might find very great resources and supplies of all kinds, perhaps sufficient to facilitate his farther progress.

3. In this state of things, the importance of Dover and Sandown Castles exceed calculation. They are well fortified, should be well provided, well commanded, and not liable to be taken by assault.

B.

in that country will not be sufficient to stop his progress, and to cover Canterbury until reinforcements come up. It must take care not to be encircled by the enemy. It must take post on Boughton Hill, on the left towards Whitstable, and on the right towards Chatham and Chilham, and also maintain the post at Ashford, destroy all the roads in its front, and on each flank, that it may be turned with the more difficulty; embarrass as much of the road as possible between Canterbury and Ashford, and, in short, endeavour to strengthen and make this a tenable post, if troops sufficient arrive in time to maintain it; and by these means it will considerably check the progress of the enemy.

3. The possession by an enemy of Dover Castle, of the opposite intrenched height, and of the town and port, fortified in the manner that he would soon accomplish, and defended by six or seven thousand

A.

Without Dover Castle the enemy can have no certain communication; and always supposing that on our shore he finds no means of advancing his purpose, the bringing up and placing sufficient artillery to reduce it is a work of slow process, and would give time to relieve it; whether he remained in East Kent, and made that his chief object, or found himself sufficiently strong to press on to the Medway, and there wait the result, if in the meantime he could depend on subsisting in the country.

4. Supposing him to leave Dover Castle behind him; that he had in some degree overcome his first difficulties, and at the end of six days was ready to move forwards—when he advanced (after leaving at least five thousand men behind him, strongly intrenched over Folkstone and Hythe, keeping Dover Castle in check, and scouring the country by detachments), he would advance in two columns; one along the great road by Faversham and Sittingbourne, upon Chatham; the other along the south edge of the chalk range (which is high and abrupt on his left), and by a route to be opened for this purpose. These columns would not be above four or five miles asunder, and connected by light troops and intermediate bodies. Their flanks would be well protected, one by the abrupt descent of the hills, the ther by the sea. The country is plentiful, the

men, would establish a sure communication with France, and would not easily be wrested from his hands. The conquest of this alone would be to him a sufficient object, could he arrive with the means of attacking it immediately. Its preservation is to us most important; and the destruction or removal of the heavy guns at Archcliffe Fort, or at other contiguous places, that could by any means be transported to annoy the castle, must in due time be provided for.

4. From Canterbury, the enemy's first step towards farther progress must be the acquiring possession of Boughton Hill, and the post connected with it. The degree of resistance that could here be made, would depend on the time elapsed since his landing, and the degree of reinforcement to us that would have arrived at Faversham; for to that place, and to Maidstone and Chatham, must every aid have been directed.

Boughton Hill, well fortified, and with sufficient numbers to defend it, certainly offers a post of great strength and importance, as obstructing the prior usual passage from East Kent, along the high ground, for the enemy would not choose the low road, by Ashford and Lenham, at the foot of the chalk hills, and exposed on their left flank.

If obliged to retire before the enemy, there is a

A.

towns and villages frequent and good. Whatever opposition is made must be forced, before possession is obtained of Rochester and Chatham.

5. Chatham is of great importance, and if the delay the enemy had made before his arrival near that place had allowed the strength of the country

B.

favourable position for equal troops between Faversham and Throwley, with a corps to the right on the edge of the chalk hills, and communicating with Ashford. Behind this position there is sufficient water. About a mile farther back there is another good position, nearly parallel, the left before Judd's Place and behind Faversham. The water is before it and a great deal of wood in its rear. The most remarkable position is behind the road which leads from Sittingbourne to Deptling and Maidstone. This road follows a hollow to Deptling. There is much wood on each side of it, particularly to the eastward.

No other remarkable general position occurs between this and Chatham; but on the routes from Boughton, many intermediate woods, risings, and hollows afford stations where the advance of an enemy may be checked, and any degree of resistance made.

If any of these general positions are occupied, and to be held, not only every field defence, of which time will allow, should be made, but routes should be opened for leaving them with the greatest quickness, if necessary, and the hedges in front opened in every direction to allow of the action of cavalry.

5. The loss of Chatham and Rochester would be of the greatest consequence, and could they be preserved and covered by a sufficient force, the enemy

A.

to be so generally collected as that too much would not be endangered for its preservation, it would be well worth some risk; but at any rate such a look-out should be kept, and previous dispositions ascertained, that from the moment of the enemy's landing, everything valuable should be removed at least to Sheerness or across the river, in order that he might find nothing of any consequence, but empty buildings, which in such a situation it is most probable he would not be tempted to destroy.

6. As the Medway at Chatham presents an impassable barrier, the enemy would there be obliged to turn ,to his left towards Maidstone, to endeavour at that place to cross the river; but as he would find it deep and considerable, and as a very large force would be assembled to oppose him, he would find it a matter of great difficulty, which, however, we shall suppose he surmounts, and remains master of the passage.

would soon find himself in great difficulties. This, it is supposed, might be done by 30,000 men, were the situations previously prepared and fortified. But should it be necessary to give up Chatham, after providing for the defence of Rochester Bridge and the opposite side of the Medway, the army would move upon Maidstone, occupying a camp fortified and covering that town; and connected with a corps on Coxheath.

Sheerness and Upnor Castle would remain in our possession, as well as Fort Amherst, in Chatham Lines, which ought not to be taken without a regular operation, and ought to be well provided accordingly. Rochester Castle also ought to be put in a certain state of defence, so as to command the bridge, and at least to retard the enemy.

6. The preservation of Maidstone as long as possible, is a point of great importance, for were the enemy master of that side of the Medway, as high as Coxheath, he would necessarily possess so great an extent of country in his rear, and so safe a communication with East Kent, that he could probably subsist at ease, and at leisure determine on his farther operations, whether solidly to establish himself in that district, or to pursue his progress to the capital. In the latter case, he would still have the passage of the Medway to surmount, an operation which ought not to be easily effected.

A.

7. Although master of the east bank of the river, he would find great difficulty, owing to the intricacy of the country, in moving down the other bank and attempting to regain the great road at Stroud, and to open a communication with Chatham; nor need any corps be afraid of acting on this line, and on his exposed flank, as, with tolerable care, their falling back might be ensured, and at any rate a retreat by the Isle of Grain and by boats to Sheerness, would remain open to them.

If the enemy has been able to command and keep up a communication with the coast of East Kent, he must have received reinforcements; and if he leaves a body at Chatham sufficient to secure the passage of the Medway, his advancing force must certainly be reduced at the time when opposition to him is greatly on the increase.

8. From Stroud, the enemy, in advancing by the great route to London, besides having his left flank always exposed, will have to surmount whatever difficulties are presented to him in front; in the route to Gravesend, where he may interrupt for the first time the navigation of the river; about Gravesend, where there are several favourable points and ground advantageous to cavalry; in the position and defence of the Darent River; in the position behind the Cray, extending by Chiselhurst to Bromley; in the position from Plumstead to Shooter's

B.

7. As the increase of our force must now be great, considerable though not decisive actions would most probably take place on the one side or other of Maidstone. In proceeding down the west bank of the river to gain possession of Stroud and of Rochester Bridge, the enemy would be opposed at the ascent of the chalk hills, and at several strong ravines which terminate on the river, and his left flank would be liable to attack.

A mile behind Stroud there is a strong ground which communicates with Cobham Park, and which the great road crosses.

8. Between Stroud and Dartford there are several considerable ravines, woods, and partial positions, which cross the great road, and where great opposition may be made.

At Gravesend and Northfleet there is a considerable extent of country, where the fields are very large, without wood, and not unfavourable for cavalry. Dartford Brent overlooks the town of Dartford; but the course of the river Dart is a marked and defensible line in the country.

Behind the Cray River to Foot's Cray, and from

A.

Hill, Eltham, &c., which still covers Woolwich; about Blackheath and Greenwich, strongly intrenched; and, lastly, in the great position which covers the capital from Deptford to Sydenham, Norwood, Streatham, Tooting, and Wandsworth.

If from Maidstone the enemy takes his route more to the left, either by Wrotham, Farningham, and Foot's Cray, or by Sevenoaks, Farnborough, and Bromley, or by both routes, he will meet with the same chalk range, the same woody and intricate country, and the same general positions to surmount, he will have both the flanks of his march exposed as well as his rear, for he can hardly be supposed in such strength, as during the progress of so many miles to have left behind him corps sufficient to keep up and ensure a communication with the other side of the Medway.

Although the enemy's general direction is supposed along one great route, yet he may open parallel communications for the march, in more than one column.

Unless he is in very great strength, his attempting to advance on two or more great routes distant from one another, and so ill connected, would be hazardous in the extreme, and give us every advantage in attacking his divided force; at the same time, unless he can command and carry

B.

thence to Chiselhurst and Bromley, is a sloping country, a marked position, and in many parts of it strong and advantageous. Bromley stands on a prominent and bold point, and communicates with a remarkable ridge of hills, which, passing behind Hayes and before Wickham, proceeds by Addington to Addington Hills and to Croydon, where it meets an open and extensive country towards Epsom, highly favourable to the operations of cavalry.

The whole of this line facing to the south presents a respectable barrier against an enemy coming from that quarter, and here or on the Darent an important stand must certainly be made, otherwise Woolwich dock and arsenal become exposed.

Behind the left of this position, but retired some miles, Shooter's Hill, extending to Plumstead on the left, and to Eltham on the right, still covers Woolwich, and affords a very good position, if it can be well supported on the right, otherwise, if turned by a superior enemy, there would be great danger of the retreat of the troops to Blackheath being cut off, and it must be considered as the position of a great corps covering Woolwich, and detached and supported from the principal army occupying the Norwood Hills, with which it communicates.

A.

on an extensive front, as well as preserve a communication with the rear, it seems impossible for him to exist during the time that must be necessary to surmount so many local and prepared obstacles.

On the whole of their routes through the chalk countries there is a great want of water, which must materially affect and determine the movements and positions of both armies, and in general is in favour of the advancing one.

9. If the enemy has been suffered or found means to advance thus far, and to possess Shooter's Hill and Bromley, he cannot be in a situation to hesitate or delay making his last great effort to gain the capital, by forcing the positions which surround it, and first of all the posts of Blackheath and Greenwich, which must be maintained to the last extremity.

This position is divided into three different parts. 1st. From Deptford to the south point of Norwood, six miles in extent. 2nd. From that point to Streatham, three miles. 3rd. From Streatham to Battersea or Wandsworth, four miles. To attack either of the two last would require a great movement to his left round by Croydon and Mitcham. Nor can his force be supposed sufficient to attack any one part, and at the same time to give effectual check to the

B.

9. The great line of defence which, on the side of the river, encompasses the capital, and is a most respectable and important one, is that which, beginning at Deptford, follows the heights behind the Ravensbourne to Sydenham, and from thence skirts Norwood round its south point to Streatham. The whole of this line is strong, high, and commanding, and itself nowhere commanded. From Streatham the ground falls in a more gradual but still commanding slope quite to the Thames, and in two branches, the inner one in front of Clapham to Battersea, the outer one through Tooting to Wandsworth. All the roads which lead from any point of the coast between the Thames and Portsmouth cross this line. Seven or eight field-forts (such as may be thrown up in a few days) erected at the several principal and prominent points, to serve as

A.

other two parts of the position. They could therefore mutually support each other.

The great object, therefore, would be to prepare measures for attacking him while he was meditating or endeavouring to effect his purpose, nor could the event be doubtful from the numbers, experience, and spirit with which we could now act.

B.

points of *appui* to the positions necessary to be taken, would give it great strength; and in this situation the enemy might be awaited, or from this he may be attacked.

Supplementary Observations.

The point of Blackheath over Greenwich must be considered as the principal outwork of London. A large intrenchment should encompass it, and it should be maintained to the last extremity, which its communication with Deptford will permit.

Shooter's Hill, Bromley, Combhurst before Croydon, a detached hill between Croydon and Streatham, and Wimbledon Hill may be considered as the more advanced posts, and if, when the necessity may seem more apparent, they were strengthened with capacious field-works, they would give great aid to the operations of an army.

Batteries on the Isle of Dogs would effectually protect Greenwich, Deptford, and the left of the position. Much time must have elapsed before an enemy could have arrived in its front. The powers of the capital may have been exerted in fortifying it to any required extent. The troops of the coast, those of the different districts, and those of the interior country, must have assembled round the capital, amounting to any number that might be wished for, or thought necessary. These of all descriptions would be arranged and distributed to their posts—whether firelock men, swordmen, pikemen, or with whatever arms they might appear, for spirit and bravery will give effect to every weapon in

an attack of such importance. But it would not be meant under any circumstances to confine our force within the circuit of this position. On the contrary, whatever corps or army had acted on our right, would be increased as much as possible. Its detachments would extend to the Crays and Dartford. Its general position would be considered from Beckenham to Wickham, and along the Addington Hills towards Croydon. The advantageous fall of the ground, and the large commons in that neighbourhood, of Bromley, Hayes, Addington, Croydon, Mitcham, as well as the extensive and open down country, between Croydon and Epsom, so favourable for our numerous cavalry, would make it impossible for an enemy to turn this way.

From the south part of Norwood to Croydon is about two miles. This space offers an advantageous position, and has the open down country on its right to ensure it from being turned.

The destination of this corps of chosen troops would, therefore, be to extend on the enemy's rear and flank, and in the nearest and most advantageous situation, to watch and circumscribe his movements, till the favourable opportunity of a general attack offered itself, in conjunction with the other parts of our great position.

In the foregoing state of things, every possible advantage has been allowed to the enemy.

He has been supposed landed without material loss, provided with a sufficiency of horses for some cavalry, and to transport ammunition and artillery in a considerable proportion: for seventy miles he has advanced through a most difficult country, forced the passage of a great river, kept up a communication with his point of landing, and at last with 35,000 men arrived near the capital, determined and impelled to risk everything in a last great effort.

To effect this, he must have landed with 30,000 men and 1000 horses; by reinforcements he must have increased them with 25,000 more (for less than 20,000 could not secure the communications behind him); he must have collected at least 3000 horses in the country, a moderate number indeed for the absolute necessities of such an army; he must have been able to subsist solely on the country, which, according to our calculation, ought not to happen. This he must have done, besides incurring great risk in crossing the sea, against opposition to his descent and to his progress; against precautions taken to remove beyond his reach everything which might be useful to him (precautions above all others most important); against a force constantly accumulating, and at all times superior in cavalry and artillery, well supplied with everything from the rear, and only

giving way at first in order to return and strike with more experience and vigour.

This force, in the last stage of things, after providing for probable distant defence, and without calculating upon the numbers and assistance which in that case would issue from the capital, may be rated at 20,000, acting on the communications of the enemy, and 60,000 more immediately in their front, all good and determined men, fighting for everything they can hold honourable and dear, against an enemy whose professed design is rapine, plunder, and the ruin of their country.

But instead of this shaded side, there is still the brighter side of the prospect. An enemy intending his descent at one advantageous point, and obliged to accomplish it at several others, perhaps distant and unconnected, may find himself after having experienced considerable loss at sea, and some by land from the opposition made to him, with his vessels cut off from their return, and himself left fatigued and distressed on such a beach as Dungeness, not without provisions or artillery, but without the means of transporting them or connecting with the rest of his embarkation, the roads surrounding him bad or broken up, the passes to a degree guarded, and the country deserted and driven, particularly the horses. The greater his force is, the greater his difficulty to move forwards, whether he has to follow a navigable river,

one side only of which he can command, or to skirt the coast, supposing his vessels could accompany him.

But if he has to penetrate by marches through a strong and defensible country (where he must meet with great opposition), to an object which is very distant indeed, his progress should be impracticable. Men loaded with ammunition and six days' provisions, and experiencing resistance at every step, must fail on a route that produces nothing, and must give up the project and endeavour to canton themselves in some corner of the province, and wait an attack, or surrender on the best capitulation they can procure.

This is at least as probable a state of the case as the other, and with the energy and spirit of an united people, may once more be verified. For, though on the continent there have been frequent instances of quick and successful progress made by armies starting from the frontier, with magazines and communications behind them, and fully equipped with all the requisites for a fortunate campaign; yet in naval expeditions, owing to their peculiar difficulties, a failure has often attended them, even when their object was a partial one, and not far from the shore; but when their object was the conquest of a great country, they have always miscarried, if the opinion, spirit, and indignation of that country were raised against the invaders.

Having set forth the peculiar circumstances attending the progress and opposition of an enemy acting on what is regarded as the most advantageous line to him, and the most important to us, it remains generally to state the occurrences that may arise from his landing at other points of the southern district, and from pursuing the routes that lead from the coast to the capital.

We have seen the difficulties and consequences attending a descent on the eastern extremity of Kent, and that the nature of the coast from the Downs to Folkstone forbids it in that quarter. From Folkstone to three miles beyond Hythe, the shore continues to be defended by batteries; but from thence to Dungeness, and round to Rye Harbour, there is an extensive and accessible beach for twenty miles, defended by nothing but the batteries at Dungeness Point, close to which ships of any burthen can approach, and which cannot be maintained from the instant an enemy gains the shore.

The space of twenty miles, therefore, which forms the sea-side of Romney Marsh, offers the opportunity of descent, with the probability of little opposition, from the nature of the country which it encompasses, and from the distance at which the troops are unavoidably placed. These circumstances also operate against the enemy, for, when landed, they would find the country without wood, and afford-

ing no considerable cover. They could not advance in front across the marshes, but would be obliged to move to their left along the shore and shingle, or by New Romney and Brookland, according to which side they landed on, to endeavour to gain Rye, where they ought to be opposed on Playdon Heights, at the passage of the river Rother; or they might go to their right by New Romney and Dymchurch, towards Hythe. In both cases, it is impossible they could yet acquire a single horse in the country, and must depend on those they brought with them, and their own exertions, over deep shingle and bad roads and having at the same time to transport artillery, ammunition, &c.

If the enemy turns towards Rye, he must from thence proceed by the same routes as if he landed at that place, and would endeavour to secure Rye Harbour for his communication with France. If towards Hythe, he would from thence have the choice of a good road towards Ashford, through a strong country, and about half-way to that town there is a very defensible position at Braebourn Lees; but as this route presents no considerable object, it is thought he would rather aim at advancing from Hythe and Folkstone upon Canterbury, and gaining possession of East Kent.

From Hythe there are two passable country roads that lead to Canterbury; the left one is an old

Roman road called Stone Street, the right by Elham to Barham; both crossing much wood and ravine. But the principal and best road is a turnpike one through Folkstone to Barham Downs, where it joins the road between Dover and Canterbury.

The clay hills over Hythe and Sandgate, and the steep of the chalk range from Folkstone towards Wye are defensible, besides many inferior positions. An enemy arriving at Hythe could hardly be supposed to feel himself in a situation to attempt a rapid march upon Ashford and Faversham, thereby to cut off everything that was to the eastward of that line, or from thence to move upon Maidstone or Chatham, leaving the force in East Kent behind him.

If landed about Rye, Hastings and Bexhill, his first object would be to secure Rye Harbour for his communications, and to intrench a post on Fairlight Head. Playdon Height, and Battle are positions that oppose his progress from Rye and Hastings. Behind the Rother is a strong and defensible position that bars both roads, and Silver Hill forms a part of it. At Seacock's Heath, where the Rye and Battle roads join, is a respectable and advantageous position. If the enemy turns off here by Cranbrook to Maidstone, besides the intermediate difficulties of a very woody, intricate country, he has to arrive at the position of Coxheath behind the Beult river. If he proceeds

along the great route he will be opposed behind Lamberhurst, behind the Medway at Tunbridge, on the summit of the midland ridge, on the edge of the chalk hills, and in the positions from Farnborough to the capital.

If landed near Pevensey and Eastbourne, his first operation would probably be to seize on Lewes and on Newhaven harbour as a communication, and then proceed by the easternmost road of Hailsham and Heathfield to Tunbridge, or by the road from Lewes through Maresfield and Crowborough, or by both.

If landed near Brighton and Shoreham, he would establish his communication from Newhaven and Shoreham, and advance by some of the many good roads from which he has to choose, as already pointed out.

If landed near Arundel, or between that and Chichester, the river Arun would afford him shelter, and he would advance on the roads that have been mentioned.

On all these routes through the low Wealds, there are many defensible, though not extensive, positions, that offer themselves, from one distance to another, depending on the size of the woods, the nature of the soil, and the general state of the cross-roads. But it is principally on the ascent and summit of the ranges, that advantageous positions are to be main-

tained. Of all these, it is on the defence of the various points of the midland range upon which our great reliance is to be placed; for, besides being covered by the advanced positions of the Medway and its branches, it is, in general, in itself strong, steep, wooded and well-watered, advantages which are wanting to the northern chalk range, and make the defence of its ascent from the Vale of Westerham, steep though it is, very precarious. Besides which, an enemy wishing to force it, possesses another decisive advantage, for, masters of the midland range and of that valley, they would have an excellent road along it from Maidstone to Dorking, which being parallel to the chalk range, and at a small distance from its foot, they could quickly make any movement they please to the right or left, and, undiscovered, determine their force on any point they think proper. The maintenance of this high ground is, therefore, not to be much relied on, although to be attempted.

The Medway is the most capital feature in the defence of the southern district; and is to be supported at all risks. Behind it, at Maidstone and Tunbridge, our principal force must be stationed, and from thence directed upon the attacked points.

From the want of, or great inferiority in cavalry, the enemy must wish for, and act with the greatest advantage in an enclosed country. This is the case

everywhere to the eastward of the road from Eastbourne to Tunbridge and Bromley; but to the westward of that road, an enemy must pass the open ground on the summit of the clay range, and the Downs between Guildford and Croydon, situations favourable to cavalry.

Nothing could more effectually disappoint and disconcert the project of an invading army than the driving and abandonment of the country, and the total destruction of the roads for twenty miles round whatever point he might effect his landing at, or at least for several miles on each side of the route he must pursue.

Could this be accomplished as easily as imagined, he would find himself in a desert, unable to advance, or to give the time necessary to free himself from the first embarrassment thrown in his way, and which would only be a prelude to more considerable opposition.

This alone persevered in, would stop all progress; his distresses and wants would increase in proportion to his numbers, and if his communications were interrupted by a superior naval force, he must soon be reduced to the greatest difficulties. But as this cannot be effected to the utmost of our wishes, it may be essential to point out how far the roads of the country should be destroyed so as to be disadvantageous to the enemy, and advantageous to ourselves.

It is desirable to reduce the enemy to advance on a small point to prevent him from extending his flanks, and to throw as many obstacles in the way of his progress to the front as can be devised. But to do this, it is necessary to reserve access to his flanks, to be able to follow his rear, and by opposing him in front, to have our own rear open for a speedy retreat, or for receiving supplies and reinforcements.

To combine all these circumstances will be a matter of great difficulty, and differences of opinion will prevail as to the mode of effecting them.

It is thought, however, that to destroy the communications between the various routes that lead to the capital must be to our advantage; for it will not prevent light troops from harassing the flanks of an enemy's march, and it will reduce his progress to be made on one great route (including such collateral ones, as after much delay he may be enabled to open, and which, in some parts of the country, would be attended with much difficulty), for if under such circumstances, he pressed forwards on two great routes that cannot communicate or support each other, he would give us the opportunity of attacking him with a united force.

From the time we take a position in front of the enemy, we can only destroy direct roads in proportion as we retire, but flank roads we can break up, and

by that means prevent the enemy altering his position without our permission; and this is one of the great advantages which our enclosed and intricate country affords us.

From the instant an enemy has landed, we must endeavour to determine his advance on such line as we deem most advantageous to ourselves.

If he landed in Romney Marsh, we should make such opposition, and so effectually destroy all the roads leading from Hythe to Canterbury and Ashford, and from thence forward, that he might be shut out of East Kent, and obliged to take the route of Rye.

From Rye he should have no option but the road to Tunbridge, and should be disabled from going to the right towards Maidstone; or if it should be determined to bar up the route by Lamberhurst and Wadhurst towards Tunbridge and force him to go on to Maidstone, he would have the difficult country of the Kentish Wealds to cross, the strong post of Coxheath to master, and the passage of the Medway to make, where it becomes considerable.

From Eastbourne or Brighton, it would not be easy to confine him to any one route, as there are so many good and contiguous ones, with frequent com-

munications; but it should be our object to press him to the westward, as these routes, in their progress to the capital, pass over much open and favourable ground.

In this manner may the enemy be successfully opposed; and if we profit from the many and singular advantages we possess, and exert that spirit and vigour which become a great and a free people, fighting for their laws, their existence, and everything that is most dear to them, against an enemy, envious of their happiness, and bent on their destruction, there can be no doubt of an honourable and glorious termination of the contest.

GENERAL SKETCHES, &c.

General sketch of an arrangement for driving back and carrying off as much as possible of the produce of the coast in the southern district (which comprises the counties of Kent, Sussex, and part of Surrey), towards the places indicated as depôts and as advanced magazines, in the event of an army attempting a descent upon the coast of this district; together with some general observations on the local advantages of the district, and the positions it affords for an army employed in its defence.

COAST OF EAST KENT.

AUGUSTINE LATHE.

August 20, 1796.

The produce of this lathe should be ordered back and formed into a depôt behind the river Medway on Barming, East Malling, and other commons near Maidstone, or upon Coxheath, leaving at Harbledown such a magazine only as may be necessary for the more immediate use of the army in that neighbourhood (which magazine must be occasionally supplied from the grand depôt). The open grounds beyond the Medway are not well supplied with water, and the river is brackish a considerable way up. On these accounts, this station will probably not be deemed well adapted for the reception of large quantities of cattle. Part of them may be carried farther back to Dartford and Bexley Heaths to graze on the Darent and Cray.

SHEPWAY LATHE.

The produce of the east division of this lathe contained in the six hundreds of Loningborough Head, Stowting, Street, and Bircholt, should also form part of the depôt near Maidstone, a magazine being left at Ashford, or rather at Kennington Lees,

similar to that recommended for Harbledown. The produce of the remainder of this lathe should likewise be carried back to the depôt near Maidstone, together with such part of the produce of

SCRAY LATHE

as it may be found expedient to remove; magazines similar to those recommended for Ashford and Harbledown being formed at Cranbrook and Smarden.

COAST OF SUSSEX.

HASTINGS AND PEVENSEY RAPES.

The produce of Hastings and Pevensey rapes to be removed to Waterdown Forest, or behind the Medway near Tunbridge. The latter is the strongest position, on account of the river being in its front; but owing to the country being much enclosed, it is not in other respects so well adapted for the formation of a considerable depôt.

The forage magazine may, for still greater security, be formed on Ide Hill, or Sevenoaks Common, both on the summit of the interior range of chalk hills; a small magazine for the more immediate use of the army being formed at Hurst Green, behind the Rother, from the produce of Hastings rape, and another at Uckfield, from the produce of Pevensey

rape, both to be occasionally supplied from the depôt in the neighbourhood of Tunbridge.

LEWES AND BRAMBER RAPES.

The produce of Lewes rape may be ordered back by the way of Reigate to Box Hill, and Headley Common, east of the Mole, and the produce of Bramber rape, by the way of Dorking to Ranmer Common west of that river, both on the summit of the north range of the chalk hills. The necessary magazines for the immediate supply of the army being formed from the former at Cuckfield, and from the latter at East Grinstead, which may be occasionally replenished from their respective grand depôts at Box Hill and Ranmer Common.

ARUNDEL RAPE.

The produce of Arundel rape may be sent back to Netley Heath, Clandon, and Merrow Downs on the summit of the north range between Guildford and Dorking, leaving on the heights above Petworth the necessary magazine for immediate supply.

CHICHESTER RAPE.

The produce of this rape may be directed by way of Haslemere, and Liphook to Romping Downs, beyond that part of the north range called the Sow's

Back situated between Guildford and Farnham, leaving an advanced magazine for immediate use at Eastbourne, behind the Adur near Midhurst.

General sketch of an arrangement for driving back and carrying off as much as possible of the produce of the south-west district (which comprises the counties of Hants and Dorset, and part of Wilts), towards the places indicated as depôts and advanced magazines, in the event of an enemy attempting a descent on the coast of this district; with some observations on the local advantages of the district, and the favourable positions it affords to an army employed in its defence.

HAMPSHIRE.

August, 1796.

Such part of the produce of the hundreds of Bosmore, Portsdown, and Titchfield as is deemed necessary for the maintenance of Portsmouth, should be sent into the Isle of Portsea; what is requisite should be carried into the Lines of Gosport, and the remainder, together with the produce of the hundreds of Selborne, , Alton, Mansbridge, Mainsborough, Bishop's Waltham, Micheldever, Meonstoke, Bermondspit, Fawley, , Odiham, and Bishop's

Sutton, Basingstoke, to fall back by the several routes of Winchester, Alresford, Alton, Basingstoke, and Odiham to Eversley Common, beyond Hartford Bridge, the necessary magazines for the immediate use of the army being formed on the heights near East Tistead on Prior's Down Common, between Alton and Peterhead, and on Magdelen Hill, near Winchester.

The produce of the more western hundreds of Redbridge, Barton, Stacey, Thorngate, Wherwell, Kingsomborn, Evingar, Baddlesgate, Overton to fall back on the several routes of Stockbridge, Andover, Whitchurch, Kingsclere, &c., to Greenham and Crookham Heaths, between the Kennet and Enbourne rivers near Newbury, leaving on Dunwood Hill, near Romsey, the necessary magazine for immediate use.

The produce of the four south-west hundreds of New Forest, Christchurch, Ringwood, and Fordingbridge to be moved back by way of Salisbury to the heights above Uphaven on the east and west banks of the Avon; the advanced magazine for immediate use being formed on Breamore Down, behind Fordingbridge. In this removal, might be included such part of the produce of the Isle of Wight as may not be judged necessary for the supply of the island, which, with the exception of the cattle, would be most expeditiously removed in vessels up the South-

ampton Water to disembark at Southampton, or the most convenient port above that town. The cattle to be passed over at Lymington, and the remainder of the produce to be collected in the centre of the island between Carisbrook and Newport.

DORSETSHIRE.

The produce of Dorsetshire may be directed to fall back by the several routes of Shaftesbury, Stalbridge, Sherborne, Yeovil, and Crewkerne, upon that part of the Mendip Hills above Wells and Shepton Mallet; the advance magazines for the immediate supply of the army being formed on Pimpern's Down, above Blandford.

General sketch of an arrangement for driving back and carrying off as much as possible of the produce of the western district (which comprises the counties of Devon and Cornwall and part of Somerset), towards the places indicated as depôts and advanced magazines, in the event of an enemy attempting a descent on the coast of this district; with some observations on the local advantages of the district, and the favourable positions it affords to an army employed in its defence.

DEVONSHIRE.

August, 1796.

That part of the county of Devon, east of the Exe, and the hundreds of Somerset, south of the Thone and Yeo Rivers, should have its produce removed to Poulet Hill, beyond the Parret, leaving an advanced magazine behind Chard, and another at Collumpton, with an intermediate one at Hembury Fort, beyond Honiton.

It may probably be more convenient to have Exeter supplied with the produce of some part of the county of Devon, not so easily to be carried back as that part of the hundreds east of the Exe.

The produce, therefore, of Exminster, High Tor, Teignbridge, and east part of Wonford hundreds, may be appropriated to this purpose; that of the hundreds of the more southern part of the coast —namely, of Coleridge, Stanborough, Ermington, Plympton, and Roborough, should be thrown into Plymouth for the supply of that important garrison; and the produce of Tavistock, Lyfton, West Burleigh, Crediton, and west part of Wonford hundreds, to be conducted into the strong posts on the most northerly part of Dartmoor; leaving advanced magazines at Bovey Tracey, Holme near Ashburton, and at Meavy on the Plym.

CORNWALL.

The produce of the hundred of the southernmost part of the Hundred East should be deposited on Mount Edgecumbe as a supply for that place, whose heights must be defended to the last extremity, as on the defence of them the security of Plymouth Dock depends. The remaining produce of this hundred might be moved back behind Newport and Launceston, leaving an advanced magazine at Callington. The produce of the hundred of West, and Trigg, south of the Camel, should fall back upon the northernmost part of Temple Moors, from whence, in case of necessity, the retreat may be continued by way of Launceston into the northern parts of Devonshire, as advanced magazines should be formed from this removal at, or near, St. Neots, between the rivers Fowey and Neots.

The produce of the neighbourhood of Falmouth and Penryn, should be thrown into, or under the cover of Pendennis Castle, a strong post to be defended as long as possible, and the remainder of the produce of the hundreds of Powder, Pyder, Penryn, and Pennith, might fall back behind the Camel, near Wade Bridge, and from thence, if necessary, by the several routes of Camelford, and Stratton, or Temple Moors, and Launceston, into the

northern parts of Devonshire, leaving on the heights near Bodmin, St. Michael, and Redruth, advanced magazines to be occasionally supplied from the grand depôts behind the Camel or Temple Moors.

General sketch of an arrangement for driving back and carrying off as much as possible of the produce of the eastern district (which comprises the counties of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Lincoln, Cambridge, Hertford, and Huntingdon), towards places indicated as depôts and advanced magazines, in the event of an enemy attempting a descent on the coast of this district; with some observations on the local advantages of the district, and the favourable positions it affords to an army employed in its defence.

ESSEX.

August, 1796.

The produce of the southern hundreds—namely, Becontree, Dengie, Havering, Harlow, Chafford, Dunmow, Rochford, Witham, Waltham, Thurstable, Ongar, Winstree, Chelmsford, Tendring — to be moved back to the west bank of the River Lea; the cattle and horses occupying the extent of meadows from Enfield Wash to Hertford. The forage maga-

zine to be placed on Cole Green, near the latter, in the forks of the River Lea and Maran. The advanced magazine to be formed from the produce of those hundreds for the more immediate supply of the army, would appear most advantageously posted as follows: One on Lexden Heath, near Colchester, one on the heights above Kelvedon, one on Danbury Hill, behind the Blackwater, and one on Langdon Hill.

The produce of the northern hundreds—namely, Clavering, Freshwell, Hendford, Dunmow north of the Braintree Road, Lexden—to fall back upon Haverhill and Chesterford. The cattle from thence to follow the course of the Cam and Bourn as far as may be necessary for pasturage, and the forage magazine to be formed on Gog-Magog Hills, leaving on the heights near Castle Hedingham, behind the Coln, an intermediate depôt, for the occasional supply of the advanced magazine at Lexden and Kelvedon, in case the grand depôts near Hertford and on Newmarket Heath should be at too great a distance for that purpose.

SUFFOLK AND NORFOLK.

After Ipswich, Yarmouth, Norwich, Lynn Regis, and such other places on the coast as may be deemed necessary to be defended, are sufficiently stocked from the supplies of the most contiguous hundreds,

the remainder of the produce of Suffolk and Norfolk may be driven back, the former into the Isle of Ely, behind the Great Ouse River, and the latter into that part of Wisbeach hundred, situated between the Waldersea River and Shri Drain.

Yarmouth, Norwich, and Lynn will serve as three advanced magazines for the army on the coast of Norfolk, but two more may perhaps be judged necessary between Norwich and Lynn, one of which may be on the heights south of East Reedham, the other on Lyng or Elsing Common, behind the Wensum; and as the grand depôt near Wisbeach is at too great a distance to supply with convenience the advanced magazines for the eastern part of the country, an intermediate depôt may be formed from the produce of the most eastern hundreds for the heights between Swaffham and Castle Acre behind the river Lynn.

Ipswich, already indicated as a post to be maintained, will serve as one of the advanced magazines for the coast of Suffolk; two more (if not three) may be necessary between that town and Yarmouth—namely, one at Saxtead Green, on the heights above Framlingham, one on Ditchingham Green, near Bungay, beyond the Wavency, and an intermediate one, if necessary, at Linstead Green, on the heights above Halesworth.

The distance of the grand depôt in the Isle of Ely from the coast of Suffolk may render it also expedient to have an intermediate one, for the supply of the advanced magazines of this county, formed at or near Bury St. Edmunds, or on Ixworth Heath.

General sketch of an arrangement for driving back and carrying off as much as possible of the produce of Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland, whenever the enemy may attempt a descent on the coast of the north-east district.

YORKSHIRE, EAST RIDING.

August 20, 1796

After Hull has been sufficiently stocked from the produce of Holderness, the cattle of Wapentake and of Harthill, east of York Wolds, may be driven back to Weighton, Holme Common, and Spalding Moor, behind the Wolds, and the supplies of forage formed into a depôt near Sandholme, or Gilberdike, behind the Walling Fenn, leaving an advanced magazine on the heights above Beverley, with the Hull river in front, and another near Driffield, in the skirts of the Wold.

The forage supplies of Dickering and Buckrose

Wapentakes may be conveyed by Malton, Kirkham, and Howsham Bridges across the Derwent to the heights near Castle Howard, and the cattle to occupy the right bank of the same river from the influx of the Rye to Hutton, or as much there as may be necessary for pasturage, leaving an advanced magazine on the heights above Weaverthorpe.

YORKSHIRE, NORTH RIDING.

The cattle of Ryedall and Pickering Wapentakes, with Whitby Strand, may fall back by way of Helmsley, Blackmore, to the heights on the right of the Rye River, with the forage magazine, if judged necessary, thrown still farther back behind the Codbeck River, near Thirsk, leaving an advanced magazine on the heights above Pickering behind the Costa.

The cattle of Langbaurgh Wapentake to fall back on the right bank of the Wisk, behind Northallerton, with the forage magazine on Yafforth Moor; or the whole still farther back behind the Swale with the forage magazine on Morton Flat, upon the road to Bedale, having left an advanced magazine on the heights near Middleton, on the left of the Leavan.

DURHAM.

The cattle of Stockton Ward, and such part of

Map of the Seat of War
FLANDERS
During the Campaign of 1793-4.

Darlington as may be necessary to move, may be driven back by the route of Bishop's Auckland upon Thornby Common behind the Wear near Walsingham; and their supplies of forage deposited on Dodd Hill, or behind the Wescrow River, at or near the same town, leaving one advanced magazine at Stockton and another at Hardwick Park behind Sedgefield.

The supplies of Easington Ward, and the eastern parts of Chester, to fall back upon Muggleswick Common, after leaving at Durham and Gateshead, a sufficient stock for their maintenance, which may at the same time serve as advanced magazines for the army.

NORTHUMBERLAND.

After Newcastle has received the supplies necessary for its maintenance, the remainder of the produce of Castle Ward, and Bedlington-shire, might be ordered by way of Chollerton Bridge behind the north Tyne, and the forage depôt formed on the heights above Warden, in the forks of the north and south Tyne, leaving an advanced magazine at Ponteland, behind the Blythe River.

The produce of Morpeth Ward, and eastern parts of Coquet Dale Ward, to be directed back by way of Elsdon, behind the Reed River, leaving one advanced magazine at Hartburn, behind the Hart above Morpeth, and another at Rothbury.

The cattle of Bamburgh Ward, and that part of Glendale Ward, east of the Till, to be driven by the several bridges across that river to the left bank thereof, and the supplies of forage conveyed to Yetholm, and formed into a depôt on the left bank of the Beaumont River, leaving advanced magazines at Brandon Waller and Tilmouth, all behind the river Till.

THE END.

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MAP OF THE SEAT OF WAR
IN
HOLLAND
During the Campaign of 1793-4
NORTH SEA

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